Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ghanshyam Bhatt (Dead) Through Lrs Ajay ... vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 7 April, 2025
Author: Avanindra Kumar Singh
Bench: Avanindra Kumar Singh
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:16707
1 SA-1675-2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH
ON THE 7 th OF APRIL, 2025
SECOND APPEAL No. 1675 of 2017
GHANSHYAM BHATT (DEAD) THROUGH LRS AJAY BHATT AND
OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri D. N. Pandey - Advocate for the LRs of appellant Ghanshyam Bhatt.
Shri Ashish Trivedi - Advocate for the intervenor.
Ms. Mamta Mishra - Panel Lawyer for the State.
JUDGMENT
This appeal was heard and reserved for orders on admission on
20/01/2025.
2. This Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of Code of Civil
Procedure by the appellant/defendant whose suit was decreed by the
trial Court but learned First Appellate Court allowed the appeal of the
State and dismissed the suit.
3. In very brief, the plaintiff filed a Civil Suit No.28-A/2003 before
the Court of Fourth Civil Judge Class-I, Jabalpur for declaration of
title and permanent injunction regarding suit property bearing Khasra
No.48/2 and 49/2 area 0.364 hectares sitated in village Chamanpur
which he purchased by registered sale deed dated 12/07/1973 from
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Gendabai w/o late Bhaiyalal. State remained absent in spite of notice.
After recording the evidence of the plaintiff, learned trial Court vide
judgment and decree dated 07/07/2003 dismissed the suit on the
ground that under Section 7 to 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976, plaintiff can file an appeal as per Section 12
before the competent authority and even time barred appeal can be
heard and he can file Second appeal also, therefore Ex/P/7 order of
Tehsildar is valid. Learned trial Court also held that plaintiff has not
filed relevant documents and, therefore dismissed the suit.
4. In Civil Appeal No.56-A/2003 learned third Additional District
Judge, Jabalpur vide judgment and decree dated 07/08/2004 took
additional documents under Order 41 Rule 7 of CPC and remanded
the case to the trial Court. Thereafter, learned Fourth Civil Judge,
Class-I in civil Suit No.28-A/2003 vide judgment and decree dated
07/05/2007 decreed the suit.
5. On an appeal preferred by the State i.e. RCA No.17/2015,
learned Fourth Additional District Judge, Jabalpur vide judgment and
decree dated 29/07/2017 allowed the appeal of the State and set aside
the decree of the trial Court. Now, the plaintiff is before this Court in
second appeal.
6. The grounds of the appeal are that learned First Appellate Court
has wrongly held that provision of Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976 are binding upon plaintiff as he was aware of
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the proceeding but neither he had filed any return under the provision
of the Act nor preferred any appeal or revision against the order
before competent authority for declaring the suit lands as surplus
lands.
7. It is submitted that on 12/07/1973 Smt Genda Bai had already
sold the suit land in favour of plaintiff and had delivered possession
of the same. His name was also recorded in the revenue records,
therefore, competent authority should have issued the notice to the
plaintiff under the provision of the Act. It is further submitted that it
was wholly immaterial as far as plaintiff is concerned that the suit
land was included by son of his vendor Mahes in the return filed by
him under Section 6 of the Act, 1976 and that was subsequently
declared as surplus. As the suit land was already sold, therefore they
could not have been included in the return. Learned First Appellate
Court wrongly drawn inference against the plaintiff for not producing
the notification whereby the area where the suit lands are situated
was exempted from operation of provisions of the Act, 1976. It is
further submitted that notification was issued by the defendant,
therefore he should have produced the notification and oral evidence
in this regard. It is proved that the suit land was situated within green
belt and are exempted from the operation of the Act, 1976 by virtue
of notification issued by the State Government declaring that lands
situated within 200 meters of Omti nala shall be so exempted.
Therefore, he appealled which was not considered by the appellate
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Court.
8. Considered the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and
perused the record.
9. On perusal of the record, it is seen that plaintiff is stating that he
purchased the suit land on 12/07/1973 but sale deed is not produced.
Consequently, if the suit property was purchased on the said date i.e.
12/07/1973 then 'Khasra panchshala' of that years is not produced. In
fact, 'khasra panchshala' (Ex.P/1) is of the year 1983 to 1987 whereas
i n 'khasra panchshala' (Ex.P/2) is of year 1973 to 1977, name of
Genda Bai is mentioned. Even otherwise, this 'khasra panchshala'
produced in the trial Court is torn in many places, therefore, plaintiff
should have called original record and proved 'khasra panchshala'.
Plaintiffs have written multiple letters to revenue authorities i.e. the
Collector Jabalpur (Ex.P/3), the Commissioner Jabalpur (Ex.P/4) and
other one letter exhibit P/5 which was not addressed to anyone. In
Ex.P/7 Tehsildar has written to the office of Collector Jabalpur
regarding the suit property of surplus land that within the time, appeal
should have been filed by Ghanshyam Bhatt. Ex.P/11 is the 'khasra
panchshala' of year 1977 which shows the name of Ghanshyam but if
the suit property was purchased in the year 1973 then how for the first
time, name of plaintiff came into the revenue record in the year 1977
has not been explained. Ex.P/13 is return filed by the Mahendra
Kumar s/o Bhiyalal under Section 6 of Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976. Plaintiff himself admitted that he had not filed
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any notification but it could have been filed by the respondent/State.
Plaintiff has to prove his case even in ex-parte proceedings, therefore
this is not a legal arguments that if remaining documents were lacking
then that gap should have been filled by the respondent/State.
10. On perusal of the judgment of appellate Court, it is seen that the
appellate Court has considered all the legal and factual aspects and
has specifically mentioned in Para-17 of the judgment that plaintiff is
always free to challenge the revenue entries before the competent
revenue Court and Civil Court has not right to correct the entries,
therefore there is nothing by way of substantial question of law on
which this second appeal can be admitted.
11. Even otherwise, the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with
the findings of fact under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure
is well defined by catena of decisions of the Supreme Court. This
Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact until or unless the same
is perverse or contrary to material on record. [See: Narayan
Rajendran and Anr. v. Lekshmy Sarojini and Others, (2009) 5 SCC
264, Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed and Others, (2001) 7 SCC
189, Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and Antoher, (2012) 8 SCC
148, D.R. Rathna Murthy v. Ramappa, (2011) 1 SCC 158
Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishnath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288,
Vanchala Bai Raghunath Ithape v. Shankar Rao Babu Rao Bhilare,
(2013) 7 SCC 173 and Laxmidevamma and Others v. Ranganath and
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Others, (2015) 4 SCC 264]. The concurrent findings of fact recorded
by the courts below are based on meticulous appreciation of evidence
on record which by no stretch of imagination can be said either to be
perverse or based on no evidence.
12. Thus, in view above analysis, no substantial question of law
arises in this appeal on which it can be admitted. In the result, the
appeal stands dismissed at admission stage itself.
(AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH)
JUDGE
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