Madhya Pradesh High Court
Anjali @Sakuntla Vishwakarma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 5 August, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:36396
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 5 th OF AUGUST, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 30127 of 2025
ANJALI @SAKUNTLA VISHWAKARMA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Munendra Singh - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Alok Agnihotri - Government Advocate for the respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed
seeking following reliefs:-
7.1 That, it is therefore, prayed that Hon'ble Court may
kindly be pleased to issue a Writ in the nature of
mandamus directing the petitioner to consider and
decide the pending representation (contained in
Annexure P/4) of the petitioner in accordance with law,
in the interest of justice.
7.3 It is most respectfully prayed that appropriate action
be also directed to be taken against the authorities who
have not provided the Skeleton to the petitioner.
7.2 Any other relief or writ or direction or order which
this Hon'ble court may deem fit and proper looking the
facts and circumstances of the case be awarded to the
Petitioner including the cost of the litigation.
2. It is pointed out that father of the petitioner was got missing in the
year 2011 and he was subsequently found dead and DNA test was conducted
in the matter. It is the case of the petitioner that the Police Authorities have
filed a closure report in the matter. Petitioner has filed an application for
getting conducted the DNA test on 28/11/2017. On the basis of which, DNA
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test was got conducted.
3 . However, now after lapse of almost 8-9 years, petitioner has
preferred a representation to the Superintendent of Police, District Umaria on
04/07/2025 seeking a relief of handing over the remains/ bones of deceased
father. There is no document on record to demonstrate that those bones are
still retained by the respondents Department. There is a closure report filed
way back on 31/12/2017 which was duly accepted by the Court also.
Petitioner was having knowledge with respect to such proceedings as she
herself has filed an application to the Superintendent of Police, Umaria in
the month of November, 2017. However, there is no explanation for
approaching the Court with a delay of almost 8 years.
4. The law with respect to sleeping litigant has been considered by the
Court in catena of cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha
Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy
and Ors. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 , has held as under :-
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles
that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented, nonpedantic approach while
dealing with an application for condonation of
delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being had to the fact that these
terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in
proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not be
given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence
on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
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21.5. (v) Lack of bonafides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice and
cause public mischief because the courts are
required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and
it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between
inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or
few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is
attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict
approach whereas the second calls for a liberal
delineation.21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and
attitude of a party relating to its inaction or
negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle
is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and the
said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the
name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted
or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
the courts should be vigilant not to expose the
other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one
gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or
interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinised and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which
is founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given
some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some
more guidelines taking note of the present day
scenario. They are:-
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay
should be drafted with careful concern and not in a
haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the
courts are required to condone delay on the
bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis
on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay
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should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the
base of individual philosophy which is basically
subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid
down regard being had to the concept of judicial
discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving
consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay
as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical
propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant
manner requires to be curbed, of course, within
legal parameters."
5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Anr. vs.
Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 has opined as under:-
"54. This Court has consistently rejected the
contention that a petition should be considered
ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner
approaches the Court after coming to know of the
relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the
same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay
and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep
slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in
cases where some diligent person had approached the
Court within a reasonable time."
6 . A Division Bench of this Court in Focus Energy Ltd. (M/s) vs
Government of India, (DB) reported in I.L.R. (2011) M.P. 53 relying upon
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
"10. Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible
conclusion that appellant is guilty of delay and
laches. Its conduct disentitles it to any relief. In
New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and
Others, AIR 2007 SC 1365 the Supreme Court has
held that delay and laches are relevant factors for
exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In Municipal
Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000)
2 SCC 48 the Supreme Court has observed that
discretionary relief can be provided to one who has
not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his
rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an
indolent litigant. In the State of Haryana v. Aravali
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Khanij Udyog, (2008) 1 SCC 663 it has been held
that where third party rights are created, the High
Court should not interfere. Similarly, in Shiba
Shankar Mohapatra (supra) it has been held that
the Court exercising public law jurisdiction does
not encourage agitation of stale claims where the
right of third parties crystallizes in the
interregnum."
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn.
Ltd. vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as follows:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to
be borne in mind by the High Court when they
exercise their discretionary powers under Article
226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the
High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
powers if there is such negligence or omission on
the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken
in conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite
party. Even where fundamental right is involved
the matter is still within the discretion of the Court
as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC
185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion
has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492]
(PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon
Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor
Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] .
Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy either
because the party has, by his conduct done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect
he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy,
yet put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy
were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a
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bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances always important in
such cases are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval which
might affect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
8. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok
Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC 311 that :
"10. ... It is time and again, stated that a party
who has slept over his right since is not
entitled to the discretionary relief of the High
Court."
9. If the abovementioned judgments with respect to delay and latches
are applied to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the petitioner has
slept over her right for a considerable period. Therefore, no relief can be
extended to the petitioner.
10. Accordingly, the petition sans merit and is hereby dismissed. No
order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA)
JUDGE
Shbhnkr
