Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dinesh Pandey vs Somkant Tripathi on 7 April, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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1 SA. No. 551 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 7th OF APRIL, 2025
SECOND APPEAL No. 551 of 2025
DINESH PANDEY
Versus
SOMKANT TRIPATHI
Appearance:
Shri Vibhor Kumar Sahu - Advocate for appellant.
Shri Vinod Kumar Bhardwaj- Senior Advocate with Shri Anand
Raghuwanshi- Advocate for respondent.
JUDGMENT
This second appeal, under Section 100 of CPC, has been filed against the
judgment and decree dated 23.01.2025 passed by Principal District Judge, Datia
in RCA No. 32 of 2023, by which the judgment and decree dated 03.05.2023
passed by Second Civil Judge, Senior Division, Datia in RCSA No. 49 of 2014
has been reversed and the decree under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P.
Accommodation Control Act (for short "the Act") has been passed.
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2. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal, in short, are that
respondent filed a suit for recovery of rent, as well as, for eviction and mesne
profits in respect of a shop situated at Patwa Triangle. Earlier, the suit was
dismissed by judgment dated 30.03.2019 passed by Second Civil Judge, Class
II, Datia. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree, respondent preferred an
appeal, which was allowed by order dated 04.03.2021, and the matter was
remanded back with a direction to amend the issues as well as to decide the
appeal after giving full opportunity of hearing to the parties. Thereafter, the trial
court by judgment and decree dated 03.05.2023 again dismissed the suit filed by
respondent. However, the appeal filed by respondent was partially allowed in
respect of ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act, and therefore, this appeal
has been filed by the tenant.
3. The case of plaintiff is that he is the owner of a shop situated at Patwa
Triangle, Bada Bazar, Datia. On 1.12.2013, appellant had taken the shop on
monthly rent of Rs. 9,000/- for a period of 11 months. It was also agreed that
after the period of 11 months, the tenancy may be extended with the consent of
parties. It was also agreed upon by the defendant that he would take the
electricity connection on the basis of rent agreement and the plaintiff would also
give his consent for the same. Accordingly, on 04.12.2013, plaintiff gave
written consent on the condition that the electricity charges shall be paid by
defendant/appellant only. Thus, the rent note was executed between the parties
on 01.12.2013. It was further pleaded that the appellant had paid rent in January
2014. Thereafter, appellant paid the rent on 06.03.2014, which was for the
month of February and March 2014, and thereafter appellant did not pay rent
from April 2014. Accordingly, a registered notice was sent on 12.08.2014 and
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the tenancy was terminated. Appellant was directed to pay the outstanding rent
to the tune of Rs. 36,000/- and to hand over the vacant possession of the shop. It
was the case of plaintiff that the defendant did not pay the rent for the months of
April to July 2014 and also did not hand over the vacant possession of the shop.
It was further pleaded that defendant had given a wrong reply alleging therein
that he has already paid the rent for the months of April to July 2014. It was also
the case of plaintiff that defendant is in habit of committing default in payment
of rent. Earlier, a suit was filed by the plaintiff before the Court of III Civil
Judge, Class II, Datia for recovery of rent, which was ultimately compromised
and a new rent note was executed. However, defendant is not complying with
the terms and conditions of the new rent note. The plaintiff had never provided
any electricity facility to defendant and it was also not agreed upon between the
plaintiff and defendant that plaintiff would provide electricity. It was further
pleaded that the grandson of plaintiff has also attained majority and he wants to
start his business of mobile and computer repairing. His grandson Manu has
sufficient experience and the suit premises is suitable for starting the business.
The plaintiff has no other shop or place so that his grandson may start the
business of mobile and computer repairing.
4. The defendant/appellant filed his written statement and claimed that from
the year 2006, he is in possession of the shop in question in the capacity of
tenant. He is running the business of utensils. The tenancy was initially started
on a monthly rent of Rupees 5,000. Since appellant has established his business,
therefore now the plaintiff is harassing him and wants to enhance the rent as per
his whims and wishes, whereas the rent can be enhanced only in accordance
with the provisions of law. On multiple occasions, plaintiff, by using abusive
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language, had insisted that defendant should vacate the shop, therefore, the
defendant had lodged a report with regard to the conduct of plaintiff. Thereafter,
plaintiff has got the electricity connection disconnected and now the defendant
is running his business without any electricity connection. Even the
plaintiff has not issued the receipt of rent which was received by him for the
months of April to August 2014, and the suit has been filed on frivolous
grounds. Defendant has no other place to start the business, and the present
business run by defendant is the only source of income for himself and his
family, and in case if defendant is evicted, then he and his family would be at
the verge of starvation.
