Madhya Pradesh High Court
Gopal Singh Tomar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 23 January, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (1)
M.Cr.C. No. 3260 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 23rd OF JANUARY, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 3260 of 2024
GOPAL SINGH TOMAR AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Munna Lal Sharma and Shri Himanshu Chaturvedi, Advocate for
the applicants.
Dr. Anjali Gyanani, Government Advocate for respondent nos. 1 to
3/State.
Shri Arun Kumar Pateriya and Shri Prasun Kumar Maheshwri,
Advocates for respondent no.4.
ORDER
This application, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, has been filed seeking
quashment of order dated 28-10-2023 passed by JMFC Gwalior in Complaint
Case Number un-registered/2023 as well as FIR in Crime Number 730/2023
registered at Police Station Gwalior on 29-10-2023 for offences under sections
420, 467, 468, 469, 470 and 471 read with 34 of IPC.
2. It is submitted by counsel for applicant that respondent number 4 filed an
application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C stating that the house, which was in
the ownership and possession of his late father Devi Singh, is situated at
Kotwala Mohalla, Gwalior. It was alleged that on 04-11-2008, applicant no.1
prepared a forged Will by putting forged signatures of Devi Singh and
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (2)
applicant numbers 2 and 3 stood as witnesses to the said forged will, knowing
fully well that Devi Singh has already expired. Thereafter, on the basis of the
said Will, applicant got his name mutated in the records of the Municipal
Corporation. Applicants 2 and 3 had also submitted their false affidavits in the
mutation proceedings. It was also alleged that respondent No.4 got the Will
examined by a handwriting expert, and the Will contains forged signatures of
testator Devi Singh. It is submitted that the concerned magistrate, by order
dated 28-10-2023, passed an order under Section 156(3) of CrPC and on the
basis of the said order, Police has registered Crime Number 730/2023 at Police
Station Gwalior for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, and
Section 34 of IPC.
3. Challenging the FIR lodged in compliance of the order passed under
Section 156(3) of CrPC, it is submitted by counsel for the applicant that the
Magistrate, while passing an order under Section 156(3) of CrPC, should not
have directed the Police to register an FIR. Respondent No.4 has also instituted
a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction, which is pending. It is
submitted that since the Will in question is the subject matter of the civil suit,
therefore, registration of offence is unwarranted. However, it was fairly
conceded that the trial court, by order dated 05-09-2023, passed in RCSA No.
349A/2023, has restrained the parties from alienating the property during the
pendency of the suit. It is further submitted that although the alleged Will
was prepared on 04-11-2008, but the complaint was filed in the year 2023.
Furthermore, once the civil suit is pending, then continuation of criminal
proceedings is unwarranted. The complaint has been lodged out of malafides. It
is further submitted that even otherwise, the entire dispute is purely civil in
nature, and therefore, it should not have been allowed to take the colour of a
criminal case.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (3)
4. Per Contra, the application is vehemently opposed by counsel for the
State as well as counsel for respondent number 4.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
6. In the present case, respondent No. 4 filed an application under Section
156(3) of CrPC along with a report of a handwriting expert to show that the
Will relied upon by the applicant for getting his name mutated in the records of
Municipal Corporation contains forged signatures of his father. Preparing a
forged document necessarily involves criminal ingredient, which is punishable
under Sections 467, 468, 469, and 471 of IPC. There may be certain cases
where allegations may contain civil as well as criminal ingredients, and where
the allegations are not primarily of civil nature, then the civil as well as
criminal proceedings can go on simultaneously. The Supreme Court, in the case
of P. Swaroopa Rani vs. M. Hari Narayana Alias Hari Babu reported in
(2008) 5 SCC 765 has held as under:-
"11. It is, however, well settled that in a given case, civil
proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously.
Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed
depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case. (See M.S.
Sheriff v. State of Madras [AIR 1954 SC 397] , Iqbal Singh Marwah
v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101]
and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Assn. of
Chartered Certified Accountants [(2005) 12 SCC 226 : (2006) 1
SCC (Cri) 544] ."
7. Furthermore, it is a well-established principle of law that findings
recorded by the civil court are not binding on the criminal court . The Supreme
Court in the case of Kishan Singh (Dead) Through LRs. v. Gurpal Singh
and Others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 775 has held as under :
"16. In Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah this
Court held as under : (SCC pp. 389-90, para 32)
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (4)
should be made to avoid conflict of findings between
the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point
out that the standard of proof required in the two
proceedings is entirely different. Civil cases are
decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence
while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the
prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has
to be given. There is neither any statutory provision
nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in
one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in
the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the
basis of the evidence adduced therein."
