Madhya Pradesh High Court
Krishan Kumar Sharma @ Pinku vs Umesh Sharma on 17 February, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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1 M.A Nos. 715/2011 & 617/2011
IN THE HIG COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 17th OF FEBRUARY, 2025
MISC. APPEAL No. 715 of 2011
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.
Versus
KRISHNA KUMAR SHARMA @ PINKU AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Shriniwas Gajendragadkar, Advocate for appellant.
Shri R.P.Gupta, Advocate for respondent/claimant.
&
MISC. APPEAL No. 617 of 2011
KRISHNA KUMAR SHARMA @ PINKU
Versus
UMESH SHARMA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri R.P.Gupta, Advocate for appellant.
Shri B.N.Malhotra, Advocate for respondent No.3
JUDGMENT
M.A. No.715/2011 has been filed under Section 173 of Motor
Vehicle Act against the award dated 31.01.20211 passed by VII Motor
Accident Claim Tribunal, Gwalior in MACC No.82/2010, thereby
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challenging the very factum of accident as well as liability of insurance
Company.
Similarly M.A. No.617/2011 has been filed by the claimant for
enhancement of compensation amount.
Accordingly, by this common order, both the appeals shall be
decided.
2. For the sake of convenience, facts of the case are being taken
from MA No.715/2011, which, in short, are as under:-
On 26.06.2008 at about 11 PM, claimant Krishna Kumar Sharma
was allegedly going on his Scooter bearing registration No.MP07 KB
8022. When he reached in front of Sun-city, it is alleged that respondent
No.2 Umesh Sharma by driving offending truck bearing registration
No.MP06-E-6107 dashed the Scooter from behind. As a result claimant-
Krishna Kumar Sharma sustained multiple injuries. It was alleged that
respondent No.2-Umesh Sharma escaped from the place of accident
along with the vehicle. The FIR was lodged at Police Station Gole- Ka-
Mandir and accordingly, Crime No.325/2008 was registered for offence
under Section 279 and 338 of IPC. Respondent No.2-Umesh Sharma
was arrested and charge-sheet was filed. Claimant- Krishna Kumar
Sharma was admitted in J.A. Hospital, Gwalior and during treatment, his
right hand was amputated from his shoulder joint and his leg was also
operated twice. Claimant-Krishna Kumar Sharma remained hospitalized
from 26.02.2008 to 28.07.2008. It was alleged that applicant-Krishna
Kumar Sharma has spent Rs.1 lac for his treatment and has suffered
permanent disability and has lost his power to earn livelihood in
perpetuity and accordingly, claim petition was filed for grant of
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compensation.
By impugned award, Claims Tribunal held that the accident was
proved by claimant-Krishna Kumar Sharma and also held that insurance
company is severally and jointly liable to pay compensation amount and
held that since right hand of claimant-Krishna Kumar Sharma has been
amputated from his shoulder, therefore, he has suffered permanent
disability of 30% and accordingly, by adjudicating permanent body
disability of claimant-Krishna Kumar Sharma as 30%, awarded total
compensation amount of Rs.603650/-.
3. This appeal has been filed challenging the very factum of accident
as well as liability of insurance company.
4. Challenging factum of accident, it is submitted by counsel for
appellant that since FIR was lodged belatedly by one month and five
days, therefore, it is clear that vehicle was deliberately and falsely
involved at a later stage. By referring to statement of injuries (Ex.P/4), it
is submitted that word "unknown" is mentioned, therefore, it is clear that
some unknown vehicle had caused the accident and therefore, offending
truck bearing registration No. MP06-E-6107 was wrongly involved in
order to claim compensation.
5. The first question for consideration is as to whether mere delay in
lodging FIR can be a ground to dislodge the claim of the claimant
regarding commission of accident by offending vehicle or not?
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Sunita and others Vs.
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others reported in
(2020) 13 SCC 486 has held as under:
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"21. We have no hesitation in observing that such a
hypertechnical and trivial approach of the High Court cannot
be sustained in a case for compensation under the Act, in
connection with a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death
of a family member. Recently, in Mangla Ram v. Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. [Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 656 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2
SCC (Cri) 819] (to which one of us, Khanwilkar, J. was a
party), this Court has restated the position as to the approach
to be adopted in accident claim cases. In that case, the Court
was dealing with a case of an accident between a motorcycle
and a jeep, where the Tribunal had relied upon the FIR and
charge-sheet, as well as the accompanying statements of the
complainant and witnesses, to opine that the police records
confirmed the occurrence of an accident and also the identity
of the offending jeep but the High Court had overturned
[Pratap Singh v. Mangla Ram, 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3765]
that finding inter alia on the ground that the oral evidence
supporting such a finding had been discarded by the Tribunal
itself and that reliance solely on the document forming part of
the police record was insufficient to arrive at such a finding.
