Madhya Pradesh High Court
Roopansh Khatri vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 5 June, 2025
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
WRIT PETITION No. 127 of 2018
ROOPANSH KHATRI AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
WITH
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 17182 of 2018
ROOPANSH KHATRI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
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Appearance:
Shri Ashok Lalwani- Senior Advocate with Abhishek Singh-
Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Lokesh Jain Government Advocate for respondents No. 1 and 2.
Shri Prakash Upadhyay Senior Advocate With Jalaj Dwivedi Advocate
for the respondents No. 3 to 5.
Shri Gulab Chand Sohane, Advocate for the respondent No. 6.
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(O R D E R)
(Reserved on : 06/02/2025)
(Pronounced on : 05/06/2025)
These two petitions have been filed arising out of FIR and
consequential proceedings against the petitioners in crime No. 60/2017
registered at Police Station Gora Bazar, Jabalpur under Sections 279, 337 IPC
wherein charge-sheet has subsequently been filed under Sections 279, 337,
338 IPC against petitioner No.1.
2. In W.P. No. 127/2018 which is filed by Roopansh Khatri and Sahil
Khatri respectively as petitioners No. 1 and 2, prayer has been made to
constitute a Special Investigation Team or pass an order for some high power
special agency to investigate into the manipulations made in the said FIR and
consequential investigation only for facilitating claim of compensation by the
complainant i.e. respondent No. 5 Rishabh Jain in connivance of the police
officials i.e. respondents No. 3 and 4. A further prayer is made to take
departmental action against the respondents No. 3 to 5 and prosecute
respondent No. 3 to 6 or to pass any other order to meet the ends of justice.
3. In M.Cr.C. No. 17182/2018 which is filed by Roopansh Khatri as sole
petitioner, prayer has been made to quash the charge sheet arising out of the
aforesaid crime which has resulted into criminal case R.T. No. 4854/2017
before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur.
4. For the purpose of this common order, reference to parties and
documents is taken from W.P. No. 127/2018, unless expressly mentioned
otherwise.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the present
petitioners are real brothers. Petitioner No. 2 is owner of the motor-cycle
having registration No. MP20-MV-8612 model CBR Honda. It is their case
that petitioners belong to affluent family and own good property in Jabalpur
City. There is a racket going on in Jabalpur to implicate persons having good
financial means and having vehicles of their ownership, in false motor
accident claims case only so as to extract compensation either from the
vehicle owners or from the insurance company. It is the case of the petitioners
that they have been made victims of the racket going on between the
claimants and police officials to lodge false FIRs, conduct biased
investigation and implicate vehicles in non-existent road traffic accidents so
that insurance amount can be got extracted from the Insurance Company or
from the vehicle owner and in this racket vehicle of the petitioner No. 2 also
got involved and they have been falsely implicated in this case. It is further
argued that care is taken in such cases to make out weak cases which is not
sustained in criminal trial but some police record will be made out so as to
extract compensation from the Insurance Company by filing claim case
before the Claims Tribunal. In this manner the innocent vehicle owners who
have no role in the accident case nor their vehicles are actually involved, but
still they are being made to face criminal trial though they will be ultimately
acquitted but they are having to unnecessarily face creation of a criminal
record against them only so as to facilitate certain unscrupulous persons to
claim fabricated motor accident claim compensation in connivance with the
police officials to lodge such false FIRs. These persons like petitioners also
have to face unwarranted prosecution for years together.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that in this
case the entire FIR and investigation is fabricated and farce. The incident is
said to have taken place on 26.03.2017 at about 6:00 PM when the motor
cycle driven by the complainant Rishabh Jain dashed with motor cycle driven
by the petitioner No. 1 and owned by the petitioner No. 2. It is contended that
for a long period nothing took place though the incident is alleged to have
taken place on 26.3.2017 at Dumna Road going towards Jabalpur Airport
near Nehra Company. For the first time, a Dehati Nalish was registered on
19.06.2017 at police station Ranjhi, District Jabalpur though the area does not
fall into jurisdiction of the Police Station Ranjhi but falls in the jurisdiction of
the Police Station Gora Bazar. It is contended that entire FIR is based on
concocted story of an accident taking place almost three months prior to
registration of very first Dehati Nalsi which was on 19.06.2017, otherwise
there was no occasion for some other police Station to have lodged Dehati
Nalishonce the area where the accident took place fell in the jurisdiction of
Gora Bazar Police Station and such registration of Dehati Nalish by some
other police station at "zero" could have been justified only if there was some
urgency in registering the FIR but in the present case it is not so as almost
three months had elapsed.
7. It is further argued that only with a view to explain the delay of three
months in registration of FIR, a story has been cooked up by the Police
Authorities that the complainant had approached the Superintendent of Police
Jabalpur on 31.03.2017 itself and that he was running from here and there but
no police station was listening to his plea. It is further contended that from
the very contents of Dehati Nalish, it is evident that the complainant states
that the accident took place on 26.03.2017 and in the very same night he took
treatment in Metro Hospital but no treatment papers of Metro Hospital are
there. Only one paper of medical report stated to be issued by one Dr. Shirish
Naik of Jamdar Hospital Jabalpur is on record, which too has been produced
by the complainant to the Police Authorities and is dated 05.05.2017. It has
not been seized by the Police Authority from the said Hospital and the said
prescription mentions that there is a five week old doubtful crack in right
Scophoid bone (wrist bone near thumb) and the said prescription mentions
that there is a healed crack. It is contended that neither the statement of Dr.
Shirish Naik has been recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. nor any record
from the said hospital has been seized by the Police and only on presentation
of one prescription by the complainant, the FIR has been lodged and charge-
sheet has been presented. It is contended that this prescription cannot be said
to be a material only on the basis of which the petitioner No. 1 can be
prosecuted under Section 337 and 338 IPC because the report is not of any
Radiologist but is only one Dr. Shirish Naik who is MS in Orthopedics and he
also in the prescription says that there is a five week old doubtful crack. If
indeed there was any fracture sustained by the complainant on 26.03.2017
and he states to have taken treatment in Metro Hospital then no treatment
papers of Metro Hospital of 26.03.2017 are there and if there was any
carelessness by Metro Hospital Authorities either in not carrying out X-ray
despite there being fracture or not detecting fracture from the X-ray, then
complainant never took any action against the Metro Hospital and it is clear
that only to claim accident claim compensation that this entire story has been
cooked up. Only because the complainant never sustained any fracture,
therefore, an improbable story has been cooked up that he sustained fracture
five weeks ago and even the doctor recording prescription on 5.5.2017
mentioned that it is a doubtful crack which seems to be old healed crack,
which is only a possibility and not definite diagnosis.
