Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jhammulal Choudhari vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 10 March, 2025
Author: Avanindra Kumar Singh
Bench: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, Avanindra Kumar Singh
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
1 MCRC-23920-2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH
ON THE 10th OF MARCH, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 23920 of 2017
JHAMMULAL CHOUDHARI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Mohd. Irfan Rayeen - Advocate for the applicant.
Shri Ajay Tamrakar - Government Advocate for the respondents/State.
ORDER
Per: Justice Avanindra Kumar Singh
The petitioner has filed this petition seeking leave to appeal against the
judgment of acquittal passed on 23/09/2017 by the First Additional Sessions
Judge, Lakhnadoun District Seoni in Sessions Trial No. 173/2010, whereby
the respondents No.2 to 4 have been acquitted from the offence punishable
under Sections 467, 420/120-B, 167/120-B and 468/120-B of the IPC.
2. The brief facts of the case are that on 29/12/2008 the complainant
Jhammulal Choudhari filed a complaint against respondents No. 2 to 4
before the JMFC Lakhnadoun District Seoni for the registration of compliant
for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 107, 120-B, 166,
167, 420, 447, 467, 468, 463 and 489 of IPC read with Section 3(1)(v) of
Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
3. It is submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
2 MCRC-23920-2017
prosecution had proved the charges framed against the accused persons
beyond reasonable doubt.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supports the
judgment and submits that State has not filed any appeal.
5. On perusal of the record, it is seen that complainant had made a
complaint that he is the owner of land bearing Khasra No.67/2 & 67/3 area
0.049 Hectare & 0.012 Hectare and on Khasra No.67/1 area 0.008 Hectare,
the house of respondents No. 2 & 3 is situated which surrounds the whole
land of the applicant i.e. Khasra No.67/2 from the west, north and south side.
Respondents No. 2 & 3 made conspiracy with respondent No.4 who is a
Revenue Officer i.e. Patwari, he prepared a forged map in which Khasra
No.67/2 & 67/3 which belongs to the complainant was not mentioned. When
the aforesaid facts came into the knowledge, he made complaint to various
authorities but no action has been taken by the said authorities.
6. The Magistrate proceeded under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and
directed the police to file charge-sheet after due investigation, police
registered crime No.104/2009 and filed charge-sheet. Matter was committed
to the sessions trial where charges were framed. Accused persons denied the
charges and evidence was recorded. Statement of accused persons under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. were recorded wherein they denied the charges
levelled against them. After evaluating the evidence, the trial Court under the
impugned judgment acquitted the respondents of the charges levelled against
them.
7. Assailing the impugned judgment, this petition for grant of leave to
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
3 MCRC-23920-2017
appeal has been filed and grounds taken here are that there was evidence
beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence
in correct perspective and committed error in acquitting the respondents for
the alleged offence. It is further submitted that the trial Court in Para-15 of
the impugned judgment wrongly held that Missal Sheet Map (Ex.P/13) has
been prepared on the basis of Naksha Missal Sheet (Ex.P/14) by grossly
overlooking the Ex.P/13. There is no Batank and the document Ex.P/13 is of
the year 1918-19 whereas documents Ex.P/14 is of 2005-06. The trial Court
has not perused the document Ex.P/6 prepared by Ajay Shrivastava (PW-6)
on 10/06/2000 on the basis of sheet of 1988-89, Thereafter, from 12/01/2001
to 2008 respondent No.4 was In-charge Patwari and he has committed
forgery and wrongly shown the construction upon the open plot vide Ex.P/14
which was prepared on the basis of challu sheet and not on the basis of
Missal.
8. It is further stated that the trial Court failed to see Prativedan dated
12/03/2001 when respondent No.4 took charge from Ajay Shrivastava (PW-
6). The trial Court committed error of law in rejecting the application dated
26/05/2017 for taking additional documents of the case which goes to the
root of the case but fairly submitted that he did not challenge the said order
rejecting the application dated 26/05/2017 vide order dated 20/09/2015
where the Court rejected the application on the ground that these documents
were of later period. Learned counsel further submitted that the trial court in
Para-26 in the impugned judgment has held that Kummi Lal (PW-2) himself
admitted that he did not file any document of map prepared by respondent
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
4 MCRC-23920-2017
No.4.
9. Considered the arguments and perused the record.
10. In criminal trial if two views are possible and unless view of the
trial Court is perverse and the appellate Court should not interfere. The
judgment of Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in the case of State of
Gujarat vs. Koli Arjan Samat Vadher & others (Criminal Appeal No.506 of
2011) dated 06/03/2023 wherein the Hon'ble Court relied the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chaman Lal vs. The State of Himachal
Pradesh, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 988, held as under :-
"9.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189),
this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal
against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to
19, it is observed and held as under:
12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the
High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily
set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are
possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more
probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the
appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as
to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were
perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled
to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court
had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or
had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record
contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may
also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide
Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219, Shambhoo Missir v.
State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17, Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
5 MCRC-23920-2017
(2003) 1 SCC 761,
Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699, Budh Singh
v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731, State of U.P. v. Ram Veer
Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102, S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy
(2008) 5 SCC 535, Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206, Perla
Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram
Singh v. State of H.P (2010) 2 SCC 445)
13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy
Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) "... the High Court should
and will always give proper weight and consideration to such
matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of
the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he
has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the
benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in
disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the
advantage of seeing the witnesses."