Disapproving that approach, this Court, after adverting to
multitude of cases under the Act, noted as follows: (Mangla
Ram case [Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018)
5 SCC 656 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri)
819] , SCC pp. 667-71, paras 22-25)
"22. The question is: Whether this approach of the
High Court can be sustained in law? While dealing
with a similar situation, this Court in Bimla
Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC
530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)
1101] noted the defence of the driver and conductor of
the bus which inter alia was to cast a doubt on the
police record indicating that the person standing at the
rear side of the bus, suffered head injury when the bus
was being reversed without blowing any horn. This
Court observed that while dealing with the claim
petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988, the Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by
the pleadings of the parties, its function is to determine
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the amount of fair compensation. In paras 11-15, the
Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 533-34)
'11. While dealing with a claim petition in
terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by
the pleadings of the parties; its function being to
determine the amount of fair compensation in
the event an accident has taken place by reason
of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It
is true that occurrence of an accident having
regard to the provisions contained in Section
166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining
a claim petition but that would not mean that
despite evidence to the effect that death of the
claimant's predecessor had taken place by
reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle,
the same would be ignored only on the basis of a
post-mortem report vis-à-vis the averments
made in a claim petition.
12. The deceased was a constable. Death took
place near a police station. The post-mortem
report clearly suggests that the deceased died of
a brain injury. The place of accident is not far
from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult
to believe the story of the driver of the bus that
he slept in the bus and in the morning found a
dead body wrapped in a blanket. If the death of
the constable had taken place earlier, it is wholly
unlikely that his dead body in a small town like
Dharampur would remain undetected throughout
the night particularly when it was lying at a bus-
stand and near a police station. In such an event,
the court can presume that the police officers
themselves should have taken possession of the
dead body.
13. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has
rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently
there was absolutely no reason to falsely
implicate Respondents 2 and 3. The claimant
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was not at the place of occurrence. She,
therefore, might not be aware of the details as to
how the accident took place but the fact that the
first information report had been lodged in
relation to an accident could not have been
ignored.
14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the
claimant's witnesses might have occurred but the
core question before the Tribunal and
consequently before the High Court was as to
whether the bus in question was involved in the
accident or not. For the purpose of determining
the said issue, the Court was required to apply
the principle underlying the burden of proof in
terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a dead body
wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot
at such an early hour, which was required to be
proved by Respondents 2 and 3.
15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has
rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was
necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of
an accident caused by a particular bus in a
particular manner may not be possible to be
done by the claimants. The claimants were
merely to establish their case on the touchstone
of preponderance of probability. The standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have
been applied. For the said purpose, the High
Court should have taken into consideration the
respective stories set forth by both the parties.'
(emphasis supplied)
The Court restated the legal position that the claimants
were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of
preponderance of probability and standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied by the
Tribunal while dealing with the motor accident cases.
Even in that case, the view taken by the High Court to
reverse similar findings, recorded by the Tribunal was
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set aside.
23. Following the enunciation in Bimla Devi
case [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC
530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)
1101] , this Court in Parmeshwari v. Amir
Chand [Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC
635 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri)
605] noted that when filing of the complaint was not
disputed, the decision of the Tribunal ought not to have
been reversed by the High Court [Amir
Chand v. Parmeshwari, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 9302]
on the ground that nobody came from the office of the
SSP to prove the complaint. The Court appreciated the
testimony of the eyewitnesses in paras 12 & 13 and
observed thus: (Parmeshwari
case [Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC
635 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri)
605] , SCC p. 638)
'12. The other ground on which the High Court
dismissed [Amir Chand v. Parmeshwari, 2009
SCC OnLine P&H 9302] the case was by way of
disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW
1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totally
conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the
appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh
extended his help to the appellant by helping her
to reach the doctor's chamber in order to ensure
that an injured woman gets medical treatment.
The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be
disbelieved just because he did not file a
complaint himself. We are constrained to repeat
our observation that the total approach of the
High Court, unfortunately, was not sensitised
enough to appreciate the plight of the victim.
13. The other so-called reason in the High
Court's order was that as the claim petition was
filed after four months of the accident, the same
is 'a device to grab money from the insurance
company'. This finding in the absence of any
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material is certainly perverse. The High Court
appears to be not cognizant of the principle that
in a road accident claim, the strict principles of
proof in a criminal case are not attracted. ...'
24. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V.
Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal [N.K.V. Bros. (P)
Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, (1980) 3 SCC 457 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 774] , wherein it was contended by the
vehicle owner that the criminal case in relation to the
accident had ended in acquittal and for which reason
the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be
rejected. This Court negatived the said argument by
observing that the nature of proof required to establish
culpable rashness, punishable under IPC, is more
stringent than negligence sufficient under the law of
tort to create liability. The observation made in para 3
of the judgment would throw some light as to what
should be the approach of the Tribunal in motor
accident cases. The same reads thus: (SCC pp. 458-59)
'3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in
our country, specially when truck and bus
drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial
recklessness often persuades the courts, as has
been observed by us earlier in other cases, to
draw an initial presumption in several cases
based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see
that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers
and owners do not escape liability merely
because of some doubt here or some obscurity
there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be
inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly
reasonable. The court should not succumb to
niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We
are emphasising this aspect because we are often
distressed by transport operators getting away
with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact
that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary
control over the drivers in the matter of careful
driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable
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driving of public transport must bring owner and
driver to their responsibility to their neighbour.
Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-
fault liability by legislation. A second aspect
which pains us is the inadequacy of the
compensation or undue parsimony practised by
tribunals. We must remember that judicial
tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the
Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation
for State relief against accidental disablement of
citizens. There is no justification for
niggardliness in compensation. A third factor
which is harrowing is the enormous delay in
disposal of accident cases resulting in
compensation, even if awarded, being postponed
by several years. The States must appoint
sufficient number of tribunals and the High
Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that
the trauma and tragedy already sustained may
not be magnified by the injustice of delayed
justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in
this regard.'
25. In Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina
Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646
: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] , this
Court examined similar situation where the evidence of
claimant's eyewitness was discarded by the Tribunal
and that the respondent in that case was acquitted in the
criminal case concerning the accident. This Court,
however, opined that it cannot be overlooked that upon
investigation of the case registered against the
respondent, prima facie, materials showing negligence
were found to put him on trial. The Court restated the
settled principle that the evidence of the claimants
ought to be examined by the Tribunal on the touchstone
of preponderance of probability and certainly the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not
have been applied as noted in Bimla Devi [Bimla
Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5
SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] . In paras 8
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& 9 of the reported decision, the dictum in United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta [United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] , has
been adverted to as under: (Dulcina Fernandes
case [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz,
(2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 13] , SCC p. 650)
'8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila
Datta [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila
Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ)
798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] while considering
the nature of a claim petition under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 a three-Judge Bench of this
Court has culled out certain propositions of
which Propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be
relevant to the facts of the present case and,
therefore, may be extracted hereinbelow: (SCC
p. 518, para 10)
"10. ... (ii) The rules of pleadings do not
strictly apply as the claimant is required to
make an application in a form prescribed
under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading
where the proceedings are suo motu
initiated by the Tribunal.
* * *
(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a
claim and determines the compensation, it
does not do so as in an adversarial
litigation. ...
(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow
such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It
may choose one or more persons
possessing special knowledge of and
matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in
holding the enquiry."
9. The following further observation available in
para 10 of the Report would require specific
note: (Shila Datta case [United India Insurance
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Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri)
328] , SCC p. 519)
"10. ... We have referred to the aforesaid
provisions to show that an award by the
Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial
adjudication between the litigating parties
to a dispute, but a statutory determination
of compensation on the occurrence of an
accident, after due enquiry, in accordance
with the statute."'
In para 10 of Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina
Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646
: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13], the
Court opined that non-examination of witness per se
cannot be treated as fatal to the claim set up before the
Tribunal. In other words, the approach of the Tribunal
should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and
evidence by applying the principles of preponderance
of probability."
22. It is thus well settled that in motor accident claim
cases, once the foundational fact, namely, the actual
occurrence of the accident, has been established, then
the Tribunal's role would be to calculate the quantum of
just compensation if the accident had taken place by
reason of negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle
and, while doing so, the Tribunal would not be strictly
bound by the pleadings of the parties. Notably, while
deciding cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents,
the standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of
preponderance of probability and not the strict standard
of proof beyond all reasonable doubt which is followed
in criminal cases."
