This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 is filed assailing the order dated 17.10.2019, passed by XXVth
Additional Sessions Judge ,Indore in Sessions Trial No. 8 of 2012, whereby
charges have been framed against the petitioners for the offence punishable
under Section 420 read with Section 120B, Section 409 read with section
120B, Section 467 read with Section 120B, Section 468 read with section
120B and Section 471 read with section 120B of IPC. The quashing of
proceedings in aforestated trial is further requested.
2. The exposition of facts in brief, giving rise to present petition, is as
under:-
D. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore committed the case
for trial to the Sessions Court. Learned Sessions Judge, Indore took
cognisance of the offence and heard both the parties on framing of
charge. The accused B.K. Sarkar and V.N. Bhargava submitted an
application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. Learned XXVth Additional
Sessions Judge, Indore rejected the application and proceeded to frame
charge for offence punishable under Section 420 read with Section
120B, Section 409 read with section 120B, Section 467 read with
Section 120B, Section 468 read with section 120B and Section 471
read with section 120B of IPC against the accused/petitioners vide
impugned order dated 17.10.2019 passed in ST No. 8 of 2012.
3. The impugned order is assailed in the present petition on following
grounds:-
B. The allegations made against the accused in the complaint are
totally falls and the documents annexed with the application for
discharge under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. show that the alleged training
programme was conducted and accordingly the payments were made;
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C. The complainant is a terminated employee of Oriental
Insurance Company Ltd. The present complaint is filed with malafide
intention and ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance with personal
grudge.
D. The complaint did not contain any specific allegation. The
complainant has not placed the sufficient material on record necessary
for framing the charges.
E. The ingredients of alleged offence are not made out.
On these grounds, it is prayed that the impugned order be set aside and
continuation of the proceedings being abuse of process of law, further
proceedings in ST No. 8 of 2012 be quashed.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners relying on the judgments of the
Supreme Court in case of Rukmini Narvekar vs Vijay Sataredkar & Others
reported in AIR 2009 SC 1013 contended that the trial court committed an
error in ignoring the relevant and material documents submitted alongwith the
application for discharge under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. The Oriental Insurance
Company had clearly stated in letter dated 30.4.2019 addressed to the
petitioners B.K.Sarkar and V.N. Bhargav that the training programme was
properly conducted and no wrongful loss was caused to the company. The
trial Court committed gross error in ignoring this material document filed on
record by the accused. Learned counsel further contended that the
complainant is a terminated employee of the Oriental Insurance Company
Ltd. He had lodged this complaint with ulterior motive of wreaking
vengeance on the officers of Oriental Insurance Company. Therefore, the
proceedings suffer from malafide and personal grudge.
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6. Per contra learned counsel for the respondent/complainant submitted
that the complainant sought information from the Oriental Insurance
Company with regard to training programme for the agents in financial year
1999 to 2001. Learned counsel referring to the replies submitted to the
application under the Right to Information Act, the reply filed in the first
appeal and before Chief Information Commissioner, contended that in each of
the reply, the Oriental Insurance Company reiterated that no training for
agents was conducted in financial year 1999-2001. Learned counsel
submitted that on the basis of this information, the private complaint was
filed. The complainant has right to move the criminal court and set the
criminal law in motion, if the cognisable offence comes to his knowledge.
The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore after examining the complainant
and the evidence produced under Section 200 and 202 of Cr.P.C. proceeded
to take cognisance of the offence and found sufficient ground to proceed
against the accused. The accused attempted to assail the validity of the order
of Judicial Magistrate First Class but instead of arguing on merits, proposed
to withdraw their petition. The present petition has no substance, therefore,
deserves to be dismissed. Learned counsel for respondent relied on the
judgments of the Supreme court in cases of Bhisham Lal Verma VS. State
of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 1399; Rajiv Thapar and others Vs. Madan
Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330; State of Karnataka Vs. M. Devendrappa
and another, (2002) 3 SCC 89, Padal Venkata Rama Reddy @ Ramu Vs.
Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy 2011 (3) Crimes 161 (SC); Sanapareddy
Maheedhar Seshagiri & another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and
another AIR 2008 SC 787; Mohd. Allauddin Khan Vs. State of Bihar and
others, (2019) 6 SCC 107; Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Aryan
Singh 2023 SCC Online 379; Supriya Jain Vs. State of Haryana and
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:23624
another, (2023) AIR(SC) 3287; Umesh Kumar Vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh, (2013) 10 SCC 591; Monica Kumar (Dr.) and another Vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 649; Bhaurao Dagdu Paraklar Vs.
