Madhya Pradesh High Court
Akash Vyas vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 9 April, 2025
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 9 th OF APRIL, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 53347 of 2022
AKASH VYAS AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Mradul Bhatnagar - Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Madhusudan Yadav - Govt. Advocate for the respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition u/S 482 of Cr.P.C has been filed by the petitioners seeking
quashment of FIR pertaining to Crime No. 86/2021 registered by P.S. Mahila
Thana, Distt. Ujjain for offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 294, 506 and
Section 34 of IPC with all consequential proceedings thereto.
2. The petition in brief stats as under:
(i) Petitioner - Akash married to respondent Akshita on 23.11.2017 at
Indore as per Hindu rites and rituals. Immediately after the marriage, respondent
Akshita forced the petitioner Akash to leave the house of his parents and to shift to
a separate house. When petitioner - Akash refused to comply with the unjustified
demand, respondent no.2 - Akshita started quarreling with him over petty issues.
On 06.06.2021, respondent no. 2 - Akshita collected all her belongings and left her
matrimonial home in absence of petitioners. When petitioners attempted to
reconcile, respondent no.2 informed that she is not interest to live with the
petitioners and want divorce. On 02.08.2021, petitioner no.1 - Aakash received a
call from Mahila Thana Distt. Ujjain. During counselling at the instance of Mahila
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Thana, Ujjain, respondent no.2 exerted pressure on the petitioners for separate
living in Indore. Police Station - Mahila Thana Distt Ujjain registered an FIR for
offences punishable u/Ss 498A, 294, 506 and 34 of IPC against the petitioners on
false allegation of demand of dowry and harassment.
(ii) The offences alleged are not made out on vague, omnibus and general
allegations contained in the FIR. No medical or supporting material with regard to
harassment or cruelty is available. The investigation was not conducted in
impartial manner. On these grounds, it is prayed that the impugned FIR pertaining
to Crime No. 86/2021 registered at P.S. Mahila Thana, Distt. Ujjain be quashed
alongwith all consequential proceedings.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in addition to the grounds
mentioned in the petition submits that no specific allegations with regard to
cruelly or harassment are contained in the impugned FIR. The demand for
business purpose does not amount to demand of dowry. The allegations are false
and fabricated. Learned counsel has placed reliance on various judgments passed
by the Apex Court in the case of Iqbal@Golu and Another Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Another decided on 14.12.2021 in Cr. Appeal No. 1628/2021 arising
out of SLP(Cri) No. 2786/2019, Shakson Belthissor Vs. State of Kerala reported
i n (2009) 14 SCC 466 and Ramesh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR
2005(SC) 1989 to contend that the alleged offences are not made out against the
petitioners. Therefore, the impugned FIR and the chargsheet alongwith all
consequential proceedings may be quashed.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposes the petition and
submits that the FIR contains specific allegations of harassment and cruelty against
the petitioners. Therefore, petition is meritless and deserves to be dismissed.
5. Heard both the parties. Perused the record.
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6. The Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana & Ors vs. Bhajan Lal,
reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 after an elaborate consideration of the matter and
after referring to its various earlier decisions, observed in para 108 as under:-
''108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code
under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced
above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where
the proceeding is maliciously Instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.''
7. The allegation contained in impugned FIR are, in brief, as under-
The complainant reported to the P.S. Woman cell, Distt. Ujjain that she had
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got married to the Akash Vyas S/o Anil Vyas on 23.11.2017, a resident of Indore,
as per Hindu rites and rituals. Her parents have paid Rs. 5 lakhs cash in
installments to her in-laws for purchase of household articles for marriage.
Initially, she lived happily at her matrimonial house. After few months, her
husband Akash and mother-in-law started harassing her mentally for bringing
inadequate dowry. Her husband - Akash manhandled her under intoxication and
used to demand money from time to time. Her parents fulfilled the demand by
giving some amount of money and when her parents failed to pay the money, she
was harassed and manhandled by her husband. On 06.06.2021, her mother-in-law
Uma and husband Akash demanded Rs. 5 lakhs for bringing material for
construction. She refused as her parents were not capable to fulfill the said
demand. She informed about the same to her brother Akashay, who tried to
convince Akash and mother-in-law Uma, but to no avail. Thereafter, she went to
her parental house at Ujjain. To save her marriage, she went to Women Cell,
Ujjain for counseling on 04.08.2021.They were given 20 days time to live
together. But her husband and mother-in-law kept on demanding Rs. 5 lakhs. Due
to continuous demand of money from husband and mother-in-law, even during
counseling, she refused to live with her husband. On 14.09.2021, Akash came to
Ujjain and again harassed and threatened her for arranging Rs. 5 lakhs. On such
allegations, P.S. Women Cell registered FIR at Crime No. 86/2021 for offence
punishable u/S 498A, 294, 506 r/W 34 of IPC.
8 . In case of CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh
(2003) 6 SCC 175, it was held by Supreme Court that FIR is not an
encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence
reported. It was observed that-
"20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an encyclopaedia, which must
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disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a
report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim
or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant
need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects
of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must
disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must
provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At
this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the
commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a
cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of
information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to
record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is also not necessary for
him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete
investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the
information. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the details he must find
out those details in the course of investigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The
information given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the
investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take
action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the information furnished provides a
reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the police officer concerned is
empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to
record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other
competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the report is true,
whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is
named, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all matters
which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the report discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not give full details
regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate
the case and discover the true facts, if he can."
