Madhya Pradesh High Court
Teja Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr on 18 June, 2025
Author: Hirdesh
Bench: Anand Pathak, Hirdesh
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE JUSTICE ANAND PATHAK &
HON'BLE JUSTICE SHRI HIRDESH
ON THE 18TH OF JUNE, 2025
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1324 2016
TEJA SINGH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
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Appearance:
Shri Ashok Kumar Jain and Ms. Nikita Jain- learned Counsel for appellant.
Ms.(Dr.) Anjali Gyanani- learned Public Prosecutor for respondent- State.
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JUDGMENT
Per Hirdesh, J:
Today, this case is listed for hearing on IA No.25452 of 2024, second
application under Section 389(1) of CrPC moved on behalf of appellant- Teja
Singh for suspension of jail sentence and grant of bail on the ground of period
of custody, as he has already suffered more than 10 years of incarceration
without remission. His earlier suspension application (IA No.20379 of 2023)
was rejected vide order dated 01-08-2024.
(2) On being asked, learned Counsel for appellant agreed to argue the matter
finally.
(3) Accordingly, with the consent of learned Counsel for parties, matter is
finally heard. IA No. 25452 of 2024 stands closed.
(4) The instant Criminal Appeal under Section 383 of CrPC has been filed
on behalf of appellant from jail, assailing the judgment of conviction and order
of sentence dated 03-11-2016 passed by Fifth Additional Sessions Judge,
Gwalior in Sessions Trial No.755 of 2014, whereby appellant has been
convicted and sentenced as under:-
Conviction Offence
Section 450 of IPC Five years' rigorous imprisonment with fine
of Rs.5,000/- and in lieu of fine, further three
months' rigorous imprisonment
Section 366 of IPC Ten years' rigorous imprisonment with fine of
Rs.5,000/- and in lieu of fine, further three
months' rigorous imprisonment
Section 506 Part II of Five years' rigorous imprisonment with fine
IPC of Rs.5,000/- and in lieu of fine, further three
months' rigorous imprisonment
Section 376(2)(i) of IPC Life Imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000/-
and in lieu of fine, further six months'
rigorous imprisonment
(5) Briefly stated the case of prosecution is that on 14-11-2014, eight-year
old minor victim girl (PW-1) was sleeping with her mother on the verandah
outside her room. At night, a horseman from Punjab, who used to carry fodder,
came and picked up the minor victim girl, gagged her mouth and took her away
in his lap. That person was wearing a blue-coloured turban like cloth. He had
covered his mouth a little and then, opened it. The minor victim girl asked him
why he had covered his mouth. Then, he said that he has killed another girl and
if she does not listen to him, he will kill her. When minor victim girl shouted,
that person slapped her. Further allegation of minor victim girl is that, the said
person used to come to her farm to get fodder and was wearing a blue turban
and had a belt tied around his waist. He had a red knife. He showed knife to
her and inserted his finger in the place where she urinates, which caused pain
her vagina. When she shouted, he slapped her. He lifted long frock, took off
underwear and inserted his penis on the urinated place of minor victim girl. He
abused her with filthy language and said that if she tells anyone about the
incident, he will kill her. After that, he left her in the field and ran way.
Thereafter, the minor victim girl came to the tribal area on foot, after which her
family members picked her up. On the basis of such allegations, father of
minor victim girl lodged an FIR at Police Station Purani Chhawani, Gwalior
vide Crime No.358 of 2014 for offence punishable under Sections 376, 450,
363, 506 Part II of IPC and Section 5/6 of the POCSO Act against an unknown
bearded person. Matter was investigated. Appellant was arrested. Relevant
seizures were made. Statements of witnesses were recorded. After completion
of investigation and other formalities, the police filed charge- sheet against
appellant- Teja Singh for commission of offences punishable under Section
363, 376, 450 of IPC before the competent Court of Criminal jurisdiction.
(6) Charges were framed. Appellant denied committing alleged crime and
pleaded trial. During trial, appellant- accused in his statement recorded under
Section 313 of CrPC pleaded that he is innocent and has been falsely
implicated. Prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined as many as 14
witnesses, whereas appellant- accused did not examine and produce any
witness in order to lead any evidence in his defence.
(7) The Trial Court, after evaluating the documentary as well as the oral
evidence and medical evidence available on record, convicted and sentenced
appellant, as aforesaid.
