Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ramkaran Singh Gurjar vs Union Of India on 21 July, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
WRIT PETITION No. 7050 of 2012
RAMKARAN SINGH GURJAR
Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Alok Katare - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Praveen Neewaskar - DSG appeared for the respondent.
Shri M S Jadon - GA learned counsel for the State.
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Reserved on 15/07/2025
Delivered on 21/07/2025
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ORDER
1. Heard on I.A. No.2786/2024, which is an application for
dismissal of the petition.
2. The said application has been moved with an averment that
since no cause of action much less a part of cause of action has
arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, therefore,
the present writ petition is not maintainable before this Court,
thus, is liable to be dismissed.
3. In support of the aforesaid averments, Shri Praveen
Newaskar, learned DSG appearing on behalf of Union of India
had placed reliance upon the orders of this Court, one passed in
W.P. No.7433/2014 dated 25.01.2024 (Rajesh Singh Parihar vs.
Union of India and Ors) and another passed in W.P.
No.6089/2013 dated 04.07.2025 (Shyam Sunder vs. Union of
India and Ors), wherein the orders passed in the matter of
Rajendra Singh Tomar vs. Union of India and Ors in W.P.
No.1455/2022 dated 04.01.2024 and the judgment passed by the
Apex Court in the matter of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh vs. Union of
India and Another reported in AIR 1961 SC 532 and Alchemist
Ltd. vs. State Bank of Sikkim reported in 2007 (11) SCC 335
were relied and it was held that this Court has no jurisdiction to
hear the said petitions. Apart from the aforesaid reliance was also
placed in the matter of Pawan Deep vs. Union of India and Ors
passed in W.P. No.606/2016 dated 21.02.2023. It was contended
on the basis of the said orders that since the facts of present case
are similar, it be also dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction.
4. Learned counsel has further relied upon the order passed in
W.A. No.483/2024 dated 29.02.2024 (Rajesh Singh Parihar vs.
Union of India and Ors), whereby an appeal preferred against
the order passed in W.P. No.7433/2014 dated 25.01.2024 was
dismissed and the order passed by Single Bench was affirmed
which further goes to show that the present petition also deserves
to be dismissed on the ground of limitation.
5. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the petitioner while
relying upon the decision in the matter of Ram Narain Singh vs.
Chief of Army Staff and Ors reported in 2002(2) JLJ 86, order
passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of
Shrikishan Yadav vs. Commandant, Central Reserve Police
Force and Ors reported in 2004(1) MPLJ 205, decision of
Coordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of S.P. Tiwari vs.
Union of India and Ors reported in 2006 (2) MPJR 411, Order
of Apex Court in the matter of Nawal Kishore Sharma vs. Union
of India and Ors reported in 2014 (9) SCC 329 and order passed
by Single Bench of this Court in the matter of R.S. Bhadoria vs.
Union of India passed in W.P. No.27675/2018 dated 07.03.2019
has raised two fold arguments. Firstly, it has been argued that
Director General, CISF, who is the Chief of the Department and is
a party to the petition, can be sued anywhere in India and merely
placing reliance on the cause of action would not be justified.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner had secondly, argued that
the petitioner who is resident of Bhind had received the copy of
the appellate order at Bhind which gives a cause of action to the
petitioner to prefer the present petition at Gwalior within whose
jurisdiction the said district lies and as the communication of the
appellate order was sent to the petitioner at Bhind, a part of cause
of action had arisen there, therefore, the present petition is very
well maintainable.
7. To appreciate the aforesaid controversy the facts of the case
are required to be examined which are that the petitioner was
appointed on the post of Constable vide order dated 16.03.2010
and after his appointment he was directed to report for training
vide order dated 22.03.2010 at RTC Anantpur, Deoli-II, CISF
RTC Deoli-II Post-CRP Line, Tonk, Rajasthan and after
completing the training of 32 weeks, he was posted as a regular
incumbent Constable (GD) in 6 th Res. Bn. Deoli, Post Deoli,
District Tonk, Rajasthan on probation for a period of two years
which was successfully completed by him on 19.03.2012. Vide
order dated 11.05.2012 all of a sudden the services of the
petitioner were terminated by respondent no.4, Commandant,
CISF. Against the said order the petitioner preferred an appeal
before respondent no.2 Inspector General who dismissed the
appeal and confirmed the order of termination. The order of the
appellate authority was served upon the petitioner at his residence
at Bhind. Alleging the said service of the order of the appellate
authority to be a part of cause of action, the present petition has
been filed at Gwalior.
