Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shri D.P. Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 25 June, 2025
Author: Sanjay Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Dwivedi
1
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
+
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY DWIVEDI
ON THE 25th OF JUNE, 2025
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.2930 of 2011
SMT. ASHA DWIVEDI
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.2931 of 2011
KAUSHAL SAKET
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.2949 of 2011
R.P. TIWARI
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.2984 of 2011
SMT. MANJULATA TIWARI
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.3013 of 2011
SHRI KAUSHLESH DWIVEDI
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.3014 of 2011
SHRI D.P. SINGH
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: SATYA SAI RAO
Signing time: 6/26/2025
12:25:34 PM
2
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.3015 of 2011
DR. PRADEEP MISHRA
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
&
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.3016 of 2011
SHYAM KISHORE MISHRA
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
............................................................................................................................................
Appearance :
Shri Himanshu Chourasiya, Shri N.K. Gupta, Shri Naveen Dubey, Shri
Anil Khare - Senior Advocate with Shri Priyank Agrawal, Shri Rahul
Tripathi, Shri Manoj Sharma - Senior Advocate with Ms. Lavanya Verma and
Shri Shivam Singh - Advocates for the appellants in their respective appeals.
Shri Abhinav Shrivastava - Advocate for the respondent.
............................................................................................................................................
Reserved on : 20.05.2025
Pronounced on : 25.06.2025
JUDGMENT
These appeals have been filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'CrPC') against the
judgment dated 08.12.2011 passed by the Special Judge (Prevention of
Corruption Act), Rewa in Special Case No.14/2004, in which all the
appellants were convicted for the offence punishable under Sections
420/120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity 'IPC') and Section
13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for
short the 'Act, 1988').
2. As per the case of prosecution, on 15.09.1998, the Lokayukta
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
received a complaint containing general allegations that there is a large
scale irregularity committed in appointment of Shiksha Karmi Grade-I, II
and III by Zila Panchayat and Janpad Panchayat.
3. The selection was being conducted in District Rewa.
4. As per the allegation, which was also published in a local
newspaper, there was a rampant nepotism in the selection of Shiksha
Karmi in Rewa District. It is alleged that during the course of selection
of Shiksha Karmi, illegal means have been adopted and instead of
eligible candidates, ineligible candidates were selected by manipulating
the marks and on that plot and conspiracy, unfair selection was done in
which public servants and members of Janpad Panchayat were involved
and as such, misusing their power, they committed a crime. Therefore,
vide Crime No.97/1998, a case was registered by the Lokayukta against
the present appellants and offence got registered under the aforesaid
Sections.
5. The main limb of argument of the learned counsels appearing for
the appellants is that the prosecution has failed to adduce any relevant
material and evidence so as to fulfill the requirement of respective
Sections under which the present appellants have been charged. It is
submitted by the counsels for the appellants that if the allegations and
the case of prosecution and the evidence adduced by them are seen, then
it is clear that the conviction of the present appellants is based upon
surmises and conjectures whereas no material is produced by the
prosecution so as to implicate them in the alleged offence. It is the
submission of the counsels for the present appellants that the complaint
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
received by the Lokayukta was not very specific. They further submitted
that though there were allegations about irregularities alleged to have
been committed during the course of selection of Shiksha Karmi but
nothing was collected by the prosecution so as to substantiate those
allegations and even otherwise, the persons said to have been illegally
selected have not been made accused and the persons who were though
eligible but not selected were also not brought in the witness box so as
to raise their grievance and even nobody has claimed that the selection
was illegal and their right of selection and appointment was defeated.
6. It is also submitted by the counsels for the appellants that all the
allegations were unfounded because the selection in question and
appointments made thereof have never been set aside by the State
Government. On the contrary, the candidates selected as Shiksha Karmi,
later on got regularized and are still performing their duties. As such, it
is clear that the Appointing Authority has never found any irregularity
and illegality in the selection of Shikha Karmi but the Lokayukta
registered a case and submitted the charge-sheet on a vague allegation
without there being any cogent material indicating the direct
involvement of the present appellants in the alleged crime so as to
satisfy the requirement of relevant Sections under which the present
appellants have been charged and therefore, according to them, no
offence is made out and the trial Court without appreciating that aspect
has passed the impugned judgment convicting the present appellants and
as such, it is not sustainable and according to the appellants, the
impugned judgment deserves to be set aside.
7. The counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
documents on which the conviction is founded have never been seized
in proper manner and also not kept in a sealed cover.
8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has
opposed the submissions made by the counsels for the appellants and
submitted that in the impugned judgment, the trial Court has considered
the irregularities which have been alleged and as to how manipulation in
the tabulation register was done so as to give benefit to the ineligible
candidates so as to ignore the rightful claim of the eligible candidates.
