Madhya Pradesh High Court
Anurag Saxena vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 22 April, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:8984
1 M.Cr.C.No. 16212 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 22nd OF APRIL, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 16212 of 2025
ANURAG SAXENA AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Romesh Pratap Singh - Advocate for applicants.
Shri Mohit Shivhare - Public Prosecutor for respondent/State.
ORDER
This application, under section 528 of the BNSS, has been filed for
quashment of FIR in Crime No. 304 of 2024 registered at Police Station Dinara,
District Shivpuri for offence under Section 85 of BNS and Sections 3 and 4 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, as well as, charge sheet and criminal proceedings
pending before the trial court.
2. It is submitted by counsel for applicant that applicant No. 1 is husband
and applicant No. 2 is mother-in-law of respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2
lodged an FIR alleging that she got married to applicant No. 1 on 20.1.2022 in
accordance with Hindu rites and rituals. Her father had given a cash amount of
Rs. 7 lakhs and goods worth Rs. 2 lakhs in dowry, apart from gold and silver
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ornaments worth Rs. 3 lakhs. After marriage, for about one and a half years,
she was kept properly but thereafter applicants started harassing her by alleging
that her father has given less dowry and therefore she should bring an
additional amount of Rs. 5 lakhs from her father and only then they would keep
her. After sometime, the cruelty of applicants increased to such an extent, that
she informed the incidents to her father, brother, uncle and aunty on telephone.
Thereafter, her father tried to convince the applicants but they did not agree and
used to beat her on the ground of non-fulfilment of demand of dowry. On
23.8.2024, her husband took her to Pune where applicant No. 1 and her sister-
in-law Aastha started quarreling with her on the question of dowry and they
also used to insist that she should bring an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs and only then
she would be allowed to live in her house. Ultimately on account of non-
payment of additional dowry of Rs. 5 lakhs, applicant No. 1 and her sister-in-
law ousted her from the matrimonial house. Thereafter, she contacted her father
on phone. Then her father requested applicant No. 1 that she should be sent
back to her parental home and accordingly applicant No. 1 left her on
29.8.2024 to her parental home and while going back he again reiterated that
until and unless she brings an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs, she should not come back
and she should stay back in her parental home only. It was alleged in the FIR
that applicants are not intending to keep her with them and her father does not
have the financial capacity to fulfill their demand and accordingly the FIR was
lodged.
3. It is submitted by counsel for applicants that Police after completing the
investigation has deleted the name of Aastha Saxena from the charge sheet and
has filed charge sheet against the applicants. However, counsel for applicants
was not in a position to point out as to whether trial Court has passed any
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order with regard to non-filing of charge sheet against Aastha Saxena or
not.
4. Be that whatever it may be.
5. It is submitted by counsel for applicants that allegations are omnibus and
general in nature and therefore applicants cannot be prosecuted for the offence
under Section 85 of BNS and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
6. Per contra, application is vehemently opposed by counsel for the State.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. The Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh and Others reported in (2015) 11 SCC 260 has held as
under:-
"12. In Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P. (2014) 16
SCC 551, it was observed (SCC p. 553, paras 8-9):
"8. We have gone through the FIR and the criminal
complaint. In the FIR, the appellants have not been
named and in the criminal complaint they have been
named without attributing any specific role to them. The
relationship of the appellants with the husband of the
complainant is distant. In Kans Raj v. State of
Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935 :
(2000) 3 SCR 662]it was observed (SCC p. 217, para
5):
"5. ... A tendency has, however, developed for
roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased
wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not
discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the
prosecution even against the real culprits. In their
overenthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for
maximum people, the parents of the deceased have
been found to be making efforts for involving other
relations which ultimately weaken the case of the
prosecution even against the real accused as appears
to have happened in the instant case."
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The Court has, thus, to be careful in summoning
distant relatives without there being specific material.
Only the husband, his parents or at best close family
members may be expected to demand dowry or to
harass the wife but not distant relations, unless there is
tangible material to support allegations made against
such distant relations. Mere naming of distant relations
is not enough to summon them in the absence of any
specific role and material to support such role.
9. The parameters for quashing proceedings in a
criminal complaint are well known. If there are triable
issues, the Court is not expected to go into the veracity
of the rival versions but where on the face of it, the
criminal proceedings are abuse of Court's process,
quashing jurisdiction can be exercised. Reference may
be made to K. Ramakrishna v. State of Bihar, (2000) 8
SCC 547 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 27, Pepsi Foods
Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998
SCC (Cri) 1400, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC
604 and Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P., (2011) 11 SCC
259 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 159."