8. By heavily criticizing the action of the Police Authorities in registering
Dehati Nalish at Police Station Ranjhi, though the alleged accident took place
within the jurisdiction of the Police Station Gora Bazar, it is argued that the
respondents have filed reply in the writ petition which is contrary to their
own record because in the reply it has been brought out that the complainant
had been approaching various police stations as the jurisdiction of accident
place was not clear to the police authorities and then he approached the
Superintendent of Police, Jabalpur who directed the Police Station Gohalpur
to take steps and in these turn of events, the matter came to Police Station
Ranjhi which registered Dehati Nalish and then was forwarded to Police
Station Gora Bazar for registering the actual FIR. It is argued that no
documents connected the entire story which are available on record and this
story is only a story based on fabricated documents prepared later on to fill
the gap of this almost three months period.
9. On these assertions and relying on judgment of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Safiq Ahmad v. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co.
Ltd., (2021) 18 SCC 813, it is contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
come down heavily on fake compensation petitions to seek motor accident
claims and the menace of false/fraud claim petitions to claim fraudulent
compensation has become rampant and in the matter of which urgent steps
need to be taken. It is further contended that the necessary steps to carry out
investigation as per Section 2(h) of the Code of criminal procedure 1973 have
not been carried out and reliance is placed on the Judgment in the case of
State of M.P. v. Mubarak Ali, AIR 1959 SC 707. It is further argued that the
FIR and consequential case can be quashed in view of the judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293. By placing reliance on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of
Meghalaya, (2000) 8 SCC 323:AIR 2000 SC 3275. It is contended that
privately funded police investigation is in itself vitiated and illegal and
deserves to be quashed as it is motivated and not impartial.
10. Per contra, it is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the
respondents that the police authorities have taken proper steps in the matter
and as the FIR disclosed cognizable offence, the same was registered. It is
argued by the counsel for the respondent No. 6-Insurance Company that no
interference deserves to be caused in the matter because merely by
registration of FIR it cannot be deemed that a person would be arrested and
even his personal appearance can be dispensed with by the Magistrate and
therefore, it cannot be said that he would be put to any adversity by the FIR
and consequential trial, and he can always prove his innocence in the trial if
he is innocent and since the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt he
can be acquitted if he is innocent and establishes so in trial. Reliance is
placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of TGN
Kumar vs State Of Kerala & Ors. AIR 2011 SC 708.
11. Learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 (State), for
respondents No. 3 & 4 (Police Officials impleaded by name) and respondent
No. 5 (complainant) have also vehemently opposed the writ petition and
contended that the petitioners only wants to come out of the consequential
action which is being undertaken by the Police as he is involved in road
traffic accident in which the respondent No. 5 sustained fracture. It is
contended that the police authorities were under obligation to lodge the FIR
once the information disclosing cognizable offence was given to the police
authorities. It is contended that the accident indeed took place on 26.03.2017
and the respondent No. 5 kept on wandering here and there but could not get
any justice from any authority. He thereafter approached the S.P. Jabalpur
who on 01.04.2017 directed the police Station Gohalpur to take steps in the
matter and in due course of time the matter came to be brought to cognizance
of Police Station Ranjhi which registered Dehati Nalish on 19.06.2017 and
then the FIR was lodged at Police Station Gora Bazar where the actual place
of accident falls. It is contended that the place of accident was such that there
was a confusion in the jurisdiction of three different Police Stations i.e. Gora
Bazar, Ranjhi and Civil Lines and therefore, complainant was wandering here
and there and only when the jurisdiction of the police station was ascertained
then the FIR was lodged by the Police Station Gora Bazar. It is contended
that the allegations made by the petitioners are baseless because the police
officials have fairly and impartially carried out their duties and obligations
under the law. By referring to document written by the petitioner No. 2
himself it is contended that the petitioner No. 2 who is owner of the vehicle
has admitted the guilt of petitioner No. 1 so also involvement of the vehicle
in the accident and therefore, nothing further can be argued by the petitioners
looking to the letter dated 25.07.2017 given by the petitioner No. 2 to the
Police Authorities.
12. It is contended that the delay in registering the FIR took place only
because of confusion in the matter of jurisdiction of the police station
concerned and hence, there was delay. In the FIR the complainant has
submitted that since he was having severe pain in his right wrist, therefore, he
was examined in Jamdar Hospital on 05.05.2017 and was receiving treatment
there. Therefore, no fabrication or malafide intention can be fixed on the
police authorities and also the investigation proceedings were done as per
law. Therefore, no case for interference is made out in the present matter. A
separate reply has been filed by the respondent No. 3 who was SHO of Police
Station Gora Bazar at the relevant time who has only adopted the averments
and contentions made by the State Government in its reply.
13. The respondent No. 4 has also filed a separate reply and has adopted
the averments made by the State Government in its reply and has further
contended in the reply that the complainant was wandering here and there
and after directions of Superintendent of Police, Jabalpur the Police Station
Gohalpur received the complaint of the respondent No. 5 and after
preliminary investigation, Dehati Nalish was registered by Police Station
Ranjhi on 19.06.2017 which was sent to police Station Gora Bazar on
20.06.2017 which ultimately lodged the actual FIR. Initially the case was
registered under Section 279 and 337 IPC and when the complainant
submitted the X-ray report an additional charge under Section 338 of IPC was
included.
14. Interestingly, in the reply filed by the State Government to the writ
petition it is contended that the X-ray report was submitted by the respondent
No. 5 on 03.01.2017 which is even prior to the alleged date of incident i.e.