9. In case of Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, the Supreme Court laid down
following principles -
13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy
Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad , AIR 1945 PC 18, the following
principles of law emerge:
13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to
investigate into cognizable offences.
13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences.
13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is
disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an
investigation to go on.
13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, in the "rarest of rare cases". (The rarest of rare cases standard
in its application for quashing under Section 482CrPC is not to be confused
with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty,
as explained previously by this Court.)
13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the
Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.
13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage.
13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an
ordinary rule.
13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the
police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of
activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure
the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482CrPC.
10. Further, in case of State of M.P. v. Jogendra , (2022) 5 SCC 401,
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explaining the ambit of the term "Dowry" it was held that-
12. In the light of the above provision that defines the word "dowry" and takes
in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security, in our opinion, the High
Court fell into an error by holding that the demand of money for construction
of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand. In Appasaheb
case [Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra , (2007) 9 SCC 721 : (2007) 3 SCC
(Cri) 468] referred to in the impugned judgment [Jogendra v. State of M.P. ,
Criminal Appeal No. 48 of 2004, decided on 10-9-2008 (MP)] , this Court had
held that a demand for money from the parents of the deceased woman to
purchase manure would not fall within the purview of "dowry", thereby
strictly interpreting the definition of dowry. This view has, however, not been
subscribed to in Rajinder Singh case [Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab ,
(2015) 6 SCC 477 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] wherein it has been held that the
said decision as also the one in Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P. [Vipin
Jaiswal v. State of A.P. , (2013) 3 SCC 684 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 15] , do not
state the law correctly. Noting that the aforesaid decisions were distinct from
four other decisions of this Court viz. Bachni Devi v. State of
Haryana [Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana , (2011) 4 SCC 427 : (2011) 2 SCC
(Cri) 280] , Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab [Kulwant Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 339] , Surinder Singh v. State
of Haryana [Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana , (2014) 4 SCC 129 : (2014) 4
SCC (Cri) 769] and Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab [Raminder
Singh v. State of Punjab , (2014) 12 SCC 582 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 116], the
Court opined that keeping in mind the fact that Section 304-B was inserted in
IPC to combat the social evil of dowry demand that has reached alarming
proportions, it cannot be argued that in case of an ambiguity in the language
used in the provision, the same ought to be construed strictly as that would
amount to defeating the very object of the provision. In other words, the Court
leaned in favour of assigning an expansive meaning to the expression "dowry"
and held thus : (Rajinder Singh case [Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab ,
(2015) 6 SCC 477 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , SCC p. 491, para 20)
"20. [Ed. : Para 20 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./16/2015 dated 6-4-2015.] Given that the statute with
which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and
common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to
be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment
in Appasaheb case [Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra , (2007) 9
SCC 721 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 468] followed by the judgment
of Vipin Jaiswal [Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P. , (2013) 3 SCC
684 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 15] do not state the law correctly. We,
therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable
security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after
the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a
married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in
relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly
and unequivocally point otherwise." (emphasis supplied)
14. In the facts of the instant case, we are of the opinion that the trial court has
correctly interpreted the demand for money raised by the respondents on the
deceased for construction of a house as falling within the definition of the
word "dowry". The submission made by the learned counsel for the
respondents that the deceased was also a party to such a demand as she had on
her own asked her mother and maternal uncle to contribute to the construction
of the house, must be understood in the correct perspective. It cannot be lost
sight of that the respondents had been constantly tormenting the deceased and
asking her to approach her family members for money to build a house and it
was only on their persistence and insistence that she was compelled to ask
them to contribute some amount for constructing a house. The Court must be
sensitive to the social milieu from which the parties hail. The fact that the
marriage of the deceased and Respondent was conducted in a community
marriage organisation where some couples would have tied the knot goes to
show that the parties were financially not so well off. This position is also
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borne out from the deposition of PW 1 who had stated that he used to bear the
expenses of the couple. Before the marriage of the deceased also, PW 1 had
stated that he used to bear her expenses and that of her mother and brother (his
sister and nephew) as her father had abandoned them. In this background, the
High Court fell in an error in drawing an inference that since the deceased had
herself joined her husband and father-in-law, the respondents herein and asked
her mother or uncle to contribute money to construct a house, such demand
cannot be treated as a "dowry demand". On the contrary, the evidence brought
on record shows that the deceased was pressurised to make such a request for
money to her mother and uncle. It was not a case of complicity but a case of
sheer helplessness faced by the deceased in such adverse circumstances.
10. A perusal of the complaint and consequential FIR reveals specific
allegations of cruelty against husband and mother-in-law with regard to
inadequacy of dowry and further demand of money. She has further alleged mental
and physical harassment by her husband. The complainant has alleged specific
incidents with relevant details of such incident. The allegations in the FIR cannot
be said to be inherently improbable or absurd. At this juncture, it cannot be said
that possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
would be caused to them. The respondent is pursuing legal remedies available to
her, so it cannot be said that petitioners are unnecessarily harassed by the
respondent. Therefore, no case is made out for quashing the FIR and
consequential proceedings in exercise of inherent jurisdiction in view of the law
laid down by the Apex court in cases of Bhajan Lal, Neeharika, Tapan and
Jogendra (supra). In view of the above discussion, the precedents of law relied
upon by the learned counsel for petitioner above are of no assistance, as the same
are distinguishable on facts.
11. Consequently, the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is dismissed.
CC as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
