Madhya Pradesh High Court
Harnam Singh Gurjar vs The State Of M.P. on 18 June, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
1 WP-4820-2006
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
ON THE 18th OF JUNE, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 4820 of 2006
HARNAM SINGH GURJAR
Versus
THE STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri MPS Raghuwanshi - Senior Advocate alongwith Shri Md. Amir
Khan - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri M.S. Jadon - Government Advocate for the State.
ORDER
The present petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India
has been filed by the petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated
27.04.2006 passed by the respondent No.2/Director General of Police,
Bhopal in an appeal preferred by the petitioner by which the order dated
15.10.2005 passed by the Inspector General of Police, Gwalior Range,
Gwalior to the effect of stopping one increment of the petitioner for a year
with cumulative effect was upheld. As a consequence of the aforesaid orders,
promotion of the petitioner had been cancelled by the Director General of
Police, Bhopal vide order dated 08.03.2006.
2. Short facts of the case are that the petitioner was working as
Constable in Police Line Gwalior at the relevant point of time and while he
was posted there, he was charge-sheeted on 22.05.2002 whereby one charge
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
2 WP-4820-2006
was levelled against him which is as under:-
"आरोप व आरोपी आर क (आरमोरर) 282 हरनाम
िसंह
थाना क पू के अप0 0 6/200 म ज जांच हे तु भेजे गये दो
315 बोर के क टे व 2 राउ ड के थान पर जांच उपरा त 2 क टे व
4 कारतूस क गलत जांच रपोट भेज कर घोर लापरवाह व
उदासीनता दिशत करना, जससे यायालय म वसंगित उ प न
होने से अिभयु को लाभ पहुच
ं ा ।"
3. After issuance of the charge-sheet, the petitioner duly submitted his
reply and denied the charge. The Disciplinary Authority being dissatisfied
with the reply filed by the petitioner directed for departmental inquiry. The
Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry and examined number of witnesses
and finally submitted inquiry report to the respondent No.4/SP, Gwalior who,
inflicted the penalty of stopping one increment for a year with cumulative
effect vide Annexure P/2, dated 07.10.2005. In between, the petitioner was
promoted on the post of Head Constable (Arms) vide order dated 04.01.2006
but in consequence of the aforesaid penalty imposed by the respondent No.4,
his promotion was cancelled. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order
dated 07.10.2005 of S.P., Gwalior had preferred an appeal before respondent
No.2/Director General of Police, which was dismissed vide order dated
27.04.2007. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the present petition has been filed.
4. Shri M.P.S. Raghuwanshi - learned Senior Advocate alongwith Shri
Md. Amir Khan - Advocate for the petitioner has argued before this Court
that the impugned orders are liable to be quashed, inasmuch as, in the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
3 WP-4820-2006
present case, the enquiry had not been properly conducted and no
opportunity was granted to the petitioner and even he was not given
opportunity to produce his defence witnesses and the enquiry was conducted
in a very hurried and haste manner, therefore, the Disciplinary Authority had
committed a grave error of law in inflicting the penalty of stopping one
increment for a year with cumulative effect.
5. It was further submitted that the petitioner has admitted his bona-
fide mistake about the fact that from police station Kampoo, two unsealed
Kattas with one live and one used cartridge were received for inspection with
regard to Crime No.06 of 2000 but due to clerical mistake, it was mentioned
that two Kattas and four cartridges were received and the same were sent
back after inspection, but the respondents could not demonstrate the fact that
due to the aforesaid bonafide mistake, any benefit accrued to the accused,
thus, the charge as aforesaid against the petitioner should be quashed and the
impugned orders of inflicting penalty of stopping one increment for a year
with cumulative effect being bad in law be set aside. It was thus prayed that
the present petition be allowed.
6. While placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the
matter of Union of India vs. J. Ahmed reported in (1979) 2 SCC 286 , it was
submitted that the allegations mentioned against the petitioner do not specify
as to what is the nature of loss, which has been caused. In absence of any
gross negligence which resulted into any loss or allegation of acting with
malice, the punishment order is extremely disproportionate which warrants
interference by this Court and further, by placing reliance on the judgments
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
4 WP-4820-2006
of Bhagat Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & others reported in (1983) 2
SCC 442; G. Vallikumari vs. Andhra Education Society and others reported
in (2010) 2 SCC 497 and Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya vs. Commissioner of
Police, Delhi and others, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 560, it was submitted that
since punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it may be interfered with.
On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the orders impugned herein be set aside.
7. Per contra, learned Govt. Advocate for the respondents has opposed
the prayer made on behalf of the petitioner and had prayed for dismissal of
the present petition considering the gravity of charges amounting to
dereliction of duty and serious misconduct.
8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9. Discussions and Findings.
At the first instance, this Court deems it appropriate to discuss the
legal position as to misconduct and its impact :-
10. In J. Ahmed (supra), the Apex Court had opined as under:-
"11. .......It is, however, difficult to believe that lack
of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge
of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute
misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty
and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in
evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in
discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless
the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
5 WP-4820-2006
such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so
heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. An
error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of
culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence.