26.03.2017. No application for amendment in the reply has been filed nor any
other date was suggested by the counsel for the State during the course of the
arguments and not even any oral assertion was made that this date mentioned
is erroneous and some other dates be read in its place.
15. Heard.
16. In the present case, the accident is stated to have taken place on
26.03.2017 at near Nehra Company, on Dumna Road leading towards
Jabalpur Airport. For the first time a Dehati Nalish was registered at Police
Station Ranjhi on 19.06.2017 though the spot does not fall admittedly within
the limits of Police Station Ranjhi. The spot admittedly is located within
limits of Police Station Gorabazar. The Dehati Nalish mentions the contents
that the complainant resides at Damoh Naka, Gohalpur, Jabalpur and on
26.03.2017 he was returning from Dumna Airport with his friend Anand
Pathak and driving the motorcycle of his friend Anand Pathak and Anand
Pathak was driving motorcycle of the complainant. When they reached near
Nehra Company, then a 20 to 25 year old boy driving Honda CVR
motorcycle with registration No.MP-20/MW-8612 dashed into the
motorcycle of the complainant and the complainant fell down resulting in
abrasions on forehead, right wrist and right waist. His motorcycle was also
damaged. The other friends helped him out and called Lalu Prasad, another
friend. The accused who dashed the motorcycle did not get any injury and he
fled from the place. Then Anand Pathak took the complainant to home and
complainant also took treatment at Metro Hospital. He reported the incident
to S.P. Office on 31.03.2017 and when he felt pain in the wrist, then he
consulted Jamdar Hospital on 05.05.2017 and is under treatment. This Dehati
Nalish was registered by Assistant Sub Inspector, Ravindra Singh of Police
Station Ranjhi, Jabalpur. On the basis of this Dehati Nalish, FIR was lodged
by Police Station Gorabazar with the assertion that Dehati Nalish has been
received from Police Station Ranjhi to the jurisdictional Police Station, i.e.
Gorabazar and therefore, the FIR is being lodged under Sections 279, 337 of
I.P.C. containing the averments made in the Dehati Nalish.
17. The respondents have tried to justify the delay in lodging of the FIR on
the ground that the spot of the accident was such that there was confusion
amongst three Police Stations, i.e. whether it falls in Police Station Gorabazar
or Civil Lines or Ranjhi and the complaint was being made to wander from
here to there. In para 6 & 8 of the reply filed by the State Government
following pleadings are made:-
"6. Even on merits, the instant petition is liable to be rejected by this
Hon'ble Court. It is submitted that admittedly the accident was
occurred on 26.03.2017 near Nehra Company (Dumna Airport to
Jabalpur City Road). The respondent No.5 on the said date approached
the Dumna Police Chouki for registration of the case. The police
officials sent the 'respondent No. 5 to Police Station Ranjhi and the
Police station Ranjhi sent applicant/respondent No. 5 to Civil Lines
Police Station. It is submitted that since, the jurisdiction of the Police
Station regarding the place where accident took place was in dispute
and therefore initially the complaint of the respondent No. 5 by any
police station. Subsequently the respondent No. 5 approached
Superintendent of Police Jabalpur on 01.04.2017. The Superintendent
of Police forwarded the complaint of the respondent No. 5 to Police
Station Gohalpur. After preliminary inquiry on 19.06.2017, a Dehati
Nalishi was registered under Section 279 and 337 of IPC, however, the
case was transferred to Police Station Gora Bazar on 20.06.2017 and
thereafter the I.O. i.e. the respondent No. 4 in direction of the
respondent No.3 started the investigation of the case. During the
investigation, the petitioner No. 2 was served by a notice under Section
133 of Motor Vehicle Act. On 25.08.2017, the petitioner No. 2 in reply
to the notice admitted that his Motor Cycle bearing No. M.P. 20
MW-8612 was driven by his younger brother petitioner No. 1 on
26.03.2017 and the accident occurred because of him.
8. It is submitted by the answering respondents that on 03.01.2017,
the respondent No. 5 submitted medical report and X-ray report of
Jamdar Hospital wherein it was mentioned that there is a fracture in
the wrist of the respondent No. 5 and accordingly Section 338 of IPC
was included matter. Subsequently on 26.08.2017 after concluding the
investigation, the Challan was prepared which was duly submitted
before the Competent Court on 01.09.2017. The matter is now fixed
from framing of charge on 24.07.2018."
18. The State has taken the plea that the complaint was being sent from
here to there. If that is taken to be, then it is clear that complainant on
31.03.2017 came to know that he is being sent from here to there by different
police stations and he eventually reached the S.P. on that date.
19. It is really surprising that the S.P. sent him to Police Station Gohalpur.
Gohalpur is not one of three police stations among which there was
confusion, because undisputedly looking to geography of Jabalpur city
Gohalpur is in a totally different place and there could have been no
confusion that the place of accident would fall in Gohalpur Police Station. It
is surprising to note that the Superintendent of Police Jabalpur did not know
that under which police station area spot of accident falls and if he was under
any confusion then he could have directed any Additional Superintendent of
Police or Deputy Superintendent of Police under him to enquire and fix the
jurisdiction of spot of accident. However, he did not chose to do any of these
things, but instead chose to send the complainant to a totally different police
station, which shows that the Superintendent of Police, Jabalpur, if he
endorsed the letter dated 31.3.2017 on 01.4.2017, had no knowledge of his
duties as Superintendent of Police, because if this letter is indeed submitted to
the S.P. on 31.03.2017 and he indeed sent the complainant to a totally
different and unconnected Police Station, without instructing any of his
subordinates to fix the jurisdiction of the police station, then it is evident that
there cannot any better example of a totally negligent, careless and
incompetent officer holding the post of Superintendent of Police, Jabalpur.
20. In the fairness of things the State should have come out with specific
information that what punitive or disciplinary action has been taken against
the then Superintendent of Police, Jabalpur for sending the complainant to a
totally different Police Station, which was not one amongst the three police
stations out of which confusion had arisen.