7. Thus, it is clear that claim petitions are to be decided on the basis
of evidence led in the claim petition and not only purely on the basis of
document of criminal case. Furthermore, mere delay in lodging the FIR
cannot be sole ground to dislodge the authenticity of allegations made in
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the FIR. The complainant may always give a plausible explanation for
delay in lodging the FIR. Furthermore, FIR is not an encyclopedia and is
not a substantive piece of evidence and if the delay is plausibly
explained, then even the delayed FIR can be relied upon. Furthermore,
prompt FIR is not a guarantee of correctness of allegations.
8. Be that whatever it may be.
9. Once the claim petition is to be decided on the basis of evidence
led by the parties in the claim petition, therefore, primary consideration
as to whether plausible explanation has been offered by claimant for
delay in lodging the FIR?
10. FIR was lodged by Narhari Prasad Sharma who is the maternal
uncle of claimant-Krishna Kumar Sharma. The FIR was lodged on
31.07.2008 in respect of accident which took place on 26.06.2008. In the
FIR itself, it is mentioned that reason for delay is that injured was under
treatment. Furthermore, claimant remained hospitalized from
26.06.2008 till 28.07.2008. One of his hand was amputated. If the
caretakers of the claimant were busy in taking care of injured and
instead of rushing to the police station, if they decided to look after the
injured who has suffered not only grievous injury but a complete mental
setback on account of amputation of his right hand, then by no stretch of
imagination, it cannot be said that FIR was delayed and was lodged with
solitary intention to falsely involve the offending truck bearing
registration No.MP06-E-6107.
11. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion
that mere delay in lodging FIR cannot be a ground to dislodge the
authenticity of evidence of claimant that accident was caused by
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offending truck bearing registration No. MP06-E-6107.
12. So far as word "unknown" as mentioned in the statement of injury
Ex.P/4 is concerned, it is suffice to mention here that aforesaid
document does not speak about the identity of offending vehicle but it
speaks about the identity of patient. The word "unknown" is mentioned
in front of name of injured, father's name, address. If the identity of
injured was not known, then doctors were left with no other option but
to mention that neither name of injured is known nor the name of his
father and address are known. Therefore, merely because the identity of
injured was not known at the time of admission in the hospital, it cannot
be said that accident was caused by an unknown vehicle. Accordingly,
first contention of counsel for appellant that claimant-Krishna Kumar
Sharma has failed to prove the very factum of accident is hereby
rejected.
13. The second contention of counsel for Insurance Company is that
since owner and driver did not appear before the Claims Tribunal,
therefore, copy of permit was not available on record and thus, it is clear
that offending truck bearing registration No. MP06-E-6107 was being
driven without any valid permit and thus, Insurance Company should
not have been held liable.
14. Heard counsel for appellant/insurance company.
15. The appellant has examined its investigator namely Vinod Kumar
Dixit (DW-3). The counsel for appellant was directed to explain the
authority of private person to conduct an investigation and to collect
evidence by even issuing summons to the witnesses to appear before
him. Unless and until a statutory provision gives power to a person to
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investigate, he cannot issue any summons to any person to appear and
submit document and make a submission before him. It is true that
insurance company has to act through their functionaries and if they
depute somebody to collect the documentary evidence, then same can be
done, but a person cannot clam himself to be an investigator, cannot
issue summon to the witnesses to appear before him and cannot direct
the witnesses to produce the documents. It is not the case of insurance
company that they ever approached the concerning RTO by filing an
application under RTI to obtain copy of permit. Even otherwise,
insurance company did not file an application before the Claims
Tribunal to requisition the record from the concerning transport
department pertaining to the permit of offending vehicle. Thus, it is clear
that appellant/insurance company has miserably failed in discharging its
burden to show that offending vehicle is not having any valid permit at
the time of accident.
16. In the Bed-head ticket, it is mentioned that it was informed that
patient had slipped from Motorcycle, but for the reasons best known to
the Insurance Company, they did not examine the doctor who had
operated upon the appellant/claimant.
17. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion
that Claims Tribunal did not commit any mistake by holding the
insurance company jointly and severally responsible to pay the
compensation amount.
18. No other arguments were advanced by insurance company with
regard to the factum of accident or liability of insurance company.
19. Accordingly, the appeal filed by insurance company fails and is
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hereby dismissed.
20. This appeal has been filed by claimant-Krishna Kumar Sharma for
enhancement of compensation amount.
21. It is submitted that although doctor has opined that
appellant/claimant has suffered permanent disability to the tune of 90%,
but Claims Tribunal has wrongly held that permanent disability suffered
by claimant is only 30%. The appellant/claimant is a right hander and
once he has lost his one hand on account of amputation from his
shoulder joint, then it is clear that he is not in position to do work as a
normal person and thus, Claims Tribunal should have considered his
permanent disability to the tune of 90%, specifically on account of
crookedness in one of his leg. Apart from that it is also submitted by
counsel for appellant that future prospects have also not been awarded.
