Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rahul Singh Sikarwar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 5 August, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
ON THE 5 th OF AUGUST, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 26863 of 2023
RAHUL SINGH SIKARWAR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Mr. Siddharth Sharma - Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Jitesh Sharma - GA for the State.
ORDER
The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 31.07.2023, whereby his
candidature for the post of Constable has been cancelled on account of his
involvement in the criminal case.
2. The facts necessary for decision of this case are that the petitioner
participated in the recruitment process for the post of Constable in the year
2020. He was declared successful in the written test and physical
examination. The petitioner thereafter submitted the attestation form,
wherein he disclosed the factum of criminal case (Crime No.162/2017)
registered against him at Police Station Madhoganj, District Gwalior for the
offences punishable under Section 341, 294, 323, 506 & 34 of IPC. He also
disclosed that the said criminal case was decided in the National Lok-Adalat
vide order, dated 09.12.2017 (Annexure P/3), on the basis of compromise
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between the parties.
3. The matter was then considered by the Screening Committee in its
meeting held on 25.04.2023 and based upon the recommendation of
the Screening Committee, the impugned order is passed by respondent no.4
on 31.07.2023. In the impugned order, it has been observed that the
petitioner may not have involved in the offence involving moral turpitude,
but specific allegation was made against him regarding assaulting the
complainant as also his sister and wife.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, challenging the impugned
order, submitted that the petitioner was acquitted in the case pursuant to the
order passed in the Lok-Adalat and, therefore, his involvement in the said
criminal case would not be a disqualification for his appointment on the post
of Constable. He also submitted that the offences alleged against the
petitioner are trivial in nature and, therefore, needs to be ignored while
considering the petitioner's candidature for appointment. The learned counsel
for the petitioner further submitted that the State Government has issued
guidelines vide circular, dated 24.07.2018 (Annexure P/4), wherein under
Clause 6(ii)(a), if the offence registered against a candidate are trivial in
nature and is acquitted by the Court, he should be accepted as suitable for the
post. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the Apex
Court judgment in the case of Anil Bhardwaj Vs. High Court of M.P. &
others, reported in (2021)13 SCC 323 and also on Division Bench judgment
of this Court in the case of Rohit Singh Raghuvanshi Vs. State of M.P.
(W.A.No.7/2020).
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5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supported
the impugned order and submitted that the petitioner was found involved in
the criminal case. His acquittal, in the said case was not honourable and was
only based upon the compromise between the parties and, therefore,
the Screening Committee was entitled to consider the petitioner's conduct
while judging his suitability for the post. The learned counsel also placed
reliance upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case
o f Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and another Vs. Mehar
Singh, reported in (2013)7 SCC 685, State of M.P. & others Vs. Parvez
Khan reported in (2015)2 SCC 591, as also in the case of State of M.P. &
others Vs. Bhupendra Yadav, reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1181 . He,
therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
6. Considered the arguments and perused the record.
7. The petitioner was involved in the criminal case for the offences
punishable under Section 341, 294, 323, 506 & 34 of IPC . The said criminal
case was closed pursuant to the compromise between the parties by the order
passed in Lok-Adalat. Meaning thereby, the statements of the complainant
and other witnesses were not recorded against him. However, the fact
remains that it was not a honourable acquittal. Further, the allegations made
against the petitioner was regarding assaulting the complainant's son and
nephew and when complainant's sister and wife came to rescue him, the
petitioner assaulted them also with fists and kicks. From perusal of the
statement of the facts in the impugned order, it is found that the specific
allegations were made against the petitioner. The Screening Committee has
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taken into account the petitioner's involvement and his role in the criminal
incident. In view of the recommendations of the Screening Committee,
respondent no.4 has passed the impugned order, wherein in paragraph 2 to 5,
the petitioner's involvement in the criminal case is considered as under :
"2. अ यथ के व द थाना माध गज जला वािलयर म अपरारध
कमांक 162/17 धारा 323,, 294, 506, 341, 34 भा०द० व० का करण
पंजीब द हुआ, जसम यायालय ारा राजीनामे के आधार पर दोषमु
कया गया ह।
3. उ करण छानबीन सिमित म पर ण हे तु बैठक दनांक
25.04.2023 को रखा गया। पर ण उपरांत सिमित ारा पाया गया क
अ यथ ारा फ रयाद क लड़क एवं प तक के साथ लात घूस ं ो से
मारपीट क गई।
4. अ यथ ारा अपने सािथय के साथ िगरोहबंद होकर गु डागद करते
हुए फ रयाद के पु एवं भतीजे के साथ उनके खेत म जाकर मारपीट क
गई। जब फ रयाद क लड़क बीच-बचाव करने गयी तो उसके साथ भी
लात घूसं से मारपीट क गई। साथ ह फ रयाद क प के साथ भी
मारपीट क गई।
5. अ यथ के इस आचरण से उसक गु डागद एवं आपरािधक मनोवृ
एवं म हलाओं के ित ितर कार क वृ प रल त होती ह। उसके
व द लगे आ ेप और दज अपराध उसके च र क कृ ित क ओर
प तः इं िगत करते ह-भले ह इन अपराध के वचारण के बाद कुछ भी
प र णित हो। पुिलस का कत य कानून का पालन सुिन त करना है ।
अतः उ यवहार वाले य को पुिलस सेवा के उपयु नह ं माना जा
सकता ह।"
8. The issue of considering the candidature of a candidate for
appointment in view of his involvement in the criminal case has been
considered, time and again, by the Apex Court as also by this Court. Similar
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issue was considered by the Apex Court in the case of Mehar Singh (Supra).
