Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 3812 MP
Judgement Date : 12 August, 2025
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
WRIT PETITION No.11833of 2021
ARUN KUMAR MISHRA
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Prakash Upadhyay - Senior Advocate with Shri Jalaj Dwivedi -
Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri K.S. Baghel- Government Advocate for the respondent - State.
ORDER
(Reserved on :31.07.2025) (Pronounced on : 12.08.2025) The present petition has been filed challenging theorder Annexure P-5
whereby the petitioner has been punished with withholding one annual
increment with cumulative effect along with restricting pay and allowances for
the suspension period from 21.10.2014 to 17.01.2020 to subsistence allowance
already drawn during the aforesaid suspension period. The said penalty order
has been upheld in appeal vide order Annexure P-7 dated 10.12.2020.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner was
charge sheeted vide Annexure P-1 with the charge that while being posted at
Police Station Baheriya, District Sagar, on 21.09.2014 he received hospital
memo of injuries being caused to one Jahar Singh, but he did not register the
offence for a period of 21 days and did not take any step for obtaining bed head
tickets of the injured and of arresting the accused. Therefore, he exhibited
dereliction towards duties, which amounts to misconduct under the police
regulations.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner was
also subjected to criminal trial in the matter and he has been acquitted by the
criminal Court vide judgment dated 12.04.2019 passed by the Special Judge,
P.C. Act, Sagar in Special S.T. No.20/2016. Therefore, the petitioner could not
have been punished by the disciplinary authority as the punishment order has
been passed after the judgment of acquittal in criminal case.
4. It is further argued that even if the charges in criminal case and
departmental enquiry are found to be different, even then the authority has
gravely erred in punishing the petitioner, because the enquiry report is only
based on preliminary enquiry and disciplinary authority while passing the
penalty order has not discussed the evidence obtained against the petitioner. It is
argued that such discussion of evidence was all the more required because in
fact no evidence was adduced against the petitioner in the course of
departmental enquiry.
5. By placing reliance on statements of witnesses, which are placed on
record of witnesses as Annexure P-4, it is contended that the complainant Jahar
Singh turned hostile and further that the Station House Officer namely
ShriLaxmanAnuragi, who was the star witness against the petitioner in the
departmental enquiry has clearly admittedly in response to questions Nos.17, 23
& 24 that the petitioner was given memorandum of road accident not on
21.09.2014, but on 25.09.2014 and further that he had made report against the
petitioner without going through the case diary, because the case diary had been
seized by the Lokayukt Police and also that from the memorandum sent to the
petitioner the contents do not disclose any cognizable offence. On the basis of
such statements of witnesses, it is argued that no dereliction of duties or
negligence or misconduct can be said to be attributable against the petitioner.
6. By taking this Court through various facts of the case, it is argued that
the FIR was registered by the petitioner only after due investigation because the
injured person got injured at District Sagar, but had admitted himself in
People's Hospital, Bhopal and he was under treatment at Bhopal and therefore,
the necessary documents could not be collected and the statements of injured
could not be taken speedily and this led to delay in registration of the FIR and
also consequential actions. It is contended that all the offences, i.e. Sections
279, 338 and 337 of I.P.C. were bailableand therefore, no reasons were made
out to arrest accused persons.
7. Per contra, learned Government Advocate for the State has argued that
the misconduct is duly proved looking to the material adduced against him
during the course of the departmental enquiry and further that this Court cannot
sit as an appellant authority over findings of the enquiry officer in writ
jurisdiction, because the findings are based on sufficient evidence available on
record and therefore, no interference should be caused by this Court in the final
order, which is based on findings recorded by enquiry officer after regular
departmental enquiry.
8. Heard.
9. In the present case, the allegations against the petitioner in the
departmental enquiry and the allegations against the petitioner in criminal trial
are altogether different. The allegation in the criminal trial related to demand
and acceptance of bribe from the injured person, who got injured in road traffic
accident. The allegation was demand of bribe of Rs.3,000/- and acceptance of
bribe of Rs.2,000/-. The petitioner has been acquitted in the said case upon trial.
Though, looking to the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal trial it may be
debatable that whether the petitioner demanded or accepted bribe and any effect
on such finding recorded in the departmental enquiry could have been argued by
the petitioner based upon his acquittal in criminal case. However, as in the
departmental enquiry there was no charge relating to demand and acceptance of
bribe and the charge in the departmental enquiry is only restricted to the
question of petitioner indulging in laxity and dubiousactivities as investigating
officer of the case in not registering the crime within time and not carrying out
investigation with diligence and in timely manner, therefore, in the considered
opinion of this Court, there is no commonality of charges against the petitioner
in criminal trial and in the departmental enquiry. Therefore, the petition cannot
derive any benefit out of his acquittal in criminal case.