(8) The limb of the argument of learned Counsel for appellant is that there
was inordinate delay in lodging the FIR by father of minor victim girl which
has remained unexplained by prosecution. The incident with minor victim girl
is alleged to be happened around 02:00 in the night, while FIR (Ex.P4) was
lodged after 12 hours i.e. on 14-11-2014 around 02:30 pm. Further, the FIR
was lodged against unknown bearded person. Although appellant was arrested
on 17-11-2014, but the Test Identification Parade was conducted on 06-12-
2014 i.e. after 18 days of arrest of appellant. The complainant and accused are
belonging to same community and there is previous enmity. Age of appellant at
the time of incident was 26 years and while conducting the Test Identification
Parade, same age group, same bearded person and face was not matched with
other persons by police, therefore, the delay in conducting Test Identification
Parade or identification of appellant appears to be doubtful. There are some
improvements in the evidence of minor victim girl and her family members
recorded in police diary statements under Section 161 of CrPC and statements
recorded under Section 164 of CrPC., There was no last seen evidence
regarding either taking away the minor victim girl by appellant or at the time of
commission of crime, so also there was no witness in regard to seeing the
appellant fleeing away from scene of occurrence. No external injury was found
on the body of minor victim girl. Although as per medical evidence, blood &
injury was found on the urinated place (vagina) of minor victim girl, the same
could have caused due to sleepwalking that the minor victim girl had woken up
in her sleep on the date of incident and walked away due to which, she had
sustained injuries by falling. No offence of rape was committed by appellant
with her. Therefore, the trial Court has wrongly convicted the appellant for Life
Imprisonment without going through concrete material available on record.
Hence, prayed for setting aside the impugned judgment.
(9) On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor for State supported the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. It is submitted that
prosecution has come forward with acceptable evidence. There is no serious
infirmity found in the evidence of minor victim girl as well as in the evidence
of her mother. Evidence of minor victim girl is also corroborated by medical
evidence. Minor improvement in the evidence of witnesses should not be a
ground for throwing out the prosecution case unreliable. Even otherwise,
statement of minor victim girl and other witnesses is sufficient for recording
conviction of appellant. Prosecution has rightly established its case beyond
reasonable doubt. Considering the depravity and circumstances of offence,
proper jail sentence has been awarded by the trial Court because appellant is a
matured person and has sexually assaulted tender-age minor victim girl. The
act of appellant is a gruesome and abhorring act. It leaves a permanent scar on
personality of minor child, inhibiting growth and development. It instils a
feeling of fear, insecurity and a brooding sense of shame and guilt for no fault
of minor child victim. Looking to nature and gravity of offence, jail sentence
awarded by the trial Court is just and proper and appellant does not deserve
any leniency. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of appeal.
(10) Heard learned counsel for parties. Perused record as well as impugned
judgment.
(11) Before adverting to the genesis of case, this Court thinks it apposite to
go through the evidence of following material witnesses.
(12) Minor victim girl (PW-1) in her examination-in- chief deposed that she
recognizes accused but does not know his name. Accused took her to the field
at night and inserted his finger in her urinated place (vagina) and defection
area. She was sleeping when accused took her from her home. Accused left her
after committing crime and ran away. She had seen accused before the incident
also, who used to come to College to get fodder for the horses. This witness in
her evidence further deposed that accused told her that he had killed another
girl and had knife with him. He was threatening her with knife and said that if
she narrates anybody about the incident, he will kill her. This witness further
stated that she felt a lot of pain when accused inserted his finger in her urinated
place (vagina) and defection area. Accused was identified in the jail. This
witness denied that accused had climbed on her stomach and done bad things
with her at the time of alleged crime and denied giving statement (Ex.P3) to
the police in this regard. In her cross-examination, this witness denied that she
has disease of sleepwalking that she had woken up in her sleep on the date of
incident and walked away due to which, she had sustained injuries by falling.
