Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rajesh Shrivas vs Bhure Singh on 4 February, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
1 MA. No. 3111 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 4th OF FEBRUARY, 2025
MISC. APPEAL No. 3111 of 2023
RAJESH SHRIVAS AND OTHERS
Versus
BHURE SINGH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Akshat Kumar Jain - Advocate for appellants.
Shri Naresh Singh Tomar- Advocate for respondent No.3.
ORDER
This Misc. Appeal, under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, has
been filed against the Award dated 28.04.2023 passed by II Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal, Ambah, District Morena (M.P.) in MACC No.05/2021, by which
claim petition filed by appellants has been dismissed.
2. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal, in short, are that
appellants have filed a claim petition alleging that on 29.09.2020 at about 12
noon, respondent No.2 by driving the offending Bus bearing Registration No.
MP06-P-0623, in a rash and negligent manner, dashed the motorcycle of
Shubham, as a result he lost his life and accordingly, compensation of
Rs.1,07,30,000/- was claimed.
3. Respondent No.1 is the owner whereas respondent No.2 is the driver of the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
offending vehicle and respondent No.3 is the Insurance Company of appellants.
4. Respondent No.1 was proceeded ex parte whereas respondent No.2 filed
his written statement and denied the claim averments and pleaded that in the FIR,
it is mentioned that the accident has been caused by some unknown vehicle. It
was further pleaded that he is holding a valid driving licence and the vehicle is
insured with respondent No.3. Respondent No.3 also denied the averments in the
claim petition and claimed that respondent No.2 was not having a valid driving
licence and the vehicle was being plied without any permit, fitness certificate,
pollution certificate, tax payment receipts etc. Thus, it was the contention of
respondent No.3 that the vehicle was being plied in violation of terms and
conditions of the insurance policy.
5. The claimants, in order to prove their claim, examined Rajesh Shrivas
(AW-1), Anil Sikarwar (AW-2), Anil Singh Tomar (AW-3). Respondents did not
examine any witness in their defence. The claims tribunal, by the impugned
Award, has dismissed the claim petition filed by appellants on the ground that
they have failed to prove that the accident was caused by offending Bus bearing
registration No.MP06-P-0623.
6. Challenging the Award passed by the Claims Tribunal, it is submitted by
counsel for appellants that it is well established principle of law that claim
petitions cannot be decided on the basis of documents of criminal case and
therefore, Claims Tribunal has committed material illegality by not appreciating
the evidence led by appellants but by relying upon the documents of criminal
case. It is further submitted that the cases are to be decided on the basis of
preponderance of probabilities and the rule of strict proof, as applicable in
criminal cases, does not apply to the claims petitions. Counsel for appellants has
also placed reliance on the judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of
Geeta Dubey & Ors Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. decided on
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
18.12.2024 in Civil Appeal No.14668/2024 and by this Court in the case of Iffco
Tokyo General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Mamta Bai Lodhi (Thakur) and
others decided on 25.10.2024 in M.P. No.5892 of 2024 and in the case of Shri
Ram General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Kusum Bai and others decided on
21.01.2025 in MA.No.1814/2020.
7. Per contra, the appeal is vehemently opposed by counsel for respondents. It
is submitted that appellants themselves had relied upon the documents which are
part of charge-sheet. It is clear from the FIR Ex.P-2 that Brijesh Shrivas who is
the real uncle of deceased had given an information to the Police that accident has
been caused by some unknown vehicle, as a result injured Shubham had sustained
injury on the backside of his head, and fell unconscious and subsequently during
treatment, he has expired. It is further submitted that although Brijesh Shrivas is
the real uncle of deceased, but for the reasons best known to appellants, he was
not examined. It is further submitted that even in the Crime Details Form
(Ex.P/11) by which spot map was prepared on the information given by Brijesh
Shrivas, it is specifically mentioned that the accident was caused by some
unknown vehicle. Accordingly, it is submitted that unknown vehicle was
substituted by offending vehicle in order to recover compensation amount.