It was also a case wherein the incumbent was acquitted based upon
compromise, the Court held that it is still open to the Screening Committee
to examine the suitability of the candidate and take a decision. The Court
held in paragraphs 22, 23, 33, 34, 35 as under :
"22. Clause (3) of the comprehensive policy delineated in the
Standing Order is material for the present case. It refers to the
Screening Committee comprising high police officers. After a
candidate, who has disclosed his involvement, is acquitted or
discharged, the Committee has to assess his/her suitability for
appointment. Clause (6) states that those against whom serious
offences or offences involving moral turpitude are registered and
who are later on acquitted by extending benefit of doubt or
because the witnesses have turned hostile due to fear of reprisal by
the accused person shall not generally be considered suitable for
government service. However, all such cases will be considered
by the Screening Committee manned by senior officers. In our
opinion, the word "generally" indicates the nature of discretion.
As a matter of rule, such candidates have to be avoided.
Exceptions will be few and far between and obviously must be
substantiated with acceptable reasons.
23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the
Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved
in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if
they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or
discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable. The
Screening Committee will be within its rights to cancel the
candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on
some serious flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the
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result of material witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced
officers of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge
whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to
similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if
appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening Committee
will have to consider the nature and extent of such person's
involvement in the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause
for worsening the law and order situation rather than maintaining
it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not
merit any interference from this Court as its object appears to be
to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enter the
police force.
*** *** ***
33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned, his case
appears to have been compromised. It was urged that acquittal
recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be treated as a
disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose of the Legal
Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no merit in this
submission. Compromises or settlements have to be encouraged to
bring about peaceful and amiable atmosphere in the society by
according a quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also
to reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from the agony of
pending litigation. But these considerations cannot be brought in
here. In order to maintain integrity and high standard of police
force, the Screening Committee may decline to take cognizance of
a compromise, if it appears to it to be dubious. The Screening
Committee cannot be faulted for that.
34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the fact that
in their application and/or attestation form they have disclosed
their involvement in a criminal case. We do not see how this fact
improves their case. Disclosure of these facts in the
application/attestation form is an essential requirement. An
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aspirant is expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and
integrity are inbuilt requirements of the police force. The
respondents should not, therefore, expect to score any brownie
points because of this disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to
the point in issue. It bears repetition to state that while deciding
whether a person against whom a criminal case was registered and
who was later on acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a
post in the police force, what is relevant is the nature of the
offence, the extent of his involvement, whether the acquittal was a
clean acquittal or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because
the witnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in the
prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge in
similar activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can only
be taken by the Screening Committee created for that purpose by
the Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee's decision is not
mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot
be questioned.
35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great
responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the
society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be
worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police
force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have
impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal
antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or
discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order
will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely
exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to
the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police
force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of
taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The
decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless
it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is
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tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward
manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter
of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating.
In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and
efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by
the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its
credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the
Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of the trust
reposed in it and must treat all candidates with an even hand."
