Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jitendra vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 26 June, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AMIT SETH
ON THE 26th OF JUNE, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 4230 of 2025
JITENDRA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Prateek Kulshrestha - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Rajendra Singh Yadav - Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of
Advocate General.
Shri Atul Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent [R-2].
ORDER
1 .Present application under section 483(3) of BNSS has been filed
for cancellation of bail granted to respondent No. 2 / accused - Rustam
Singh by the trial court vide order dated 24.12.2024 passed in Sessions Trial
No.286/2024.
2 . Learned counsel for the applicant seeks cancellation of bail
granted to respondent No. 2 primarily on the ground that trial court has erred
in following the principle of parity with co-accused Udayveer Gurjar, who
was granted regular bail by co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated
19/12/2024 passed in M.Cr.C. No. 46187/2024. Learned counsel submits
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that allegations levelled against co-accused Udayveer Gurjar were not
similar to the allegations levelled against respondent No. 2. That apart, one
of the consideration of co-ordinate Bench of this Court in granting bail to
the co-accused Udayveer Gurjar was that he was national level player of
weightlifting which ground was not available to respondent No. 2. Learned
counsel further submits that perusal of Annexures P/3 & P/4, which are
medical documents of injured Saraswati and Pooja reveal that left hand
humerus bone fracture was allegedly caused by respondent No. 2 and,
therefore, bail could not have been granted to him. He further submits that
parity was not available to the respondent No. 2 as 306 bore rifle along with
live cartridges were recovered from him. He further submits that respondent
No. 2 is having criminal antecedent as FIR bearing crime No. 88/2024 was
registered against him at police station Matabasiya, District Morena for the
offence punishable under section 324, 323, 294, 506 & 34 of IPC. In support
of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgments
delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Shabeen Ahmad vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Another reported in 2025 INSC 307 and also in the case
o f Jagjeet Singh and Ors vs Ashish Mishra @ Monu and Anr. reported in
(2022) AIR (SC) 1918 by referring para 29 of the judgment. On these
grounds, it is prayed that bail granted to the respondent No. 2 by the trial
court vide order dated 24.12.2024 passed in Sessions Trial No.286/2024 may
be cancelled.
3 . Learned counsel for the State supported the arguments of learned
counsel for the applicant / complainant and prayed to recall the bail granted
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to respondent No. 2.
4 . On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 / accused
vehemently opposed the application and argued that perusal of bail order
passed by the trial court dated 24.12.2024 in Sessions Trial No.286/2024
especially referring to the ground on which bail was granted stated therein
that the respondent No. 2 is a sole bread earner in his family. He was in
custody for last five months. The injury sustained by the injured Saraswati is
bone deep which shows charred burning and blackening, whereas, as per
prosecution, injury was alleged to be caused from distance. Charge sheet was
filed and trial was likely to take considerable time. The injury sustained by
the injured is not threatening to life. Co-accused Udayveer Gurjar was
granted bail by co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 19/12/2024
passed in M.Cr.C. No. 46187/2024.
5 . Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 submitted
that consideration made by learned trial Court for grant of bail to the
respondent No. 2 reveal that apart from the parity, learned trial Court also
took into consideration the fact that respondent No. 2 was languishing in jail
for last five months and he cannot be kept in custody for an unlimited period
without any substantial reason. He further submits that parity was not the
only criteria, on which, learned trial Court extended benefit of bail to the
respondent No. 2. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed
reliance upon the judgments delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Dolat
Ram vs State of Haryana reported in 1995 (1) SCC 349 and in the case of
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Himanshu Sharma vs. State of M.P. reported in 2024 (INSC) 139 by
referring para 12 of the judgment and order passed by co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 46187/2024. On these grounds, he prays that
instant application filed by the applicant may be dismissed.
6. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material
available on record.
7. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Shabeen Ahmad (Supra), it has been held that the bail once granted ought
not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or
perverse order of bail is open to interference by the Superior Courts.
Similarly, in the case of Jagjeet Singh (Supra) relied upon by the applicant,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that ordinarily the Court would be slow
in interfering with any order wherein bail has been granted. However, if it is
found that such an order is illegal or perverse or is found upon irrelevant
materials adding vulnerability to the order granting bail. The bail can be
cancelled.
8 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case the case of Dolat Ram Vs.