Therefore, the Claims Tribunal did not commit any mistake by rejecting the claim
petition on the ground that appellants have failed to prove involvement of the
offending vehicle.
8. Heard, learned counsel for the parties.
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Sunita and others Vs. Rajasthan State
Road Transport Corporation and others reported in (2020) 13 SCC 486 has
held as under:
"21. We have no hesitation in observing that such a hypertechnical and
trivial approach of the High Court cannot be sustained in a case for
compensation under the Act, in connection with a motor vehicle
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
accident resulting in the death of a family member. Recently, in Mangla
Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance
Co. Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 656 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC
(Cri) 819] (to which one of us, Khanwilkar, J. was a party), this Court
has restated the position as to the approach to be adopted in accident
claim cases. In that case, the Court was dealing with a case of an
accident between a motorcycle and a jeep, where the Tribunal had relied
upon the FIR and charge-sheet, as well as the accompanying statements
of the complainant and witnesses, to opine that the police records
confirmed the occurrence of an accident and also the identity of the
offending jeep but the High Court had overturned [Pratap
Singh v. Mangla Ram, 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3765] that finding inter
alia on the ground that the oral evidence supporting such a finding had
been discarded by the Tribunal itself and that reliance solely on the
document forming part of the police record was insufficient to arrive at
such a finding. Disapproving that approach, this Court, after adverting
to multitude of cases under the Act, noted as follows: (Mangla Ram
case [Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 656 :
(2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 819] , SCC pp. 667-71,
paras 22-25)
"22. The question is: Whether this approach of the High Court
can be sustained in law? While dealing with a similar situation,
this Court in Bimla Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009)
13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)
1101] noted the defence of the driver and conductor of the bus
which inter alia was to cast a doubt on the police record
indicating that the person standing at the rear side of the bus,
suffered head injury when the bus was being reversed without
blowing any horn. This Court observed that while dealing with
the claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988, the Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the
pleadings of the parties, its function is to determine the amount
of fair compensation. In paras 11-15, the Court observed thus:
(SCC pp. 533-34)
'11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of
Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal
stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties;
its function being to determine the amount of fair
compensation in the event an accident has taken place by
reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the
provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine
qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would
not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of
the claimant's predecessor had taken place by reason of
an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be
ignored only on the basis of a post-mortem report vis-à-
vis the averments made in a claim petition.
12. The deceased was a constable. Death took place near a
police station. The post-mortem report clearly suggests
that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of
accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore,
difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he
slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body
wrapped in a blanket. If the death of the constable had
taken place earlier, it is wholly unlikely that his dead body
in a small town like Dharampur would remain undetected
throughout the night particularly when it was lying at a
bus-stand and near a police station. In such an event, the
court can presume that the police officers themselves
should have taken possession of the dead body.
13. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly
proceeded on the basis that apparently there was
absolutely no reason to falsely implicate Respondents 2
and 3. The claimant was not at the place of occurrence.
She, therefore, might not be aware of the details as to how
the accident took place but the fact that the first
information report had been lodged in relation to an
accident could not have been ignored.
14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the claimant's
witnesses might have occurred but the core question
before the Tribunal and consequently before the High
Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved
in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the
said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle
underlying the burden of proof in terms of the provisions
of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a
dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the
spot at such an early hour, which was required to be
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
proved by Respondents 2 and 3.
15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly
taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be
borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a
particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible
to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to
establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance
of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose,
the High Court should have taken into consideration the
respective stories set forth by both the parties.'
(emphasis supplied)
The Court restated the legal position that the claimants were
merely to establish their case on the touchstone of
preponderance of probability and standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt cannot be applied by the Tribunal while
dealing with the motor accident cases. Even in that case, the
view taken by the High Court to reverse similar findings,
recorded by the Tribunal was set aside.