17. In Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi
Admn.) this Court considered all the earlier judgments on the
issue and held that while deciding the case in Karam Chand,
this Court failed to take note of the Constitution Bench
judgment in M.S. Sheriff and, therefore, it remains per
incuriam and does not lay down the correct law. A similar
view has been reiterated by this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma
v. Daya Sapra, wherein it has been held by this Court that
the decision in Karam Chand stood overruled in K.G.
Premshanker.
18. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands
crystallised to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by
the civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal
case is concerned and vice versa. Standard of proof is
different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is
preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is
proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory
nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court
either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding
between the same parties while dealing with the same
subject-matter and both the cases have to be decided on the
basis of the evidence adduced therein. However, there may
be cases where the provisions of Sections 41 to 43 of the
Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the relevance of previous
judgments in subsequent cases may be taken into
consideration."
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (5)
8. The Supreme Court in the case of Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine
Imam And Another Vs. State (Delhi Administration) and Another
reported in (2009) 5 SCC 528 has held as under :
"24. If primacy is to be given to a criminal proceeding,
indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own
merit, keeping in view the evidence brought before it and not
in terms of the evidence brought in the criminal proceeding.
The question came up for consideration in K.G.
Premshanker v. Inspector of Police wherein this Court inter
alia held: (SCC p. 97, paras 30-31)
"30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
--(1) the previous judgment which is final can be
relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of
the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same
parties, principle of res judicata may apply; (3) in a
criminal case, Section 300 CrPC makes provision
that once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may
not be tried again for the same offence if the
conditions mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the
criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the
same cause, judgment of the civil court would be
relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are
satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be
conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section
41 provides which judgment would be conclusive
proof of what is stated therein.
31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a
previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided
under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the
Evidence Act then in each case, the court has to
decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with
regard to the matter(s) decided therein. Take for
illustration, in a case of alleged trespass by A on B's
property, B filed a suit for declaration of its title and
to recover possession from A and suit is decreed.
Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by B against A
for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (6)
civil proceedings would be relevant and the court
may hold that it conclusively establishes the title as
well as possession of B over the property. In such
case, A may be convicted for trespass. The illustration
to Section 42 which is quoted above makes the
position clear. Hence, in each and every case, the first
question which would require consideration is--
whether judgment, order or decree is relevant, if
relevant--its effect. It may be relevant for a limited
purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This
would depend upon the facts of each case."
25. It is, however, significant to notice that the decision of
this Court in Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India,
wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the
civil courts will be binding on the criminal courts but the
converse is not true, was overruled, stating: (K.G.
Premshanker case, SCC p. 98, para 33)
"33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in
V.M. Shah case that the finding recorded by the
criminal court stands superseded by the finding
recorded by the civil court is not correct enunciation
of law. Further, the general observations made in
Karam Chand case are in context of the facts of the
case stated above. The Court was not required to
consider the earlier decision of the Constitution
Bench in M.S. Sheriff case as well as Sections 40 to
43 of the Evidence Act."
Axiomatically, if judgment of a civil court is not binding on a
criminal court, a judgment of a criminal court will certainly
not be binding on a civil court.
26. We have noticed hereinbefore that Section 43 of the
Evidence Act categorically states that judgments, orders or
decrees, other than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and
42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment,
order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some
other provisions of the Act. No other provision of the
Evidence Act or for that matter any other statute has been
brought to our notice.
27. Another Constitution Bench of this Court had the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (7)
occasion to consider a similar question in Iqbal Singh
Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah wherein it was held: (SCC p.
387, para 24)
"24. There is another consideration which has to be
kept in mind. Sub-section (1) of Section 340 CrPC
contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry.
Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not
made during the pendency of the proceeding before
the court and this is done at the stage when the
proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is
rendered. Section 341 provides for an appeal against
an order directing filing of the complaint. The
hearing and ultimate decision of the appeal is bound
to take time. Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon
a court trying the complaint to adjourn the hearing of
the case if it is brought to its notice that an appeal is
pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial
proceeding out of which the matter has arisen. In
view of these provisions, the complaint case may not
proceed at all for decades specially in matters arising
out of civil suits where decisions are challenged in
successive appellate fora which are time-consuming.
