Madhya Pradesh High Court

Dinesh Kumar Vaishya vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 April, 2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT,
CHIEF JUSTICE
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN

WRIT APPEAL No. 72 of 2025

DINESH KUMAR VIASHYA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADJHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS

........................................................................................................
Appearance:
Shri Prakash Upadhyay, Sr. Advocate with Shri Ravindra Chaturvedi and Shri
Aditya Jaiswal- Advocates appeared for the appellant.
Shri Aditya Adhikari, Sr. Advocate with Shri Ashish Prasad and Shri Sharad
Chandra Khare- Advocates appeared for the respondent No.4.
Dr. S. S. Chouhan - Govt. Advocate for the respondents / State.
..........................................................................................................
JUDGMENT

(Reserved on : 20 / 03 / 2025) (Pronounced on : 01 / 04 / 2025)

Per: Hon'ble Shri Justice Vivek Jain.

The present intra Court appeal has been filed arising out of order dated 16.12.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP No.35770/2024 whereby the learned Single Judge directed removal of representative of respondent No.4 company from the enquiry team constituted for assessing the compensation amount but allowed the representative of respondent No.4-company to remain present on spot and further permitted the

respondent No.4 company to raise objections to any false and fictitious claims, if any made by the claimants.

2. The learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the aforesaid order passed by the learned Single Judge has contended that a coal block has been allotted to respondent No.4 at District Singrauli and proceedings for acquisition of land are going on, during course of which proceeding for assessment of compensation are going on. It is vehemently argued by learned senior counsel for the appellant that as per Section 95(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement act, 2013 (For short referred to as 'LARR Act-2013') only Requiring Body or a local authority is given right to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.

3. It is argued by learned senior counsel for the appellant that the present respondent No.4 is not the Requiring Body in terms of provisions of LARR Act-2013. By taking this Court through the various provisions of LARR Act-2013, it is argued by learned senior counsel for the appellant that person interested is defined in Section 3(x) of the said Act while Requiring Body is defined under Section 3(zb) of the said Act. It is vehemently argued that the respondent No.4 does not fall within the definition of Requiring Body because the land is being acquired for the use of Central Government and acquisition proceedings will confer right on the land upon the Central Government and further that allocation of coal mine would amount transfer of limited right of extraction of coal from the said mines whereas primary and legal owner of the land would be the Central Government.

4. By taking this Court through various provisions of The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short referred to as 'Act of 1957') so also Coal Blocks Allocation Rules, 2017, it is argued that the respondent No.4 is given a limited right of extraction of coal from the

lands and real title in the land under the acquisition will not vest in respondent No.4 and therefore, the respondent No.4 cannot be said to be Requiring Body for the purpose of LARR Act-2013. It is further argued that the learned Single Bench while granting liberty to the respondent No.4 to raise objection to any alleged false claim by the land user has not given any reasons for the same and therefore, giving away of blanket right of participation without any analysis of legal provisions and providing reasons for the same, makes the order of the learned Single Judge vulnerable.

5. By relying on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish Kumar Gupta v. State of Haryana reported in 2017(4) SCC 760 it is vehemently argued that post-acquisition allottee has no locus to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation under the scheme of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short referred to as 'Act of 1894') which is analogous to the scheme of LARR Act-2013 and therefore, right of participation could not have been given to the respondent No.4 as it is contrary to the scheme of LARR Act-2013.

6. Another argument was raised that even if the respondent No.4 is held to be a Requiring Body in terms of Section 3(zb) then it has only limited right of participation under Section 23 read with Section 95 of LARR Act- 2013 and there is no provision in the said Act for making objection at the time of inspection of land or assets. Thus, on this ground also, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is criticized.

7. Per Contra, the counsel for the respondent No.4 by relying on the various provisions of LARR Act-2013 as well as the Act of 1894, has vehemently argued that impugned order giving right to the respondent No.4 to raise objection to any false or fictitious claims is in accordance with the legislative scheme contained in the LARR Act-2013 and Act of 1894 and further that similar type of rights were also there in Section 50 (2) of Act of

1894. Therefore, it is not something new right which is given under the LARR Act-2013 nor the order passed by the learned Single Judge amounts to granting any right which is not recognized under the law. The order passed by the learned Single Judge, therefore, is stated to be absolutely in accordance with the legislative scheme of the enactment concerned.

8. The learned counsel for the respondent No.4 has also argued that once a company is funding the process of acquisition and the cost of acquisition is to be recovered from the said company, it would be a Requiring Body as defined in Section 3(zb) of LARR Act-2013and further that the somewhat analogous provisions of Section 50(2) of the Act of 2013 were interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi reported in 1995(2) SCC 326 and Supreme Court has recognized such right of the company for whom the acquisition is taking place.

