Madhya Pradesh High Court
M/S Ku Enterprises Through Director ... vs Wariz on 10 March, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 1 MP No.6700/2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA
MISC. PETITION No.6700 of 2024
M/S KU ENTERPRISES THROUGH DIRECTOR
SHRI LOKENDRA
...Petitioner
and
WARIZ AND OTHERS
...Respondents
Reserved on 14.02.2025
Pronounced on 10.03.2025
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Appearance:
Shri Nitin Phadke, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Shri Manoj Munshi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Vikram
Malviya, learned counsel for respondent No.1.
Shri Arpit Gupta, learned Panel Lawyer for respondent No.5 / State.
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ORDER
The present Misc. Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India has been preferred by petitioner, challenging the order dated
30.09.2024 in Case No.0110/Appeal/2023-24 passed by Sub-Divisional
Officer, Revenue, Juni Indore, Indore, (M.P.), whereby the Sub-Divisional
Officer dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC read with
Sections 32 and 43 of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (in short
"MPLRC").
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 2 MP No.6700/2024
02. The facts of the case as pleaded in this petition by petitioner are that
the respondent No.1 (Wariz Kasliwal) filed an appeal on 07.03.2024 under
Section 44 of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 before the Sub-
Divisional Officer, challenging the order of the Tehsildar, Indore in
Revenue Case No.2/A-27/2020-21 dated 28.07.2020, the present appeal
filed by appellant (Wariz Kasliwal) with a delay of four years. Respondent
No.1 (Wariz Kasliwal) did not add the other respondents as parties to the
proceedings, they are the parties to the proceedings before Tehsildar in
Revenue Case No.2/A-27/2020-21. Shri Ambuj Kasliwal, Shri Nitin
Kasliwal, Shri Mukul Kasliwal & Shri Vikas Kasliwal were parties before
the Tehsildar in the above case, the appellant (Shri Wariz Kasliwal) filed the
appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer against the order of Tehsildar
dated 28.07.2020 and petitioner (M/S KU Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.) was shown
as a respondent in the matter. The petitioner filed an application before the
Sub-Divisional Officer under Order VII Rule 11 CPC read with Sections 32
& 43 of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 raising objection that
the appeal is suffering from non-joinder of necessary parties and for
limitation and prays for dismissal of the appeal.
03. The respondent filed a reply to said application seeks relief that the
application submitted under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is baseless and should
be rejected. After hearing, Sub-Divisional Officer dismissed the said
application on 29.04.2024 (Annexure P-2).
04. Challenging the legality and validity of the order dated 29.04.2024
passed by Sub-Divisional Authority, petitioner (M/S KU Enterprises Pvt.
Ltd.) filed Misc. Petition bearing M.P. No.2597/2024 before this Court,
"the impugned order is set aside and the appellate Authority to redecide the
application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC read with Sections 32 and 43 of
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, along with application filed
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by respondent under Order I Rule 10 of C.P.C. and also it is open to the
petitioner to raise other objections before the learned appellate Authority
including the question of limitation." With aforesaid directions, the said
Misc. Petition was disposed of on 16.07.2024.
05. In spite of above direction, the Sub-Divisional Authority allowed
both the applications filed by respondent under Order I Rule 10 and Order
VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. Consequently, Shri Ambuj Kasliwal, Shri Nitin
Kasliwal and Shri Mukul Kasliwal were impleaded as respondents and Shri
Vikas Kasliwal was also impleaded as respondent, the objections raised by
respondent under Order VII Rule 11 CPC that the other necessary party i.e.
(Ambuj Kasliwal) was not impleaded in the appeal memo, the rejection of
the appeal was sought on the ground of non-joinder of the necessary party
i.e Shri Ambuj Kasliwal and the limitation, the appellate Authority opined
that the said objection no longer holds merit, further observed that both the
aforementioned applications pertaining to the impleadment of parties in the
present case have already been allowed and the application filed under
Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is hereby rejected on 30.09.2024 by Sub-
Divisional Authority.
06. Challenging the legality and validity of the order dated 30.09.2024 of
Sub-Divisional Authority, present Misc. Petition No.6700/2024 is being
filed on following grounds:-.