State of Haryana [(1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237] has held as
under:
"Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are
necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail,
already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation
of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are: interference
or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of
Justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or
abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The
satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the
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record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another
reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once
granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without
considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered
it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain
his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial.
These principles, it appears, were lost sight of by the High Court
when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. The High
Court it appears to us overlooked the distinction of the factors
relevant for rejecting bail in a non-bailable case in the first
instance and the cancellation of bail already granted"
9 . In the case of Bhuri Bai vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh: 2022
LiveLaw (SC) 956, the Apex Court has held as under:
"19. It remains trite that normally, very cogent and
overwhelming circumstances or grounds are required to cancel the
bail already granted. Ordinarily, unless a strong case based on any
supervening event is made out, an order granting bail is not to be
lightly interfered with under Section 439 (2) CrPC."
20. It had not been the case of the prosecution that the
appellant had misused the liberty or had comported herself in any
manner in violation of the conditions imposed on her. We are
impelled to observe that power of cancellation of bail should be
exercised with extreme care and circumspection; and such
cancellation cannot be ordered merely for any perceived
indiscipline on the part of the accused before granting bail. In
other words, the powers of cancellation of bail cannot be
approached as if of disciplinary proceedings against the accused
and in fact, in a case where bail has already been granted, its
upsetting under Section 439 (2) CrPC is envisaged only in such
cases where the liberty of the accused is going to be counteracting
the requirements of a proper trial of the criminal case. In the
matter of the present nature, in our view, over-expansion of the
issue was not required only for one reason that a particular factor
was not stated by the Trial Court in its order granting bail."
10. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Mubin and Ors.; 2011 Crl.
L.J. 3850, the Court has held as under;
"9. The primary question which is to be considered by us in
this case is as to whether the accused applicants had committed
any offence, during the pendency of the appeal, on account of
lodging of some first information reports. In other words, can it be
said that a person has committed an offence when a first
information report is lodged against him. In our considered
opinion, merely lodging of a first information report, does not
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amount to commission of an offence and it is only
accusation/allegation which can be said to be leveled against the
accused person at the stage. As a matter of fact, the question as to
whether an offence has been prim-facie committed or not is
considered when an opinion is formed by the Court after applying
mind on the material before it. That stage would come only at the
time of framing of charge. It would be relevant to mention here
that the legislature, in its wisdom, has clearly laid down the
distinction in the provisions under Section 228, Cr. P.C. and the
terminology used at the stages prior to it. The relevant provisions
of the Code of criminal procedure is as under:- "228. - Framing of
charge - (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid,
the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence which -
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may,
frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case
for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate (or any other Judicial
Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial
Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the
First Class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such
Magistrate) shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure
for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a
charge against the accused."
In other words, an accused can be said to have committed an
offence only when a Court, after considering the material before it
and hearing the parties, forms an opinion to that effect, at the time
of framing of charge. It is only after judicious consideration by a
Court and an opinion is formed by it for presuming the
commission of an offence that an accused can be said to have
committed an offence. Therefore, an offence can be said to have
been committed only at the stage of framing of charge when the
concerning Court forms an opinion for presuming that the accused
has committed the offence and not at earlier point of time. The
word 'commit' as per Johnson Dictionary means 'to be guilty of a
crime."
11. While examining this case, in the light of the above mentioned
settled principle of law, it is found that learned trial court while granting bail
to the respondent No. 2 vide order dated 24/12/2024 has not solely applied
principle of parity with co-accused Udayveer Gurjar, but has assigned
number of reasons as stated hereinabove, on which, respondent No. 2 was
found entitled for grant of bail. The order passed by the trial court is,
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therefore, not opened to challenge on the ground as raised in the petition.
12. That apart, there is nothing on record to show that after registration
of FIR, charge-sheet has been filed against respondent No. 2 and cognizance
has been taken against him. Merely lodging of FIR does not amount to
commission of offence. It is only the accusation/allegation. An accused can
be said to have committed the offence only when the Court after considering
the material before it and hearing the parties forms an opinion to that effect at
the time of framing of charge.
13. In view of the above discussion and in the light of the settled
principle of law, as discussed above, present application, seeking
cancellation of bail granted to respondent No. 2 vide impugned order, sans
merits and is hereby dismissed.
(AMIT SETH)
JUDGE
Durgekar