9. Again in the case of Parvez Khan (Supra) , the Apex Court reiterated
the same legal proposition holding as under :
"13. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear that a
candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of
confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must
have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal
antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or
discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was completely
exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the credibility of the
police ought not to enter the police force. No doubt the Screening
Committee has not been constituted in the case considered by this
Court, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the
respondent, in the present case, the Superintendent of Police has
gone into the matter. The Superintendent of Police is the
appointing authority. There is no allegation of mala fides against
the person taking the said decision nor the decision is shown to be
perverse or irrational. There is no material to show that the
appellant was falsely implicated. Basis of impugned judgment
[Parvez Khan v. State of M.P. , Writ Appeal No. 262 of 2010,
decided on 20-3-2012 (MP)] is acquittal for want of evidence or
discharge based on compounding."
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10. The Apex Court reiterated the same legal proposition in the case
of Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & others Vs. Pradeep Kumar
& another, reported in (2018)1 SCC 797 held in para - 13 as under :
"13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case does not
automatically entitle him for appointment to the post. Still it is
open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine
whether he is suitable for appointment to the post. From the
observations of this Court in Mehar Singh and Parvez Khan cases,
it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must
be of impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal
antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or
discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was honourably
acquitted/completely exonerated. The decision of the Screening
Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be mala
fide. The Screening Committee also must be alive to the
importance of the trust repose in it and must examine the candidate
with utmost character."
11. In view of the aforesaid legal pronouncement of law by the Apex
Court, it is now settled that the jurisdiction to judge the suitability of a
candidate for appointment, lies with the Screening Committee only. The
Apex Court in para 22 of Mehar Singh case, held that as a rule such
candidates should be avoided. It is further held in para 33, that the decision
of the Screening Committee can be interfered with only when the same is
malafide or is actuated with some extraneous consideration. Further, in para
35, the Apex Court held that the decision of Screening Committee has to be
accepted unless it is malafide. Looking to the facts of present case, it is found
that the petitioner has not alleged malafide against the Screening Committee.
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Thus, the discretion exercised by the Screening Committee needs to be
accepted.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon Clause
6(ii)(a) of circular, dated 24.07.2018 (Annexure P/4) to say that once the
petitioner is acquitted, he is suitable for the post. To appreciate this
argument, Clause 6(ii)(a) is reproduced hereunder:
"(ii) य द अ यथ के व पंजीब करण साधारण क म का है और
यायालय ारा उसे द डत कया गया है । अ यथ ारा इसका उ लेख
अनु माणन फॉम म कया गया हो अथवा नह , ऐसे करण म ववेक का
उपयोग कर, अ यथ शासक य सेवा के िलये यो य/अयो य है के संबंध
म अिभमत दया जावेगा।
(a). य द अ यथ के व पंजीब करण साधारण क म का है और
यायालय ारा उसे दोषमु कया गया है । अ यथ ारा इसका उ लेख
अनु माणन फॉम म कया गया हो अथवा नह , उसे शासक य सेवा के
िलये यो य माना जावेगा।"
13. As seen from above, a candidate should be held as suitable firstly if
he is tried for trivial offence(s) and secondly he is acquitted. No doubt
petitioner was tried for compoundable offences, but his acquittal was not
honourable. He was acquitted based upon compromise. The term 'acquitted'
used in aforesaid clause has to mean acquitted on merits otherwise undue
benefit would be acquired by candidates who may be involved in criminal
activities but are not even put to trial because of compromise. The petitioner,
therefore, does not get any help from Clause 6(ii)(a) of circular, dated
24.07.2018 also. The said clause would have been attracted if the petitioner
would have been acquitted on merits and not on compromise. Somewhat
similar clause was under consideration before Apex Court in the case of Anil
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Bhardwaj (Supra). The Apex Court while dealing with similar provision held
that the acquittal should be on merits. Para 27 being relevant is quoted
hereunder :
"27. Clause (viii) on which the reliance is placed contemplates that
the candidate who has been acquitted on merit by the Court will be
eligible for the Government service. The aforesaid contemplation
relates to at the time of character verification. Thus, at the time of
character verification, if a candidate is found to be acquitted on
merits by the Court, the candidate shall be treated to be eligible for
Government Service. The above clause (viii) as quoted above
cannot come to the rescue of the appellant who at the time of
character verification or at the time of consideration of the case of
the appellant by the committee on 18.07.2018 had not been
acquitted. Had the appellant in column 12 had mentioned about
the acquittal or at the time of character verification it was found
that the candidate has been acquitted on merit by the Court, Clause
6(viii) would have been attracted but in the present case the said
clause is not attracted since at the time of character verification the
appellant had not been acquitted and he was acquitted after more
than a year from rejection of his candidature.