It is also to be noticed that there is no provision of
appeal against an order passed under Section 343(2),
whereby hearing of the case is adjourned until the
decision of the appeal. These provisions show that, in
reality, the procedure prescribed for filing a
complaint by the court is such that it may not fructify
in the actual trial of the offender for an unusually
long period. Delay in prosecution of a guilty person
comes to his advantage as witnesses become
reluctant to give evidence and the evidence gets lost.
This important consideration dissuades us from
accepting the broad interpretation sought to be placed
upon clause (b)(ii)."
28. Relying inter alia on M.S. Sheriff, it was furthermore
held: (Iqbal Singh Marwah case, SCC pp. 389-90, para 32)
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort
should be made to avoid conflict of findings between
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (8)
the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point
out that the standard of proof required in the two
proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are
decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence
while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the
prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has
to be given. There is neither any statutory provision
nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in
one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in
the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the
basis of the evidence adduced therein."
29. The question yet again came up for consideration in P.
Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, wherein it was
categorically held: (SCC p. 769, para 11)
"11. It is, however, well settled that in a given case,
civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can
proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or
criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon
the fact and circumstances of each case."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Prem Raj Vs. Poonamma Menon
and Another decided on 02.04.2024 in S.L.P.(Cr.) No.9778/2018 has held
as under :
"9. In advancing his submissions, Mr. K. Parameshwar,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, placed reliance
on certain authorities of this Court. In M/s. Karam Chand
Ganga Prasad and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors.(1970)3
SCC 694, this Court observed that:
".......It is a well-established principle of law that
the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the
criminal courts. The converse is not true."
In K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and Anr,
(2002)8 SCC 87, a Bench of three learned Judges observed
that, following the M.S. Sheriff vs. State of Madras, AIR
1954 SC 397, no straight-jacket formula could be laid down
and conflicting decisions of civil and criminal Courts would
not be a relevant consideration except for the limited purpose
of sentence or damages.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (9)
10. We notice that this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs.
Daya Sapra (Smt.) (2009)13 SCC 729, had observed as
under:
"26. It is, however, significant to notice a
decision of this Court in Karam Chand
Ganga Prasad v. Union of India (1970) 3
SCC 694, wherein it was categorically held
that the decisions of the civil court will be
binding on the criminal courts but the
converse is not true, was overruled therein..."
This Court in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja (2021)1
SCC 414, considered a numerous precedents, including
Premshanker (supra) and Vishnu Dutt Sharma (supra), to
opine that there is no embargo for a civil court to consider
the evidence led in the criminal proceedings.
The issue has been laid to rest by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah vs.
Meenakshi Marwah, (2005)4 SCC 370 :
"32. Coming to the last contention that an
effort should be made to avoid conflict of
findings between the civil and criminal
courts, it is necessary to point out that the
standard of proof required in the two
proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases
are decided on the basis of preponderance of
evidence, while in a criminal case, the entire
burden lies on the prosecution, and proof
beyond reasonable doubt has to be given.
There is neither any statutory provision nor
any legal principle that the findings recorded
in one proceeding may be treated as final or
binding in the other, as both the cases have to
be decided on the basis of the evidence
adduced therein. While examining a similar
contention in an appeal against an order
directing filing of a complaint under Section
476 of the old Code, the following
observations made by a Constitution Bench in
M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras [1954 SCR
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (10)
1144: AIR 1954 SC 397: 1954 Cri LJ 1019]
give a complete answer to the problem posed:
(AIR p. 399, paras 15-16)
"15. As between the civil and the
criminal proceedings, we are of the
opinion that the criminal matters should
be given precedence. There is some
difference of opinion in the High Courts
of India on this point. No hard-and-fast
rule can be laid down but we do not
consider that the possibility of
conflicting decisions in the civil and
criminal courts is a relevant
consideration. The law envisages such an
eventuality when it expressly refrains
from making the decision of one court
binding on the other, or even relevant,
except for certain limited purposes, such
as sentence or damages. The only
relevant consideration here is the
likelihood of embarrassment.
16. Another factor which weighs with us
is that a civil suit often drags on for years
and it is undesirable that a criminal
prosecution should wait till everybody
concerned has forgotten all about the
crime. The public interests demand that
criminal justice should be swift and sure;
that the guilty should be punished while
the events are still fresh in the public
mind and that the innocent should be
absolved as early as is consistent with a
fair and impartial trial. Another reason is
that it is undesirable to let things slide till
memories have grown too dim to trust.