23. Following the enunciation in Bimla Devi case [Bimla
Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC
(Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] , this Court
in Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand [Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand,
(2011) 11 SCC 635 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC
(Cri) 605] noted that when filing of the complaint was not
disputed, the decision of the Tribunal ought not to have been
reversed by the High Court [Amir Chand v. Parmeshwari, 2009
SCC OnLine P&H 9302] on the ground that nobody came from
the office of the SSP to prove the complaint. The Court
appreciated the testimony of the eyewitnesses in paras 12 & 13
and observed thus: (Parmeshwari case [Parmeshwari v. Amir
Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3
SCC (Cri) 605] , SCC p. 638)
'12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed
[Amir Chand v. Parmeshwari, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H
9302] the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony
of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is
totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the
appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
help to the appellant by helping her to reach the doctor's
chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets
medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot
be disbelieved just because he did not file a complaint
himself. We are constrained to repeat our observation that
the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was
not sensitised enough to appreciate the plight of the
victim.
13. The other so-called reason in the High Court's order
was that as the claim petition was filed after four months
of the accident, the same is 'a device to grab money from
the insurance company'. This finding in the absence of
any material is certainly perverse. The High Court appears
to be not cognizant of the principle that in a road accident
claim, the strict principles of proof in a criminal case are
not attracted. ...'
24. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V. Bros. (P)
Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal [N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai
Ammal, (1980) 3 SCC 457 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 774] , wherein it
was contended by the vehicle owner that the criminal case in
relation to the accident had ended in acquittal and for which
reason the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be
rejected. This Court negatived the said argument by observing
that the nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness,
punishable under IPC, is more stringent than negligence
sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The observation
made in para 3 of the judgment would throw some light as to
what should be the approach of the Tribunal in motor accident
cases. The same reads thus: (SCC pp. 458-59)
'3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our
country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate
nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades
the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other
cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases
based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents
Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent
victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not
escape liability merely because of some doubt here or
some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly
reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties,
technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this
aspect because we are often distressed by transport
operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity,
despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient
disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of
careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable
driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to
their responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State
must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A
second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the
compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals.
We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs
and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential
foundation for State relief against accidental disablement
of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in
compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the
enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in
compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by
several years. The States must appoint sufficient number
of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick
disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained
may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice.
Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard.'
25. In Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim
Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] , this Court examined similar situation
where the evidence of claimant's eyewitness was discarded by
the Tribunal and that the respondent in that case was acquitted in
the criminal case concerning the accident. This Court, however,
opined that it cannot be overlooked that upon investigation of the
case registered against the respondent, prima facie, materials
showing negligence were found to put him on trial. The Court
restated the settled principle that the evidence of the claimants
ought to be examined by the Tribunal on the touchstone of
preponderance of probability and certainly the standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied as noted
in Bimla Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC
530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] . In
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
paras 8 & 9 of the reported decision, the dictum in United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta [United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798
: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] , has been adverted to as under:
(Dulcina Fernandes case [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier
Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 13] , SCC p. 650)
'8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila
Datta [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta,
(2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1
SCC (Cri) 328] while considering the nature of a claim
petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three-Judge
Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of
which Propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to
the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be
extracted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 518, para 10)
"10. ... (ii) The rules of pleadings do not strictly
apply as the claimant is required to make an
application in a form prescribed under the Act. In
fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are
suo motu initiated by the Tribunal.
* * *
(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and
determines the compensation, it does not do so as
in an adversarial litigation. ...
(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such
summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose
one or more persons possessing special knowledge
of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in
holding the enquiry."
9. The following further observation available in para 10
of the Report would require specific note: (Shila Datta
case [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta,
(2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1
SCC (Cri) 328] , SCC p. 519)
"10. ... We have referred to the aforesaid
provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal
cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication
between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
statutory determination of compensation on the
occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in
accordance with the statute."'
In para 10 of Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim
Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13], the Court opined that non-examination
of witness per se cannot be treated as fatal to the claim set up
before the Tribunal. In other words, the approach of the Tribunal
should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence
by applying the principles of preponderance of probability."
