[Cites 8, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Harpal Singh Dhakad vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 December, 2025
Author: Vijay Kumar Shukla
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke, Vijay Kumar Shukla
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31284
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
ON THE 2 nd OF DECEMBER, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 76 of 2024
ARVIND KUMAR JAIN AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Rajmani Bansal - Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Samar Ghuraiya - Puublic Prosecutor for respondent No.1/State.
Shri Soumya Pawaiya - Advocate for respondent [R-2].
WITH
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 9124 of 2023
HARPAL SINGH DHAKAD
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
None for the petiitoner.
Shri Samar Ghuraiya - Puublic Prosecutor for respondent
No.1/State.
Shri Soumya Pawaiya - Advocate for respondent [R-2].
ORDER
The present application, under Section 528 of the BNSS has been filed
by the petitioners for quashment of First Information Report bearing Crime
No.21 of 2023 registered at Police Station Dharnawada, District Guna for the
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offence under Sections 306, 34 of IPC as well as all consequential
proceedings arising therefrom insofar as it relate to present petitioners.
2. As per the prosecution case, the complainant, Rajesh Jain, son of
Babulal Jain, aged about 50 years, resident of village Dharnawada, appeared
at the concerned police station along with his younger brother Rajnish Jain
and lodged an oral report. The complainant stated that he is a permanent
resident of village Dharnawada and earns his livelihood by running a grocery
shop. It was further stated that agricultural land measuring 7 bighas, situated
at Chhavda-Dharnawada Road, village Dharnawada, was jointly recorded in
the names of the complainant and his brother Rajnish Jain. Out of the said
land, in the year 2017, they sold 3 bighas of roadside land to Harpal Dhakad,
resident of village Khiriya, by a duly executed and registered sale deed.
Subsequently, in the year 2022, the remaining 4 bighas of land were sold to
Arvind Jain and Praveen Jain, residents of village Dharnawada. It was
alleged that on the land purchased by Harpal Dhakad, he along with Komal
Dhakad, son of Maan Singh Dhakad, residents of village Biriya, started
establishing a petrol pump. During the course of construction of the petrol
pump, Arvind Jain, son of Gaindalal Jain, and Praveen alias Vittu, son of
Narendra Jain, residents of Dharnawada, raised objections claiming that the
land on which the petrol pump was being constructed belonged to them and
the land purchased by Harpal Dhakad was situated at the rear side. About one
year prior to the incident, the petrol pump project was allegedly cancelled.
Thereafter, as per the complainant, Harpal Dhakad, Komal Dhakad, Arvind
Jain and Praveen Jain allegedly started pressurizing the complainant and his
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brother for money and land. It is further alleged that for about one month
prior to the incident, the aforesaid four persons continuously harassed the
complainant's son Samyak Jain, alleging that he had sold them land by
furnishing an incorrect survey/plot number, due to which they allegedly
suffered financial loss, and on this pretext they were demanding
compensation. On 21.01.2023, at about 12:30 PM, being allegedly fed up
with the continuous harassment and mental torture by the aforesaid four
persons, the complainant's son Samyak Jain consumed a poisonous
substance. At the time of the incident, the complainant was present at Guna,
and no family member was present with him. Upon coming to know of the
incident, neighbours namely Akshay Jain, Rajat Jain, Neeraj Sahu and Tinkal
Jain, residents of Dharnawada, took Samyak Jain to Guna for treatment in a
private vehicle. The complainant and his brother also received information
regarding the incident over the phone. It is alleged that during the course of
treatment at Balaji Hospital, Guna, Samyak Jain stated that Harpal Dhakad,
Komal Dhakad, Arvind Jain and Praveen Jain had been continuously
harassing and torturing him, and due to such harassment, he consumed
poison. A video recording of the said statement was allegedly made on a
mobile phone by Dilip Jain, son of Shantilal Jain, resident of Aron, who is
the complainant's brother-in-law, and the said video recording is stated to be
available on his mobile phone. Samyak Jain, aged about 20 years, resident of
village Dharnawada, remained under treatment at Balaji Hospital; however,
during the course of treatment, he succumbed on 21.01.2023 at about 08:30
PM. His post-mortem was subsequently conducted at the Government
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Hospital, Guna. The complainant alleges that his son consumed the
poisonous substance due to the mental distress caused by the continuous
harassment by the aforesaid four persons. On the basis of the above oral
report, an offence under Sections 306 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code has
been registered and the matter has been taken up for investigation.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted before this Court that
the petitioners have been falsely implicated in the present matter. It was
contended that at the time of registration of the FIR, respondent No.1 was
duty-bound to examine the basic and material facts, which clearly indicate
that it was not the petitioners who were harassing the complainant's son, on
account of which he is alleged to have committed suicide. The police
authorities failed to appreciate that the real dispute between the parties is
purely civil in nature and pertains to a piece of land, and not to any alleged
act attributable to the present petitioners.
