Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rohit vs Shakti Pump India Limited And Ors. on 10 February, 2025
Author: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
Bench: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
1
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GAJENDRA SINGH
ON THE 10th OF FEBRUARY, 2025
MISC. PETITION No. 3568 of 2022
ROHIT AND OTHERS
Versus
SHAKTI PUMP INDIA LIMITED AND ORS. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Rajendra Singh Suryavanshi - Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Piyush Mathur - Senior Advocate with Shri Shashank Sharma and Shri
Dharmendra Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent No.1.
Shri Arvind Parmar with Shri Amit Raj - learned counsel for the respondents
No.2 and 3.
ORDER
Per: Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
Heard finally at motion stage with consent of the parties.
2. That, the petitioners have filed the present petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India being aggrieved by the Order dated 24.06.2022
passed by Industrial Tribunal in Reference No. 04/1.D./2019, Indore whereby
claim of the petitioners that the respondent no. 1 has violated the mandatory
provisions of section 25(N) of the I.D. Act, 1947 before retrenchment, has
been dismissed.
3. Draped in Brevity, facts of the case are as hereunder:-
i) Petitioners are authorized by 209 workers under section 36(1)(c) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). As
per the petitioners, the respondent no. 1 Company on account of various
demands by the workers have illegally retrenched 209 workers on
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08.01.2019. The workers had submitted complaint under section 10 of
the Act before the Conciliation Officer, Pithampur, District Dhar. The
Conciliation Officer failing conciliation has made a reference of the
dispute to the learned Industrial Tribunal under the Act by order dated
29.05.2019. The terms of reference dated 29.05.2019 are as under:
ii. The reference bearing reference no. 04/ID/2019 was tried by the
learned Industrial Tribunal, wherein the petitioners have examined five
witnesses namely, (1) Rohit s/o Krishnalal Patidar (PW/1), (2) Manoj s/o
Shyam Singh Chouhan (PW/2), (3) Akash s/o Suresh Dhibar (PW/3), (4)
Prahlad s/o Purushottam Vishwakarma (PW/4), and (5) Shantaram s/o
Dayaram Patil (PW/5) and exhibited 31 documents.
iii. The respondent no. 1 Company has examined six witnesses namely,
(1) Mahesh Tiwari (DW/1), (2) Sanjay Kumar Jha (DW/2), (3) Rohit s/o
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Yadunandan Patidar (DW/3), (4) Dharmendra Singh Gaur (DW/4), (5)
Mahendra Gadning (DW/5)-(Accountant, Provident Fund Authority),
and (6) Gangadhar Paratey (DW/6) - (Service Manager, State Bank of
India) whereas Respondent no. 2 Ravindra Kalotra (Defendant no.
2/DW/1) and Respondent no. 3 Devendra Patidar (Defendant no. 3/
DW/1) have themselves stepped into the witness box in rebuttal and
have exhibited 285 documents.
iv. The learned Industrial Tribunal on the basis of evidence led by the
parties passed the impugned order answering the reference in negative,
holding that the petitioners have been employees of respondent no. 2 &
3, and the services of the employees have been terminated on the
account of termination of contract by respondent no. 2 & 3 and there is
no Employer-employee relationship between the petitioners and
respondent no. 1.
v. Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 24.06.2022 passed by the
Industrial Tribunal, the present petition has been filed before this Court
by the petitioners averring that the petitioners were in employment of the
Respondent No. 1, and were engaged in jobs of a perennial nature, and
were working under the supervision of supervisors of Respondent No. 1.
It has been further averred that the petitioners were not aware of the fact
that their services were being taken as employees of Respondent No. 2 &
3 and were working as regular employees for many years. It has been
further averred that the Respondent No. 2 & 3 are creation of the
Principal employer who have been put up as a screen to avoid his own
responsibility, and the petitioners have illegally been shown as
employees of the Respondents No. 2 & 3, and the contract between the
Respondent No. 1 and Contractors Respondents No. 2 & 3 was a sham.