10. The charge against the petitioner in departmental enquiry was in the
matter of registering the FIR with delay of 21 days, not obtaining bed head
tickets of injured and not taking action for timely arrest of the enquired accused
persons. It is not in dispute that the accident in question took place on
18.09.2014 at District Sagar. The copy of FIR is available on the record of
departmental enquiry, which has been produced for perusal of this Court by
learned counsel for the State. The FIR mentions that pre-MLC has been
registered at District Hospital, Sagar that a patient namedJahar Singh aged about
30 years has been admitted to the said hospital having suffered injuries in a road
traffic accident involving motorcycles. FIR is registered on 12.10.2024 and the
reason for delay is mentioned as hospital memo being enquired in the
intervening period. Therefore, it is evident that FIR itself mentions that it has
been lodgedwith delay and the delay is attributable to hospital memo being put
to enquiry.
11. As per the question put up to the SHO namely ShriLaxmanAnuragi in
the Departmental enquiry, he stated that the hospital memorandum was received
by Police Station on 21.9.2014 and was handed over to the petitioner on
25.09.2014.The copy of hospital memorandum is available in the file of
departmental enquiry and mentions that one accident has taken place between
two motorcycles and the patients have been admitted in ward No.6. Apart from
the aforesaid fact, nothing has been mentioned in the hospital memorandum
dated 18.09.2024 on which receipt of police station is mentioned as dated
21.09.2014.
12. Thereafter, there is a letter of the petitioner written to the CHMO,
District Sagar to send details like bed head ticket etc. of the injured person. The
statements of the injured person Jugal Kishore have been recorded while being
admitted at Peoples Hospital, Bhopal. The injured took treatment at Peoples
Hospital, Bhopal and various documents of taking treatment at Peoples
Hospital, Bhopal are part of the enquiry record. He in the statements of
departmental enquiry has stated that he was in treatment at Peoples Hospital,
Bhopal for almost 20 days. From a perusal of the treatment papers as available
in the record of the departmental enquiry, it appears that the injured person was
undergoing treatment at Peoples Hospital, Bhopal at least from 23.09.2014 as
various diagnostic reports of said hospital are annexed with the enquiry file
dated 23.09.2014. Therefore, it appears that the injured was at Bhopal while the
petitioner was posted as Assistant Sub Inspector in the Police Station in district
Sagar. If there was some delay in recording the statements of the injured person
and consequential delay in registering of FIR, it required close scrutiny that
what are the exact lapses of the petitioner behind this late registration of FIR
because the injured had been taking treatment while admitted to an hospital in
Bhopal, which is more than 175 km away from Sagar.
13. The injured person Jahar Singh has deposed in the enquiry that
immediately upon his return, the FIR has been registered. Though, it cannot be
disputed that despite the injured person under the treatment at Bhopal, it was
obligatory upon the petitioner to have registered FIR and carried out
investigation in the matter and registration of FIR could not have been delayed
only on the ground that the injured person was not available at Sagar, because
the hospital memorandum had already been received by the petitioner.
14. However, looking to the statements of the then SHO namely
LaxmanAnuragi, it is evident that the petitioner got hospital memorandum on
25.09.2014 and in any event later to 21.09.2014. The SHO further mentioned in
response to question 23 that the case diary had been seized from Lokayukt
Police and the case diary was not in his possession and the report sent against
the petitioner was sent without perusal of the case diary and also that if he had
studied the case diary, he would not have sent such type of report against the
petitioner. In response to question No.24, he further clarified that looking to the
hospital memorandum no ingredients of any cognizable offence are made out
and only this fact is written that some persons have suffered injuries on account
of one motorcycle having met an accident with another motorcycle. He admitted
that the hospital memorandum in itself does not disclose any cognizable
offence.
15. From the aforesaid material as available upon perusal of the enquiry
file and also perusal of the statements of the witnesses during course of enquiry,
it is evident that the petitioner succeeded in explaining the delay caused in
registration of FIR.
16. The petitioner in his departmental appeal has raised all the grounds
and in the written arguments as placed on record as Annexure P-6. Despite all
the grounds raised before the appellate authority, the appellate order which is
placed on record as Annexure P-7, the aforesaid grounds have been discarded
only on the ground that the petitioner had recorded statements of three witnesses
on 28.09.2014 and he should have registered the FIR immediately after that
date. However, he waited till 12.10.2014 and registered the offence only after
recording the statements of complainant-injured JaharSingh. Looking to these
facts, the appellate authority rejected the appeal by upholding the order passed
by Disciplinary Authority.