4. It was further submitted that the complainant has deliberately and
mala fide given a criminal colour to a civil dispute in order to exert pressure
upon the petitioners. In fact, an agreement to sell in respect of the disputed
land was executed between the complainant and the present petitioners,
namely Arvind Jain and Praveen Jain, and merely because the said agreement
could not be acted upon or fulfilled, a false, frivolous and vexatious FIR has
been lodged against the petitioners. It was argued that such abuse of the
criminal process is impermissible in law and the impugned FIR deserves to
be quashed on this ground alone.
5. Learned counsel further submitted that while registering the FIR,
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respondent No.1 has completely ignored the undisputed fact that the learned
Civil Court has already granted an injunction in favour of the present
petitioners with regard to the disputed land. The existence of civil
proceedings and the grant of interim protection in favour of the petitioners
clearly establish that the dispute between the parties was subsisting prior to
the alleged incident. The criminal prosecution has thus been initiated with an
ulterior motive to harass the petitioners and to overreach the civil court
proceedings, rendering the action illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the settled
principles of law.
6. It was also submitted that even from a bare and prima facie reading
of the FIR as well as the charge-sheet, there is not an iota of material to
suggest that the deceased committed suicide due to any act of abetment on
the part of the present petitioners. The essential ingredients of the offence of
abetment of suicide are conspicuously absent, and the allegations made are
vague, omnibus and devoid of any proximate or direct act attributable to the
petitioners. The registration of the impugned FIR against the petitioners is
thus manifestly malicious and an abuse of the process of law, and therefore,
the same deserves to be quashed in the interest of justice.
7. It is further submitted that the version sought to be introduced
during the course of the merg inquiry is a clear afterthought and has been
deliberately fabricated with the sole object of implicating the present
petitioners subsequent to the unfortunate death of the deceased. Such a
version is wholly unreliable and lacks any legal sanctity, particularly when
the same does not find mention in the earliest version of the incident.
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8. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that there is no suicide
note left by the deceased, nor there is any contemporaneous material to
indicate that the petitioners had, in any manner whatsoever, instigated,
provoked, aided or abetted the deceased to take the extreme step. There is
also a complete absence of independent witnesses who could substantiate the
prosecution story. The entire case of the prosecution rests on bald, vague and
uncorroborated statements made by interested and related witnesses,
recorded after the incident, which by themselves are insufficient to fasten
criminal liability upon the petitioners for the offence of abetment of suicide.
9. It was further submitted that none of the statements recorded during
the merg inquiry disclose any specific, proximate or active role attributable
to the petitioners which could be said to have driven the deceased to commit
suicide. The essential ingredients required to constitute an offence of
abetment, namely instigation, intentional aiding or active participation, are
conspicuously absent from the material on record. Mere allegations of
harassment, without any supporting evidence showing a direct and live link
between the conduct of the petitioners and the alleged act of suicide, do not
satisfy the settled legal test for abetment.
10. Learned counsel emphasized that the prosecution has also failed to
establish any causal connection between the alleged acts of the petitioners
and the deceased's decision to take her own life. There is nothing on record
to demonstrate that the deceased was left with no other option except to
commit suicide or the conduct of the petitioners was of such a grave and
compelling nature as would ordinarily drive a person of reasonable prudence
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to take such an extreme step. In the absence of such material, the
continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners would amount to
a gross abuse of the process of law.
11. It was, therefore, submitted that the prosecution case, being
founded entirely on conjectures, surmises and hearsay evidence, does not
disclose the commission of any cognizable offence against the petitioners.
The impugned proceedings are manifestly malafide and have been initiated
with an oblique motive, and consequently, the FIR and all proceedings
emanating therefrom deserve to be quashed in the interest of justice.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the State vehemently opposed the
petition and submitted that the present petition, seeking quashment of the
FIR as well as the consequential proceedings, is wholly misconceived,
premature and devoid of any legal or factual merit. It was contended that the
jurisdiction of this Court while exercising inherent powers for quashment is
extremely limited in nature. At this stage, the Court is only required to
satisfy itself as to whether the allegations contained in the FIR, read in their
entirety and taken at face value, prima facie disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence.