(13) Mother of minor victim girl (PW-2) in her statement deposed that she
knows accused by name and face. Accused used to come to take fodder, due to
this, she knows him before the incident. On the date of incident, she and her
daughter were sleeping together. Around 02:00 in the night, she did not find
her daughter. People nearby were called and search was conducted. After about
half an hour, her minor girl was seen coming from field crying. At that time,
her clothes were in mud and she was feeling cold. Due to which, she first got
clothes of her daughter removed and got her warmed by fire. Her daughter was
very nervous due to which she did not tell anything. In the morning, her
daughter complained of pain in her entire stomach and vagina. After which, she
along with her sister-in-law (PW-9) took her daughter to Dr. Parshar at
Motijhil, where after seeing, Dr. Parashar told her to first to go to Police
Station and report and then, take her daughter to hospital because her condition
is very bad. Mother of minor victim girl in her evidence further evidence
deposed that her daughter was admitted to Kamlaraja Hospital. She had seen a
torn wound on the toilet and bathroom area of her daughter which she herself
had seen after removing the clothes. Blood was flowing from that place and
there was an injury. Her daughter told that the person who caused offence was
wearing a blue coloured long frock and blue-coloured turban and he had a
knife in his hand. He had scared her and taken her towards a field. After the
incident, she had gone to the Police Station and lodged report Ex.P4. This
witness also denied that her daughter has disease of sleepwalking.
(14) Dr. Madan Parshar (PW-3) in his evidence deposed that he practices
Medicine in his Clinic at Motijhil. A woman had come to his Clinic with her
child for treatment and he does not remember her name. He had seen blood on
clothes of girl and her condition was serious. The woman who had come along
with girl had told him that some person had taken away his daughter at night
due to which the girl was in such a condition. The said woman had also told
him that the girl had a wound at urinated place. After which, he had advised
the said woman to go to the Police Station and hospital. He had not done any
treatment of minor girl.
(15) Dr. Supriya Rohit (PW-4) in her evidence deposed that there was no
external injury mark on the body of minor victim girl but on abdominal
examination, there was pain on touching the lower abdomen. On genital
examination, there was bleeding which was found on external genitals. This
witness further deposed that two slides of external genital secretion, two swabs
of internal swab, one of external genital secretion and one of internal swab
were taken and the samples were sent for FSL examination.
(16) According to the FSL report (Ex.P15), blood was found on pajama
(cloth) of minor victim girl as well as on the underwear of accused. Semen and
human sperms were not found on cloth and pubic hair of accused.
(17) So far as the contention of appellant that the FIR was lodged against
unknown bearded person is concerned, the FIR is not meant to be an
encyclopedia nor is it expected to contain all the details of prosecution case. It
may be sufficient if the broad facts of prosecution case are stated in the FIR.
The FIR was lodged by the mother of minor victim girl herself on the next day
after her daughter- minor victim girl was brought to hospital for treatment.
Unless there is an indication of fabrication, the prosecution version can be
doubted merely on the ground that the FIR does not contain the name of
accused.
(18) It is settled principle of law that the delayed FIR does not automatically
invalidate a case, but the Court will scrutinize the reasons for the delay. If a
delay in conducting Test Identification Parade (TIP) impacts the reliability and
credibility of identification evidence, it could be detrimental to prosecution's
case.
(19) Regarding delay in lodging the FIR, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Ramdas & Others Vs. State of Maharasthra, [Appeal (Criminal) 1156-
1158 of 2005 decided on 07.11.2006] has held as under:-
"Mere delay in lodging the first information report is not
necessarily fatal to the case of the prosecution. However, the fact
that report was lodged belatedly is a relevant fact of which the court
must take notice. This fact has to be considered in the light of other
facts and circumstances of the case, and in a given case the Court
may be satisfied that the delay in lodging the report has been
sufficiently explained. In the light of totality of the evidence, the
Court of fact has to consider whether the delay in lodging the report
adversely affects the case of the prosecution. There may be cases
where there is direct evidence to explain the delay. Even in the
absence of direct explanation there may be circumstances appearing
on record which provide a reasonable explanation for the delay.
