Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mahila Shriya Bai vs The Board Of Revenue Through Its on 4 April, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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1 WP. No. 199 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 4th OF APRIL, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 199 of 2025
MAHILA SHRIYA BAI
Versus
THE BOARD OF REVENUE THROUGH ITS AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri D.S. Rajawat - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri S.S. Kushwaha - Government Advocate for respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking the following relief (s):
7.1 That, order annexure P/4 dated 18.10.2024 passed by the
respondent no.1 may kindly be quashed.
7.2 That, in alternate matter may kindly be remanded back to
respondent no.1 with the direction to decide the same its own merit.
7.3 That, other relief doing justice including cost be ordered.
2. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that petitioner, under the
provisions of Madhya Pradesh Krishi Prayojan Ke Liye Upayog Ki Ja Rahi
Dakhal Rahit Bhumi Par Bhumiswami Adhikaron Ka Pradan Kiya Jana
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(Vishesh Upabandh) Adhiniyam, 1984, was allotted land by order dated
03.12.1990 passed by Naib Tahsildar, Circle Nai Sarai, Tahsil Isagarh, District
Ashok Nagar. In a revision, Additional Collector, Ashok Nagar, by order
dated 25.01.1993 passed in Case No./339/91-92/Revision set aside the
aforesaid order. Being aggrieved by the order of Additional Collector,
petitioner approached the Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior, by filing
Revision No.125/Revision/92-93 which too was dismissed by order dated
30.09.1994. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, petitioner preferred
another Revision No.1058/94 which too was dismissed by order dated
21.04.2016 passed by the Board of Revenue. Thereafter, it appears that on
31.03.2020, petitioner filed a Review Application before the Board of
Revenue along with an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, for
condonation of delay. By the impugned order dated 18.10.2024 passed in Case
No.Review/0242/2020/Ashok Nagar/Land Revenue, the Board of Revenue has
rejected the application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act and has
consequently dismissed the Review Petition as barred by time.
3. Challenging the order passed by the Board of Revenue, it is submitted
by counsel for petitioner that the application for condonation of delay should
have been considered by adopting a liberal view. Petitioner had made out a
sufficient cause for condonation of delay and therefore, the Board of Revenue
should have condoned the delay.
4. Heard learned counsel for petitioner.
5. In an application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act, it was
mentioned by petitioner that the revision was dismissed by Board of Revenue
by order dated 21.04.2016. Since counsel for petitioner was not having mobile
number of petitioner, therefore, he could not communicate the result of
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revision. It is submitted that on 10.10.2019, petitioner came to know about
dismissal of revision by order dated 21.04.2016 and accordingly she filed an
application for grant of certified copy which was received on 11.10.2019. On
account of Covid-19 pandemic, petitioner could not come down to Gwalior
and ultimately the Review Application was filed on 20.03.2020.
6. The contention of petitioner that the counsel could not inform petitioner
about the outcome of revision is misconceived and cannot be accepted. This
Court in the case of Lokpal Singh and Another Vs. Matre and Others
reported in 2019 (3) MPLJ 330 has held that being plaintiffs, it was the duty
of appellants to keep a track of their civil suit and in view of the fact that
nowadays everybody is having mobile phones and they have full technical
facilities to contact their counsel even on mobile and having failed to do so,
this Court is of considered opinion that the appellants have failed to make out
any good reason before the appellate Court for condonation of delay.
7. Delhi High Court in the case of Jan Chetna Jagriti Avom
Shaikshanik Vikas Manch and Others Vs. Anand Raj Jhawar Sole
Proprietor of M/S RR Agrotech reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Del 878 has
held as under:-
5. As mentioned above, the only explanation advanced by the
appellants with regard to the colossal delay of 565 days in filing the
appeal is that their erstwhile counsel kept them in dark. This
explanation needs to be tested on the anvil of the judicially
sanctified parameters under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
5.1 As regards Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the undisputed
propositions of law as culled out of various judicial precedents are
as follows. Where an applicant is able to satisfy the court that he
was precluded from filing the appeal or application other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order XXI CPC from
circumstances beyond his control, the court has discretion to
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condone the delay in filing the appeal etc. Like any other discretion,
the discretion under Section 5 of the Act also must be exercised
judiciously, keeping in mind the principles evolved across time.
One of those principles evolved across time is that the sufficiency
of cause set up by the applicant under Section 5 of the Act must be
construed liberally in favour of the applicant. Unless no explanation
for delay is submitted or the explanation furnished is wholly
unacceptable, the court must liberally condone the delay, if third
party rights had not become embedded during the interregnum. It is
not the length of delay but the sufficiency of cause which has to be
examined by the court, in the sense that if there is sufficient cause,
delay of long period can be condoned but if it is otherwise, delay of
even a few days cannot be condoned. The purpose of construing the
expression "sufficient cause" liberally is to ensure substantial
justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is
attributable to the applicant.
