Madhya Pradesh High Court
Hanumant Singh vs Jokham Singh on 4 October, 2024
Author: Anil Verma
Bench: Anil Verma
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:17604
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL VERMA
ON THE 4 th OF OCTOBER, 2024
MISC. PETITION No. 3895 of 2024
HANUMANT SINGH
Versus
JOKHAM SINGH
Appearance:
Shri Anil Kumar Jain and Shri Pradeep Kumar Shrivastava, learned
counsel for the petitioners.
ORDER
Heard at the motion hearing stage.
Petitioner has preferred this petition under Article 227 of Constitution
of India being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 12.3.2024 passed by
District Judge, Raghogarh, District Guna in MCA No.5/2019 (Annexure P-1)
and order dated 4.10.2017 passed by Civil Judge, Class-I, Raghogarh,
District Guna in Execution Case No.213/97 whereby petitioner's execution
petition has been dismissed being time barred and miscellaneous appeal has
also been dismissed on the same ground.
Learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner has filed civil
suit on 25.6.1996 for decree of specific performance and permanent
injunction and trial Court has decreed the suit on 11.9.1998 and petitioner
has filed execution petition on 4.7.2016 before execution Court but petition
has been dismissed and vide order dated 4.10.2017 (Annexure P-2). He has
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preferred miscellaneous appeal before Appellate Court and same has been
dismissed vide order dated 12.3.2024(Annexure P-1). Petitioner remained in
jail incarceration vide order (Annexure P-9). Therefore, petitioner could not
file execution proceeding at the earlier stage. Therefore, delay in filing the
execution petition be condoned.
From perusal of petition and Annexure P-1 and Annexure P-2 and
copy of judgment and decree, it appears that petitioner's suit has been
initially decided on 11.9.1998 vide judgment (Annexure P-4) and
Decree(Annexure P-5). He has preferred execution proceeding after a lapse
of more than 21 years. As per Article 135 of Limitation Act, the limitation
period prescribed is of three years from the date of passing of decree for
filing the execution petition but it has been filed after a lapse of 21 years.
Period spent in jail by petitioner is not related with the impugned judgment
and decree, therefore, it cannot be made a ground for exemption of said
period.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Majji Sannemma @
Sanyasirao Vs. Reddy Sridevi and others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC
1260 in has held as under:-
"
18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran (supra), while
refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed
that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even
appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of
delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is
further observed that the law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts
have no power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. It is further observed that while
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exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court
has to exercise discretion judiciousy."
6. Hon'ble the Apex Court again in the case of Basawaraj and Another
Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81 in
paragraph No.12 has held as under:-
"12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has
to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing
from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has
no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation." The
statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no
choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the
law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute."
7. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and on
perusal of the condonation of delay application, it appears that it is the duty
of the petitioner to explain reasons for day-to-day delay in not filing this
contempt petition within time, but the petitioner has failed to prove huge
delay of 21 years. The reason assigned by the petitioner does not appear to
be bonafide and this cannot be considered as sufficient cause for delay.
Therefore, this contempt petition is time barred and such a huge delay cannot
be condoned.
8. Consequently, this petition is dismissed being time barred.
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C.C. as per rules.
(ANIL VERMA)
JUDGE