This, however, is not a hard-and-fast rule. Special
considerations obtaining in any particular case
might make some other course more expedient and
just. For example, the civil case or the other
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (11)
criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to
make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give
precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section
476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil
suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings
have finished."
(Emphasis Supplied)"
10. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha Vs.
Rameshwari Devi and Others reported in (2007) 12 SCC 369, in which it
has been held as under:
"14. From a plain reading of the findings arrived at
by the High Court while quashing the FIR, it is
apparent that the High Court had relied on
extraneous considerations and acted beyond the
allegations made in the FIR for quashing the same in
exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code. We have already noted the illustrations
enumerated in Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] and from a careful
reading of these illustrations, we are of the view that
the allegations emerging from the FIR are not
covered by any of the illustrations as noted
hereinabove. For example, we may take up one of
the findings of the High Court as noted hereinabove.
The High Court has drawn an adverse inference on
account of the FIR being lodged on 31-12-2001
while the appellant was forced out of the
matrimonial home on 25-5-2001.
15. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the High Court was not justified in drawing an
adverse inference against the appellant wife for
lodging the FIR on 31-12-2001 on the ground that
she had left the matrimonial home at least six
months before that. This is because, in our view, the
High Court had failed to appreciate that the appellant
and her family members were, during this period,
making all possible efforts to enter into a settlement
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (12)
so that Respondent 2 husband would take her back
to the matrimonial home. If any complaint was made
during this period, there was every possibility of not
entering into any settlement with Respondent 2
husband.
16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was filed
only when all efforts to return to the matrimonial
home had failed and Respondent 2 husband had filed
a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955. That apart, in our view, filing of
a divorce petition in a civil court cannot be a ground
to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of
the Code as it is well settled that criminal and civil
proceedings are separate and independent and the
pendency of a civil proceeding cannot bring to an
end a criminal proceeding even if they arise out of
the same set of facts. Such being the position, we
are, therefore, of the view that the High Court while
exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code
has gone beyond the allegations made in the FIR and
has acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, therefore,
the High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR
by going beyond the allegations made in the FIR or
by relying on extraneous considerations.
*****
22. For the reasons aforesaid, we are inclined to
interfere with the order of the High Court and hold
that the High Court in quashing the FIR in the
exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code by relying on the investigation report and
the findings made therein has acted beyond its
jurisdiction. For the purpose of finding out the
commission of a cognizable offence, the High Court
was only required to look into the allegations made
in the complaint or the FIR and to conclude whether
a prima facie offence had been made out by the
complainant in the FIR or the complaint or not."
(Underline supplied)
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (13)
11. The Supreme Court, in the case of Sh. Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Smt.
Daya Sapra, decided on 05-05-2009 in Civil Appeal Number 3238 of 2009,
has held as under :
"30. Another Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to
consider the question in Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. vs. Meenakshi
Marwah & Anr. [(2005) 4 SCC 370]. Relying on M.S. Sheriff
(supra) as also various other decisions, it was categorically held:
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should
be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil
and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the
standard of proof required in the two proceedings are
entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of
preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the
entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond
reasonable doubt has to be given."
31. The question yet again came up for consideration in P.
Swaroopa Rani vs. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu [AIR 2008 SC
1884], wherein it was categorically held:
"13. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case,
civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed
simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal
proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and
circumstances of each case."
Hence, it is clear that where the allegations contain both civil and criminal
ingredients, then both cases can proceed simultaneously. Thus, counsel for the
applicant is not correct in contending that when a civil suit is pending, no
criminal case can be initiated under any circumstances.
12. It is next contended by counsel for the applicant that while passing an
order under Section 156(3) of CrPC, the trial magistrate should not have
directed for registration of FIR.
The Supreme Court, in the case of Mohd. Yusuf Vs. Afaq Jahan
reported in (2006) 1 SCC 627 , has held as under :
"11. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1563 (14)
before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation
under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to
examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking
cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the
police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the
police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After
all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the
substance of the information relating to the commission of the
cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the
police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a
Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should
be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police
station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence
disclosed by the complainant because that police officer could take
further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only
thereafter."
Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid judgments passed by the Supreme
Court, it is clear that the submission made by counsel for the applicant that the
Magistrate should not have specifically directed for registration of an FIR, is
misconceived.
13. No other argument is advanced by counsel for the applicant.
14. The application fails and is, hereby, dismissed.
(G.S.Ahluwalia)
Judge
(and)