There are cases where much time is consumed in taking the injured
to the hospital for medical aid and, therefore, the witnesses find no
time to lodge he report promptly. There may also be cases where on
account of fear and threats, witnesses may avoid going to the Police
Station immediately. The time of occurrence, the distance to the
Police Station, mode of conveyance available, are all factors which
have a bearing on the question of delay in lodging of the report. It is
also possible to conceive of cases where the victim and the
members of his or her family belong to such a strata of society that
may not even be aware of their right to report the matter to the
Police and seek legal action, nor was any such advice available to
them. In the case of sexual offences there is another consideration
which may weigh in the min of the Court i.e. the initial hesitation of
the victim to report the matter to the Police which may affect her
family life and family's reputation. Very often in such cases only
after considerable persuasion the prosecutrix may be persuaded to
disclose the true facts. There are also cases where the victim may
choose to suffer the ignominy rather than to disclose the true facts
which may cast a stigma on her for the rest of her life. These are
case where the initial hesitation of the prosecutrix to disclose the
true facts may provide a good explanation for the delay in lodging
the report. In the ultimate analysis, what is the effect of delay in
lodging the report with the Police is a matter of appreciation of
evidence, and the court must consider the delay in the background
of the facts and circumstances of each case. Different cases have
different facts and it is the totality of evidence and the impact that it
has on the mind of the court that is important. No strait jacket
formula can be evolved in such matters, and each case must rest on
its own facts. It is settled law that however similar the
circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a precedent to
determine the conclusion on the facts in another."
(20) Thus, mere delay in lodging of the report may not by itself be fatal to the
case of prosecution, but delay has to be considered in the background of facts
and circumstances in each case and is a matter of appreciation of evidence by
the Court. From the evidence of mother of minor victim girl, it appears that
there is no delay in lodging report. Although the minor victim girl does not
know the name of accused but accused was identified in the jail.
(21) In the matters involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the Court is
duty bound to deal with such type of cases with utmost sensitivity and minor
contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of victim girl/
prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable
prosecution case.
(22) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Trials Guidelines Regarding
Inadequacies and Deficiencies, in Re vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others
(2021) 10 SCC 598 has given references to the statements recorded under
Sections 161 & 164 of CrPC as under:-
10. REFERENCES TO STATEMENTS UNDER SECTION
161 AND 164 CRPC:
i. During cross examination, the relevant portion of the statements
recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC used for contradicting the respective
witness shall be extracted. If it is not possible to extract the relevant part
as aforesaid, the Presiding Officer, in his discretion, shall indicate
specifically the opening and closing words of such relevant portion,
while recording the deposition, through distinct marking.
ii. In such cases, where the relevant portion is not extracted, the
portions only shall be distinctly marked as prosecution or defence exhibit
as the case may be, so that other inadmissible portions of the evidence
are not part of the record. iii. In cases, where the relevant portion is not
extracted, the admissible portion shall be distinctly marked as
prosecution or defence exhibit as the case may be.
iv. The aforesaid rule applicable to recording of the statements
under Section 161 shall mutatis mutandis apply to statements recorded
under Section 164 of the Cr.PC, whenever such portions of prior
statements of living persons are used for contradiction/corroboration.
v. Omnibus marking of the entire statement under S. 161 and 164
Cr.P.C shall not be done.''
(23) Contention of Counsel for appellant that there are some improvements in
the statements of minor victim girl and her family members recorded u/S 164
of CrPC compared to their earlier statements recorded under Section 161 of
CrPC is concerned, it is settled principle of law that minor improvements or
embellishments in a witness's statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC
compared to their earlier statement under Section 161 CrPC are not necessarily
fatal to the prosecution's case. The Courts generally recognize that minor
discrepancies or improvements in details are natural and don't undermine the
credibility of witnesses, especially if the core narrative remains consistent.
Therefore, argument of learned Counsel for appellant has no substance.
(24) The legal principle "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" is well-
established in law. However, the said principle is not applicable to criminal
trial. In criminal trial, a witness may be partly truthful and partly false in the
evidence he/she gives to the Court. The role of each accused has to be seen in
criminal case and the testimony of a witness cannot be disregarded in totality.
In the case of Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 2011 SC 255, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held as under:-
"15. In Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab [(1975) 4 SCC 511 : 1975
SCC (Cri) 601 : AIR 1975 SC 1962] this Court observed as under:
(SCC p. 517, para 8)
"8. ... It is true that, as laid down by this Court in
Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P.[(1952) 2 SCC 560 : AIR
1954 SC 15 : 1954 Cri LJ 230] and other cases which
have followed that case, the court must make an attempt
to separate grain from the chaff, the truth from the
falsehood, yet this could only be possible when the truth
is separable from the falsehood. Where the grain cannot
be separated from the chaff because the grain and the
chaff are so inextricably mixed up that in the process of
separation the court would have to reconstruct an
absolutely new case for the prosecution by divorcing the
essential details presented by the prosecution completely
from the context and the background against which they
are made, then this principle will not apply."