13. In the present case, the complaint is as follows:
"Sir, it is submitted that I was married on 18-11-2009
with Sidharath Parakh s/o Manak Chand Parakh r/o
Sarafa Bazar in front of Radha Krishna Market, Gwalior
according to the Hindu rites and customs. In the marriage
my father had given gold and silver ornaments, cash
amount and household goods according to his capacity.
After the marriage when I went to my matrimonial home,
I was treated nicely by the members of the family. When
on the second occasion I went to my matrimonial home,
my husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law started
harassing me for not bringing the dowry and started
saying that I should bring from my father 25-30 tolas of
gold and Rs 2,00,000 in cash and only then they would
keep me in the house otherwise not. On account of this
my husband also used to beat me and my father-in-law
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and my mother-in-law used to torture me by giving the
taunts. In this connection I used to tell my father
Kundanmal Oswal, my mother Smt Prem Lata Oswal,
uncle Ashok Rai Sharma and uncle Ved Prakash Mishra
from time to time. On 2-4-2010 the members of the
family of my matrimonial home forcibly sent me to the
house of my parents in Ganj Basoda along with my
brother Deepak. They snatched my clothes and
ornaments and kept with them. Since then till today my
husband has been harassing me on the telephone and has
not come to take me back. Being compelled, I have been
moving this application before you. Sir, it is prayed that
action be taken against husband Sidharath Parakh, my
father-in-law Manak Chand Parakh and my mother-in-
law Smt Indira Parakh for torturing me on account of
demanding dowry.
14. From a reading of the complaint, it cannot be held
that even if the allegations are taken as proved no case is
made out. There are allegations against Respondent 2 and
his parents for harassing the complainant which forced
her to leave the matrimonial home. Even now she
continues to be separated from the matrimonial home as
she apprehends lack of security and safety and proper
environment in the matrimonial home. The question
whether the appellant has in fact been harassed and
treated with cruelty is a matter of trial but at this stage, it
cannot be said that no case is made out. Thus, quashing
of proceedings before the trial is not permissible."
9. Thus, it is clear that passing taunts for bringing less dowry itself is
sufficient to prima facie make out an offence warranting prosecution under
Section 498A of IPC. However, in the present case it was specifically alleged
that on account of non-fulfilment of demand of Rs. 5 lakhs, respondent No. 2
was beaten by the applicants and lateron she has been abandoned by applicant
No. 1. Respondent No. 2 was ousted from her matrimonial house at Pune and
only at the request of father of respondent No. 2 she was brought back and was
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left at her parental home by applicant No. 1. It is also alleged that while going
back, applicant No. 1 had also threatened that until and unless she brings an
amount of Rs. 5 lakhs she should not come back. Thus the allegations made
against applicants are specific and cannot be said to be general or omnibus in
nature.
10. It was next contended by counsel for applicants that FIR was lodged by
respondent No. 2 on 24.11.2024, whereas much prior thereto i.e. on
25.10.2024, applicant no.1 had already instituted a suit for divorce. Therefore,
it is submitted that the FIR in question is lodged by way of counter blast and
thus it is liable to be quashed.
11. Considered the submissions made by counsel for applicants.
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi,
reported in (2007) 12 SCC 369 has held as under:-
"14. From a plain reading of the findings arrived at by
the High Court while quashing the FIR, it is apparent
that the High Court had relied on extraneous
considerations and acted beyond the allegations made
in the FIR for quashing the same in exercise of its
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. We
have already noted the illustrations enumerated
in BhajanLal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC335 : 1992 SCC
(Cri) 426] and from a careful reading of these
illustrations, we are of the view that the allegations
emerging from the FIR are not covered by any of the
illustrations as noted hereinabove. For example, we
may take up one of the findings of the High Court as
noted hereinabove. The High Court has drawn an
adverse inference on account of the FIR being lodged
on 31-12-2001 while the appellant was forced out of
the matrimonial home on 25-5-2001.
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15. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the High Court was not justified in drawing an
adverse inference against the appellant wife for lodging
the FIR on 31-12-2001 on the ground that she had left
the matrimonial home at least six months before that.
This is because, in our view, the High Court had failed
to appreciate that the appellant and her family members
were, during this period, making all possible efforts to
enter into a settlement so that Respondent 2 husband
would take her back to the matrimonial home. If any
complaint was made during this period, there was every
possibility of not entering into any settlement with
Respondent 2 husband.