21. Interestingly, the State Government did not choose to file copy of the
letter dated 31.03.2017 written by the complainant, which is said to be
forwarded by the S.P., Jabalpur to Police Station Gohalpur. When this Court
called for the case diary, then the said letter was found as part of the case
diary, which is a photocopy of that letter and photocopy has been made
carefully in such a manner that all the margins are cut. No signature of
Superintendent of Police is there on this letter. It is bearing a stamp of inward
of S.P. Office having Number 1804 dated 01.04.2017 and is a handwritten
letter. At right top corner of it, in Hindi the word Gohalpur has been written,
which was stated by learned Govt. Advocate to be written by the then S.P.
Jabalpur and indicates that Police Station Gohalpur has been instructed to
take further steps in the matter. The said letter in the situation it finds place in
the case diary is as under :-
22. This letter indicates that the complaint went to three police stations, i.e.
Dumna Chouki (within Police Station Gorabazar), Ranjhi and Civil Lines. As
already noted above, this letter does not bear any signature of the S.P.
Jabalpur or any police official in the manner it is found in the diary. The
photocopy has been taken very carefully in a manner that all the margins
have been cut on which signatures might have been there. As also noted
above, it is handwritten letter stated to be scribed by the complainant and
inward Number is 1804 dated 01.04.2017. Even the said inward number does
not bear any initial of the inward clerk. If it was indeed a genuine letter, then
it would have found place in the reply, but it is not so, but has been placed
before this Court only as a part of case diary. This Court during the course of
hearing of this writ petition has passed strict orders on 10.01.2018 and
30.10.2023, which are as under:-
"Dated : 10-01-2018
Shri Ashok Lalwani, learned counsel for the petitioners.
Shri Vishal Dhagat, learned Government Advocate for the
respondents/State.
Learned G.A. for the respondents/State is directed to take
instructions as to how the charge sheet has been filed in the
present case arising out of an order of Motor Accident without
there being any MLC.
Let the matter be listed in the week commencing 22.01.2018.
Dated : 30-10-2023
Shri Ashok Lalwani - Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Saurabh Soni - Panel Lawyer for the respondent No. 1
/State.
Ms. Amrit Kaur - Advocate for respondent No.3.
Shri Harshwardhan Singh Rajput - Advocate for the respondent
No.5.
Shri Gulab Singh Suhane - Advocate for respondent No. 6.
This petition is pending since 2018.
Ms. Amrit Kaur, Advocate prays for time to file reply on behalf
of respondent No. 3.
Subject to payment of cost of Rs. 10,000/- to be recovered from
the respondent No. 3 Sub Inspector and to be deposited in the High
Court Legal Service Committee, two weeks' time is granted to file
reply failing which respondent No. 3 shall remain personally present
on the next date of hearing.
At this stage, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 submits
that it is her fault, however she is not able to explain that how it is
her fault that reply is not filed on behalf of respondent No. 3.
The Vakalatnma of respondent No. 6 is available then that of
Respondent No. 4 and for the respondents No. 1 and 2 but there is no
Vakalatnam on behalf of respondent No. 3. Even cause list reflects
name of Shri Bramhaatt Singh, Shri Abhishek Dubey, Shri Ankit
Singh Sishodiya, Ravindranath Chaturvedi and Siddharth Narula as
counsel for respondent No. 3. The contention that default yet is not
made out from the record.
Let cost be deposited and reply be filed within two weeks as
directed earlier.
In the mid of the arguments, Ms.Amrit Kaur, Advocate seeks time
when it is pointed out that how police authorities have manipulated
and managed the records, she sought time to argue the matter
without there being any pleadings when she asked to file return and
she cannot be permitted to argue on behalf of Respondent No. 3 who
happens to be main kingpin of manipulation without filing written
statements.
Right to file return on behalf of the respondent No. 5 is closed.
List the case on 23.11.2023."
23. Even in MCRC 17182/2018, while issuing notice on 01.8.2018, this
Court had passed the following order :-
"Shri Ashok Lalwani, counsel for the applicant.
Shri S.D. Khan, Govt. Advocate for the respondent/State.
Learned Govt. Advocate for the State has submitted that the OIC
has informed him that prescription showing the bony injury of Jamdar
Hospital have been received from the complainant and enclosed in the
challan/charge sheet. No seizure memo is prepared. However, there is
no procedure in this regard.
Heard on I.A. No.6974/2018, an application for stay.
The applicant demonstrates that the complainant/respondent
No.3 lodged an FIR on 20.6.2017 at Police Station, Gorabazar
registered as Crime No.60/2017 for offence under Sections 279, 337 of
the IPC.
The complainant after the accident received primary medical
treatment. He suffered the injuries on his right wrist and an abrasion
on his palm. Subsequently, the complainant went to Jamdar Hospital
for treatment on 5.5.2017. The report of Jamdar Hospital show that
there were a healed fracture on scaphoid (Rt) and a healed crack.
Report of Jamdar Hospital was submitted by the complainant to the
police. Police without making any seizure memo and without
verification from the hospital has enclosed the same in the challan.
Considering the same, charge sheet has been filed under Section 279,
337 and 338 of the IPC before the JMFC, Jabalpur and RT
No.4854/2017 has been registered.
Let notice be issued to the respondent No.3 on payment of P.F.
within six working days by ordinary as well as RAD mode, returnable
within four weeks.
Till the next date of hearing, it is directed that the proceedings of
R.T. No.4854/2017 be stayed.
List after four weeks"
24. It appears that to get over such orders, this letters and letter dated
01.6.2017 have been inserted in the case diary, which are neither part of the
reply filed before this Court nor part of the charge sheet/challan.