It has been further averred that the Respondent No.1 Company has
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illegally retrenched 209 workers on 08.01.2019 claiming setting aside of
the impugned order dated 24.06.2024 and a direction of reinstatement
with back wages.
vi. The Respondents have filed Reply supporting the order passed by the
learned Industrial Tribunal averring that the Petitioners who were never
in service of the Respondent No. 1 and were always under employment
of Respondents No. 2 & 3 Contractors. The Respondents No. 2 & 3 have
also clearly contended that the Petitioners Employees were under their
employment and on account of unlawful activities of the petitioners the
respondent contractors had to terminate their contract with respondent
No.1. It has been averred that as the termination of contract by the
Contractors automatically terminated the employment of the petitioners
it will not fall under the definition of "Retrenchment" defined under
Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
vii. Petitioners have submitted rejoinder and brought in additional
documents. The petitioners in the rejoinder have annexed passbooks, job
tickets, accidents reports, some salary slips, gate passes, performance
certificates, etc. to show and prove the factum of employment. These
documents have not been part of the original record and have not been
produced or proved before the learned Industrial Tribunal.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners in order to demonstrate employment
of the petitioners with the Respondent No. 1 drew attention of this court on
the bank statement of the petitioners with State Bank of India showing
address of the petitioners as that of the Respondent No. 1 (Exhibit P/10), the
attendance marked in SAP System by the Respondent No. 1 with regular
employees, leave application, certificate of appreciation etc. It has been
argued that petitioners were employed as machine operators, assembly
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operators which are jobs of perennial nature and the said work is not included
in the work of loading, unloading, housekeeping and gardening for which
Registration under Section 7 (2) of the Contract Labour (Regulation &
Abolition) Act, 1970 was taken by the Respondent No. 2 & 3. It has been
further argued that their ESI contribution has been deposited by the
Respondent No. 1 in its own code which is evident from Exhibit P/11, P/13
and P/18. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied on Exhibits P/12, 14
to 17, salary slips and Exhibit P/29 to P/30 to prove the control and
supervision of Respondent No. 1. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has
relied upon Exhibit P/9 which is alleged to be an offer letter by the
Respondent No.1 Company to employment between petitioners and
Respondent No. 1. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has also relied on
Exhibit P/10, P/20 & P/31 which are bank passbooks of the petitioners having
address of Respondent No. 1 and other documents such as Certificate (Exhibit
P/21) and leave application (Exhibit P/22). The petitioners have further relied
on the fact that the attendance summary report of petitioners (Exhibit D/178)
are mentioned in the same list as that of the regular employees.
5. Per-contra, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent No. 1 has argued that although, the petitioners have alleged
themselves to be working as "Machine Operator" but they have not produced
any appointment letter or any other document to prove the same. Infact, the
documents brought on record and proved by the respondents clearly prove the
employment of the petitioners with Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 has further contended that
the so called offer letter Ex P/9 alleged to have been issued by the respondent
No.1 relied on by the petitioners is false and is unsigned and has not been
duly proved by way of cogent evidence and the said employee has admitted
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in cross examination that he has been working since 2007 till 2019. Thus,
there is no question of any offer letter being made in 2009.
6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.1
has argued that the Respondent No.1 has taken registration under Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as
"CLRA Act") since 2006 by Ex.D/65 and D/66. Similarly, respondents No. 2
& 3 are licensed contractors under CLRA Act and the salary, ESI and PF
contribution of the petitioners has always been paid by the Respondents No. 2
& 3 only. It has been further argued that the contribution alleged to have been
made by Ex. P/11, P/13 and P/18 are prior to 2010 which were made under
Code of Respondent No.1 till 2010, the said Contractors did not have his
individual ESI Code, thus, the Respondent No. 1 being a principal employer,
the ESI contribution was being deposited under the Code of the Respondent
No. 1 and as soon as the Respondents no. 3 got his individual code from
2010, the ESI contribution was deposited by the Contractors under his own
code which fact is evident from Ex. D/243 which is a communication by
Contractor to ESIC Department. It is further argued that from perusal of Ex
D/13, D/14, D/16, D/17, D/21, D/25, D/26, D/28, D/34, D/35, D/43, D/44 and
D/60 it is evident that contributions of P.F. was made by the Contractors after
their registration. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 has
further relied on evidence of DW/5 Mahendra Gadning who is Accountant in
Provident Fund Authority and the said witness has exhibited Document Ex.
D/179 to D/184 which are ledger of contribution made by Contractors for the
employees.
7. It has also been contended by Learned Senior Counsel that the
documents such as Exhibit P/12 and P/14 to P/17 which have been alleged to
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be Salary Slips are fake documents which have not been duly proved as the
said employees were under employment of the Contractor. It has been argued
that the petitioners themselves have produced document Ex.P/13 which
shows the code of Contractor Dharmendra Yadav. The Code of said
Contractor is also mentioned in Document Ex. D/67. As regarding the address
in Bank Passbook it was contended that the address of an account holder in
the passbook of the bank could not be a proof of employment. The salary
received by the employees have clearly received from the contractors as
proved by Bank Statement of the Contractors Ex. D/223, Ex. D/275 and Ex.