Carelessness can often be productive of more harm than
deliberate wickedness or malevolence. Leaving aside the
classic example of the sentry who sleeps at his post and
allows the enemy to slip through, there are other more
familiar instances of which a railway cabinman signals in a
train on the same track where there is a stationery train
causing head-on collision; a nurse giving intravenous
injection which ought to be given intramuscular causing
instantaneous death; a pilot overlooking an instrument
showing snag in engine and the aircraft crashes causing
heavy loss of life. Misplaced sympathy can be a great evil
(see Navinchandra Shakerchand Shah v. Manager,
Ahmedabad Coop. Department Stores Ltd. [(1978) 19 Guj
LR 108, 120] ). But in any case, failure to attain the highest
standard of efficiency in performance of duty permitting an
inference of negligence would not constitute misconduct
nor for the purpose of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules as would
indicate lack of devotion to duty."
(Emphasis
Supplied)
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
6 WP-4820-2006
11. If the charge sheet is examined in the light of principles laid down
in the case of J. Ahmed (supra) , it will be clear like cloudless sky that the
respondents have nowhere mentioned about the impact of alleged negligence
on the part of the petitioner. This Court finds substance in the argument of
Shri MPS Raghuvanshi, learned Senior Counsel that the respondents could
not establish any ill motive on the part of the petitioner. In other words, it
was not made clear as to what was the adverse impact or resultant damage of
the act of the petitioner. The ratio decidendi of J. Ahmed ( supra) is followed
by the Apex Court in the matters of Ispector Prem Chand Vs. Govt. of NCT
of Delhi reported in (2007) 4 SCC 566; LIC Vs. R. Suresh reported in (2008)
11 SCC 319; Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Sikandar Singh
reported in (2006) 3 SCC 736; Ravi Yashwant Bhoir vs. Collector reported
in (2012) 4 SCC 407 and Mehar Singh Saini, In re, reported in (2010) 13
SCC 586.
Proportionality of punishment :-
12. In the above backdrop, it is to be seen whether the punishment
imposed on the petitioner is disproportionate. The imposition of adequate
punishment commensurate to misconduct is essential and became cause of
concern for our society from time immemorial.
13. The Apex Court in catena of judgments has held that the
punishment imposed must be proportionate. Whether it is a departmental
misconduct or an offence in a criminal case, the doctrine of proportionality is
the anvil on which quantum of punishment needs to be tested.
14. The doctrine of proportionality is not new to India. The first
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
7 WP-4820-2006
separate rock edict of King Ashoka at Dholi shows that Ashoka expressed
his anxiety that no undeserved and harsh punishment should be inflicted.
15. The eloquent saying from Dharma Kosha is worth reading :-
अपराधानु पं च द डं द डयेषू दापयेत ्।
स य द ड णयनं कुयात ्
तीयमपराधं क यिचत ् मेत।
(Let the king inflict punishments upon the guilty (i)
corresponding to the nature (gravity) of the offence, (ii)
according to justice and (iii) not pardon anyone who has
committed the offence for the second time).
Quantification of punishment in proportionate to the
evil was a sign of mature legal system. In our old scriptures,
the said wisdom is expressed in following words :-
द डया दोषानु पता । मणानुसारे ण द डम ्।
[Punishment shall be in proportion to the offence cited
in Kanthirao, Bharatiya Nyayapaddhati (Kannada) Indian
Legal System (Mysore: Institute of Kannada Studies,
University of Mysore, 1985)].
16. In the instant case, as discussed above, it is clear that the petitioner
who was/is working as Constable in Police Lines Gwalior has been charge-
sheeted for negligence shown by sending an incorrect report of 02 Kattas and
04 rounds instead 02 rounds for examination in connection with Crime
No.6/2000 registered at Police Station Kampoo Police Station. The aforesaid
fact has been admitted by the petitioner by submitting that due to clerical
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
8 WP-4820-2006
bonafide mistake on his part, the said report was sent but due that, no
accused persons have been benefited or the said report had not led to their
acquittal nor there is any observation of any kind made in this regard by any
Court of law. Thus, in absence of showing the adverse impact thereof, in the
opinion of this Court, the punishment is clearly disproportionate and
excessive in character.
17. In the case of Chairman & Managing Director, VSP & others vs.
Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, (2008) 5 SCC 569, it was made clear
that superior Courts in some cases may invoke doctrine of proportionality. If
decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the
jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when misconduct stands proved.
In the opinion of this Court, the basic principle running through catena
of judgments that punishment order can be interfered with if it is shockingly
disproportionate, is still good law.