25. Another letter dated 01.06.2017 is placed in the case diary, which is
stated to be sent by Police Station Ghamapur to S.P. Jabalpur in reference to
letter of S.P. No.1804/2017 dated 30.05.2017. As already noted above, 1801
is the inward number of the letter dated 31.03.2017 in S.P. Office. However,
the letter dated 01.06.2017 written by Police Station Ghamapur refers to
some letter of S.P. bearing No.1804/2017 dated 30.05.2017. The letter dated
30.05.2017 is neither part of the case diary nor part of the reply nor part of
the challan. It is evident that inward number of letter dated 31.03.2017 has
been borrowed, some imaginary date has been written and then a new letter
has been created by Police Station Ghamapur indicating forwarding
complaint to Police Station Ranjhi so as to fill up the gap that when the S.P.
had directed Police Station Gohalpur to look into the matter, then in what
manner the complaint came to Police Station Ranjhi. This letter dated
01.06.2017 is as under:-
26. This letter of Police Station Ghamapur is a totally new thing and it is
something totally alien to the entire controversy, because it is neither out of
the three police stations among which confusion was there, nor the police
station to which the complainant is stated to have been sent by the S.P. It is a
fifth police station jumping in the fray and seems that this letter is having
concocted letter number and date of some non-existent letter S.P. Office
Jabalpur, these particulars in the "Sandarbh" (reference) contained in this
letter seems to have been fabricated only to fill the missing link that how the
complaint of the complainant went to Police Station Ranjhi and to fill up the
gap up to 19.06.2017.
27. From the aforesaid facts it is clear to this Court from perusal of the
case diary, charge sheet and replies that the letter dated 01.06.2017 is a letter
having fabricated number and date of some non-existent letter of S.P. Office
Jabalpur and letter dated 31.03.2017 is also a totally fabricated letter as the
police has taken great pains to insert such a photo copy in the case diary that
will not show any signature.
28. The aforesaid facts reveal a very sinister attempt on the part of the
police authorities in firstly doing wrong and then trying to cover up the
wrong.
29. If indeed the letter dated 31.03.2017 was true, then there was no reason
why the Inspector General of Police or the DGP would not have taken any
action against the S.P. Jabalpur for sending the complainant to a different
police station situated in different direction of the City. If this letter was
correct, then there was no reason that why the Police Station Gohalpur had
not made any daily diary entry or not prepared Dehati Nalish. If Police
Station Gohalpur was indeed instructed by the S.P. Jabalpur, then it should
have at least made an entry in daily diary and forwarded the matter to the
correct Police Station under intimation to the S.P. or could have prepared
Dehati Nalish, conducted preliminary enquiry and then forwarded to the
correct Police Station. However, not a single letter or documentation of
Police Station Gohalpur is on record. How the complaint came in Police
Station Ghamapur is suspicious and only gives to conclusion that since the
then SHO of Police Station Ghamapur was agreeable to sign on this letter
containing fabricated letter number and date of some non-existent letter of
S.P. Office, Jabalpur, that the letter dated 01.06.2017 of Police Station
Ghamapur was got signed and inserted in the case diary.
30. It is further important to note here that if indeed, the complainant had
approached the correct Police Station Gorabazar also between 26.03.2017 till
31.03.2017, then the S.P. was under obligation to take action against SHO of
that Police Station for not taking cognizance of complainant's complaint, but
curiously, he decided to dispatch the complainant to a totally different police
station.
31. In Dehati Nalish also an attempt was made to fill up the gap of time
since 26.3.2017, but no reference was made to letter of Police Station
Ghamapur and only reference is made to some letter submitted before S.P.
Jabalpur on 31.03.2017, which has already been considered in detail above in
this order.
32. Coming to the so called X-ray report, it is only a prescription signed by
one Dr. Shirish Naik at Jamdar Hospital. No money receipt is attached with
the said prescription of deposit of money for consultation or for X-ray. The
State admits in the reply that the said report was submitted by the
complainant himself on 03.01.2017. The date seems to be wrong, but there is
admission that this report was submitted by the complainant himself and not
seized by the police. There is no seizure memo available either in the case
diary or attached to the charge sheet. This is a simple prescription and not
even the medical certificate, because a medical certificate is required to be
issued by a registered medical practitioner in accordance with clause 1.3.3 of
Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics)
Regulations, 2002. Clause 1.3.3 is as under:-
"1.3.3 A Registered medical practitioner shall maintain a
Register of Medical Certificates giving full details of certificates
issued. When issuing a medical certificate he / she shall always
enter the identification marks of the patient and keep a copy of the
certificate. He / She shall not omit to record the signature and/or
thumb mark, address and at least one identification mark of the
patient on the medical certificates or report. The medical
certificate shall be prepared as in Appendix 2."
33. The prescription is signed by one Dr. Shirish Naik, who is not an
Radiologist. One cover page of X-ray report is available in the case diary
bearing the name of Rishabh Jain as the patient having age 35 years and
undergone skiagram of right wrist. The name of Radiologist is mentioned as
Dr. Gopala Pole (MBBS, MD). It is really fishy that once the cover page of
X-ray report mentions the name of Radiologist, then no actual X-ray report
prepared by that person is on record, but only prescription of an orthopedic
doctor is on record, which mentions five weeks old doubtful fracture of right
scaphoid and nothing else.
34. It is really curious to note that even no case diary statements of Dr.
Shirish Naik or Dr. Gopala Pole have been recorded. The prescription does
not fall in the meaning of medical certificate as per Clause 1.3.3, which could
be verified from the record of the same medical practitioner, nor case diary
statements of the Doctors were taken and not even any Radiologist's report is
on record, then how the police authorities have come to conclusion and
charge sheeted the accused under Section 338 IPC is really fishy and speaks
volumes about the bad intention of the police authorities in the matter. It is
evident to this Court that police authorities any how wanted a FIR under
cognizable offences to be lodged and charge-sheet to be presented so that
some police record of some accident can be created to facilitate motor
accident claim case and that was all which was intended by the police
authorities.
35. This Court has also gone through the case diary statements of Rishabh
Jain (complainant), Akshansh Pathak (somewhere mentioned as Akash
Pathak) who is stated to be his friend and was present at the time of accident,
so also Lalu Prasad, who was called by the complainant after accident took
place and all of them have stated about the complainant firstly being taken to
Metro Hospital. However, no document of treatment of Metro Hospital is on
record. The medical record of Metro Hospital should have been first thing,
which was to be seized by the police if it had wanted to fill up the gap. The
police did not choose to either visit the Metro Hospital nor called for their
records, but simply believed the prescription of orthopedic doctor mentioning
a doubtful five weeks old fracture. If there was any carelessness by Metro
Hospital Authorities either in not carrying out X-ray despite there being
fracture or not detecting fracture from the X-ray, then complainant never took
any action against the Metro Hospital and it is clear that only to claim
accident claim compensation that this entire story has been cooked up.