14. The reliance placed upon by the petitioner's counsel on the
judgment of Division Bench in the case of Rohit Singh Raghuvanshi (Supra)
is also misplaced inasmuch as the facts of that case were entirely different.
In the said case, only offence was registered against the petitioner but there
was no final verdict by the Court. In that context, the Division Bench laid
down certain criteria to be looked into by the competent authority. However,
in the present case, criminal case has already been closed in view of the
compromise reached between the parties.
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15. Recently, the Apex Court has passed the order in the case of
Bhupendra Yadav (Supra) wherein in similar circumstances, the Court has
approved the decision of the Screening Committee in cancelling the
candidature of the candidate who was acquitted in criminal case on the basis
of compromise. In the said case also, the candidature was cancelled based
upon the compromise between the parties. The Apex Court held as under:
"16. As can be discerned from the above decision, an employer
has the discretion to terminate or condone an omission in the
disclosure made by a candidate. While doing so, the employer
must act with prudence, keep in mind the nature of the post and
the duties required to be discharged. Higher the post, more
stringent ought to be the standards to be applied. Even if a truthful
disclosure has been made, the employer is well within its right to
examine the fitness of a candidate and in a concluded criminal
case, keep in mind the nature of the offence and verify whether the
acquittal is honourable or benefit has been extended on technical
reasons. If the employer arrives at a conclusion that the incumbent
is of a suspect character or unfit for the post, he may not be
appointed or continued in service."
16. The Full Bench of this Court has also considered the jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere in
such matters in the case of Ashutosh Pawar Vs. State of M.P., reported in
2018(2) MPLJ 419, wherein in para 32 & 40, it has been held as under:
"32. Therefore, in respect of the Questions No. 1, 4 and 5 we hold
that decision of Criminal Court on the basis of compromise or an
acquittal cannot be treated that the candidate possesses good
character, which may make him eligible, as the criminal
proceedings are with the view to find culpability of commission of
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offence whereas the appointment to the civil post is in view of his
suitability to the post. The test for each of them is based upon
different parameters and therefore, acquittal in a criminal case is
not a certificate of good conduct to a candidate. The competent
Authority has to take a decision in respect of the suitability of
candidate to discharge the functions of a civil post and that
mere acquittal in a criminal case would not be sufficient to infer
that the candidate possesses good character. Division Bench
judgment of this Court in W.P.No.5887/2016 (Arvind Gurjar vs.
State of M.P.) is overruled. Another Division Bench judgment in
W.A. No.367/2015 (Sandeep Pandey vs. State of M.P. and others)
is also overruled. Jurisdiction of the High Court in a writ petition
under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is to examine the
decision-making process than to act as Court of appeal to
substitute its own decision. In appropriate case, if the Court finds
decision-making process is arbitrary or illegal, the Court will
direct the Authority for reconsideration rather than to substitute
the decision of the competent Authority with that of its own.
xxx xxx xxx
40. In view of the law laid down in above said judgments, there is
no doubt that in exercise of power of judicial review under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, this Court only examines the
decision-making process and does not substitute itself as a Court
of appeal over the reasons recorded by the State Government. We
find that the decision of the State Government holding that the
petitioner is not suitable, is just, fair and reasonable keeping in
view the nature of the post and the duties to be discharged."
17. In view of the aforesaid legal position settled by the Apex Court as
also by this Court, it is loud and clear that the interference in such matters
can be made only on the ground of malafides. Further, this Court can
examine only the decision making process and not the merits of the case. The
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jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case lies within the exclusive
domain of the Screening Committee. Further, as a rule, decision of Screening
Committee needs to be accepted unless it is shown to be malafide or based
on some extraneous consideration.
18. In view of aforesaid discussion, if the facts of this case are
considered in the light of the judicial pronouncement in various judgments, it
is clear that a criminal offence was registered against the petitioner wherein
specific allegations against the petitioner in the FIR were made. The
petitioner was not even put to trial since the matter was compromised. Under
these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
Screening Committee was competent to consider the petitioner's candidature
vis-a-vis his involvement and role in criminal incident. In absence of any
malafide and/or involvement of any extraneous consideration, the decision of
Screening Committee does not warrant interference by this Court.
19. Consequently, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.
(ASHISH SHROTI)
JUDGE
bj/-