He has further submitted that in view of the role assigned to the present
appellants and the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is clear that
the conviction is proper and the findings given by the trial Court do not
call for any interference by this Court. It is contended by the counsel for
the respondent that the submission made with regard to vague charges is
not acceptable because the present appellants got an opportunity to
defend themselves because they contested the trial and, therefore, their
stand about vagueness in the charges has no substance.
9. To bolster their submissions, both sides have placed reliance upon
several judgments of the Supreme Court.
10. From a bare perusal of the impugned judgment and the material
available on record, it is clear that the present appellants have been
charged for the offence punishable under Sections 420/120B of IPC and
Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Act, 1988 and as per the submissions
made by the counsels for the appellants, the material ingredients so as to
prove the charge under the respective Sections are not available on
record. Under such a circumstance, it is apt to reproduce the respective
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
Sections so as to see their material ingredients.
Sections 420 and 120B of IPC
"420. Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces
the person deceived to deliver any property to any
person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part
of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or
sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a
valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
120B---- [120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.--(1)
Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit
an offence punishable with death, 2[imprisonment for
life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or
upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in
this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be
punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such
offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other
than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence
punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term not
exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.]
13(1)(d) & 13(2) of the Act, 1988
13(1)(d)
if he,--
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for
any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains
for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for
any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage
without any public interest;
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
13(2) Any public servant who commits criminal
misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall be not less than [four years] but which
may extend to [ten years] and shall also be liable to
fine.)
11. As per the requirement of Section 420 of IPC, it is clear that
cheating and deceit are necessary ingredients and therefore, to prove the
charge of 420, it is the duty of the prosecution to produce the evidence
about cheating and deceit. However, from the statement of the
Investigating Officer, namely, Prakash Chandra Sonkar (PW-42), who in
paragraph-71 of his statement has very clearly admitted that during the
course of investigation, nothing has been collected so as to substantiate
that any of the appellants have given any benefit directly to any of the
candidates who got selected and even no document is collected so as to
show that any monetary transaction took place, but only on the basis that
some of the witnesses have apprehended the irregularity, he has
prosecuted the present appellants. The statement of the I.O. in
paragraph-71 is as under:-
"71- eq>sa इस प्रकरण का अनुसंधान दि. 26-9-2001 को मिला था। यह बात
सही है कि आक्षेप में जिनकी हमने अवध नियुक्ति मानी थी उनमे से किसी को
आरोपी नही बनाया गया, न उनसे पूछतांछ dh न उनका बयान रिकार्ड किया
। मैने Lo;a राज्य सरकार को यह भी नही लिखा कि नियुक्तियां fवधि अनुसान
नही की गई इसलिए नियुक्तियां निरस्त की जाये। यह बात सही है कि कोई
लेनदेन dh बात अथवा प्रत्यक्ष सहायता dh कोई साक्ष्य प्राप्त नही हुई थी,
मात्र dqN साक्षियों ने शंका जाहिर किया था, इसी आधार पर मैने अभियुक्तो
को vfHk;ksftr किया था।"
Thus, it is clear that there was no cogent evidence produced by the
prosecution so as to fulfill the requirement of Section 420 of IPC.
12. Although, the trial Court in respect of Section 120B of IPC has
observed that not only the basic offence but the conspiracy is also
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
proved but as to how it is proved, nothing has been expressed. No
evidence has been produced so as to prove the material ingredients of
Section 120B of IPC, according to which, there must be a material so as
to show an agreement between the parties for doing an unlawful act but
from perusal of whole record and the statement of the witnesses, no such
evidence has been brought forward so as to prove any premeditation
amongst the parties so as to commit any illegal act. There was also
nothing on record so as to show the agreement between the parties that
they committed any unlawful act.
13. In the same manner, if the required ingredients of Section 13(1)(d)
and 13(2) of the Act, 1988 are seen, it is clear that there must be some
material to show any corrupt or illegal means but as per the statement of
I.O. (PW-42), it is clear that there was no such material available but
only on the basis of apprehension of some of the witnesses, the offence
got registered and the present appellants were prosecuted.
14. The Supreme Court in case of A. Srinivasulu v. State of T.N.
reported in (2023) 13 SCC 705, has considered in detail as to how
charge of Section 120B r/w Section 420 of IPC is established. As per the
requirement of Section 420 of IPC, the prosecution has to establish that
the person facing the charge not only cheated someone but also that by
doing so, he has dishonestly induced the person who is cheated to
deliver any property, etc.
15. However, in the case in hand, there is nothing on record so as to
show that a particular person has been cheated because as per the case of
prosecution, eligible persons have been ignored and ineligible persons
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
were appointed whereas nobody has come forward and even no
statement of any such witness is recorded claiming that though he was
eligible but not appointed and the selection was unfair. The I.O. himself
has admitted that no-one has been called in the witness box or made an
accusation relating to the said selection. As such, the offence of Sections
120B and 420 of IPC is not made out against the present appellants in
absence of any cogent material.