07. (i). The appeal has been filed by appellant (Wariz Kasliwal) before
the Sub-Divisional Authority with a delay of four years, challenging the
order of Tehsildar in Revenue Case No.2-A/27/2020-21 dated 28.07.2020,
further averred that while filing an application, the respondent No.1 did not
add all the necessary parties to the said appeal as they were in original
revenue case bearing No.2-A/27/2020-21, the respondent No.1 Ambuj
Kasliwal, Nitin Kasliwal, Mukul Kasliwal and Vikas Kasliwal were added
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 4 MP No.6700/2024
as the parties in the original revenue matter, the appellant No.1 filed an
appeal before the Sub-Divisional Authority, the respondent No.1 has added
only the petitioner as respondent, the petitioner filed an application before
Sub-Divisional Authority under Order VII Rule 11 CPC read with Sections
32 and 43 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 that all the
necessary parties were not added as parties to the proceedings, hence, the
present appeal filed by respondent No.1 is non-joinder of the necessary
party, therefore, the appeal pending before the Sub-Divisional Authority is
not maintainable and it has to be dismissed. The respondent filed vague
reply in the said application. After hearing, the Sub-Divisional Authority
arbitrarily and erroneously dismissed the said application and the order
passed by Sub-Divisional Officer is erroneous, against the said order, the
petitioner preferred Misc. Petition before this Court bearing No.2597/2024,
the co-ordinate Bench of this Court directed the Sub-Divisional Authority to
redecide the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC read with Sections
32 and 43 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, along with
application filed by respondent under Order I Rule 10 of CPC and the
application under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC. Further the Sub-Divisional
Authority allowed the applications and the name of Ambuj Kasliwal was
also considered by Sub-Divisional Authority, while delivering the order on
an application under Section 32 of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code,
1959 later Ambuj Kasliwal was deleted with the consent of both the parties
vide order dated 11.09.2024.
(ii). Further averred that the order of Sub-Divisional Authority dismissing
the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC was erroneous without
considering the observations made by this Court in M.P. No.2597/2024 and
in spite of direction given to the Sub-Divisional Authority to redecide the
application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC including the question of
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 5 MP No.6700/2024
limitation, without looking to the facts the Sub-Divisional Authority
dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, which causes
prejudice to the petitioner and prays to quash the order dated 30.09.2024
and appeal pending before the Sub-Divisional Authority bearing
No.0110/Appeal/2023-24 is required to be dismissed on the ground of non-
joinder of necessary party i.e. Shri Ambuj Kasliwal and the limitation for
four years for filing the appeal from the order of Tehsildar dated 28.07.2020
in spite of directions given by this Court in M.P. No.2597/2024, therefore,
application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC read with Sections 32 and 43
of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code,1959 may be allowed and set aside
the order of Sub-Divisional Authority dated 30.09.2024 and reject / dismiss
the appeal.
08. Shri Nitin Phadke, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
the appeal was filed by appellant (Wariz Kasliwal) before the Sub-
Divisional Authority after a delay of four years from the order dated
28.07.2020, allowed the application under Section 52 of the Madhya
Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 without giving an opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner. Further submitted that all the parties, who
appeared before the Tehsildar are necessary parties to the appellate
proceedings, further submitted that Sub-Divisional Authority neither
considered the delay of four years nor all the parties to the proceedings
before the Tehslidar were added as necessary parties to the appeal and
dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC in spite of
directions given by this Court in M.P. No.2597/2024 dated 16.07.2024. The
order of Sub-Divisional Authority is not sustainable and needs interference
by this Court and prays to allow the present petition.
09. Shri Manoj Munshi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Vikram
Malviya, learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the appeal was
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 6 MP No.6700/2024
filed to ascertain the ownership of subject land, the other four non-
applicants were added necessary parties to the proceedings. Further
submitted that one of the necessary party namely Shri Ambuj Kasliwal had
filed an application to be excluded from the proceedings, which was
allowed by the Sub-Divisional Authority. This omission of necessary parties
from the appeal memo is no significance to decide the appeal, as it
challenges the order of Tehsildar. Further submitted that he filed an
application under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC and Order I Rule 10 CPC to
add Shri Vikas Kasliwal as necessary party to the proceedings and allowed.