5. As already pointed out, the trial court after framing the issues and
recording evidence of the parties dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved by the said
judgment and decree, plaintiff preferred an appeal which was allowed by order
dated 04.03.2021 and the matter was remanded back. Thereafter, by judgment
and decree dated 03.05.2023 passed by II Civil Judge, Senior Division, Datia in
RCSA No.49/2014, the suit was once again dismissed. Being aggrieved by the
said judgment, plaintiff preferred an appeal which has been allowed by
judgment and decree dated 23/01/2025 passed by Principal District Judge, Datia
in RCA No. 32 of 2023, and decree under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act has been
passed, whereas decree sought by the plaintiff under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act
was rejected.
6. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court, it is
submitted by counsel for appellant that in view of the provisions of Section
12(1)(f) of the Act, suit cannot be filed for bona fide need of grandson, and has
proposed the following substantial questions of law:
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"(i) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case the impugned
judgment and decree passed by the learned Lower Appellate Court is
illegal, without jurisdiction and contrary to law?
(ii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case the learned
lower appellate court has erred in law in reversing the well reasoned
judgment and decree for eviction passed by the learned trial court on
the ground contemplated under section 12(1)(A) of the M.P.
Accommodation Control Act?
(iii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case learned
appellate court has erred in law in calculating the deposit of rent and
finding regarding deposit or payment of rent is erroneous, arbitrary
and contrary to record ?
(iv) Whether, respondent herein is not entitled to get benefit of
provisions contemplated under section 13 in view of proviso to section
12(3) of said Act, 1961?
(v) Whether, learned trial court below have erred in dismissing the
respondent's suit on the ground of 12(1) (f) of said Act, 1961?
(vi) Whether, the impugned judgment passed by the learned first
appellate court is not a reasoned and speaking Judgment in the eye of
the law?
(vii) Whether, the finding in the impugned judgment passed by the
learned first appellate court are perverse and bad in law?"
7. Heard learned counsel for the appellant.
8. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Govind Rao and others Vs.
Bhavarlal and others reported in 2012 (1) JLJ 9, has held as under:
"17. It is a settled position of law that the relative and qualifying
words, phrases and clauses are applied to the antecedent
immediately preceding. In the Principles of Statutory Interpretation
by Justice Shri G.P. Singh (4th Edn.) page 199 there is a very useful
discussion on the rule of Last Antecedent. The learned Author has
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based his opinion on the decided cases of the Federal Court and the
Supreme Court in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of
West Bengal [AIR 1960 SC 935, p.939], Ashwani Kumar Ghosh v.
Arabindo Bose [AIR 1952 SC 369, p.376], and G.G. in Council v.
Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. [AIR 1946 FC, 16.23]. In the
subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court this principle has been
reiterated with a further elucidation that the basic principles of
interpretation put by the Court should not be lost sight of, which
require that the interpretation put by the Court should not lead to
absurdity or which may frustrate the policy of the Legislature. It has
also to be kept in view that the interpretation of any term has to be
made in the context in which it is used. Even when a Court may
seek aid from the dictionary meaning of a particular word out of
many meanings of the dictionary, the one which is consistent with
the policy of the Legislature and the context of the main text has to
be adopted. It is true that the Act is a beneficial legislation brought
on the Statute Book for affording protection to the tenants, but in
the same Act rights have been given to the landlord to get the suit
accommodation vacated for the bona fide need and on other
grounds also. Now the Legislature in its wisdom allowed the
landlord to get the house evicted not only for the bona fide need of
himself, but also for the members of his family and for that purpose
in the definition of the member of family certain categories of the
relatives have been named. Reading the definition as a whole one
cannot conceive that all the relations named in the definition fall in
the same category.
18. My learned brother Dr. T.N. Singh, J. has also gone through the
report of the Select Committee and Bill as it was originally
presented before the house to seek external aid for interpretation
and is right when he says that the initial idea of the family
consisting of the joint Hindu family was given up and instead the
present definition was substituted to make it applicable to all the
citizens. But the Indian tradition and culture of the families living
together even after marriage and even being separate by mess has
not been given a go-bye. The definition shows that this idea was
very much in the mind of the Legislature when this Bill was
converted into an Act. As such, if we read the relations named in the
definition minutely, we find, that in the first category the persons
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who are naturally supposed to live together in one family have been
put in a separate class because after the words paternal uncle's wife
or widow a comma has been put and thereafter the word 'or' is used
and then brother's son or unmarried daughter have been named with
a condition that they were is used living jointly with the landlord,
and thereafter again word "or" is used and the words any other
relations dependant to him have been inserted. As such in the
aforesaid context the conjunction "or" is used in the aforesaid
definition at two places is manifestly disjunctive and, therefore, if
the rule of Last Antecedent is made applicable, we find that the
qualifying term "living jointly" shall be applicable only in the case
of brother's son or unmarried daughter and the term "dependent on
him" shall be applicable in the case of only any other relations.