5.2 No doubt, for the fault of counsel, the litigant should not be
made to suffer. But that cannot be a blanket rule. Each case has to
be examined on its peculiar factual matrix. The protection of the
said rule, which can in appropriate cases be extended to an illiterate
lay person, cannot be extended to an educated litigant or a corporate
entity or the government bodies. Merely by engaging a counsel, the
litigant cannot claim to be not under a duty to keep track of the
case. Most importantly, where the applicant attributing such delay
to the professional misconduct of the counsel opts not to take any
action against the counsel, his explanation cannot be believed.
Condoning delay in such circumstances, believing the bald
allegations of the applicant would be tantamount to condemning the
erstwhile counsel without hearing him and that too on judicial
record.
5.3 In the case of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC
361, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed thus:
"7. In construing Section 5(of the Limitation Act), it is
relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The
first consideration that the expiration of the period of
limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a
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right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as
binding between the parties. In other words, when the period
of limitation prescribed has expired, the decree holder has
obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the
decree as beyond challenge and this legal right which has
accrued to the decree holder by the lapse of time should not
be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay
is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and
admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately
conferred upon the court in order that judicial power and
discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance
substantial justice."
(emphasis supplied)
5.4 In the case of Finolux Auto Pvt. Ltd. v. Finolex Cables Ltd.,
(2007) 136 DLT 585 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court held
thus:
"6. In this regard, we may refer to a decision of the Supreme
Court in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 4
CLT 95 (SC). In the said decision, the Supreme Court has
held that unless and until a reasonable or satisfactory
explanation is given, the inordinate delay should not be
condoned. In para 6 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has
laid down in the following manner:
"Law of Limitation may harshly affect a particular
party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power
to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus,
neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the
delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds
and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the
application for condonation of delay filed in the High
Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First
Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs."
(emphasis supplied)
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5.5 In the case of Pundlilk Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs v.
Executive Engineer Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that basically the laws of
limitation are founded on public policy and the courts have
expressed atleast three different reasons supporting the existence of
statutes of limitation, namely (i) that long dormant claims have
more of cruelty than justice in them, (ii) that a defendant might
have lost the evidence to dispute the stated claim, and (iii) that
persons with good causes of action should pursue them with
reasonable diligence. It was observed that the statutes of limitation
are often called as statutes of peace insofar as an unlimited and
perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty
which are essential for public order.
5.6 In the case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, (2011) 4 SCC 363, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
observed thus:
"19. We have considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that
generally speaking, the courts in this country including this
court adopt a liberal approach in considering the application
for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act".
The concepts of "liberal approach" and "reasonableness" in the
exercise of discretion by the courts in condoning delay were
considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, holding
thus:
"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause"
has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall
within the concept of reasonable time and proper
conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of
introducing liberal construction is normally to introduce the
concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its
general connotation.
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26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has
definite consequences on the rights and obligations of party
to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied
appropriately depending upon the facts and circumstances
of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour
of one party as a result of failure of the other party to
explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own
conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on
the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the
delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction
of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally.
Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party
has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its
rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive
the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it
in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.
27. ....
28. .... The concepts such as "liberal approach",
"justice oriented approach" and "substantial justice"
cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation. Especially in cases where the court
concludes that there is no justification of the delay...."
(emphasis supplied)
5.7 In the expressions of this Court in the case of Shubhra Chit
Fund Pvt. Ltd. v. Sudhir Kumar, (2004) 112 DLT 609, too much
latitude and leniency will make provisions of the Limitation Act
otiose, which approach must be eschewed by courts.
5.8 In the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs v. The
Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 the
Hon'ble Supreme Court recapitulated the scope of Section 5
Limitation Act and held thus:
"26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of
the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it
is evident that :
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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy
that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting
the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must come to
an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to
be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though
liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause
of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the
same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation
Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary
in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is established for various factors such as, where
there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled
to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with
the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for condoning
the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that
the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to
disregarding the statutory provision".
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5.9 So far as the issue regarding professional misconduct of the
counsel is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185 held
thus:
"8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and
statements, made within the limits of authority given to
him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the
party who engaged him. It is true that in certain
situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set
aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree
notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of
the advocate where it finds that the client was an
innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a
party can disown its advocate at any time and seek
relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised.
Such an absolute rule would make the working of the
system extremely difficult. The observations made in
Rafiq [(1981) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1981 SC 1400] must be
understood in the facts and circumstances of that case and
cannot be understood as an absolute proposition. As we
have mentioned hereinabove, this was an on-going suit
posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its
institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager
residing away from the city, where the court is located. The
defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private
limited company with its head-office at Calcutta itself and
managed by educated businessmen who know where their
interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were
not disposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing
they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court.
Maybe, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the
plaintiff. May be not. But one thing is clear -- they chose
to non-cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a
stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask its
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indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and
trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the
nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which
cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted".
(emphasis supplied)
5.10 In the case of Moddus Media Private Ltd. v. Scone
Exhibition Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 8491, this Court
observed thus:
"13. The litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his rights
and is also expected to be equally vigilant about the
judicial proceedings pending in the court of law against
him or initiated at his instance. The litigant cannot be
permitted to cast the entire blame on the Advocate. It
appears that the blame is being attributed on the Advocate
with a view to get the delay condoned and avoid the
decree. After filing the civil suit or written statement,
the litigant cannot go off to sleep and wake up from a
deep slumber after passing a long time as if the court is
storage of the suits filed by such negligent litigants.
Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying
to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the
nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory put
forth by the appellant/applicant/defendant company,
which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been
accepted. The appellant is not a simple or rustic
illiterate person but a Private Limited Company
managed by educated businessmen, who know very well
where their interest lies. The litigant is to be vigilant and
pursue his case diligently on all the hearings. If the litigant
does not appear in the court and leaves the case at the
mercy of his counsel without caring as to what different
frivolous pleas/defences being taken by his counsel for
adjournments is bound to suffer. If the litigant does not turn
up to obtain the copies of judgment and orders of the court
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so as to find out what orders are passed by the court is
liable to bear the consequences".
(emphasis supplied)
5.11 Most recently on 21.11.2024, in the case of Rajneesh
Kumar v. Ved Prakash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the situation where the
applicant coming under Section 5 of the Act attributed the
delay in filing the appeal to his erstwhile counsel, and
observed thus:
"10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown
on the head of the advocate who was appearing for
the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed
over a period of time a tendency on the part of the
litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and
carelessness in attending the proceedings before
the court. Even if we assume for a moment that
the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent,
this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long
and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to
be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be
equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings
pending in the court initiated at his instance. The
litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw
the entire blame on the head of the advocate and
thereby disown him at any time and seek relief".
(emphasis supplied)
8. Thus, it is clear that every litigant has to keep track of his own case and
the burden cannot be put onto the shoulders of advocate to apprise the litigant
about the outcome of litigation. There is nothing in the application to show as
to why the petitioner did not approach her counsel to know about the status of
the case. The submission that counsel had informed that he would call
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petitioner as and when required indicates that the counsel was having the
mobile number of petitioner.
9. Be that whatever it may be.
10. If petitioner is of the view that counsel has committed professional
misconduct then in the light of judgment of Supreme Court in the case of R.
Muthukrishnan Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at
Madras reported in (2019) 16 SCC 407, it is clear that the question as to
whether an advocate is guilty of professional misconduct or not is within the
exclusive domain of the Bar Council and admittedly petitioner has not
approached the Bar Council complaining the professional misconduct, if any,
of her earlier counsel. Furthermore, Section 17 of Limitation Act reads as
under:
17. Effect of fraud or mistake.--
(1) Where, in the case of any suit or application for which a
period of limitation is prescribed by this Act,--
(a) the suit or application is based upon the fraud of
the defendant or respondent or his agent; or
(b) the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit
or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of
any such person as aforesaid; or
(c) the suit or application is for relief from the
consequences of a mistake; or
(d) where any document necessary to establish the
right of the plaintiff or applicant has been fraudulently
concealed from him,
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the
plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake
or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in
the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the
applicant first had the means of producing the concealed
document or compelling its production:
Provided that nothing in this section shall enable any
suit to be instituted or application to be made to recover or
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enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction
affecting, any property which--
(i) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for
valuable consideration by a person who was not a
party to the fraud and did not at the time of the
purchase know, or have reason to believe, that any
fraud had been committed, or
(ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for
valuable consideration subsequently to the
transaction in which the mistake was made, by a
person who did not know, or have reason to
believe, that the mistake had been made, or
(iii) in the case of a concealed document, has been
purchased for valuable consideration by a person
who was not a party to the concealment and, did not
at the time of purchase know, or have reason to
believe, that the document had been concealed.
(2) Where a judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force,
prevented the execution of a decree or order within the period
of limitation, the court may, on the application of the
judgment-creditor made after the expiry of the said period
extend the period for execution of the decree or order:
Provided that such application is made within one year
from the date of the discovery of the fraud or the cessation of
force, as the case may be.
11. Thus, in order to take advantage of this Section, petitioner was under
obligation to plead and establish that in spite of due diligence she could not
discover the outcome of revision. As already held that litigants have to keep a
track of their own case and they cannot shift the burden onto the shoulders of
their counsel. Thereafter, even according to petitioner, she came to know
about the impugned order for the first time on 10.10.2019 and accordingly she
filed an application for grant of certified copy on 10.10.2019 which was
received by her on 11.10.2019. The Nationwise lockdown on account of
Covid-19 pandemic was imposed with effect from 24.03.2020. The contention
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of petitioner that since petitioner was afraid of Covid-19 pandemic, therefore,
she could not file review immediately after 11.10.2019 is misconceived and
false. In fact, in the month of October to December, 2019 and January and mid
of February, 2020, there was no whisper of Covid-19 pandemic in the country.
Thus, it is clear that even after obtaining the certified copy, petitioner did not
file review petition within reasonable time.
12. Accordingly, this Court is of considered opinion that Board of Revenue
did not commit any mistake by rejecting the application filed by petitioner
under Section 5 of Limitation Act.
13. As no case is made out warranting interference, petition fails and is
hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
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