Madhya Pradesh High Court
Icici Lombard General Insurance Co.Ltd ... vs Ishwarlal on 24 March, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:7781
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA
ON THE 24th OF MARCH, 2025
MISC. APPEAL No. 2549 of 2025
ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE CO.LTD THROUGH ITS
BRANCH MANAGER
Versus
ISHWARLAL AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Kunal Jain, Advocate on behalf of Shri Manoj Jain, learned
counsel for the appellant/insurance company is present.
ORDER
Learned counsel for the appellant / insurance company has filed this
miscellaneous appeal against the award passed by learned Claims Tribunal
dated 01.03.2023 with delay of 658 days and filed application i.e. I.A.
No.2672/2025 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that copy of the award was
sent to the Head Office of Insurance Company for permission to file an
appeal against the award but the said permission could not be received in
time and, as and when the permission was received from the Head Office,
filed this appeal with delay of 658 days and supported by an affidavit and
nothing to say anything except the facts stated in the application. Further
stated that the delay may be condoned and appeal may be admitted.
3. On perusal of the application, it is found that the delay has not been
properly explained except mentioning that time was taken in getting
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permission to file appeal from the Head Office and as soon as he obtained,
he filed the appeal.
4. The explanation submitted by the appellant/insurance company is not at
all appropriate in view of the judgments of the Apex Court. T h e Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Chief Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media
India Limited and Another (2012) 3 SCC 563 observed as under:-
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well
aware or conversant with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of
filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when the Department
was possessed with competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a
wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has
to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view
that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentality that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was
bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation
that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The
government departments are under a special obligation to ensure
that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law
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shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled
for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation
offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of
various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably
failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to
be dismissed on the ground of delay."
The Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the issue of condonation of
delay in the following judgements:
(I) In Allala Bhagvanth Rao vs. Garvandula Vijayalaxmi and Others
reported in 2016 (4) ALT 43 in paras-12 to 15 held as follows:-
12. The word 'sufficient cause' is not defined either in the
Limitation Act or in the C.P.C.; the reason appears to be that there
is no straight jacket formula to decide whether the cause shown
for condonation of delay is sufficient cause or not. Depending on
the facts and circumstances of each case, the Court can exercise
discretion and decide the sufficient cause. Sufficient cause shall be
construed liberally without adopting any pedantic approach. It
cannot be stretched to frustrate the very intention of Legislature in
specifying the period for filing appeal or petition etc.
13. In Lanka Venkateswarlu (Died) by L.Rs.v.State of A.P.,
(2011) 1 UPLJ 242 (SC), the apex Court heavily laid on the Courts
when to allow the petitions, though no sufficient cause is made
out, and ruled as follows: "We are at a loss to fathom any logic or
rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone
the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts
such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach",
"substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial
law of limitation, especially in cases where the Court concludes
that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the
approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of
judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to
maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are
rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the
use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to
blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or
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extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly
disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst
considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5
of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and
unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers,
especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable
bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a
systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies;
prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of
exercising discretionary powers."
"14. In fact, the petitioner did not make out any sufficient cause
except making a bald unsubstantiated allegation in the affidavit If
such lame excuses for condoning the delay are accepted as
sufficient causes, virtually denuding or jettisoning the substantive
law of limitation.
15. In view of the law declared by the apex Court basing on the
concept of real justice, substantial justice the Courts cannot allow
petitions under Section 5 of Limitation Act, when no sufficient
cause is made out. Therefore, basing on lame excuse or
unsubstantiated cause, it is difficult to condone the delay, liberally
construing the word sufficient cause."
(II) In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the Hon'ble Apex Court
broadly culled out the following principles:
i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-
pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper
spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that
these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper
perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical
considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for
emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel
or litigant is to be taken note of.
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v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of
delay is a significant and relevant fact.
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not
affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts
are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is
no real failure of justice.
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally
unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of
short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice
is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart,
the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a
liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its
inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a
total go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in
the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to
expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud,
misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and
the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial
discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a
collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines
taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with
careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the
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notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the
bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is
seminal to justice dispensation system.
b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt
with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy
which is basically subjective.
c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had
to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for
achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system
should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a nonserious
matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
non-challan manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal
parameters.
(III) In Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao Vs. Reddy Sridevi and
others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260, the Hon'ble Apex Court
observed:-
"17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.
[(1962 2 SCR 762] (supra), it is observed and held as under:--
In construing s.5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the
period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a
right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding
between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation
prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit
under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge,
and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by
lapse of time should not be light- heartedly disturbed. The other
consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause
for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to
condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been
deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power
and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance
substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High
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Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, "s. 5
gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to
be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion
ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood;
the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as
to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor
want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant."
18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556],
while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence
of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking
condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further
observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has
to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have
no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further
observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to
exercise discretion judiciously.
19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium
Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448], it is observed as under:--
"The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of
limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace". An
unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and
uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order.
The principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit
finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there
should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation
are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury,
quickening diligence and 8 preventing oppression. The object for
fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a
lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They
are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but
avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence
states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not
of the sleepy."
20. In the case of Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81], it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the
delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each
case. It is further observed that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be
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liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to
the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect
rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by
statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of
bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for
condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each
application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid
down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay
where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would
amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to
legislature."
(IV) In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan,
Mumbai reported in (2012) 5 SCC 157, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as
under:
"What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and
justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise
of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar
statues, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the
successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the
judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various
stages of litigation apart from the costs.
What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the
factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide
nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no
negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the
delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If,
on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found
to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his
cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to
condone the delay."
Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for
condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that
certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly,
reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the
delay of more than seven years."
(V) In Kilaru Appa Rao Vs. Sunku Prathapa Reddy reported in 2022
(6) ALT 288 (TS), the Hon'ble Court observed:-
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"11. The dictum of law is that the delay if inordinate, should not be
condoned by adopting casual or liberal approach. Courts are not
expected to condone the delay in the following circumstances:-
"1. When the reason urged is found to be concocted.
2. When the party who seeks for condonation of delay is found to
be thoroughly negligent.
3. In case condonation of inordinate delay leads to substantial
injustice to the opposite party due to the subsequent events.
4. The inordinate delay, if condoned, results in unending
uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The list is illustrative and
not exhaustive."
5. A conspectus of above the judgments referred to Supra, the Hon'ble
Apex Court observed that length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the
explanation is the only criterion. It was further held that the primary function
of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance
substantial justice. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of
parties and they are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics,
but seek their remedy promptly. The Hon'ble Apex Court also cautioned that
if the delay is occasioned by party deliberately to gain time then the Court
should lean against acceptance of the explanation. The explanation should
not be fanciful and concocted. The Courts while dealing with an application
to condone delay should keep in mind the right accrued to other side and
should deal with such application with utmost care.
6. As per the expressions of Hon'ble Apex Court, while condoning the
delay the Court must see whether the deponent explained sufficient cause.
Involving substantial rights of the parties alone is not the criteria. Unless,
sufficient cause is shown, that in case inordinate delay, condoning the delay
does not arise. The petitioner failed to show sufficient cause to condone the
delay as per the affidavit of 658 days.
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7. Accordingly, as per Hon'ble Apex Court's judgments, the delay is 658
days, this Court does not find any ground to condone the delay.
8. Thus, I.A. No.2672/2025 is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, I.A.
No.2672/2025 is dismissed. Consequently, the present Miscellaneous
Appeal also stands dismissed.
(DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA)
JUDGE
N.R.