19. To conclude, in the definition of 'member of family' there are
three categories one consisting of spouse, son, unmarried daughter,
father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother, unmarried sister,
paternal uncle, paternal uncle's wife or widow; the second category
is that of brother's son or unmarried daughter and the third category
is of any other relations and in view of the rule of Last Antecedent
the term "living jointly with" qualifies only brother's son or
unmarried daughter and the term "dependent on him" qualifies only
any other relation. The term "living jointly with" or "dependent on
him" does not govern the relations enumerated in category one
above. The reference is answered accordingly."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Dwarkaprasad vs. Niranjan and
another, reported in AIR 2003 SC 2024, has held as under:-
"8. This brings us to the legal question about the meaning to be given
to the word "himself" used in clause (g) of Section 13(1) of the Act.
Normally, the rent legislations are meant for the benefit of the tenants
but the rent statutes contain exceptions in favour of the landlord which
give him a right to evict the tenant, the most important being to ensure
that he gets payment of rent regularly and promptly and that in case the
tenanted premises is required by him for his personal need, he is able
to get its possession from the tenant. So the provision regarding
eviction of tenant to meet the personal requirement of the landlord
with respect to the premises is a provision for the benefit of the
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landlord. The question arises that should such a provision be construed
strictly so as to confine it to the requirement of the landlord alone or
can it be extended to include the requirement of members of the
landlord's family? In the present case, the plaintiff has pleaded right
from the beginning that he constitutes a joint family with his mother
and brothers and sisters. It is also in evidence that the plaintiff holds
the property for the benefit of the entire family. Even when the
plaintiff is the sole owner of the property, it is open to him to use the
property for the benefit of his larger family which includes his brothers
and sisters. The respondent tenant cannot dispute the fact about the
plaintiff's constituting a joint family because it is specifically provided
in the lease deed which is an admitted document. Moreover, the
defendant had not led any evidence to contradict or dispute this plea.
The way the case has been argued before the courts below also clearly
suggests that the only objection raised on behalf of the tenant was a
legal objection that the need of the brothers and sisters of the landlord
cannot be considered under clause (g). The fact that the plaintiff
constituted a joint family with his brothers and sisters was never
disputed.
17. In the case in hand, the landlord is the head of the family being
the eldest amongst the brothers. All the brothers and sisters including
the mother of the landlord live with him as members of the joint Hindu
family. It is his obligation to settle his younger brothers in business as
it is his obligation to settle his children in business. Therefore, he can
legitimately seek eviction of a tenant by pleading that he needs the
demised premises to settle his son and his younger brothers in
business. This being the legal position, the conclusion is inevitable i.e.
the plaintiff landlord must succeed and a decree for eviction is liable to
be passed in his favour for the entire demised premises. Accordingly
this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court
which has granted only a decree for half portion of the suit premises is
hereby modified. The landlord is held entitled to a decree for
possession of the entire demised premises. The decree for possession
passed by the lower appellate court with respect to the entire suit
premises is hereby restored. The respondents are granted three months'
time to vacate the suit premises and hand over its peaceful vacant
possession to the plaintiff landlord. Parties are left to bear their
respective costs. "
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10. If the facts of the present case are considered in the light of evidence led
by the parties, then it is clear that the defendant/appellant (DW1) himself has
admitted that plaintiff and his two sons are running a single shop and both sons
are working in the said shop. Grandson of respondent/plaintiff is also living in
the same house and even on certain occasions, rent was paid to the grandson of
plaintiff. Thus, the court below has rightly held that plaintiff has successfully
proved that his grandson is dependent upon him.
11. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that the
findings of fact recorded by the first appellate Court are based on sound
application of mind and plaintiff has successfully proved that his grandson is
dependent upon him. In view of the admissions made by defendant/appellant
himself that plaintiff and his sons are running their business in a shop
admeasuring 10 x 20 square feet, this Court is of considered opinion that
plaintiff has successfully pleaded and proved that the shop in question is bona
fidely required for non-residential purposes.
12. As no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal, accordingly
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
(and)