36. A mechanical damage report is also part of the challan signed by two
witnesses and the investigating officer on 22.06.2017 mentioning that there is
damage to footrest, shocker, leg guard, gear and both the tyres of the
motorcycle. This mechanical damage report is not signed by any mechanical
examiner or lost assessor or valuer. It cannot be believed that a person did not
get his motorcycle repaired for three months after the accident. Even no
photographs of the damaged motorcycle are part of the case diary. Therefore,
it is evident that this has also been prepared by the Investigating Officer only
to facilitate claim of compensation by the complainant and nothing else.
37. Faced with all these facts during the course of arguments, learned
counsel for the respondents made an argument in desperation mentioning that
the petitioner No.2 has admitted the involvement of vehicle and guilt of
petitioner No.1 by writing a letter, which is part of the charge-sheet and is
available at page 21 of the writ petition, which is as under:-
**okgu ekfyd dk i= fnukad 25@8@17
izfr]
Jheku~ Fkkuk izHkkjh egksn;]
Fkkuk xksjkcktkj
ftyk tcyiqj ¼ e-iz ½
fo"k;%& eks-lk-Ø- ,e-ih-20 ,e-MCyw 8612 okgu pkyd ,oa ekfyd ds laca/k esa tkudkjh
nsus ckor~A
egksn;]
fuosnu gS fd eS lfyy [k«kh firk vfuy [k«kh fuoklh lkmFk flfoy ykbZu
CykWd ua- 32 Fkkuk flfoy ykbZu dk fuoklh gwa ;g fd fnukad 26-08-2017 dks 'kke 6
cts usgjk daiuh f'ko eafnj ds lkeus esjk eksVj lk;dy ls ,d eks- lk-
pkyd ,DlhMsaV gks x;k Fkk ?kVuk fnukad dks eks-lk- esjk NksVk HkkbZ :ika'k [k«kh pyk
jgk Fkk mDr eksVj lkbZdy dk eSa Lo;a okgu ekfyd gwa ftldh tkudkjh lgh ,oa lR;
ns jgk gwaA
vkosnd
lfyy [k«kh firk vfuy [k«kh
fuoklh CykWd ua- 32]
lkmFk flfoy ykbZu
Fkkuk flfoy ykbZu**
38. The said letter was stated vehemently to be an admission of guilt by the
petitioner No.2. However, the FIR is against the petitioner No.1, who was
allegedly driving the vehicle and even this letter signed by the petitioner No.2
is in response to a notice under Section 133 Motor Vehicle Act issued by the
Police Station, when he has been called to the police station along with driver
and documents of the vehicle.
39. As per Section 133 of the Motor Vehicle Act, it is the duty of the owner
of vehicle to give information regarding the name and address and license
held by the Driver or Conductor, which is in his possession or could by
reasonable diligence be ascertained by him. Section 133 of the Motor Vehicle
Act is under:-
"133. Duty of owner of motor vehicle to give information. -
The owner of a motor vehicle, the driver or conductor of which is
accused of any offence under this Act shall, on the demand of any
police officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government, give
all information regarding the name and address of, and the licence
held by, the driver or conductor which is in his possession or could by
reasonable diligence be ascertained by him."
40. The notice sent by the police authorities under Section 133 of the
Motor Vehicle Act was as under:-
"dk;kZy; Fkkuk izHkkjh Fkkuk xksjkcktkj ftyk tcyiqj e-iz-
Ø-Q/17 fnukad 19-08-17
uksfVl
¼/kkjk 133 MV Act½
Ikzfr]
lfyy [k«kh firk vfuy [k«kh
e-ua- 32 vkj-Vh-vks vkWfQl ds lkeus
lkmFk flfoy ykbZu Fkkuk flfoy ykbu tcyiqj e-iz-
vkidks tfj;s uksfVl lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd fnukad 26-03-17 ds 'kke 06-20
cts izkFkhZ _"kHk tSu firk jktsUnz dqekj tSu fuoklh neksg ukdk xksgyiqj dks vkids
eksVjlk;dy Ø- ,e-ih- 20 ,e MCY;w 8612 ds pkyd }kjk usgjk daiuh f'ko eafnj ds
ikl izkFkhZ dks VDdj ekjdj pksV igqWapk;k FkkA
vr% vki ;g crkosa fd mDr ?kVuk fnukad dks okgu dk pkyd dkSu FkkA ,oa
fnukad 23-08-17 ds Bhd 10-00 cts e; okgu pkyd ,oa okgu ds nLrkost ds Fkkuk
mifLFkr vkosaA
Fkkuk izHkkjh
Fkkuk xksjkcktkj"
41. The Police Station in-charge did not limit his query to the scope of
Section 133, but he went ahead and physically called the vehicle owner as
well as physically called the driver to the police station, which is not the
scope of Section 133. It is evident to this Court that the Station House Officer
grossly abused his powers and misused the provisions of Section 133 Motor
Vehicle Act and physically called the vehicle owner and driver to the police
station. Thus, this notice is not a notice under Section 133 Motor Vehicle Act,
but is a pressure tactics to pressurize the vehicle owner and if under such
pressure tactics the vehicle owner has written the letter while sitting in the
police station, then it cannot be said to be admission of guilt of driver. At best
it can be said to be admission of petitioner No.1 driving vehicle on
26.03.2017 and nothing else. How petitioner No.2, who was not present at the
time of incident can admit occurrence of accident involving petitioner No.1,
who was alleged to be driving the vehicle.
42. The menace of false motor accident cases is writ large in the society
and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Safiq Ahmed (supra) has
recognized the requirement of curbing the menace of filing false claim
petitions and also taken cognizance of number of fictional accidents and false
petitions and impleadment of names and addresses of fake persons in actual
accidents or actual persons in fake accidents.