18. In U.P. SRTC v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra, (200) 3 SCC 450 it was
ruled that :-
"8. This will show that not only this Court but also the
High Court can interfere with the punishment inflicted upon
the delinquent employee if, that penalty, shocks the
conscience of the Court. The law, therefore, is not, as
contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, that the
High Court can, in no circumstance, interfere with the
quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee
after disciplinary proceedings.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
9 WP-4820-2006
9. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in
ColourChem Ltd. v. A.L. Alaspurkar [(1998) 3 SCC 192 :
1998 SCC (L&S) 771] has also laid down the same
proposition and held that if the punishment imposed is
shockingly disproportionate to the charges held proved
against the employee, it will be open to the court to interfere.
(Emphasis
Supplied)
This principle was reiterated by the Apex Court in the matter of M.P.
Electricity Board Vs. Jagdish Chandra Sharma reported in (2005) 3 SCC
Substitution of penalty :-
19. The ancillary question is whether this Court itself should modify
the punishment or relegate the matter back to the disciplinary authority.
20. Shri Rahuvanshi, learned Senior Counsel although cited the
judgments of the Apex Court wherein while holding that punishment as
excessive, the Supreme Court itself substituted the punishment. A careful
reading of the said judgments in the factual backdrop of the case shows that
Apex Court in order to do complete justice between the parties exercised its
power under Article 142 of the Constitution. The question whether this Court
should substitute the punishment while interfering with the punishment is no
more res integra. The Apex Court after taking stock of its previous judgments
in the matter of Chief Executive Officer, Krishna District Cooperative
Central Bank Ltd vs K. Hanumantha Rao reported in (2017) 2 SCC 528 had
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
10 WP-4820-2006
opined as under :-
"7.3 The impugned order is also faulted for the reason
that it is not the function of the High Court to impose a
particular punishment even in those cases where it was found
that penalty awarded by the employer is shockingly
disproportionate. In such a case, the matter could, at the best,
be remanded to the disciplinary authority for imposition of
lesser punishment leaving it to such authority to consider as
to which lesser penalty needs to be inflicted upon the
delinquent employee. No doubt, the administrative authority
has to exercise its powers reasonably. However, the doctrine
that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be
reconciled with the doctrine that the Court must not usurp the
discretion of the public authority. The Court must strive to
apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding
authority the full range of choice. In Lucknow Kshetriya
Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh [Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin
Bank v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 : (2013) 3 SCC
(L&S) 159], this principle is formulated in the following
manner: (SCC pp. 380-81, paras 13-14)
"13. Indubitably, the well-ingrained principle of law is
that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority
in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be
given to a delinquent employee keeping in view the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
11 WP-4820-2006
seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an
employee. Courts cannot assume and usurp the function of
the disciplinary authority. In Apparel Export Promotion
Council v. A.K. Chopra [Apparel Export Promotion Council
v. A.K. Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 405]
this principle was explained in the following manner: (SCC
p. 773, para 22)
'22....The High Court in our opinion fell in error in
interfering [Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K.
Chopra, 1997 SCC OnLine Del 973 : (1997) 77 FLR 918]
with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by
the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven
misconduct. ... The High Court should not have substituted
its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment
was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not warrant
any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of
the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the
High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone.' 14.
Yet again, in State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak
[State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak, (2008) 7
SCC 580 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 431] , this Court reiterated
the law by stating: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 14 and 17) '14. In
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
12 WP-4820-2006
the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope of
interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional
cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with
the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be
exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court,
although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the
question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a
limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High
Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not
interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist
sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless
shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected
to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court
no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the
punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give
reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that
it is disproportionate would not suffice.
17. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by
the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the
conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority
or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the
question of imposition of penalty. The High Court in this
case, has not only interfered with the punishment imposed by
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
13 WP-4820-2006
the disciplinary authority in a routine manner but overstepped
its jurisdiction by directing the appellate authority to impose
any other punishment short of removal. By fettering the
discretion of the appellate authority to impose appropriate
punishment for serious misconducts committed by the
respondent, the High Court totally misdirected itself while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in this
background, the conclusion of the Division Bench of the
High Court cannot be regarded as proper at all. The High
Court has interfered with the punishment imposed by the
competent authority in a casual manner and, therefore, the
appeal will have to be accepted."
(Emphasis
Supplied)
It was poignantly held that ordinarily this court should not substitute
the punishment as imposition of penalty is basically in the province of the
disciplinary authority.
21. When the facts of the case of the petitioner are tested on the anvil
of the enunciation of judgments cited above, this Court finds that the
respondents had used a sledge hammer to kill a fly which had not only killed
the fly but had damaged the surroundings, to which this Court cannot watch
as silent spectator, thus, deems it appropriate to set aside the punishment
orders (Annexure P/1 and P/2) so far as the present petitioner is concerned.
The matter is remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority/Competent
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12148
14 WP-4820-2006
Authority to take a fresh decision on the question of quantum of punishment
within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order
keeping in view the findings arrived at in this order and thereafter, if the
petitioner is found entitled for promotion, the Authority concerned is
directed to give benefits as per his entitlement by reviewing its earlier order
dated 08.03.2006 (Annexure P/3) within a period of two months from the
date of taking decision on the question of punishment.
22. With the aforesaid observation and directions, the present petition
is disposed of.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
pwn*