22. It is thus well settled that in motor accident claim cases, once the
foundational fact, namely, the actual occurrence of the accident, has
been established, then the Tribunal's role would be to calculate the
quantum of just compensation if the accident had taken place by reason
of negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle and, while doing so, the
Tribunal would not be strictly bound by the pleadings of the parties.
Notably, while deciding cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents,
the standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of preponderance of
probability and not the strict standard of proof beyond all reasonable
doubt which is followed in criminal cases.
23. In the present case, we find that the Tribunal had followed a just
approach in the matter of appreciation of the evidence/materials on
record. Whereas, the High Court adopted a strict interpretation of the
evidence on the touchstone of proof beyond reasonable doubt to record
an adverse finding against the appellants and to reverse the well-
considered judgment of the Tribunal in a cryptic manner.
24. Reverting to the factual matrix, the actual occurrence of the
accident between the motorcycle driven by Sitaram bearing Registration
No. RJ 25 SA 6923 coming from one side and a bus belonging to
Respondent 1 (the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation) bearing
Registration No. RJ 26/PA 0042 coming from the opposite direction, is
duly proved. The Tribunal has relied upon the uncontroverted evidence
of witnesses AD 1 and AD 3, and the documents presented by them,
especially FIR No. 247 of 2011 (Ext. 1) and charge-sheet (Ext. 2)
against one Banwari Lal Bairwa (Respondent 2), charging him with
offences under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC and Sections 134/187
of the Act, to establish that on 28-10-2011 at around 7 a.m., Sitaram,
along with pillion rider Rajulal Khateek, was riding on a motorcycle
bearing No. RJ 25 SA 6923 from Village Bapuee to Chaut ka Barwad
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
for Daug, to his sister, when, near Mahapura tri-section, Bus No. RJ
26/PA 0042 belonging to Respondent 1 (the Rajasthan State Road
Transport Corporation) coming from the opposite direction hit the
motorcycle from the front, resulting in the death of Sitaram.
25. The Tribunal had justly accepted the appellants' contention that
the respondents did not challenge the propriety of the said FIR No. 247
of 2011 (Ext. 1) and charge-sheet (Ext. 2) before any authority. The
only defence raised by the respondents to this plea was that the said FIR
No. 247 of 2011 was based on wrong facts and was filed in connivance
between the appellant complainants and the police, against which the
respondents complained to the in-charge of the police station and the
District Superintendent of Police but to no avail. Apart from this bald
assertion, no evidence was produced by the respondents before the
Tribunal to prove this point. The filing of the FIR was followed by the
filing of the charge-sheet against Respondent 2 for offences under
Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC and Sections 134/187 of the Act,
which, again, reinforces the allegations in the said FIR insofar as the
occurrence of the accident was concerned and the role of Respondent 2
in causing such accident. Be that as it may, the High Court has not even
made a mention, let alone record a finding, of any impropriety against
FIR No. 247/2011 (Ext. 1) or charge-sheet (Ext. 2) or the conclusion
reached by the Tribunal in that regard. Yet, the FIR and charge-sheet has
been found to be deficient by the High Court."
Thus, it is clear that the motor accident claim cases cannot be decided on
the basis of documents of criminal case and they have to be decided on the basis
of material as well as evidence which is led before the Claims Tribunal.
Furthermore, documents collected during investigation and opinion formed by
Investigating Officer is not binding on the Motor Accident Claims tribunal. The
material collected by Police during investigation is not substantive piece of
evidence, whereas the evidence led before the Claims Tribunal is a substantive
piece of evidence. Therefore, the evidence led by appellants before the Claims
Tribunal shall be considered on its face value.
10. Rajesh Shrivas (AW-1) is not an eyewitness. He has stated that his brother
Brijesh had informed the doctor and police about the accident. He claimed that
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
accident was witnessed by Anil Singh Sikarwar and Anil Singh Tomar. Thus, it is
clear that Rajesh Shrivas (AW-1) is a hearsay witness.