Further submitted that all the parties were joined as necessary parties to the
proceedings on the application filed by respondent under Order I Rule 10 of
C.P.C. Further submitted that the Sub-Divisional Authority allowed the
application Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C., all necessary parties have been
impleaded in the appeal. Further submitted that order of Tehsildar in
mutation in the revenue records bearing No.RCMS-2/A-27/2020-21 on
28.07.2020 has to examine by learned Appellate Authority and well-
reasoned order passed by the Sub-Divisional Authority dated 30.09.2024
and needs no interference by this Court, therefore, the petition devoid of
merits is liable to be dismissed.
10. In the light of rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties,
the points for determination arises as follows :
"(i) Whether, the impugned order dated 30.09.2024 in case
No.0110/Appeal/2023-24 by Sub-divisional Authority is
legally justified in dismissing the application filed under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC is sustainable or needs any
interference by this Court.
(ii) Whether, the appellant Wariz Kasliwal explained
the delay of filing appeal for four years from the
order dated 28.07.2020 by Tehsildar?
(iii) Whether, the order of the Sub-Divisional
Authority is sustainable in spite of specific
observations made by this Court in M.P.
No.2597/2024 dated 16.07.2024 or needs any
interference?"
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 7 MP No.6700/2024
11. Since the above points are interrelated to each other they are dealt
together.
12. The admitted facts are in either side, admittedly, M/S KU Enterprises
Pvt. Ltd. through its Director Shri Shambhu Kumar submitted the
application before the Tehsildar that the land situated at Village
Pipliyakumar in Survey Nos.62/1 to 62/5 and 63/1 to 63/5 for total extent of
4.419 hectares, which currently recorded in the revenue records in the
names of Wariz Kasliwal, Ambuj Kasliwal, Vikas Kasliwal, Nitin Kasliwal
and Mukul Kasliwal is requested to be recorded in the name of Shri
Shambhu Kumar Director of M/s. KU Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. in the revenue
records under the provisions of Indian Companies Act. Further admitted
fact that the above mentioned partnership firm, which was registered on
17.04.2001 and has submitted an application along with documents to
include the name of Shri Shambhu Kumar Director of M/S KU Enterprises
Pvt. Ltd. to approve the family division in revenue records. The Tehsildar
examined the entire case and passed the order dated 28.07.2020 stating that
"the land located at village Pipliyakumar in Survey Nos.62/1 to 62/5 and
63/1 to 63/5, the documents, patwari reports, statement of applicant i.e.
Shri Shambhu Kumar along with affidavit, the record books with consent of
co-sharers are covered under Section 178 of Madhya Pradesh Land
Revenue Code, 1959. Resultantly, ordered mutation of the said land in the
name of Shri Shambhu Kumar S/o Shankar Lal Director of M/s KU
Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. in revenue records with direction to Halka Patwari to
implement the order within three days".
13. Being aggrieved by and dis-satisfied with the order of Tehsildar, after
four years present appeal is filed by appellant (Wariz Kasliwal) before Sub-
Divisional Authority without assigning any reasons and one among them
preferred an appeal, rest of them could not file appeal in spite of directions
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 8 MP No.6700/2024
of this Court, all respondents were not added as parties to the proceedings
pending before the Sub-Divisional Authority and on the directions of this
Court in M.P. No.2597/2024 dated 16.07.2024 and application under Order
VI Rule 17 of CPC were allowed and necessary amendments made in the
application and Order I Rule 10 of CPC allowed and added some of the
necessary parties Shri Nitin Kasliwal, Shri Mukal Kasliwal and Shri Vikas
Kasliwal were added and Shri Ambuj Kasliwal was not added as party to
the appellate proceedings, in spite of the direction by this Court without
deciding the delay of filing appeal Order VII Rule 11 CPC dismissed by
Sub-Divisional Authority, which causes prejudice to the respondents (M/S
KU Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. through Director Shri Shambu Kumar).
14. Section 53 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 reads
as follows:
"53. Subject to any express provision contained in this
Code the provision of the [Indian Limitation Act,
1908] [See now the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of
1963).] (IX of 1908), shall apply to all appeals and
applications for review under this Code."
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of condonation
of delay by following judgments :
16. In Allala Bhagavanth Rao vs. Garvandula Vijayalaxmi and
others1, in paras12 to 15 held as follows:-
12. The word 'sufficient cause' is not defined either in the
Limitation Act or in the C.P.C.; the reason appears to be that there
is no straight jacket formula to decide whether the cause shown
for condonation of delay is sufficient cause or not. Depending on
the facts and circumstances of each case, the Court can exercise
discretion and decide the sufficient cause. Sufficient cause shall
be construed liberally without adopting any pedantic approach. It
cannot be stretched to frustrate the very intention of Legislature
in specifying the period for filing appeal or petition etc.