8. In the matter of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) in para 13
the Apex Court has observed as under:-
"13.Now it is clear that the jurisdiction conferred
on the High Court by Article 226 not depend upon
the residence or location of the person applying to
it for relief; it depends only on the person or
authority against whom a writ is sought being
within those territories. It seems to us therefore
that it is not permissible to read in Article 226 the
residence or location of the person affected by the
order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction
of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on
the person or authority passing the order being
within those territories and the residence: or
location of the person affected can have no
relevance on the question of the High Court's
jurisdiction. Thus if a person residing or located
in Bombay, for example, is aggrieved by an order
passed by an authority located, say, in Calcutta,
the forum in which he has to seek relief is not the
Bombay High Court though the order may affect
him in Bombay but the Calcutta High Court where
the authority passing the order is located. It
would, therefore, in our opinion be wrong to
introduce in Art.. 226 the concept of the place
where the order passed has effect in order to
determine the jurisdiction of the High Court
which can give relief under Article 226........."
9. What would be a cause of action is now required to be gone
into. First what cause of action means? It is a bundle of facts
which taken with the law applicable, gives the person a right to
relief against another. However, it must include sum act done by
the otherside, since in the absence of any act, no cause of action
possibly be appeared. Thus, the entire controversy revolves
around the fact that whether a part of cause of action has arisen
within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court or not, the
answer is yes, the High Court will have jurisdiction to entertain
and adjudicate that dispute. However, when no part of cause of
action arises within the territorial jurisdiction obviously the High
Court is lacking its jurisdiction to entertain such petition. Article
226 (2) of the Constitution as it stands today which also provides
that power to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court
exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which
the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of
such power, notwithstanding that such Government or authority or
the residence of such person is not within those territories. The
said Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India reads as under:-
"(2)The power conferred by clause (1) to issue
directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any
High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to
the territories within which the cause of action,
wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such
power, notwithstanding that the scat of such
Government or authority or the residence of such
person is not within those territories."
10. The phrase 'cause of action' had been posed before Apex
Court for consideration in several writ petitions. The definition of
this phrase was given in Cooke v. Gill, (1873) 8 CP 107 quoted
with approval by the Apex Court in several judgments which
reads as under:- "A cause of action means every fact, which, if
traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order
to support his right to a judgment of the Court."
11. The Apex Court at several occasion had raise the phrase
"cause of action" in detail . In case of Om Prakash Srivastava vs
Union Of India And Another reported in 2006 (6) SCC 207 in
para 8, 9 and 10 has held as under:-
"8.Two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution
on plain reading give clear indication that the
High Court can exercise power to issue direction,
order or writs for the enforcement of any of the
fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause
of action wholly or in part had arisen within the
territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction notwithstanding that the seat of the
Government or authority or the residence of the
person against whom the direction, order or writ
is issued is not within the said territories. (See Oil
and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar
Basu and Ors. (1994 (4) SCC 711).
9.By "cause of action" it is meant every fact,
which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a
judgment of the Court. In other words, a bundle of
facts, which it is necessary for the plaintiff to
prove in order to succeed in the suit. (See Bloom
Dekor Ltd vs. Subhash Himatlal Desai and Ors:
(1994 (6) SCC 322).
10.In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20
of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) "cause of
action" means every fact, which it is necessary to
establish to support a right to obtain a judgment.
(See Sadanandan Bhadran vs. Madhavan Sunil
Kumar: (1998 (6) SCC 514)."
12. The claim of the petitioner that part of cause of action had
arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is based on
pleading that the order of appellate authority confirming the order
of his termination was received by him at his address at Bhind.
The issue, thus, boils down to the fact that whether mere
communication of an order at Bhind by the authority gives part of
cause of action to the petitioner to invoke territorial jurisdiction of
this Court.
13. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and Others vs. M/s
Swaika Properties and Another, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 217,
the Apex Court has considered the question as to whether the
Calcutta High Court had raised its territorial jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain a writ petition,
which was filed with regard to acquisition of certain properties
under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. The
proceedings for acquisition under the aforesaid act were initiated
by State of Rajasthan. Notice under Section 52 sub-Section 2 of
the Act was duly served on the Company at its registered office at
Calcutta. The writ petition was filed at Calcutta High Court
challenging the notification of acquisition issued by the State of
Rajasthan. A writ was issued by Calcutta High Court against
which an appeal was filed by State of Rajasthan. The Apex Court
in para 8 of judgment has held as under:-
"8. The expression "cause of action" is tersely
defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure: "The
'cause of action' means every fact which, if
traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to
prove in order to support his right to a judgment
of the court." In other words, it is a bundle of
facts which taken with the law applicable to them
gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the
defendant. The mere service of notice under
Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at
their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road,
Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the
State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a
cause of action within that territory unless the
service of such notice was an integral part of the
cause of action. The entire cause of action
culminating in the acquisition of the land under
Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of
Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench.
The answer to the question whether service of
notice is an integral part of the cause of action
within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the
Constitution must depend upon the nature of the
impugned order giving rise to a cause of action.
The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by
the State Government under Section 52(1) of the
Act became effective the moment it was published
in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified
land became vested in the State Government free
from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for
the respondents to plead the service of notice on
them by the Special Officer, Town Planning
Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the
grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order
under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing
the notification issued by the State Government
under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the respondents
felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands
situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the
validity of the notification issued by the State
Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of
the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the
grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such
a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur
Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part
arose."
14. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the
law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against
the defendant. The Apex Court further held that mere service of
notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their
registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the
territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to
a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such
notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The Apex Court
went on to say that the answer to the question as to whether
service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within
the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend
upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of
action. The Apex Court held that since the notification dated
February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under Section
52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in
the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested
in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not
necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on
them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur
under Section 52(1) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction
or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the
notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1)
of the Act. Thus, in fact the service of notice, communication of
order, when it forms the part of cause of action that the territorial
jurisdiction must be at the place where notice is served upon the
person had received and the said communication since was made
by way of sending information to the person which cannot be said
to be an integral part of cause of action, therefore, the writ petition
cannot be entitled to be at place where the communication is said
to be received.
15. In the present case as noted above the order rejecting the
appeal was passed by the Inspector General, CISF at New Delhi
and merely because it is communicated to the appellant at Bhind
where he was accidentally residing after his termination, will not
confer any territorial jurisdiction to this Court and, thus, would
not confer right to entertain the writ petition. Thus, so far as this
aspect is concerned, the finding is in negative.
16. The another aspect which needs to be answered is whether
the Director General, CISF, Government of India who has
authority over the regular staff, CISF can be sued anywhere in
India and if he can be issued anywhere, then whether this Court
has jurisdiction to hear the writ petition.
17. In this context, the judgment cited by the learned counsel
for the petitioner in the matter of Ram Narain Singh (supra) is
seen therein challenge is made to the order of appeal preferred
against the order of dismissal of the petitioner therein which was
passed at Banglore was challenged in appeal before the Chief of
Army Staff who was the statutory authority to hear the appeal and
who had rejected the said appeal, therefore, in that context placing
reliance in the matter of Dinesh Chandra Gahtori vs. Chief of
Army Staff and Another reported in 2001 (9) SCC 525 it is held
that the said authority can be sued anywhere in India and also
since the said order was communicated to the petitioner therein at
the place of his residence in Rewa, thus, the petition was held to
be maintainable at Jabalpur. The facts of the aforesaid case herein
are altogether different as herein case Director General of CISF
has not passed any orders, but has been made the party being head
of department.
18. In the matter of S.P. Tiwari (supra) the Coordinate Bench of
this Court while placing reliance in the matter of Dinesh Chandra
Gahtori (supra) has held that the Chief of Army Staff can be sued
anywhere in the country, therefore, the writ petition on the ground
of territorial jurisdiction cannot be thrown out. The aforesaid
judgment of the Coordinate Bench had been passed prior to 2006,
before the advent of Armed Force Tribunal and on the basis of
decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Dinesh Chandra
Gahtori (supra), which was in the present context, according to
this Court, is of no help to the petitioner.
19. So far as the decision in the matter of Nawal kishore
Sharma(supra) relied upon by the petitioner is considered therein
it has been observed that in order to maintain a writ petition, a
writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him
has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be
infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the
Court's jurisdiction and as discussed above, this fact has already
been answered in preceeding paras that no cause of action had
arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, therefore,
the said citation is of no help to the petitioner.
20. So far as the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the
matter of Dinesh Chandra Gahtori (supra) it was passed prior to
2006 before establishment of Armed Force Tribunal. The said
citation related to jurisdiction to hear the service matters related to
Indian Army, Indian Navy, Air-force and Ministry of Defence,
which now lays with the Armed Force Tribunal, thus, would not
be applicable.
21. So far as the judgment in the matter of Shrikishan Yadav
(supra) passed by Division Bench of this Court is concerned, it
was in relation to the Central Reserve Police Force, but the
present matter is in relation to CISF which is a para-military force
and is not part of a regular armed force and service matters of the
personnals in CAPFs like CISF and CRPF are generally dealt with
by Central Adminisrative Tribunal (CAT). Thus, the said judgment
is also of no help to the petitioner.
22. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of
Deshraj vs Union Of India passed in W.P. No.22512/2021 dated
21.10.2024 has taken a similar view and had dismissed the
petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction.
23. In the instant case the petitioner was appointed on the post
of Constable (GD) at Deoli, Rajasthan. Before he could complete
his probation successfully, his services were terminated at Deoli.
The petitioner had preferred an appeal against the said order by
the appellate authority passed at New Delhi before the Inspector
General, CISF, New Delhi, and only the said order was
communicated to the petitioner at Bhind where he was residing,
thus, it could be said that communication of the order was not an
integral part of a cause of action as the said communication was
only by way of sending information to the petitioner, therefore,
the petition at Gwalior cannot be entertained.
24. The petition, accordingly, stands dismissed.
(Milind Ramesh Phadke)
Judge
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Date: 2025.07.21 18:28:40 +05'30'