D/276. It has further been contended that the SAP attendance summary report
(Exhibit D/178) marked the presence of each employee wherein the
attendance of the contracted employees were also duly marked so as to verify
the attendance of the workers for payment to the Contractors, in fact, Exhibit
D/178 clearly marked the attendance of the regular employees as regular
employees and the attendance of contractual employees were clearly being
marked as contracted employees only. Senior Counsel for Respondent No. 1
has also relied on communications Ex. D/2, D/11, D/31, D/36 to D/41, D/46,
D/48, D/49, D/50 and D/53 which are applications by the employees to the
Contractors to demonstrate their employment and supervision by the
Contractor. Further, Learned Senior Counsel for Respondent No.1 has relied
on orders passed by the Labour Commissioner (Exhibit D/129, D/137 &
D/140) to prove that the Petitioners are the Employees of the Respondent No.
2 & 3 Contractors and their services are automatically terminated after
withdrawal of the services of the Contractors.
8. Learned counsel for the Respondent No. 2 & 3 has contended that the
Petitioners were employees of the Respondent contractors and their
employment, wages, ESI and PF contributions were always paid by the
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Respondents No. 2 & 3. Learned Counsel for Respondents No. 2 & 3 have
contended that they have been granted a valid license under Section 12 (1) of
the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 vide Exhibit D/190
to D/193 and D/228 to D/231 and have also been granted registration under
the Employee State Insurance Act, 1948 and the Provident Funds Act, 1952
by Ex. D/194, D/240, D/241 and D/242. Learned counsel for the Respondent
No. 2 & 3 drew attention of this court to Ex.225 and Ex.243 which is list of
employees issued by them to the ESIC and PF Department which are also
duly exhibited. It is also further stated that the Respondents No. 2 & 3 have
duly proved the payment of wages to the employees from their own account
by bank statement (Exhibit D/223, D/275 and D/276).
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.
10. The primary issue to be dealt with in the case at hand is whether the
petitioners were successful in proving Employer Employee relationship
before the Industrial Tribunal and only if the said relationship is found to be
established and proved, the petitioners would become entitle to any relief
from this court.
11. For the purpose of determining the relationship of an employer and an
employee, factors to be considered have been enumerated by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Balwant Rai Saluja vs. Air India Limited (2014)
9 SCC 407 in which it has been held as hereunder: -
"65. Thus, it can be concluded that the relevant factors to be taken into
consideration to establish an employer-employee relationship would include,
inter alia:
(i) who appoints the workers;
(ii) who pays the salary/remuneration;
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(iii) who has the authority to dismiss;
(iv) who can take disciplinary action;
(v) whether there is continuity of service; and
(vi) extent of control and supervision i.e. whether there exists
complete control and supervision.
As regards extent of control and supervision, we have already taken
note of the observations in Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills case [Bengal
Nagpur Cotton Mills v. Bharat Lal, (2011) 1 SCC 635 : (2011) 1
SCC (L&S) 16] , International Airport Authority of India case
[International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo
Workers' Union, (2009) 13 SCC 374 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 257] and
Nalco case [National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout,
(2014) 6 SCC 756 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 353] ."
12. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of International
Airport Authority of India- International Air Cargo Workers' Union
reported in (2009)13 SCC 374 has held as hereunder:-
"35. As noticed above, SAIL did not specifically deal with the legal
position as to when a dispute is brought before the Industrial
Adjudicator as to whether the contract labour agreement is sham,
nominal and merely a camouflage, when there is no prohibition
notification under section 10(1) of CLRA Act.
36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under section
10 of CLRA Act, but the contract labour contend that the contract
between principal employer and contractor is sham and nominal, the
remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles in Gujarat
Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. The remedy of the
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workmen is to approach the industrial adjudicator for an
adjudication of their dispute that they are the direct employees of the
principle employer and the agreement is sham, nominal and merely
a camouflage, even when there is no order under section 10(1) of
CLRA Act.
37. The industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds
that contract between principal employer and the contractor is sham,
nominal and merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the
employer and that there is in fact a direct employment, by applying
tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss
from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the
employee the way in which the work should be done, in short who
has direction and control over the employee. But where there is no
notification under section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not
proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was
sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the
principal employer to absorb or regularize the services of the
contract labour does not arise.