16. Likewise for constituting the offence of Sections 13(1)(d) and
13(2) of the Act, 1988, there must be some cogent material so as to see
that a public servant obtained for himself or for any other person, any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. However, as per the statement of
I.O. (PW-42), it is clear that there was no such material collected
indicating that any of the appellants has got any valuable thing or any
pecuniary benefit from anybody. The allegation with regard to one of the
witnesses in respect of demand of Rs.50,000/- is concerned, that witness
was not relied upon and even from the statement of I.O. (PW-42), it is
clear that no evidence with regard to any demand of transaction is
available with the prosecution. Although, it is apprehended only by
some of the witnesses but that is not enough to prove the guilt of the
present appellants. Since nobody has been examined by the prosecution,
who has suffered any such injury and his rightful claim of appointment
has been snatched and given to ineligible persons, therefore, in absence
of any such statement, the charge of irregularity or illegal appointment
cannot be said to be found proved against the present appellants.
17. Surprisingly, when the selection and appointment made therein
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
have not been disturbed by the appointing authority i.e. the State
Government and the person said to have been deceited, never came
forward and made any allegation neither to the police nor to any of the
authorities, the foundation of charge is very weak and on the basis of the
said charge, which is otherwise not found proved during the trial,
conviction cannot be sustained.
18. In paragraph-149 of the impugned judgment, the trial Court itself
has observed that the witness namely Jagannath Mishra (PW-15), has
not made any statement in the Court about the demand of Rs.50,000/- by
one of the accused/appellant namely D.P. Singh. Although, the trial
Court has observed that in the police statement, this witness has made a
mention about the demand of Rs.50,000/- by one of the appellants
namely Pradeep Mishra and, therefore, it is found that the said allegation
has some substance. Although, I am not convinced with the observation
made by the trial Court for the reason that though there was a demand of
Rs.50,000/- but no evidence adduced whether that demand was fulfilled
or any amount was paid to anybody. Even otherwise, the person who has
not been selected, has also not raised any grievance in this regard. The
selection was also not found illegal because as per the statement of I.O.,
no such person has made any complaint to the State Government about
any such illegality committed during the course of selection of Shiksha
Karmi and that selection should be cancelled or appointment made
therein be set aside.
19. From examination of record and overall material available before
the Court, it is clear that neither the required ingredients of Sections 420
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
and 120B of IPC and Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Act, 1988 were
available on record nor the charges were found proved. Even otherwise,
in view of the admission made by I.O. itself, it is clear that he has
prosecuted the present appellants only on the basis of apprehension of
some of the witnesses and as such, it is not proper to say that conviction
was based upon apprehension and on surmises and conjectures without
collecting cogent evidence during course of investigation to prove the
charges.
20. Although, the counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the
judgment which is impugned in this case but he is not able to satisfy this
Court as to how the charge levelled against the present appellants has
been found proved and what cogent material and evidence were
produced by the prosecution so as to prove the guilt of the present
appellants.
21. The Supreme Court in case of Deepak Gaba and others v. State
of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in (2023) 3 SCC 423 has
observed as under:-
"18. In order to apply Section 420IPC, namely, cheating
and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, the
ingredients of Section 415IPC have to be satisfied. To
constitute an offence of cheating under Section 415IPC,
a person should be induced, either fraudulently or
dishonestly, to deliver any property to any person, or
consent that any person shall retain any property. The
second class of acts set forth in the section is the
intentional inducement of doing or omitting to do
anything which the person deceived would not do or
omit to do, if she were not so deceived. Thus, the sine
qua non of Section 415IPC is "fraudulence",
"dishonesty", or "intentional inducement", and the
absence of these elements would debase the offence of
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
cheating. [Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc.,
(2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201]
x x x
20. In the present case, the ingredients to constitute an
offence under Section 420 read with Section 415IPC are
absent. The pre-summoning evidence does not disclose
and establish the essential ingredients of Section
415IPC. There is no assertion, much less legal evidence,
to submit that JIPL had engaged in dishonesty, fraud, or
intentional inducement to deliver a property. It is not the
case of Respondent 2 complainant that JIPL had tried to
deceive them, either by making a false or misleading
representation, or by any other action or omission; nor is
it their case that JIPL had offered any fraudulent or
dishonest inducement to deliver a property. As such,
given that the ingredients of Section 415IPC are not
satisfied, the offence under Section 420IPC is not made
out."
22. Further in case of N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
CBI reported in (2021) 18 SCC 70, the Supreme Court has observed as
under:-
"50. Section 420IPC, provides that whoever cheats and
thereby dishonestly induces a person deceived to deliver
any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy,
the whole or any part of valuable security, or anything,
which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being
converted into a valuable security, shall be liable to be
punished for a term which may extend to seven years
and shall also be liable to fine.