13. Learned counsel submitted that a plain, meaningful and holistic
reading of the FIR, the statements recorded during the merg inquiry as well
as during the course of investigation, and the material collected by the
investigating agency clearly disclose the ingredients of the offences alleged
against the petitioners. It was argued that the FIR specifically alleges
continuous harassment, intimidation and pressure exerted by the present
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petitioners upon the deceased in relation to the land dispute, which,
according to the prosecution, created such mental stress and trauma that the
deceased was driven to take the extreme step. These allegations, if taken at
their face value, unquestionably disclose a prima facie case and warrant a
full-fledged trial.
14. It was further submitted that the contention of the petitioners that
the dispute is purely civil in nature is a defence which cannot be examined at
this stage. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the mere existence of
a civil dispute or pending civil proceedings does not ipso facto bar criminal
prosecution, particularly when the allegations disclose ingredients of a
cognizable offence.
15. Learned counsel contended that abetment of suicide can be proved
by circumstantial evidence and the conduct of the accused persons preceding
the incident. The law does not mandate the existence of a suicide note as a
sine qua non for sustaining a charge under the offence of abetment of
suicide. The cumulative effect of the material collected during investigation
prima facie establishes a link between the conduct of the petitioners and the
deceased's decision to end her life.
16. Learned counsel emphasized that the inherent jurisdiction of this
Court to quash criminal proceedings is an extraordinary and sparingly
exercisable power, which should be invoked only in the rarest of rare cases
where the allegations do not disclose any offence or where the proceedings
are manifestly attended with mala fides. In the present case, it was submitted
that the allegations are neither absurd nor inherently improbable, and the
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material on record discloses sufficient grounds to proceed against the
petitioners. Thus, no case for interference is made out and the petition
deserves to be dismissed.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 opposed the petition and
submitted that the instant proceedings for quashment are wholly
misconceived and are an attempt to prematurely derail a lawful criminal
prosecution. It was argued that the FIR, read as a whole and taken at face
value, clearly discloses persistent harassment, intimidation and undue
pressure exerted by the petitioners upon the deceased in connection with the
disputed land. The materials collected during the merg inquiry and
investigation prima facie establish a consistent course of conduct on the part
of the petitioners which created severe mental trauma and distress to the
deceased, ultimately driving her to take the extreme step. At this stage, the
truthfulness or sufficiency of the evidence cannot be tested.
18. It was further submitted that the attempt of the petitioners to
portray the dispute as purely civil is a mere defence and cannot be a ground
for quashing the FIR. The pendency of civil proceedings does not grant
immunity from criminal liability when the allegations disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence. Abetment of suicide, it was contended,
can be inferred from surrounding circumstances and the continuous conduct
of the accused. Thus, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
19. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
20. The question for consideration is whether the allegations in the
FIR, taken at face value, disclose the ingredients of Section 306 IPC/108 of
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BNS.
Sections 306 and 107 IPC/108 and 45 of BNS are reproduced below
for ready reference:
"306. Abetment of suicide
If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of
such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine.
It must be read with Section 107 of IPC which explains the
meaning of Abetment, which reads as:
107. Abetment of a thing-
A person abets the doing of a thing, who
First.--Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.--Engages with one or more other person or persons in
any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal
omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order
to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.--Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the
doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.--A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by
wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to
disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or
procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that
thing.
Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the
commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the
commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission
thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
Reading these sections together would indicate that there must be
either an instigation, or an engagement or intentional aid for 'doing of a
thing'. When these three criteria of Section 306 IPC/108 BNS apply, it
means that the accused must have encouraged the person to commit suicide
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or was engaged in conspiracy with others to encourage the person to commit
suicide or acted (or failed to act) intentionally to aid the person to commit
suicide.
21. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar vs. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 in Para 20 has held as under:
"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or
encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation
though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that
effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and
specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable
certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt
out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his
acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such
circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option
except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have
been inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without
intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be
instigation."
22. The ingredients under Sections 107 and 306 of the I.P.C. were
interpreted by Apex Court in Prakash and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra
and Another, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3835 in the following
manner:
"14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has been
interpreted, time and again, and its principles are well-established.