13. In Lanka Venkateswarlu (Died) by L.Rs. v. State of A.P.,
(2011) 1 UPLJ 242 (SC), the apex Court heavily laid on the
1. 2016 (4) ALT 43
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 9 MP No.6700/2024
Courts when to allow the petitions, though no sufficient cause is
made out, and ruled as follows: "We are at a loss to fathom any
logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to
condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The
concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach",
"substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the
substantial law of limitation, especially in cases where the Court
concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our
opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show
the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is
required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the
parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being
satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High
Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong
intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been
repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases.
Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy
unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary
powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within
reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be
exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or
fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form
the basis of exercising discretionary powers."
"14. In fact, the petitioner did not make out any sufficient cause
except making a bald unsubstantiated allegation in the affidavit If
such lame excuses for condoning the delay are accepted as
sufficient causes, virtually denuding or jettisoning the substantive
law of limitation.
15. In view of the law declared by the apex Court basing on the
concept of real justice, substantial justice the Courts cannot allow
petitions under Section 5 of Limitation Act, when no sufficient
cause is made out. Therefore, basing on lame excuse or
unsubstantiated cause, it is difficult to condone the delay,
liberally construing the word sufficient cause."
17. In Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai2, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
"What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and
justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise
of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar
statues, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that
the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of
the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at
various stages of litigation apart from the costs.
2. (2012) 5 SCC 157
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 10 MP No.6700/2024
What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the
factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide
nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no
negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for
the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay.
If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is
found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting
his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not
to condone the delay."
Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for
condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that
certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and,
accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had
condoned the delay of more than seven years."
18. In Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy3, the Hon'ble Apex Court broadly culled
out the following principles:
i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-
pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper
spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that
these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper
perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical
considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for
emphasis.
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of
delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is
to be taken note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of
delay is a significant and relevant fact.
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not
affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts
are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is
no real failure of justice.
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally
unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of
short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice
is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart,
3. (2013) 12 SCC 649
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 11 MP No.6700/2024
the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a
liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its
inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a
total go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in
the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to
expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud,
misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and
the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial
discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a
collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines
taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
a) An application for condonation of delay should be
drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner
harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay
on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits
is seminal to justice dispensation system.
b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt
with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy
which is basically subjective.
c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had
to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for
achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system
should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious
matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
non-challan manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal
parameters.
19. In Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Sridevi and
others4, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed:-
"17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.
[(1962 2 SCR 762] (supra), it is observed and held as under:--
In construing s.5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the
4. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 12 MP No.6700/2024
period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a
right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding
between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation
prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under
the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this
legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time
should not be light- heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is
shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the
appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in
order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be
exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the
Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad.
269, "s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction
is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion
ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the
words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want
of bona fide is imputable to the appellant."
18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC
556], while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the
absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking
condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further
observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it
has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts
have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is
further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the
court has to exercise discretion judiciously.
19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448], it is observed as under:--
"The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of
limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace". An unlimited
and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty;
some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is
based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the
interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at
the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice
suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and 8 preventing
oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on
public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general
welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his
Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant
and not of the sleepy."
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20. In the case of Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013)
14 SCC 81], it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and
circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression
"sufficient cause" cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack
of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though
limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party
has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there
cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing
conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to
be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed
that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by
imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles
and showing utter disregard to legislature."
20. In Kilaru Appa Rao vs. Sunku Prathapa Reddy5, the Hon'ble
Court observed:-
"11. The dictum of law is that the delay if inordinate, should not be
condoned by adopting casual or liberal approach. Courts are not expected
to condone the delay in the following circumstances:-
"1. When the reason urged is found to be concocted.
2. When the party who seeks for condonation of delay is found to be
thoroughly negligent.
3. In case condonation of inordinate delay leads to substantial
injustice to the opposite party due to the subsequent events.
4. The inordinate delay, if condoned, results in unending uncertainty
and consequential anarchy. The list is illustrative and not
exhaustive."