State of Maharashtra (2005) AIR (SCW) 4094; Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav
and others Vs. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society, (2013) 11
SCC 531; Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2010) 2
SCC 114; Purushottam Kumar Jha Vs. State of Jharkhand (2006) 9 SCC
458; and Renu Kumari Vs. Sanjay Kumar and others, (2008) 12 SCC 346
to butress his contentions.
7. Heard both the parties and perused the record.
8. Section 227 and Section 228 of Cr.P.C. read as under:-
"227. Discharge- If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith, and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge
considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he
shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing."
228. Framing of charge.- (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid,
the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence which -
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge
against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, [or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and
direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the
case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he
deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate] shall try the offence in accordance
with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge
against the accused.
9. In the case of Vinay Tyagi Vs. Irshad Ali reported in (2013) 5 SCC
762, the Supreme Court examining the scope of provision under Section
228 of Cr.P.C., held as under:
17. After taking cognizance, the next step of definite significance is the duty of the
Court to frame charge in terms of Section 228 of the Code unless the Court finds,
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upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith,
that there exists no sufficient ground to proceed against the accused, in which case it
shall discharge him for reasons to be recorded in terms of Section 227 of the Code.
17.1 It may be noticed that the language of Section 228 opens with the words, 'if
after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that
there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence', he may
frame a charge and try him in terms of Section 228(1)(a) and if exclusively triable by
the Court of Sessions, commit the same to the Court of Sessions in terms of Section
228(1)(b). Why the legislature has used the word 'presuming' is a matter which
requires serious deliberation. It is a settled rule of interpretation that the legislature
does not use any expression purposelessly and without any object. Furthermore, in
terms of doctrine of plain interpretation, every word should be given its ordinary
meaning unless context to the contrary is specifically stipulated in the relevant
provision.
17.2. Framing of charge is certainly a matter of earnestness. It is not merely a formal
step in the process of criminal inquiry and trial. On the contrary, it is a serious step as
it is determinative to some extent, in the sense that either the accused is acquitted
giving right to challenge to the complainant party, or the State itself, and if the charge
is framed, the accused is called upon to face the complete trial which may prove
prejudicial to him, if finally acquitted. These are the courses open to the Court at that
stage.
17.3. Thus, the word 'presuming' must be read ejusdem generis to the opinion that
there is a ground. The ground must exist for forming the opinion that the accused had
committed an offence. Such opinion has to be formed on the basis of the record of
the case and the documents submitted therewith. To a limited extent, the plea of
defence also has to be considered by the Court at this stage. For instance, if a plea of
proceedings being barred under any other law is raised, upon such consideration, the
Court has to form its opinion which in a way is tentative. The expression 'presuming'
cannot be said to be superfluous in the language and ambit of Section 228 of the
Code. This is to emphasize that the Court may believe that the accused had
committed an offence, if its ingredients are satisfied with reference to the record
before the Court.
18. At this stage, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Amit
Kapur v. Ramesh Chander & Anr. [JT 2012 (9) SC 329] wherein, the Court held as
under :
"16. The above-stated principles clearly show that inherent as well as revisional
jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously. If the jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code in relation to quashing of an FIR is circumscribed by the factum and
caution afore-noticed, in that event, the revisional jurisdiction, particularly while
dealing with framing of a charge, has to be even more limited.
17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of
Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the
Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the ‗record of
the case' and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may
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either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion
there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall
frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the
Court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the
accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption
of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of
constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for
exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There
is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code.
Section 227 is expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while
Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the
Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an
offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the
Code.
18. It may also be noticed that the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court is in a way final and no inter court remedy is available in such cases. Of
course, it may be subject to jurisdiction of this court under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India. Normally, a revisional jurisdiction should be exercised on a
question of law. However, when factual appreciation is involved, then it must find
place in the class of cases resulting in a perverse finding. Basically, the power is
required to be exercised so that justice is done and there is no abuse of power by
the court. Merely an apprehension or suspicion of the same would not be a
sufficient ground for interference in such cases.