43. As per Clause 815 of Police Regulations, there is a specific provision
for examination of wounded persons and it is obligatory for the police to
obtain the consent of a person having sustained injuries and being sent to the
nearest hospital. The Constable must take the injured person to hospital with
report to the police prosecutor, who will send the necessary requisition to the
civil surgeon for examination of injured person. Clause 815 of M.P. Police
Regulations is as under :-
"815. Wandered persons - Examination of - Complainants and
others wounder or injured during the commission of an offence
should, as a rule, and provided their consent is obtained, be
conveyed as soon as possible to the nearest hospital, together with
a requisition in the prescribed form for their examination. When an
injured person is sent to headquarters for examination by the civil
surgeon, the requisition form should, if possible, be filled up in
English. If there is nobody at the police station capable of writing
English, the constable who takes the injured person to hospital will
report to the Police Prosecutor who will send the necessary
requisition for examination to the civil surgeon. If an injured
person is unconscious and incapable of giving a consent, and there
is no relation present empowered to give a consent on his behalf,
the investigating officer will forward the injured person to hospital
if he considers this course is essential in his own interests as
affording the only chance of saving his life. Such a person should
not, however, be forwarded to hospital if it is apparent that the
journey will precipitate his death."
44. If indeed the complainant was wounded on 26.03.2017 and sustained
fracture and after unsuccessfully approaching three different police stations,
ultimately reached the S.P. on 31.03.2017, then what action was taken by the
S.P. in terms of Clause 815 and if he did not take any action then what action
should be taken against the S.P. for violating clause 815 is something, which
was required to be contemplated by the Senior Officers of the police force.
45. Since no action was taken, then it only leads to one conclusion that the
letter dated 31.03.2017 never existed, because if it ever existed, then it was
obligatory for the senior officers of the police, to have taken action under for
violation of Clause 815 of Police Regulation against the then S.P.
46. So far as the alleged letter written by petitioner No.1 dated 25.08.2017
and it was projected to be admission of guilt, the same has already been dealt
with by this Court above. However, one more aspect may need to be
considered. This letter is obviously not a confession of the accused, who is
the petitioner No.1. Confession given to police authority is obviously not
admissible in evidence as per Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act
1872. Even if it was a disclosure statement under Section 27 of Indian
Evidence Act, even then a disclosure statement in itself has no evidentiary
value, except only that part of the statement made by the accused, which
distinctly relates to discovery of some fact as a consequence of information
disclosed by the accused under Section 27. Recently, a three Judge Bench of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the Sections 25 to
27 of the Indian Evidence Act in the following manner in the case of Randeep
Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3383, which reads as under:-
"15. Sections 25 to 27 of the Evidence Act read thus:
"25. Confession to police-officer not to be proved.-- No confes-
sion made to a police-officer, shall be proved as against a person
accused of any offence.
26. Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be
proved against him.-- No confession made by any person whilst he
is in the custody of a police-officer, unless it be made in the imme-
diate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such
person.
Explanation.--In this section "Magistrate" does not include the
head of a village discharging magisterial functions in the Presi-
dency of Fort St. George or elsewhere, unless such headman is a
Magistrate exercising the powers of a Magistrate under the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1882 (10 of 1882).
27. How much of information received from accused may be
proved.-- Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered
inconsequence of information received from a person accused of
any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of such in-
formation, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates dis-
tinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved."
16. A perusal of the deposition of PW-27, which we have quoted
above, shows that he attempted to prove the confessions allegedly made
by the accused to a police officer when they were in Police custody.
There is a complete prohibition on even proving such confessions. The
learned Trial Judge has completely lost sight of Sections 25 and 26 of
the Evidence Act and has allowed PW-27 to prove the confessions al-
legedly made by the accused while they were in police custody. PW-27
stated that the appellant "suffered disclosure statement at Exhibits
'P55' and 'P56' respectively". Obviously, he is referring to disclosure
of the information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The law on
disclosure under Section 27 is well settled right from the classic deci-
sion of the Privy Council in the case of Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Em-
peror2. In the case of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P.3, this
Court relied upon the decision of the Privy Council and in paragraph 9
held thus:
"9. Let us then turn to the question whether the statement of
the appellant to the effect that "he had hidden them (the orna-
ments)" and "would point out the place" where they were, is
wholly admissible in evidence under Section 27 or only that part
of it is admissible where he stated that he would point out the
place but not that part where he stated that he had hidden the or-
naments. The Sessions Judge in this connection relied on Pu-
lukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor [(1946-47) 74 IA 65] where a
part of the statement leading to the recovery of a knife in a mur-
der case was held inadmissible by the Judicial Committee. In that
case the Judicial Committee considered Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act, which is in these terms:
"Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in
consequence of information received from a person accused of
any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such
information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as re-
lates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved."
This section is an exception to Sections 25 and 26, which pro-
hibit the proof of a confession made to a police officer or a con-
fession made while a person is in police custody, unless it is made
in immediate presence of a Magistrate. Section 27 allows that
part of the statement made by the accused to the police "whether
it amounts to a confession or not" which relates distinctly to the
fact thereby discovered to be proved. Thus even a confessional
statement before the police which distinctly relates to the discov-
ery of a fact may be proved under Section 27. The Judicial Com-
mittee had in that case to consider how much of the information
given by the accused to the police would be admissible under Sec-
tion 27 and laid stress on the words "so much of such informa-
tion...as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered" in that
connection. It held that the extent of the information admissible
must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which
such information is required to relate. It was further pointed out
that "the fact discovered embraces the place from which the ob-
ject is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and
the information given must relate distinctly to this fact". It was
further observed that--
"Information as to past user, or the past history of the ob-
ject produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in
which it is discovered."
This was exemplified further by the Judicial Committee by ob-
serving--
"Information supplied by a person in custody that 'I will
produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house' leads to
the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house
of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to
have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact dis-
covered is very relevant. If however to the statement the
words be added 'with which I stabbed A', these words are in-
admissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the
knife in the house of the informant."