16. In Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar[AIR 1965 SC 277 : (1965) 1 Cri
LJ 256] this Court held as under : (AIR p. 279, para 6)
"6. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in
one thing, false in every thing) is neither a sound rule of
law nor a rule of practice. Hardly one comes across a
witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of
untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or
embellishments. It is, therefore, the duty of the court to
scrutinise the evidence carefully and, in terms of the
felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff.
But, it cannot obviously disbelieve the substratum of the
prosecution case or the material parts of the evidence and
reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest."
17. A similar view was taken in Nathu Singh Yadav v. State of M.P.
[(2002) 10 SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1461]
18. The maxim has been explained by this Court in Jakki v.
State[(2007) 9 SCC 589 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 574] , observing :
(SCC p. 591, para 8)
"8..... The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus ... has
not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come
to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of
caution. All that it amounts to is, that in such cases
testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be
[discarded]. The doctrine merely involves the question of
weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given
set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called "a
mandatory rule of evidence".' [Ed.: As observed
in Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81, pp.
113-14, para 51.]"
19. It is well settled in law that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus (false in one, false in all) does not apply in criminal cases
in India, as a witness may be partly truthful and partly false in the
evidence he gives to the court. (Vide Kulwinder Singh v. State of
Punjab [(2007) 10 SCC 455 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 51] , Ganesh v.
State of Karnataka [(2008) 17 SCC 152 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri)
474] , Jayaseelan v. State of T.N. [(2009) 12 SCC 275 : (2010) 1
SCC (Cri) 224] , Mani v. State [(2009) 12 SCC 288 : (2010) 1 SCC
(Cri) 563] and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 6 SCC
673 :(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211]
20. This position of law has been reiterated by this Court in Prem
Singh v. State of Haryana [(2009) 14 SCC 494 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)
1423] wherein the Court clearly held as under : (SCC p. 498 para
14)
"14. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the
doctrine 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' has no
application in India."
(25) In view of above, the law can be summarized to the effect that the
aforesaid legal maxim is not applicable in India and the Court has to assess as
to what extent the deposition of a witness can be relied upon. The Court has to
separate the falsehood from the truth and it is only in exceptional circumstances
when it is not possible to separate the grain from the chaff because they are
inextricably mixed up.
(26) It is nowhere clear from the evidence of witnesses that there was any
enmity between appellant and complainant family. The appellant- accused did
not produce any credible evidence in his defence before the trial Court and did
not prove his innocence through any corroborative evidence. On going through
oral and documentary as well as medical evidence produced by prosecution, it
is evident that appellant forcibly had taken the minor victim girl from her house
to a field from protection of lawful guardian and aggravated penetrative sexual
assault has been duly found proved against appellant-accused by inserting a
finger in the urinated place (vagina) of the minor victim girl by threatening to
kill her showing a knife to her and threatening to kill her if she narrates the
alleged incident anybody.
(27) We are in agreement with the analysis and findings of guilty reached by
learned Trial Court. The said conclusion is inescapable based on the statements
of minor victim girl duly supported by other witnesses as well as by medical
evidence on record, as noted above. We have, therefore, no hesitation in
confirming the conviction of appellant and maintain the same.
(28) At this stage, learned Counsel for appellant made a plea of clemency for
appellant in the matter of sentence. He urged that the appellant was a young
man of 26 years of age and has full life before him and could be reformed. This
was the first offence. He is a first time offender and this was his first brush
with law. His conduct in jail has been satisfactory. He has already been in
incarceration for more than 10 years without remission. He has not displayed
any propensity towards crime or violence and his having been abiding by the
jail discipline. The post-conviction of conduct of the appellant has been
satisfactory and there has been no complaint against him. He has been
performing the duties allotted to him with devotion, interacting with other
inmates, maintaining discipline and showing respect to jail authorities. He is a
poor person and is the only support of his parents. Therefore, his sentence
should be reduced from Life Imprisonment to minimum sentence, as admissible
in law. He has no criminal record. He undertakes not to contact or influence the
victim or her family members in any manner and undertakes to further abide by
terms and conditions as may be imposed by Court while granting him reprieve
in sentence.
(29) Learned Counsel for the appellant further submitted that on the date of
incident, as per provisions of POCSO Act, minimum sentence is prescribed for
10 years in Section 6, which may be extended to Life Imprisonment but,
considering the overall facts and circumstances of case and age as well as
conduct and behaviour of appellant, he may be given an opportunity for
readjustment and reformation in a good manner in society.