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court while relying on the above in the case of
Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. Vs. Ramcharan & Others reported in (2023) 1
SCC 463 has further held that:-
"13. In International Airport Authority of India v. International Air
Cargo Workers' Union [International Airport Authority of
India v. International Air Cargo Workers' Union, (2009) 13 SCC 374
: (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 257] , after considering the decision of this
Court in SAIL v. National Union Waterfront
Workers [SAIL v. National Union Waterfront Workers, (2001) 7 SCC
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1 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1121] , it has been observed and held by this
Court that where there is no abolition of contract labour under
Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour contends that
the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is
sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. It is
further observed that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief
sought if it finds that the contract between the principal employer
and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to
deny employment benefits to the employee and that there is in fact a
direct employment, by applying tests like : who pays the salary; who
has the power to remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary
action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should
be done, in short, who has direct control over the employee.
14. It is further observed that where there is no notification under
Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the
industrial adjudication that the contract was a sham/nominal and
camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to
absorb or regularise the services of the contract labour does not
arise. It has further been observed in paras 38 and 39 as under :
(International Airport Authority of India case [International Airport
Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers' Union, (2009)
13 SCC 374 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 257] , SCC p. 388)
"38. The tests that are applied to find out whether a person is
an employee or an independent contractor may not
automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour
agreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage. For
example, if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the
labour supplied by the contractor will work under the
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directions, supervision and control of the principal employer
but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the
principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the
right to regulate the employment is with the contractor, and the
ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.
39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work
to be done by a contract labour, when such labour is
assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as
employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be
assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise.
In short, worker being the employee of the contractor, the
ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he
decides where the employee will work and how long he will
work and subject to what conditions. Only when the contractor
assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal employer,
the worker works under the supervision and control of the
principal employer but that is secondary control. The primary
control is with the contractor."
15. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid two
decisions to the facts of the case on hand and in the absence of any
notification under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and in the absence of
any allegations and/or findings that the contract was sham and
camouflage, both the Industrial Tribunal as well as the High Court
have committed a serious error in reinstating the contesting
respondents and directing the appellant principal employer to
absorb them as their employees. The parties shall be governed by the
CLRA Act and relief, if any, could have been granted under the
provisions of the CLRA Act and not under the MPIR Act.
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16. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present
appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment(s) and order(s)
[Kirloskar Brother Ltd. v. Ramcharan, 2018 SCC OnLine MP
1885] , [Kirloskar Bros. Ltd. v. Ramcharan, 2018 SCC OnLine MP
1884] passed by the High Court in WP (S) No. 1083 of 2004 and WA
No. 813 of 2018 as well as the judgment and order passed by the
Industrial Tribunal are hereby quashed and set aside. The judgment
and award passed by the Labour Court is hereby restored."
14. If we examine the case of the petitioners on the anvil of dictum of law
laid down in the aforesaid cases, it is required to be seen whether the
employees have been in employment of the respondent No.1 or in
employment of Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 and resultantly
whether an "Employer-Employee" relationship exists between the petitioners
and Respondent No.1, as there is no prescribed ratio under law to determine
employer-employee relationship, therefore facts and circumstances of each
case are required to be dealt with individually.
15. Petitioners have produced various documents to prove their case but
have not produced any letter of appointment issued by respondent No.1. The
petitioners have not disputed in their cross examination that their salaries
have been deposited in their accounts regularly by contractors. The
respondents have on the other hand proved that the Respondents No. 2 & 3
are licensed contractors having work agreement for the said period which are
exhibited as Exhibit D/68 to D/93 and the Respondent No. 1 Company has
also taken a registration in 2006 as Principal Employer vide Exhibit D/65.
The payment of wages by the contractor to the employees also has duly been
proved by the bank statements of Respondents No. 2 & 3 vide Exhibit D/223,
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D/275 and D/276 which clearly demonstrates the payment of wages to these
employees in their account by the contractors. Exhibit D/178 clearly marked
the attendance of the regular employees as regular employees and the
attendance of contractual employees were clearly being marked as contracted
employees.