17. In the case of Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
(2007) 4 SCC 566, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that disciplinary
proceedings against the police officer on the charge that he did not do
something which he should have done in the opinion of higher authority in the
course of investigation of criminal offence does not amount to misconduct
unless there is finding that the police officer was guilty of unlawful behavior.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"12. It is not in dispute that a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the appellant in terms of the provisions of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980. It was, therefore, necessary for the disciplinary authority to arrive at a finding of fact that the appellant was guilty of an unlawful behaviour in relation to discharge of his duties in service, which was wilful in character. No such finding was arrived at. An error of judgment, as noticed hereinbefore, per se is not a misconduct. A negligence simpliciter also would not be a misconduct. In Union of India v. J. Ahmed [(1979) 2 SCC 286 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 157] whereupon
MrSharan himself has placed reliance, this Court held so stating: (SCC pp. 292-93, para 11) "11. Code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of the service. It would follow that conduct which is blameworthy for the government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct (see Pearce v. Foster [(1886) 17 QBD 536, 542 : (1886-90) All ER Rep Ext 1752] ). A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct [see Laws v. London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers [(1959) 1 WLR 698] )]. This view was adopted in ShardaprasadOnkarprasadTiwari v. Divisional Supdt., Central Rly., Nagpur Division, Nagpur [(1959) 61 Bom LR 1596] and Satubha K. Vaghela v. MoosaRaza [10 Guj LR 23] . The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which runs as under:
'Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct'."
18. It has been held therein that error of judgment is not a misconduct in
itself and a negligence simplicitor would not be a misconduct.
19. In the case of BrahmanandChaturvedi vs. State of M.P. & others
reported in 2013 SCC OnLineMP 8630, it has been held by the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court that it is the duty of the enquiry officer and he is bound to
consider the statement of each witness and assign reason. The Co-ordinate
Bench has held as under:-
"11. The Enquiry Officer in his findings has disbelieved the statements of certain defence witnesses. In page 6 of his report, he opined that the witnesses BalluSen, SachinSen and DhannuSen belong to the same family and, therefore, they are "interested witnesses". Their statements cannot be relied upon. In the opinion of this Court, strict principles of Evidence Act are not applicable in a disciplinary proceeding. If the statements of witnesses are trustworthy and in cross- examination their statements could not be demolished, merely because
they are relative, their statements cannot be discarded. For this reason also the enquiry report is bad in law. The petitioner has taken a very categorical stand in the enquiry which is reproduced in internal page 7 of the enquiry report. The petitioner took a specific stand that the complainants have a track criminal record. As a counter-blast and with a view to pressurise the petitioner, they made incorrect allegations. If those allegations are accepted without proper scrutiny, it will be difficult for a police officer to act and render services in the field. The Enquiry Officer although recorded the petitioner's statement in internal page 7 of the report, did not deal with the said contention of the petitioner. The statements of various defence witnesses were not discussed. Thus, the enquiry report is perverse in nature. The Enquiry Officer is bound to consider the statement of each witness and assign reason. This view is taken by Supreme Court in (2001) 1 SCC 65 (Union of India v. K.A. Kittu), followed in [(2006) 5 SCC 88 (M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India)]."
20. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, it was held as under :-
12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
(Emphasis supplied)
21. In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority did not rely on the statement
of the SHO of the Police Station and injured in the criminal case, who did not
support the department case in the departmental enquiry. However, without
assigning any cogent reason, the disciplinary authority held the petitioner guilty
and awarded penalty to the petitioner.
22. In view of the aforesaid, it has to be held that the case against the petitioner
is a case of "no evidence" and so far as the question of non-registering the FIR
after 28.09.2014 is concerned, it may at best be a case of negligence simplicitor
and not a misconduct in view of the deposition of the complainant and SHO before
the enquiry officer and also in view of the totality of facts and circumstances
available on record.
23. Consequently, the penalty order as well as the appellate order Annexure P-5
and P-7 are set aside. However, it is clarified that so far as the salary and
allowances for the period of suspension is concerned, the petitioner would draw
only subsistence allowance for the said period, because the petitioner was
undergoing prosecution up to 12.04.2019. Therefore, the suspension period shall
be treated to be period spent on duty for all purposes except full pay and
allowances, which will be restricted to subsistence allowance only and to that
extent, no interference in the orders Annexure P-5 and P-7 is being made. In the
above terms, the petition is allowed.
(VIVEK JAIN) JUDGE rj
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