9. It is further contended that lot of fictitious claims are being made by the land losers by raising temporary structures on agricultural or other vacant lands and claiming compensation by making out a case of loss of dwelling house. Therefore, participation of the respondent No.4 to the limited extent of raising objections at the time of determination of compensation cannot be held to be unjustified.

10. Heard.

11. In the present case, the respondent No.4 has admittedly been awarded a coal block ("Bandha" Coal Block) at District Singrauli and the initial notification under the LARR Act, 2013 was issued on 14.06.2021 by the Collector, District Singrauli and placed on record as (Annexure P-1). From a bare perusal of the said notification, it is evident that Bandha coal block has been allotted to respondent No.4 at Tehsil Sarai, Distt. Singrauli and lands in

certain villages in the said Tehsil are required to be acquired for the said purpose. The relevant portion of the said notification dated 14.06.2021 is as under:-

कायालय कले टर जला िसंगरौली एवं पदे न अपर सिचव म0 0 शासन राज व वभाग

मांक/387/भू-अजन/आर/21 िसंगरौली दनांक 14/06/2021

अिधसूचना

रा य सरकार, मेसस ई. एम.आई.एल. माइ स ए ड िमिनरल रसोसस िलिमटे ड बंधा कोल लॉक के िलए जला िसंगरौली तहसील सरई अंतगत ाम ते दहु ा, पडरवाह, दे वर , बंधा एवं पचौर क भूिमय क अजन करना चाहती है और लोक योजन के िलए सामा जक समाघात िनधारण अ ययन करना चाहती है । अ ययन का काय भूिम अजन, पुनवासन और पुन यव थापन म उिचत ितकर और पारदिशता का अिधकार अिधिनयम, 2013 ( मांक 30 सन ् 2013) क धारा 4 के ावधान के अनुसार कया जाएगा।

(1) प रयोजना वकासक का नाम:- मेसस ई.एम.आई.एल. माइ स ए ड िमिनरल रसोसस िलिमटे ड बंधा कोल लॉक प रयोजना, पहचान नं0 U14290WB2020PLC2367171T पता:- Industry House. 18 Floor, 10 Camac Street, Kolkata 700017, India

(2) भूिम के ता वत अजन का योजनः- कोयला खदान से िनकलने वाले कोयले क आपूित विभ न औ ोिगक के क जायेगी जसम ताप व ुत उ पादन के भी शािमल है । औ ोिगक के एवं ताप व ुत के को कोयले क सतत आपूित होने से दे श के औ ोिगक उ पादन म वृ होगी व उसका लाभ जन सामा य को होगा। इससे अित र यह प रयोजना बृहद तर क होने के कारण थानीय लोग को य व अ य लाभ होगा। जसम य व अ य रोजगार स मिलत है । पूज ं ी का वाह िसंगरौली े म होने के कारण आस-पास के े का सवागीण वकास होगा। कंपनी ारा अपने लाभांश का अंश सामा जक उ रदािय य काय म म कोर व बफर जोन के वकास हे तु कया जायेगा, जसके फल व प इस े का स पूण के या वयन का वकास होगा।

                                 म0 0 शासन व के            शासन को राज व टै स क                 ाि   होगी, जसका उपयोग
                                  वकास योजनाओं के          या वयन हे तु कया जायेगा ।

12. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid notification, it is evident that it is not a case of respondent No.4 being a post-acquisition allottee but respondent No.4 is an entity who has been granted coal block and right of extraction of coal from the said coal block and as a consequence of grating of right of extraction of coal in this coal block, the acquisition proceedings have been put to motion.

13. So far as the reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the case of Satish Kumar Gupta (supra) is concerned, the said case was one where the State of Haryana had acquired a land for development of industrial township by an instrumentality of the said State i.e. Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation and after development of township, the land was allotted to a third party (Maruti Suzuki India Limited) and the said third party was allotted land with clear understanding that challenges to the determination of compensation by the land outstees are pending and if the compensation is enhanced in future then the allottees in the township shall be liable to pay additional price of the land allotted in the industrial township. It was a case where at the time of acquisition, the allottee who wanted to raise objection to the quantum of compensation, was not in picture at the stage of acquisition or reference Court. He was not in the picture at the time of initial determination of compensation and when the township was established and developed, he was allotted land in the township and then realized that the land losers have initiated appellate proceedings in the matter of determination of compensation and then sought for a right to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation at that stage when appeals had been filed before the High Court against award of the reference Court. In those facts of the case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that party to be a post-acquisition allottee and held that the post-

acquisition allottee has no right or locus to be heard in proceedings regarding compensation and he was held to be neither a necessary nor a proper party. Most importantly, in para-15 of the same judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court brought out clear distinction between a post- acquisition allottee, and a entity for whom, the land is being acquired, in the following manner :-

