Madhya Pradesh High Court
Suruchi Shivhare vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 25 February, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
&
HON'BLE SHRIRAJENDRA KUMAR VANI
Writ Appeal No.1060 of 2024
SURUCHI SHIVHARE
Vs
STATE OF M.P. & OTHERS
APPERANCE
Shri Pallav Tripathi - Advocate for the for the appellant.
Shri Sohit Mishra - Government Advocate for the State
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Reserved on : 19/02/2025
Delivered on : 25/2/2025
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Ther petition having been heard and reserved for orders, coming
on for pronouncement ther day, the Hon'ble Shri Justice Milind
Ramesh Phadke pronounced/passed the following:
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ORDER
The present intra-Court appeal, under Section 2(1) of Madhya
Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khandpeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam,
2005 has been filed by the appellant assailing the order dated
26.04.2024 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.10737
of 2024; whereby, the prayer of the appellant/petitioner for quashment
of a charge-sheet and further proceedings initiated by the
respondent/department in pursuance thereof, sought was rejected and
the petition was dismissed holding that scope of departmental inquiry
is well defined, and as there are no allegations of integrity or malice
and there is no jurisdictional or competence related error pointed out,
any scope for interference is not made out.
2. Assailing the order to be manifestly illegal and contrary to law,
its quashment had been sought.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant, while referring to the
provisions of Section 228-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, has
argued before this Court that disclosure of identity of the victim of
certain offences registered under 376 of IPC would lead to punishment
only when no objection is taken from the victim for her name being
published or identity being disclosed, but if an authorization, voluntary
and conscious in writing, is given by the victim itself, then the
provisions of Section 228-A of IPC would not be attracted and as
herein case, vide Annexure P/8, dated 29.01.2022 an authorization
letter was issued by the victim herself to the appellant for making her
name public, the charge framed against the appellant for disclosing the
name and identity of the rape victim is not made out and thus, had
committed grave misconduct, and therefore, deserves to be quashed
but learned Single Judge in a very cursory manner had dismissed the
petition without considering this legal position.
4. Another ground, which has been raised by the counsel for the
appellant, is that the departmental inquiry is initiated at the instance of
a third person, who was nowhere concerned with the crime and the
victim had never made a complaint about disclosing of her identify by
the appellant; thus, when there was no locus to the complainant to
indulge into the matter, on his complaint, initiating of the departmental
inquiry was bad in law coupled with the fact on earlier occasion, on a
complaint of the same complainant, a preliminary inquiry was
conducted in which nothing of the sought was found against the
present appellant, but ignoring the earlier preliminary inquiry report, a
second preliminary inquiry was conducted wherein the appellant was
held to be guilty and accordingly, the disciplinary authority had issued
a show-cause notice and thereafter a charge-sheet, which has not been
considered by the learned Single Judge, therefore, the impugned order
deserves to be set aside.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant, while placing reliance on the
judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Nipun
Saxena Vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 2 SCC 703, has further
argued that if an adult victim has no objection to her name being
published or identity being disclosed, she can obviously authorize any
person in writing to disclose her name and as in the present case, the
victim herself has authorized the present appellant to disclose her
name, no illegality much offence is made out against the appellant;
thus, the departmental inquiry is per se illegal.
6. On the basis of the aforesaid arguments, it was prayed that the
present appeal be allowed and the impugned order dated 26.04.2024
be set aside.
7. On the other hand, Shri Sohit Mishra - learned Government
Advocate for the State while supporting the impugned order, has
submitted that no illegality or perversity has been committed by the
learned Single Judge in holding that since no allegations of integrity or
malice has been levelled against the authority and no jurisdictional or
competence related error has been pointed out, thus has rightly
dismissed the petition.
8. It was was further submitted that the contention of the appellant
that the victim herself has authorized the appellant to disclose her
name in public being a matter of defence can very well be agitated at
the proper time in the departmental inqiury and prima facie, at this
moment on the basis of such authorization letter, which is not available
with the department, and is for the first time made available to the
department by way of the present petition cannot be taken note of. It
was, thus, submitted that the present appeal being devoid of any merits
be dismissed.
9. After hearing the rival contentions and going through the
judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Nipun
Saxena Vs. Union of India (supra), this Court finds that under
Section 228-A of IPC, disclosure of name and identity of the victim of
an offence registered under 376 of IPC is not a crime if the victim,
who is an adult, has given her voluntary and conscious
consent/authorization in writing to the effect that she has no objection
to her name being published or identity being disclosed. To this extent,
this Court is in conformity with the law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the aforesaid matter.
10. But, herein case, a complaint was made against the appellant that
she had disclosed the name and identity of a rape victim in public
through WhatsApp and on the basis of the said complaint, a
preliminary inquiry was initiated and conducted by the Additional S.P.,
City South, Gwalior and an inquiry report dated 27.09.2022 was
submitted by her wherein no material was found against the appellant
to have disclosed the identity and name of the rape victim and it was
found that no cognizable offence has been made out against her.
Thereafter, another complaint was received and with the complaint,
certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act and the CD of so
called clipping and WhatsApp whereby name of the victim was
disclosed in public was submitted. In light of aforesaid fresh contents,
another preliminary inquiry was conducted which culminated vide
report dated 23.11.2023 and the said information prima facie proved
involvement of the present appellant and on the basis of the said
report, the disciplinary authority was issued the charge-sheet, which
cannot be faulted with as the earlier report was not acted upon at any
point of time. Even otherwise, on the basis of the fresh material,
inquiry would had been conducted.
11. So far as contention of the appellant that the victim herself has
not made the complaint, therefore, on the very locus of the
complainant, the complaint should have been thrown out appears to be
misconceived as under Section 228-A of IPC, there is no mention of
the person who can be the informant rather it is only mentioned that
whoever prints or publishes the name or any matter which may make
known the identity of any person against whom an offence under
section 376 is alleged or found to have been committed shall be
punished; thus, source of information is immaterial.
12. With regard to authorization letter given by the victim to the
appellant, it can be one of the grounds for defense, but cannot be
considered for quashment of the charge levelled against the appellant
at this stage and solely on its basis, it cannot be held that charge
levelled against the appellant is not made out.
13. This Court thus, concur with the actions made observes by the
learned Single Judge that since no allegations regarding integrity or
malice against the authority conducted the departmental inquiry or no
jurisdictional or competence related error has been pointed out, the
scope of interference in service related matters becomes minimal.
14. In light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that no
illegality or perversity has been committed by the learned Single Judge
in dismissing the writ petition. Accordingly, the present appeal being
sans merits is hereby dismissed.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE) (RAJENDRA KUMAR VANI)
JUDGE JUDGE
PAWAN
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Date: 2025.02.27 16:02:56 +05'30'