(emphasis added)
Section 27 is an exception to Sections 25 and 26. It permits
certain parts of the statement made by the accused to a police of-
ficer while in custody to be proved. Under Section 27, only that
part of the statement made by the accused is admissible, which
distinctly relates to the discovery. It becomes admissible when a
fact is discovered as a consequence of the information received
from the accused. What is admissible is only such information fur-
nished by the accused as relates distinctly to the facts thereby dis-
covered. No other part is admissible. By Exhibits 'P55' and 'P56',
it is alleged that the accused showed the places where the de-
ceased was abducted, where he was murdered and where his body
was thrown. In this case, even the inadmissible part of the state-
ment under Section 27 of the Evidence Act has been incorporated
in the examination-in-chief of PW-27. The learned trial judge
should not have recorded an inadmissible confession in the depo-
sition. A confessional statement made by the accused to a police
officer while in custody is not admissible in the evidence except to
the extent to which Section 27 is applicable. If such inadmissible
confessions are made part of the depositions of the prosecution
witnesses, then there is every possibility that the Trial Courts may
get influenced by it."
47. A confession made by owner of the vehicle, admitting guilt of the
Driver, that too after the police abusing the powers under Section 133 of the
Motor Vehicle Act and calling the owner and driver physically to the police
station by applying pressure tactics, cannot be said to be disclosure of the
accused under Section 27, because no further discovery of any fact took
place. Even the police have not recorded it as disclosure statement under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
48. In the case of Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had the
occasion to consider the entire law relating to jurisdiction of the High Court
under Section 482 Cr.P.C./Article 226 of the Constitution of India and laid
down the following para meters:-
"10. While considering the aforesaid issue, law on the exercise of
powers by the High Court under Section 482CrPC and/or under Arti-
cle 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the FIR/complaint and
the parameters for exercise of such powers and scope and ambit of
the power by the High Court under Section 482CrPC and/or under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India are required to be referred to
as the very parameters which are required to be applied while quash-
ing the FIR will also be applicable while granting interim stay/protec-
tion.
10.1. The first case on the point which is required to be noticed is
the decision of this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of Pun-
jab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866] . While dealing
with the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 561-A of the
earlier Code (which is in pari materia with Section 482 of the Code),
it is observed and held that the inherent powers of the High Court un-
der Section 561 of the earlier Code cannot be exercised in regard to
the matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code;
the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash
proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; ordi-
narily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must
be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would
be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory
stage. After observing this, thereafter this Court then carved out some
exceptions to the abovestated rule, which are as under : (AIR p. 866)
"(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against
the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of
the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for in-
stance, furnish cases under this category.
(ii) Where the allegations in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no
question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of look-
ing at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether
the offence alleged is disclosed or not.
(iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do
constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence ad-
duced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or mani-
festly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is
important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there
is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly
and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where
there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not sup-
port the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as
to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the func-
tion of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any
party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend
that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation
made against the accused would not be sustained."
(emphasis supplied)
10.2. In Kurukshetra University [Kurukshetra University v. State
of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 451 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 613] , this Court ob-
served and held that inherent powers under Section 482CrPC do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to
whim or caprice; that statutory power has to be exercised sparingly
with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. In the case before
this Court, the High Court quashed the first information report filed
by the Kurukshetra University through Warden and that too without
issuing notice to the University, in exercise of inherent powers under
Section 482CrPC. This Court noticed and observed that the High
Court was not justified in quashing the FIR when the police had not
even commenced investigation into the complaint filed by the Warden
of the University and no proceedings were at all pending before any
Court in pursuance of the FIR.
10.3. Then comes the celebrated decision of this Court in Bhajan
Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426] . In the said decision, this Court considered in detail
the scope of the High Court powers under Section 482CrPC and/or
Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the FIR and referred
to several judicial precedents and held that the High Court should not
embark upon an inquiry into the merits and demerits of the allega-
tions and quash the proceedings without allowing the investigating
agency to complete its task. At the same time, this Court identified the
following cases in which FIR/complaint can be quashed:
"102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information re-
port or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or com-
plaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not dis-
close the commission of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so ab-
surd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent per-
son can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the pro-
ceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ul-
terior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
49. Thereafter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reached to conclusion in para
33 of the aforesaid judgment by considering the nature of jurisdiction of the
High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C./Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
50. In the present case, it is a case of there being no legal evidence against
the present petitioner to continue with the impugned charge sheet. On the
other hand, it is a case of gross misuse of powers by the police, which is
nothing but a grossly oppressive action by the police authority in the present
case, which has had the effect of putting the petitioners to give prejudice by
involving them into a non-existent case having no legal evidence.
51. It is not the case where the matter is at the investigation stage, but even
charge sheet has been filed after completion of investigation and no other
legal evidence remains to be collected by the police.
52. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, it is a fit case to quash the FIR
registered against the present applicant so also the consequential proceedings
arising therefrom, which is the prayer made in M.Cr.C. No.17182/2018.
Therefore, the FIR and consequential proceedings stand quashed.
53. So far as writ petition is concerned, this Court has given detailed
reasoning and findings in the matter of abuse of powers by the different
police authorities and the manner in which the letter dated 01.06.2017 and
31.03.2017 seem to have been created.
54. Let the Director General of Police cause a preliminary enquiry, either
himself or through a competent authority under him, into the matter to find
out whether the activities of various police officials in this entire matter lead
to any criminal offence or misconduct on their part. If any misconduct is
found on the part of the police officials, then they would be proceeded against
departmentally by the police authorities. In case any criminal offence is found
to be committed, then the law shall be allowed to take its own course.
55. Let the decision in this regard be taken by the Director General of
Police within a period of two months from todayand outcome be also
communicated to the petitioners, failing which the petitioners shall be entitled
to institute contempt proceedings against the Director General of Police. If
the petitioners are aggrieved by the decision so taken by the D.G.P., they
would be at liberty to renew their prayer so far W.P. No.127/2018 is
concerned by resorting to fresh proceedings as permissible under law, to the
extent of seeking disciplinary and punitive action against the police officials.
56. With the aforesaid directions, both the petitions are allowed.
(VIVEK JAIN)
JUDGE
MISHRA/rj