"15. In Himalayan Tiles [Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho, (1980) 3 SCC 223] the acquisition was under Part VII of the Act. In Santosh Kumar [Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corpn., (1986) 2 SCC 343] the question was whether award of the Collector could be challenged, to which this Court answered in the negative except on the ground of fraud, corruption or collusion. In Neyvely Lignite [Neyvely Lignite Corpn. Ltd. v. Tahsildar (LA), (1995) 1 SCC 221] again the acquisition was under Part VII of the Act and in that context this Court held that the expression "person interested" could include a company or local authority for whose benefit the land was acquired. The post-acquisition allottee cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated on a par with beneficiary for whom the land was acquired. In U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad [U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, (1995) 2 SCC 326] , the matter dealt with was in the context of statutory authority for whom the land was acquired. DDA v. Bhola Nath Sharma [DDA v. Bhola Nath Sharma, (2011) 2 SCC 54 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 344] was a case in the context of beneficiary for whom the land was acquired."

14. In the present case, coal block has been allotted to the respondent No.4 prior in time to initiation of the acquisition process and respondent No.4 is funding the acquisition process which is going on at the cost of respondent No.4. The respondent No.4, therefore, cannot be said to be a

post-acquisition allottee as was in the case of Satish Kumar Gupta (supra).

15. So far as the issue regarding coverage of respondent No. 4 in the definition of Requiring Body under Section 3(zb) of the Act of LARR Act- 2013 so also in terms of Section 50(2) of Act of 1894 and whether the respondent No. 4 falls under the definition of person interested under Section 3(x) of the LARR Act-2013 is concerned, the respondent No. 4 would obviously not fall in the definition of "person interested" as per Section 3(x) of LARR Act-2013 because the said definition relates to the person who is interested in receiving the compensation and making the claim of compensation. Section 3(x) is as under:-

3(x)"person interested" means-

(i)all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act;

(ii)the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers, who have lost any forest rights recognised under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (2 of 2007);.

(iii)a person interested in an easement affecting the land;

(iv)persons having tenancy rights under the relevant State laws including share-croppers by whatever name they may be called; and

(v)any person whose primary source of livelihood is likely to be adversely affected;

16. So far as the coverage of respondent No. 4 in the definition of Requiring Body which is claimed by the respondent No. 4 in the present case is concerned, Section 3(zb) of LARR Act-2013 is as under:-

"3(zb)"Requiring Body" means a company, a body corporate, an institution, or any other organisation or person for whom land is to be acquired by the appropriate Government, and includes the appropriate Government, if the

acquisition of land is for such Government either for its own use or for subsequent transfer of such land is for public purpose to a company, body corporate, an institution, or any other organisation, as the case may be, under lease, licence or through any other mode of transfer of land;

17. The said definition in earlier part relates to a company, body corporate etc. for whom land is to be acquired by the appropriate Government and the second part of the definition is inclusive definition declaring the appropriate government also included in the definition of Requiring Body if the acquisition of land is for own use of government or for subsequent transfer of such land is for public purpose to a company, body corporate, etc.

18. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid definition, it is clear that first part of the definition relates to a company, body corporate etc. for whom the land is to be acquired and if the land is being acquired by government for subsequent transfer of land for public purpose to a company, body corporate, etc. then even the appropriate government would be included in the definition of Requiring Body. The said definition was sought to be read down by the appellant that only the appropriate government would be the Requiring Body. We are afraid that the interpretation suggested by the learned senior counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the land is being acquired for the respondent No. 4 and at the cost of the respondent No. 4. The definition as contained in Section 3(zb) does not talk of transfer of title but talks of acquisition for a body corporate, institution, company, etc. The respondent No. 4 has been allocated a coal block prior to initiation of acquisition process and the initial notification dated 14/06/2021 is very clear about the acquisition being initiated consequence to allocation of coal block to the respondent No. 4. Therefore, it is clear that the acquisition is going on for the respondent No. 4 and even if it is held that it is being acquired by the appropriate Government for

handing over to respondent No.4 as mining rights of Coal therein have been given to it, then also the only result would be that the appropriate government would also be included in the purview of Requiring Body but it would not exclude the respondent No. 4 from the purview of Requiring Body.

19. As per Section 95(2) of LARR Act-2013 a right has been given to the Requiring Body to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determination of amount of compensation. By that provision, the Requiring Body has not been given the right to demand reference to the authority concerned under Section 64 but given a right to appear before the Collector at the time of initial determination of compensation and adduce evidence for that purpose. Section 95 is as under:-

"95. Acquisition of land at cost of a local authority or Requiring Body.

(1) Where the provisions of this Act are put in force for the purpose of acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority or of any Requiring Body, the charges of land incidental to such acquisition shall be defrayed from or by such fund or Requiring Body.

(2) In any proceeding held before a Collector or Authority concerned in such cases the local authority or Requiring Body concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation:

Provided that no such local authority or Requiring Body shall be entitled to demand a reference to the Authority concerned under section 64."