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed
by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1, Balbir
Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216, M.G. Agarwal v. State
of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200, Khedu Mohton v. State of
Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450, Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5
SCC 412, Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P(2002) 4 SCC 85 and
State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755)
15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this
Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42)
"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate
court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both
on questions of fact and of law.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
6 MCRC-23920-2017
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling
reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong
circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are
not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an
appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature
of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power
of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court
reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in
dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the
accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters
the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give
due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as
the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the
demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court
again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down
that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) "20. ... an order of acquittal should not
be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
7 MCRC-23920-2017
some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused."
18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave
certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be
justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High
Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) "(i) The
High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by
ignoring the settled legal position;
(ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and
documents on record;
(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the
evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of
justice;
(iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and
unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of
the case;
(v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration
to the findings of the High Court;
(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a
case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have
recorded an order of acquittal." A similar view has been reiterated
by this Court in Dhanapal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances,
and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the
appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The
appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence
of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters
the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner
where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there
are good reasons for interference."
9.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be
perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the
aforesaid decision, which reads as under:
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
8 MCRC-23920-2017
"20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be
perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to
be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984)
4 SCC 635, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority
v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber &
Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman
Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501, Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206
and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P (2009) 10 SCC
636)." (emphasis supplied)
9.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court
in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2
SCC 10, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence
or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would
act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some
evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied
upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the
findings would not be interfered with.
9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of
Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436, this Court again had an occasion to
consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by
the High Court in an
appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions
of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is
observed and held as under:
"31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court
in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228. In the case before this
Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed
by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence
on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
9 MCRC-23920-2017
did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while
acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High
Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p.
233)
"10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of
acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire
evidence independently and come to its own conclusion.
Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the
opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after
proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be
applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made
an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching
aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case."
31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, the
High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned
trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the
entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record
its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial
court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the
conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the
order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal
of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being
satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court
was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to
interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High
Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the
High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416)
"8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain
whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned
principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded
in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v.
State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its
conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
10 MCRC-23920-2017
in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the
conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone
will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High
Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all
the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance
per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think,
not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is
considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court
which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court,
should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in
dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions
arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the
judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so
to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In
such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's
judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court
comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does
not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the
interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not
justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court
has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in
support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the
above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the
trial court in this case."
31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999) 3
SCC 309, after observing that though there is some substance in
the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons
given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this
Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the
High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions
Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the
conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
11 MCRC-23920-2017
aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the
Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material
evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore,
was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own
conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the
eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for
discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound.
This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence
made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it
was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of
acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807, in para 5, this
Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 80910) "5. It has been
argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment
of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not
have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on
behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the
judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not
correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under
Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of
acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that
order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the
High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the
entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course,
keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of
innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the
judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the
advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose
evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled
that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of
evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of
an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that
the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
12 MCRC-23920-2017
in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that
the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the
trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate
court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and
comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to
have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at
the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52; Wilayat
Khan v. State of U.P AIR 1953 SC 122) In our opinion, there is no
substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that
the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence
and coming to its own conclusions.
31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355, this
Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be
beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for
slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but
barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to
interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice
be brought to ridicule."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. On perusal of the record, it is seen that prosecution has not
examined any hand writing expert to establish that forged map was prepared
by accused persons in a conspiracy.
12. Ajudhi @ Ayodhya is a hostile witness. Jhammu Lal (PW-4) in
his cross-examination submitted that regarding land for which he filed
private complaint against accused persons. Ajay Kumar Shrivastava (PW-6)
submits that there was a spot inspection. He along with Revenue Inspector
went on the spot and memorandum and map were prepared but he did not
sign the memorandum, he only signed the map. Investigating Officer Mr.
Heeralal Dhurve (PW-7) in his cross-examination in para 3 has admitted that
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
13 MCRC-23920-2017
accused Ram Kumar Sarathe has neither prepared any map of disputed land
nor any map attached in the record. Therefore, it seems that when there was
dispute regarding falsification of revenue record, the first step which should
be taken by the aggrieved party is filing an appropriate proceeding before
Revenue Authority for correction of record and it is only when the Revenue
Authority who enquires and holds that revenue record has been altered in
illegal way then , prima facie case would be made out and who committed
the offence is a secondary part of the dispute. Direct filing of complaint
cannot be justified because unless senior officer of the Revenue Department
above the accused persons certifies that record has been altered by
fabrication, filing of criminal complaint would not give any result.
13. In the criminal Court where the charges has to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt would not be in any position to give a finding that records
have been altered illegally without proper evidence. In the statement of Ajay
Kumar Shrivastava (PW-6) and Heeralal Dhurve (PW-7), Revenue Inspector,
there is no evidence against accused persons in fact in cross-examination in
para-3. Mr. Heeralal Dhurve (PW-7) Revenue Inspector said that there is no
difference in Missal Sheet and Chalu Sheet Map and accused Ram Kumar
Sarathe has not made any map of disputed land in his hand writing.
14. Learned trial Court in over all appreciation of evidence has given
a categorically finding that charges against the accused persons are not
proved and on the basis of oral and documentary evidence it cannot be held
that appreciation is perverse.
15. In the light of evidence discussed above, the reasons assigned in
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:12221
14 MCRC-23920-2017
the impugned judgment and in light of the judgment of State of Gujarat vs.
Koli Arjan Samat Vadher (supra) , in the considered opinion of this
Court that no case is made out to interfere in the impugned judgment. Hence,
in view of facts and legal matrix discussed above, we dismiss the petition for
grant of leave to prefer appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal.
16. Accordingly, this miscellaneous criminal case stands dismissed.
17. Let a copy of this order alongwith record be sent to the trial
Court.
(SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI) (AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH)
JUDGE JUDGE
mc