19. On analysis of the above discussion, it can safely be concluded that
'presuming' is an expression of relevancy and places some weightage on the
consideration of the record before the Court. The prosecution's record, at this
stage, has to be examined on the plea of demur. Presumption is of a very weak and
mild nature. It would cover the cases where some lacuna has been left out and is
capable of being supplied and proved during the course of the trial. For instance, it
is not necessary that at that stage each ingredient of an offence should be
linguistically reproduced in the report and backed with meticulous facts. Suffice
would be substantial compliance to the requirements of the provisions."
10. In case of State of Gujarat Vs. Dilipsingh Kishorsingh Rao, 2023
INSC 894, the Supreme Court observed as under-
7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary to determine
whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and
it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by
examining the defence of the accused, when an application for discharge is filed. At
that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the
prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to
proceed against the accused on basis of charge sheet material. The nature of the
evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents
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produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances
against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such material would
be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, necessarily, the accused
would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of
the material there are grounds for presuming that accused has committed the
offence which is triable, then necessarily, charge has to be framed.
8. At the time of framing of the charge and taking cognizance the accused has
no right to produce any material and call upon the court to examine the same. No
provision in the Code grants any right to the accused to file any material or
document at the stage of framing of charge. The trial court has to apply its judicial
mind to the facts of the case as may be necessary to determine whether a case has
been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet material
only.
9. If the accused is able to demonstrate from the charge- sheet material at the
stage of framing the charge which might drastically affect the very sustainability of
the case, it is unfair to suggest that such material should not be considered or
ignored by the court at that stage. The main intention of granting a chance to the
accused of making submissions as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. is to
assist the court to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial.
Nothing in the Code limits the ambit of such hearing, to oral hearing and oral
arguments only and therefore, the trial court can consider the material produced by
the accused before the I.O.
10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application
for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has
been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in
order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face
value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged.
This Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. N. Suresh Rajan and others (2014) 11 SCC
709 adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject has held:
"29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the
submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the
time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act
as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift
evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are
groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of
consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with
an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are
true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out
whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the
existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this
stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is
not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would
not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is
whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been
committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been
made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might
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have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its
probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court
has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence.
The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage."
11. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the
accused seeks to be discharged. The expression "the record of the case" used in
Section 227 Cr.P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any,
produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to
produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the
accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency.
12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of
existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials
on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in
the State of Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of
MP Vs. Mohan Lal Soni (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be
made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of
prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to
form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the
offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the
material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly
lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial."
11. The material on record is examined in the light of aforestated
proposition of law.
12. The document (the letter dated 30.4.2019) relied upon by the
petitioner/accused would require formal proof. The document cannot be
accepted as impeachable evidence of sterling quality. Therefore, the benefit
of law laid down in case of Rukmini Narvekar (supra) is not available to the
petitioners. The status of complainant as terminated employee of the
insurance company is also subject matter of evidentiary proof. There is
nothing to suggest personal grudge of complainant against petitioners. In
view of the prima facie evidence on record, the complaint cannot be said to
be baseless and malafide, merely to wreck vengeance due to personal grudge.
13. The allegations in complaint, the statements recorded under Section
200 and 202 of Cr.P.C. and the material on record was considered sufficient
by the trial Court to presume that the accused had committed the alleged
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offence. This Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
cannot indulge into threadbare analysis of the material on the record, to
determine the validity of the impugned order. The learned Additional Session
Judge committed no error, impropriety or illegality in framing the aforestated
charges. The defence of the accused will be considered after the evidence in
the trial.
14. In view of above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the impugned order does not suffer from any manifest impropriety much less
an illegality. So, no case is made out for exercise of inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
15. Consequently, the present petition being meritless is dismissed.
C.C as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
BDJ JUDGE
BHUNESH
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENTCH AT
INDORE, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENTCH AT
INDORE,
2.5.4.20=3fb5bcda9fd75d95d6c7cdcbd092ee5a74a94a5534ae
WAR DATT
d3a66d9385cfcfc201e0, postalCode=452001, st=MADHYA
PRADESH,
serialNumber=89FD75A8D0C99E05779A327974E46BC851028
26CE0604B211E4C91102B4D1269, cn=BHUNESHWAR DATT
Date: 2025.08.26 10:37:12 +05'30'