Anil Singh Tomar (AW-3) has stated that he picked up the mobile phone of
injured and informed his uncle Brijesh about the accident. It was his case that
accident took place at 12 noon and at that time he was going towards Morena
from his village Peepripura. In cross-examination he admitted that he runs a
private school and school timings are from 07 am to 12 noon. Incident took place
on 29.09.2020 and in the month of September, 2020, the school timings were 07
am to 12 noon. He denied that because of Covid-19 pandemic Buses were not
being plied. He admitted that he is having his own mobile but did not inform the
police. He denied that he had not witnessed the incident and also denied that he
was not present on the spot.
If the evidence of this witness is considered then it is clear that he is the
owner of private school and the school timings are up to 12 noon. It is not his case
that he had left the school premises prior to the school hours were over. If this
witness was in his school at 12 PM and the accident also took place at 12 PM then
possibility of his presence on the spot becomes doubtful. Furthermore, according
to him, he had informed Brijesh who is the real uncle of deceased about the
incident. The Dehati Nalisi which was lodged by Brijesh and has been relied upon
by appellants themselves is Ex.P-4. It does not mention the number of offending
vehicle but it merely mentions that accident was caused by some unknown
vehicle. Brijesh was the best person to corroborate the evidence of Anil Singh
Tomar (AW-3), as well as, to clarify the anomaly which had crept in Dehati Nalisi
(Ex.P/4). Furthermore, spot map was prepared by Police on information given by
Brijesh. The spot map has also been relied upon by appellants (Ex.P/11). In the
spot map also, it was specifically mentioned that accident has been caused by
some unknown vehicle. Under these circumstances, when appellants themselves
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
have relied upon the documents of criminal case and the real uncle of deceased
had mentioned that accident was caused by some unknown vehicle, then it was
obligatory on the part of appellants to examine Brijesh, but for the reasons best
known to them they have not done so.
Anil Sikarwar (AW-2) also claimed himself to be an eyewitness. It is stated
by him that at the time of accident he was travelling in the offending Bus bearing
registration No.MP06-P-0623. In his examination-in-chief, he has stated that after
the accident took place, the Bus driver took the Bus towards Porsa and this
witness also went to his matrimonial house in Khoyla Porsa. He further submitted
that he has not filed any document to show that he was travelling in the Bus. He
admitted that he has come to the Court along with father of deceased. He further
admitted that his police statement was recorded on 15.11.2020 and prior thereto
he did not give any statement to the Police. He further admitted that he is having a
mobile but he did not inform the Police about the accident. If this witness was
travelling in the Bus then he must have purchased some ticket, but that has not
been produced. Furthermore, if the driver of the Bus ran away along with the Bus
and went towards Porsa then where he de-boarded the Bus, has not been clarified.
Why he did not try to stop the bus, has also not been clarified.
11. From post mortem report (Ex.P/9), it appears that following injuries were
sustained by deceased Shubham:
1. Superficial abrasion on back 19 cm x 29 cm;
2. Superficial abrasion at left side of face 2 x 2 cm;
3. Both side temporal bone fractured; bleeding present;
4. Left lung ruptured.
No crush injury was found on the body of deceased, therefore, it is clear
that he was not run-over by the Bus. The injuries sustained by the deceased
indicate that he might have received the same on account of fall. Appellants have
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:2424
not filed any document to show that any damage was caused to the Motorcycle,
on which the deceased was riding. If the Bus had dashed the Motorcycle and on
account of which the deceased had fallen down then there must have been
damage to the Motorcycle. Nothing has been placed on record to suggest such
damage. Thus, it appears that accident was not caused by the offending Bus
bearing registration No.MP06-P-0623.
12. Under these circumstances, Claims Tribunal did not commit any mistake by
dismissing the claim petition by holding that appellants have failed to prove that
deceased died in an accident caused by the offending vehicle.
13. Accordingly, the Award dated 28.04.2023 passed by II Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal, Ambah, District Morena (M.P.) in MACC No.05/2021 is hereby
affirmed.
14. Appeals fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia)
Judge
(and)