22. Per contra counsel for insurance company has supported the
findings recorded by Claims Tribunal and submitted that permanent
disability of 30% as assessed by Claims Tribunal is correct.
23. Heard, learned counsel for parties.
24. Permanent disability is a condition in which an individual is no
longer able to work. It is not in dispute that claim of appellant is that he
is a right hander and on account of amputation of his right from the
shoulder joint, he is unable to earn his livelihood. The Vakalatnama in
the present appeal has not been signed by appellant-Krishna Kumar
Sharma, but it has been signed by Advocate who had appeared as his
counsel before the Claims Tribunal, whereas before the Claims Tribunal,
Vakalatnama was signed by appellant/claimant. Once right hand of
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claimant/appellant has been amputated, therefore, it is clear that he must
have signed the Vakalatnama by his left hand. Some of the order-sheets
of Claims Tribunal have also been signed. The order-sheet dated
30/8/2010 of the Claims Tribunal also bears the signature of claimant.
The manner in which the order-sheet has been signed, as well as, the
manner in which Vakalatnama before the Claims Tribunal has been
signed, it appears that appellant is comfortable in doing normal work
even with his left hand. The order-sheet dated 4/5/2010 contains the
signature of claimant in English, whereas order-sheets dated 19/4/2010
and 30/8/2010 contain signatures of appellant/claimant in Hindi. Thus, it
is clear that appellant/claimant Krishna Kumar Sharma has not suffered
90% of whole body disability, but with his left hand, he is able to
perform his normal working. Dr. S.N.Tripathi (PW2), has stated that on
account of injury of the right leg, the claimant has suffered tenderness
and cannot sit by folding his legs, whereas on account of amputation of
his right hand,he has suffered 90% permanent disability. It is not out of
place to mention here that Dr. S.N.Tripathi (PW2) had not operated or
treated the claimant, but he has merely issued permanent disability
certificate after going through X-ray plates.
25. Although it was submitted by counsel for appellant/claimant that
appellant had crookedness in leg, but Dr. S.N.Tripathi (PW2) has stated
that he had found tenderness in his right leg. Under these circumstances,
this Court is of considered opinion that it is difficult to hold that
appellant/claimant Krishna Kumar Sharma had suffered permanent
disability on account of tenderness in his leg. However, undisputedly
appellant has suffered amputation of his right hand, but in view of the
manner in which he has signed the order-sheets as well as Vakaltanama
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before the Claims Tribunal, it is clear that he is not completely disabled
to work on account of amputation of his right hand from the shoulder
joint, but admittedly on account of amputation of one of his upper limbs,
there is bound to be some adverse effect on his ability to earn livelihood.
Accordingly, considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the
case, this Court is of considered opinion that his whole-body permanent
disability can be assessed as 50% in place of 30% as assessed by the
Claims Tribunal.
26. Yearly income of Krishna Kumar Sharma was assessed by the
Claims Tribunal as Rs.1,08,000/- which was on the basis of Income Tax
return of Assessment Year 2007-2008. Therefore, the yearly loss of
income by treating permanent disability as 50% would be Rs.54,000/-
and since age of appellant/claimant was 23 years, therefore, the Claims
Tribunal has rightly applied the multiplier of 18. Accordingly,
appellant/claimant is entitled to following compensation amount:-
Yearly Loss of Income Rs.54,000/-
Future Prospects @ 40% Rs.21,600/-
Total Yearly Loss of Income Rs.75,600/-
Total Loss of Income after applying Rs.13,60,800/-
multiplier of 18
Medical expenses on the basis of Rs.450/-
documents
Special Diet Rs.30,000/-
Physical and Mental agony Rs.30,000/-
Attender Rs.30,000/-
Total compensation Rs.14,51,250/-
Compensation awarded by Claims Rs.6,03,650/-.
Tribunal
Compensation enhanced by Rs.8,47,600/-
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27. Since the appellant has valued the appeal at Rs.9 lacs, therefore, it
is directed that appellant/claimant shall be entitled to further amount of
Rs.8,47,600/-. Other conditions of the Award shall remain the same.
28. With aforesaid observations, MA. No. 617/2011 is, hereby,
allowed.
29. Ex consequenti, M.A. No.617/2011 is allowed and M.A.
No.715/2011 is dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia)
Judge
Rashid
Date: 2025.02.25 18:48:22 +05'30'