To attract the offence of abetment to suicide, it is important to
establish proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation or
incitement of suicide by the accused, which must be in close
proximity to the commission of suicide by the deceased. Such
instigation or incitement should reveal a clear mens rea to abet the
commission of suicide and should put the victim in such a position
that he/she would have no other option but to commit suicide.
15. The law on abetment has been crystallised by a plethora of
decisions of this Court. Abetment involves a mental process of
instigating or intentionally aiding another person to do a particular
thing. To bring a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, the act of
abetment would require the positive act of instigating or
intentionally aiding another person to commit suicide. Without
such mens rea on the part of the accused person being apparent
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from the face of the record, a charge under the aforesaid Section
cannot be sustained. Abetment also requires an active act, direct or
indirect, on the part of the accused person which left the deceased
with no other option but to commit suicide."
23. Further in the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Laxmi Das vs. State of West Bengal and another, reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 120; in paras 8, 9 and 13, it has been held as under:
8. When Section 306 IPC is read with Section 107 IPC, it is clear
that there must be (i) direct or undefined indirect instigation; (ii)
in close proximity to the commission of suicide; along with (iii)
clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide.
9. The Appellant has placed strong reliance upon the judgment in
Rohini Sudarshan Gangurde Vs. State of of Maharashtra,, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 1701, wherein this Court has interpreted Sections
306 and 107 IPC together and observed:
"8. Reading these sections together would indicate that there must
be either an instigation, or an engagement or intentional aid to
'doing of a thing'. When we apply these three criteria to Section
306, it means that the accused must have encouraged the person to
commit suicide or engaged in conspiracy with others to encourage
the person to commit suicide or acted (or failed to act)
intentionally to aid the person to commit suicide...."
13. After carefully considering the facts and evidence recorded by
the courts below and the legal position established through
statutory and judicial pronouncements, we are of the view that
there is no proximate link between the marital dispute in the
marriage of deceased with appellant and the commission of
suicide. The prosecution has failed to collect any evidence to
substantiate the allegations against the appellant. Theundefined
appellant has not played any active role or any positive or direct
act to instigate or aid the deceased in committing suicide. Neither
the statement of the complainant nor that of the colleagues of the
deceased as recorded by the Investigating Officer during
investigation suggest any kind of instigation by the appellant to
abet the commission of suicide. There is no allegation against the
appellant of suggesting the deceased to commit suicide at any time
prior to the commission of suicide by her husband."
Applying the aforestated settled principles of law to the facts of the
present case, this Court finds that the allegations levelled against the
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petitioners fail to satisfy the foundational and essential requirements of the
offence of abetment of suicide under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code). Even
if the contents of the FIR and the material collected during the course of
investigation are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, no
prima facie case is made out against the present petitioners for the said
offence. The allegations against the petitioners, at best, disclose the existence
of a long-standing civil dispute relating to land transactions between the
parties. Mere pendency of a civil dispute, or even allegations of harassment
arising out of such dispute, in the absence of specific, proximate and
intentional acts of instigation, aid or active participation on the part of the
petitioners, cannot be elevated to the level of abetment of suicide.
24. There is no material on record to indicate that the petitioners
possessed the requisite mens rea to drive the deceased to commit suicide or
that their conduct was of such a grave, direct and compelling nature as would
leave the deceased with no option except to take the extreme step. The
allegations are vague, omnibus and general in nature, lacking any clear
attribution of a specific act or role which could reasonably be said to have a
live and proximate nexus with the act of suicide.
25. It is well settled that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to
quash criminal proceedings ought to be exercised to prevent abuse of the
process of law and to secure the ends of justice. In the present case,
continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners, in the
absence of the foundational requirements of the offence alleged, would result
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in undue harassment and would amount to converting a civil dispute into a
criminal prosecution with an oblique motive. Such a course is impermissible
in law.
26. Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that the impugned FIR bearing
Crime No.21 of 2023 registered at Police Station Dharnawada, District Guna
for the offences punishable under Sections 306 and 34 of the Indian Penal
Code, and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, insofar as they
relate to the present petitioners, are manifestly unsustainable in law and
deserve to be quashed.
27. The petition is, therefore, allowed. The FIR bearing Crime No.21
of 2023 registered at Police Station Dharnawada, District Guna for the
offence under Sections 306 and 34 of IPC, as well as all consequential
proceedings arising therefrom, insofar as they relate to the present
petitioners, are hereby quashed.
No order as to costs.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
ojha