51. It is paramount that in order to attract the provisions
of Section 420IPC, the prosecution has to not only prove
that the accused has cheated someone but also that by
doing so, he has dishonestly induced the person who is
cheated to deliver property. There are, thus, three
components of this offence i.e. (i) deception of any
person, (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that
person to deliver any property to any person, and (iii)
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
mens rea of the accused at the time of making the
inducement. It goes without saying that for the offence
of cheating, fraudulent and dishonest intention must
exist from the inception when the promise or
representation was made."
23. Likewise in case of Parveen @ Sonu v. State of Haryana
reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1184, the Supreme Court in respect
of Section 120B of IPC has observed as under:-
"12. It is fairly well settled, to prove the charge of
conspiracy, within the ambit of Section 120-B, it is
necessary to establish that there was an agreement
between the parties for doing an unlawful act. At the
same time, it is to be noted that it is difficult to establish
conspiracy by direct evidence at all, but at the same
time, in absence of any evidence to show meeting of
minds between the conspirators for the intended object
of committing an illegal act, it is not safe to hold a
person guilty for offences under Section 120-B of IPC. A
few bits here and a few bits there on which prosecution
relies, cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the
accused with the commission of crime of criminal
conspiracy. Even the alleged confessional statements of
the co-accused, in absence of other acceptable
corroborative evidence, is not safe to convict the
accused. In the case of Indra Dalal v. State Of Haryana1,
this Court has considered the conviction based only on
confessional statement and recovery of vehicle used in
the crime. In the said case, while setting aside the
conviction, this Court has held in paragraphs 16 & 17 as
under:
"16. The philosophy behind the aforesaid provision is
acceptance of a harsh reality that confessions are
extorted by the police officers by practising oppression
and torture or even inducement and, therefore, they are
unworthy of any credence. The provision absolutely
excludes from evidence against the accused a confession
made by him to a police officer. This provision applies
even to those confessions which are made to a police
officer who may not otherwise be acting as such. If he is a
police officer and confession was made in his presence, in
whatever capacity, the same becomes inadmissible in
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
evidence. This is the substantive rule of law enshrined
under this provision and this strict rule has been
reiterated countlessly by this Court as well as the High
Courts.
17. The word "confession" has nowhere been defined.
However, the courts have resorted to the dictionary
meaning and explained that incriminating statements by
the accused to the police suggesting the inference of the
commission of the crime would amount to confession
and, therefore, inadmissible under this provision. It is
also defined to mean a direct acknowledgment of guilt
and not the admission of any incriminating fact, however
grave or conclusive. Section 26 of the Evidence Act
makes all those confessions inadmissible when they are
made by any person, whilst he is in the custody of a
police officer, unless such a confession is made in the
immediate presence of a Magistrate. Therefore, when a
person is in police custody, the confession made by him
even to a third person, that is, other than a police officer,
shall also become inadmissible."
24. The Supreme Court further in case of Neeraj Dutta v. State
(Government of NCT of Delhi) reported in (2023) 4 SCC 731, has
observed as under:-
"88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the
prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the
guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
x x x
88.3.(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also
be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of
direct oral and documentary evidence."
25. This Court has also observed that the foundation of conviction is
based only on documentary evidence and there is no satisfactory answer
given by the prosecution as to why the documents produced by the
prosecuting agency were not properly sealed and kept in proper custody,
even no seizure memo was produced. On the contrary, the I.O. has
CRA-2930-2011 & other connected appeals
admitted this fact that the documents were kept in open and the
possibility of tampering with the same by unknown person cannot be
ruled out. As such, the allegation of erasing the document and
manipulation in the same against the present appellants cannot be said to
be found proved and they cannot be held guilty for such an act because
it creates doubt and considering the principle of preponderance of
probability, which goes always in favour of the accused, the prosecution,
in my opinion, has failed to prove the charge beyond all reasonable
doubt. Thus, the impugned judgment is not sustainable and in my
opinion, the prosecution has not only failed to collect proper material so
as to fulfill the required ingredients of respective Sections under which
the offence got registered against the present appellants but also failed to
prove the charge levelled against them.
26. In view of the above discourse, these appeals are allowed. The
impugned judgment dated 08.12.2011 passed by the Special Judge
(Prevention of Corruption Act), Rewa, in Special Case No.14/2004,
convicting the present appellants under Sections 420/120B of IPC and
Sections 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Act, 1988, is hereby set aside. The
appellants are on bail, their bail bonds shall stand discharged.
27. Record of the trial Court be sent back immediately along with a
copy of this judgment.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI)
JUDGE
ac/-
Rao