20. Section 95(1) further makes the position clear that when acquisition is going on at the cost of any fund controlled and managed by a local authority or of any Requiring Body the charges of land incidental to such acquisition shall be borne by such requiring body and in such proceedings the Requiring Body shall have the right as per Section 95(2) which is clear by perusal of

the wording of Section 95(1) and 95(2). In the present case there is no quarrel to the fact that the acquisition is being carried out at the cost of the respondent No. 4.

21. Coming to the scheme of other provisions of LARR Act-2013, though the Requiring Body has not been given a right to initiate a reference under Section 64 of LARR Act-2013, but it has been given a right to challenge the award passed in reference proceedings by filing appeal against such award passed in reference proceedings under Section 69.

22. As per Section 45(1)(2)(i) the Rehabilitation & Resettlement committee is also required to have a representation of Requiring Body. As per Second proviso to Section 19 (1) the declaration of acquisition shall not be made without the Requiring Body depositing the amount in full or part towards the cost of acquisition of land as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government.

23. The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, (1995) 2 SCC 326 was considering the provision of Section 50 (2) of the Act of 1894. Section 50 of Act of 1894 was as under:-

"50. Acquisition of land at cost of a local authority or Company.-- (1) Where the provisions of this Act are put in force for the purpose of acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority or of any Company, the charges of and incidental to such acquisition shall be defrayed from or by such fund or Company.

(2) In any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or Company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation:

Provided that no such local authority or Company shall be entitled to demand a reference under Section 18."

24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra) has held as under:-

23. Under Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act the company for whom land is being acquired is also entitled to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the compensation. Since the company for whom land is acquired stands on the same footing as a local authority whatever has been said with regard to a local authority would apply to a company. It is, however, made clear that matters which stand finally concluded will not be reopened.

24. To sum up, our conclusions are:

1. Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act confers on a local authority for whom land is being acquired a right to appear in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector and the reference court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.

2. The said right carries with it the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference court before whom acquisition proceedings are pending on the date on which the matter of determination of compensation will be taken up.

3. The proviso to Section 50(2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector or by the reference court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the L.A. Act.

4. In the event of denial of the right conferred by Section 50(2) on account of failure of the Collector to serve notice of the acquisition proceedings, the local authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

5. Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226.

6. The local authority is a proper party in the proceedings before the reference court and is entitled to be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and oppose enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in that regard.

7. In the event of enhancement of the amount of compensation by the reference court if the Government does not file an appeal, the local authority can file an appeal against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the court.

8. In an appeal by the person having an interest in land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the reference court, the local authority should be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice of the said appeal. This would apply to an appeal in the High Court as well as in this Court.

9. Since a company for whom land is being acquired has the same right as a local authority under Section 50(2), whatever has been said with regard to a local authority would apply to a company too.

10. The matters which stand finally concluded will, however, not be reopened.

25. In LARR Act-2013, the right of the Requiring Body to demand a reference in terms of section 64 has been curtailed as was the position earlier also as per proviso to Section 50 of Act 1894. However, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering the analogous provisions which were contained in Section 50(2) of Act of 1894, it has been held that the company for whom the land was acquired stands on the same footing as a local authority, the grant of limited opportunity to the respondent No. 4 to appear and object to determination of compensation does not seems to be unjustified.

26. Learned counsel for the appellant had also argued that right cannot be given to the respondent No. 4 to appear at every stage of acquisition proceedings but even if they are held to be Requiring Body, then also as per Section 95 and other provisions of LARR Act-2013 they can only appear

and object and tender evidence at appropriate stage. There is no quarrel to this proposition that the respondent No. 4 can appear and raise objection only in the manner the same has been permitted as per Scheme of LARR Act-2013. The respondent No. 4 has been held by us to be a Requiring Body and the learned single Judge has only allowed the representative of the respondent No. 4 to remain on spot at the time of inspection without being part of the team which will conduct the enquiry. Further liberty has been given to raise objection to any false and fictitious claim made by the claimant. Obviously these objections are to be made before the concerned authority which determines the compensation at the time of determination of compensation and no right has been given to raise objection at the spot. By granting liberty to the respondent No. 4 to remain present at the time of inspection of spot, only an opportunity has been given to respondent No. 4 that may be utilized to visit the spot, take photographs/videos, draw maps, watch the manner in which survey/inspection is being carried out, etc. which will enable it to effectively object to the spot inspection report when it may be produced before the authority concerned at the time of determination of compensation. Therefore, the limited liberty that has been granted by the learned Single Judge to the respondent No. 4 does not appear to be something granted which is beyond the provisions of scheme of LARR Act- 2013.

27. Resultantly, finding no merits in the present appeal, the same stands dismissed.

(SURESH KUMAR KAIT) (VIVEK JAIN) CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE Nks/MISHRA