21. Apart from the above paras, another decision reported in V. Subba
Rao and Others vs. Secretary to Government Panchayat Raj and
Rural Development, Government of AP and Others 6, it was observed
that:
5. 2022 (6) ALT 288 (TS)
6. (1996) 7 SCC 626
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"Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties.
They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics,
but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury.
The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the
redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted
time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes
would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy
by approaching the courts. So, a life span must be fixed for each
remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to
unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of
limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the
maxim interest reinpublicaeut sit finis litium (It is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation). The idea is that every
legal remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of
time".
22. Section 43 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 reads
as follows:
"43. unless otherwise expressly provided in the
Code, the procedure laid down in the CPC shall, so
far as may be, followed in all proceedings under the
Code."
23. In the light of above provision Sections 43 and 53 of Madhya
Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, Order VII Rule 11 CPC is applied to
the present facts of the case, the Sub-Divisional Authority should decide the
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before admitting the
appeal and thereafter, he can entertain any other Misc. Applications. In spite
of directions given by this Court in M.P. No.2597/2024 dated 16.07.2024,
Sub-Divisional Authority dismissed the application under Order VII Rule
11 of CPC without deciding Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the order of
Sub-Divisional Authority dated 30.09.2024 is not indicating any reasons.
The delay of four years in application filed by appellant (Wariz Kasliwal) is
not explained for filing the appeal. The Sub-Divisional Authority did not
dispose of the application, which is pending before him in accordance with
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 15 MP No.6700/2024
law in spite of direction given by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in M.P.
No.2597/2024 dated 16.07.2024 and dismissed the Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC.
24. A conspectus of above the judgments referred to (Supra), the Hon'ble
Apex Court observed that length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the
explanation is the only criterion. It was further held that the primary
function of a Revenue Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties
and to advance substantial justice. Rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy the rights of parties and they are meant to see that parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. Hon'ble Apex
Court also cautioned that if the delay is occasioned by party deliberately to
gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation.
The explanation should not be fanciful and concocted. The Courts while
dealing with an application to condone delay should keep in mind the right
accrued to other side and should deal with such application with utmost
care and caution.
25. Under such circumstances as per the expressions of Hon'ble Apex
Court, the Revenue Court must see whether the appellant explained
sufficient rights of parties alone is not the criteria, unless; sufficient cause is
shown, that in case of inordinate delay, condoning the delay does not arise.
26. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant (Wariz Kasliwal)
after lapse of 4 years from the date of order of Tehsildar dated 28.07.2020
without explaining sufficient reasons filed the appeal with inordinate delay
of four years and the co-ordinate Bench of this Court made observation in
M.P. No.2597/2024 considering the aspect of limitation and dispose of the
application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC filed by the petitioner -
herein / respondent, without giving any reasons, the Sub-Divisional
Authority dismissed the application on 30.09.2024, therefore, the order of
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:6456 16 MP No.6700/2024
the Sub-Divisional Authority is not sustainable and needs interference by
this Court.
27. In the present case, apart from the limitation, Shri Ambuj Kasliwal is
a necessary party to the appellate proceedings, he was party to the
proceedings before Tehsildar, he was not a party to the appellate
proceedings and rest of them were added by the appellant under Order I
Rule 10 of CPC, the parties i.e. Shri Nitin Kasliwal, Shri Mukul Kasliwal
and Shri Vikas Kasliwal were added in the present appeal and therefore, the
present appeal suffers from non-joinder of necessary party i.e. Shri Ambuj
Kasliwal is a necessary party to the appeal proceedings. Wariz Kasliwal
took a plea in the appeal that he never executed power of attorney to
transfer the said land to the Company and he never executed any family
partition deed, in view of the plea taken by him in the appeal it has to be
decided by Civil Court of the validity of the general power of attorney and
partition deed, therefore, the rights of the appellant will be decided by
appropriate forum and appellant's remedy is elsewhere and they could
approach the Civil Court and ascertain their rights in accordance with law.
28. In view of the above foregoing discussions, the present Misc.
Petition is allowed and the order of the Sub-Divisional Authority dated
30.09.2024 is set aside and consequently, appeal No.0110/Appeal/2023-24
is rejected / dismissed and no order as to costs.
29. As a sequel the misc. petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
(DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA, J)
Anushree