16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was filed
only when all efforts to return to the matrimonial home
had failed and Respondent 2 husband had filed a
divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955. That apart, in our view, filing of a
divorce petition in a civil court cannot be a ground to
quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the
Code as it is well settled that criminal and civil
proceedings are separate and independent and the
pendency of a civil proceeding cannot bring to an end a
criminal proceeding even if they arise out of the same
set of facts. Such being the position, we are, therefore,
of the view that the High Court while exercising its
powers under Section 482 of the Code has gone beyond
the allegations made in the FIR and has acted in excess
of its jurisdiction and, therefore, the High Court was
not justified in quashing the FIR by going beyond the
allegations made in the FIR or by relying on extraneous
considerations.
22. For the reasons aforesaid, we are inclined to
interfere with the order of the High Court and hold that
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the High Court in quashing the FIR in the exercise of
its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code by
relying on the investigation report and the findings
made therein has acted beyond its jurisdiction. For the
purpose of finding out the commission of a cognizable
offence, the High Court was only required to look into
the allegations made in the complaint or the FIR and to
conclude whether a prima facie offence had been made
out by the complainant in the FIR or the complaint or
not."
13. It is well established principle of law that findings recorded by Criminal
Court are not binding on the Civil Court and vice versa. If a wife under the
hope and belief that with passage of time her matrimonial life would improve,
decides not to lodge the FIR, and lateron lodges the FIR after realising that the
things have gone too far where reconciliation may not be possible, then it
cannot be said that FIR lodged by her is false or by way of counter blast to the
divorce petition. Merely because a divorce petition has been filed it would not
mean that the allegations made in the divorce petition are true. The allegations
are yet to be proved by applicant No.1. Under these circumstances, this Court is
of considered opinion that patience shown by a wife cannot be used against her
for holding that FIR lodged by her is false.
14. Furthermore this Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C./528 of B.N.S.S. cannot conduct a mini trial. In the light of judgments
passed by the Supreme Court in the cases of XYZ v. State of Gujarat reported
in (2019) 10 SCC 337, State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S. Martin & Ors. reported in
(2018) 5 SCC 718, Ajay Kumar Das v. State of Jharkhand, reported in
(2011) 12 SCC 319, Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v. State of Bihar reported in
(2019) 13 SCC 350, State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh reported in (2010)
11 SCC 226, M. Srikanth v. State of Telangana, reported in (2019) 10 SCC
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373, CBI v. Arvind Khanna reported in (2019) 10 SCC 686, State of MP Vs.
Kunwar Singh by order dated 30.06.2021 passed in Cr.A. No.709/2021,
Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2018) 5 SCC 678, Teeja Devi
v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221, State of Orissa v. Ujjal
Kumar Burdhan, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 547, S. Khushboo v.
Kanniammal reported in (2010) 5 SCC 600, Sangeeta Agrawal v. State of
U.P., reported in (2019) 2 SCC 336, Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander
reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460, Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri
Satyanarayana Reddy reported in (2012) 12 SCC 437 and M.N. Ojha v.
Alok Kumar Srivastav reported in (2009) 9 SCC 682, this Court can quash
the proceedings only if the uncontroverted allegations do not make out an
offence.
15. Therefore contention of applicants that FIR in question was lodged by
way of counter blast to the divorce petition is hereby rejected being
misconceived.
16. It is next contended by counsel for applicants that applicant No.1 was
regularly making payment of certain amount to respondent No. 2 which is
evident from the various transactions done by him from January 2024 till July
2024.
17. Considered the submission made by counsel for applicants.
18. It is the duty of husband to maintain his wife. According to the FIR, she
was ousted from her matrimonial house at Pune on 29.8.2024. Thus, it is clear
that some money was transferred by applicant No.1 while respondent No. 2 was
residing with him. Since respondent No. 2 was residing with applicant No. 1
upto August, 2024, therefore it is clear that the money transactions which were
done by applicant No. 1 were not by way of maintenance to respondent No. 2.
Therefore, it is clear that for some reason the money must have been transferred
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by applicant No.1 and now applicants cannot take advantage of the same. If
money from January 2024 till July 2024 was separately paid by applicant No.1
to respondent No. 2 for her maintenance, then it is clear that although
respondent No. 2 was residing with applicant No. 1 but still for financial
purposes he had separated her from himself and was separately making
payment to bear her expenses.
19. Be that whatever it may be.
20. Merely because some money was transferred by applicant No.1 on
certain occasions to the account of respondent No. 2, that by itself cannot be a
ground to hold that allegations made by respondent No. 2 in the FIR are false.
21. No other argument is advanced by counsel for the applicant.
22. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court
is of considered opinion that no case is made out warranting interference.
23. Application fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
(and)