16. The petitioners have produced one offer letter Ex.P/9 which has been
disputed by the respondent. If we examine Ex. P/9, it is only an offer letter
which is not counter signed by the said employee. The said employee in his
cross examination has admitted in para 24 that he has been in employment
since 2007 and worked till 2019. If the said employee has come in
employment with Ex. P/9 then such employee would have certainly received
salary and other benefits after 2009. However, the employee has failed to
produce any other document except offer letter. Thus, the offer letter itself
does not prove the fact of employment. Similarly, the alleged salary slips
Ex.P/12, P/14 to P/17 which have been disputed by the respondent as not
genuine, are for the year 2008-09 relating to two employees only. Respondent
No. 2 and 3 Contractors have shown these people as their employee and have
paid salary and contribution from their own account. The employees have not
produced any other document to further prove their employment. If these
employees were in service of respondent No.1 then they would certainly be
having their regular salary deposited by respondent No. 1 and could have
proved the same by exhibiting their account statement. Similarly, these
employees have not produced any other document regarding their
contribution of ESIC or PF being paid by the respondent No.1. Thus only on
the basis of disputed salary slips they cannot be held to be regular employee
of respondent No.1.
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17. As regards the contribution of ESI, even if ESIC contribution prior to
2010 has been deposited under Code of the respondent No.1 then it has also
been brought on record that as the contractors did not have their own
Employer Code till 2010, thus the contribution has been made till 2010 under
the Code of the Principal Employer as the Principal Employer is liable for the
said contribution. After 2010 the contractors have deposited the ESI
contribution under their own Code. Similarly, Ex D/13, D/14, D/16, D/21,
D/25, D/28, D/34 and D/60 clearly show contributions of PF made by the
Contractors. The Respondents No. 2 & 3 have submitted documents Ex.
D/225 & Ex. D/243 by which a list of employees has been submitted by the
Respondents to the said departments.
18. Furthermore, the supervision and employment of the employees by
contractors also clearly reflects from various communications exhibited as
Respondents by Ex. D/2, D/10 to D/63 which are communications,
applications for job, notices and other documents which clearly demonstrate
the employment and regular supervision of the employment by the contractor.
The fact regarding termination of employment has also been proved by
Exhibit D/24, D/36 & D/58 which clearly shows that the Respondents No. 2
and 3 had shut down their businesses due to which the employment of the
employees had come to an end. In this regard the orders passed by the Labour
Commissioner (Exhibit D/129, D/137 & D/140) also hold that the Petitioners
are the Employees of the Respondent No. 2 & 3 Contractors and their
services are automatically terminated after withdrawal of the services of the
Contractors.
19. In view of the above, in the considered opinion of this court, we do not
find that there was any employer-employee relationship between the
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petitioners and respondent No.1. Hence, we find that the petitioners do not
have an Employer-Employee relationship with Respondent No.1 and were
clearly employees of Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3. As there is no
relationship of the Petitioners with the Respondent No.1, the termination of
employment due to termination of contract of Respondent No.2 and 3 cannot
be held to be "retrenchment" within the meaning of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Thus there is no illegality in the order passed in
reference by the Industrial Tribunal.
20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shalini Shyam
Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010) 8 SCC
329 has explained the principles on exercise of jurisdiction under Article
227:-
"49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the
following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different
from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of
power by the High Court under these two articles is also
different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a
writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction
on High Courts is substantially different from the history of
conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts
under Article 227 and have been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its
power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution,
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interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor
can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over
the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases
where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been
provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise
of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise
of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid
down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be
guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Waryam Singh [AIR 1954 SC 215] and the
principles in Waryam Singh [AIR 1954 SC 215] have been
repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and
various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh [AIR 1954 SC 215]
, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to
keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the
bounds of their authority".
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and
courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by
not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in
them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court
can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when
there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals
and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross
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and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural
justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court
cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just
because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or
courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the
jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.
(i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article
227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a
part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union
of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] and
therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also
very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather
cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code
by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not
and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under
Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such
statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High
Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on
equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be
exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power
of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main
object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial
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control by the High Court on the administration of justice
within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and
judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly
functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it
does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference
under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the
wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of
justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public
confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts
subordinate to the High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention
is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases
but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the
administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas
Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance.
Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but
its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline
pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be
counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of
its strength and vitality."
21. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court does not find any
perversity or illegality in the Impugned Order dated 24.06.2022 passed the by
Industrial Tribunal, Indore in Reference No. 04/1.D./2019 and hence needs no
interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:4268
22. Ex Consequenti, the petition filed by the petitioners sans merits
deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.
23. No order as to cost.
(SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI) (GAJENDRA SINGH)
JUDGE JUDGE
HS
HEMANT SARAF
2025.02.21 17:27:47
+05'30'