(30) Learned Counsel for State, on the contrary, opposes the plea of appellant
for any relief in sentence and submits that considering nature of offence and
manner in which appellant committed crime with a minor victim girl, no
leniency should be adopted in his favour.
(31) The relevant principles and factors in the matter of choice of sentence of
reprieve in sentence awarded, are enumerated below for facility of reference.
These are the factors which are, or may be taken into account by the Court
while assessing as to what could be an appropriate sentence in a given case.
'(i) Criminal and the crime are both important for the purpose of sentence
[Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1980) 2 SCC 684];
(ii) Manner of commission of the crime being with meticulous planning or
one on the spur of the moment;
(iii) Violence, if any, accompanying the crime whether injuries suffered
were serious and required extensive treatment or have caused any
permanent damage to the child bearing capacity or otherwise;
(iv) Whether the offender or accused was in a position of fiduciary trust or
exploited a social or family relationship;
(v) State of the victim impact of the crime on the victim;
(vi) The antecedents of the accused, his age, whether a first time offender
or repeat offender, possibility of recidivism.
(vii) Social backwardness or offer being a poor, illiterate labourer not
found to be adequate reason by Courts. (State of MP vs. Munna Choubey
& Anr 2005 (2) SCC 710 and State of MP vs. Babbu Barkare @ Dalap
Singh (2005) 5 SCC 413.
(viii) Passage of time since offence committed by itself considered
inadequate reasons for reprieve. (Urmila (minor) vs. Raju & Anr., (2005)
12 SCC 366.
(ix) Rape victim's marriage or rehabilitation may be considered as a
mitigating factor.
(x) The Supreme Court in catena of decisions i.e. Dinesh @ Buddha vs.
State of Rajasthan (2006) 3 SCC 771, State of Karnataka vs. Krishnappa
(2000) 4 SCC 75 & Bantu @ Naresh Giri vs. State of MP (2001) 9 SCC
615 where victim was below age of 12 years and rape had also been
committed with some injuries, has chosen to uphold the award of
minimum sentence.
(32) While determining the sentence, first the Court has to consider whether
accused was a first-time offence or a repeat offender, whether offence was
accompanied or committed with violence, nature of injuries sustained, whether
any permanent physical damage caused, did it involve betrayal of trust,
possibility of recidivism i.e. repeat offending or there was possibility of
rehabilitation/readjustment within the community, post-conviction conduct of
accused displaying penitence or propensity to crime are few of the facts which
have been considered by Hon'ble Apex Court, as noted above.
(33) As per report of custody period of appellant as well as of his criminal
called from the concerned jail, there is no complaint against him. Therefore,
considering the above fact-situation as well as the fact that his being the first-
time offender and having not displayed any tendency of recidivism, his good
post-conviction conduct, we are of the view that in this case, the ends of justice
would be met if appellant's sentence is reduced to 13 years imprisonment
instead of Life Imprisonment with fine amount as awarded by Trial Court with
default stipulation. On realization of fine amount (if not deposited), the same
be given for the benefit of victim. Appellant must not be a source of
embarrassment or harassment to victim and/or her family members in any
manner. This is ensure to safety for the well-being of victim and to prevent any
further trauma or intimidation. The appellant shall also not make any contact
with victim and/or any immediate members of her family and would not reside
near the resident of victim nor visit the locality. In case, appellant violates the
above conditions in view of undertakings given before this Court, it shall be
open to the authorities concerned to take action for externment of appellant
from the locality of victim or its vicinity in accordance with law.
(34) Appeal stands partly allowed in view of above terms.
(35) A copy of this judgment along-with record be sent to trial Court
concerned as well as copy of judgment be sent to concerned jail authority for
information and compliance.
(ANAND PATHAK) (HIRDESH)
JUDGE JUDGE
MAHEND
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
MKB PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR, ou=HIGH COURT
OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR,
2.5.4.20=8c6d4d6122d7ee987e457a3bec5922
cacbc050c998981397a35d9758a2b55074,
RA BARIK
postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=AB90F893988F10D718DA01F80
65D87F25DDC9B6C8C3FF0E5E280DD36D476F
6BA, cn=MAHENDRA BARIK
Date: 2025.07.04 16:58:21 +05'30'
