Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rajendra Prasad Chourey (Dead) Through ... vs Union Of India on 4 October, 2024
Author: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
Bench: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, Anuradha Shukla
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:50959
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND
DHARMADHIKARI
&
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
WRIT PETITION No. 10134 of 2023
Rajendra Prasad Chourey (dead) through LRs
Chitralekha Chourey & Others
Versus
Union of India & Others
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Appearance :
Smt. June Choudhari, Senior Advocate with Shri Shikhar Jat - Advocate
for the petitioners.
Shri Siddharth Singh Chouhan - Advocate for the
respondent/University.
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Reserved on : 24.09.2024
Pronounced on : 04.10.2024
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ORDER
Per: Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the matter is
heard finally.
2. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioner has assailed the order dated 17.04.2023 passed by the respondent
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no.3 whereby, the order of dismissal dated 10.07.2000 is maintained after
affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was initially
appointed as a Casual Labour in the year 1982 in the respondent
establishment. The petitioner possessed the qualification of Mechanical
I.T.I. He was regularized in March, 1983 on Class-IV post as a Mechanic.
Thereafter, in the year 1985, he was promoted as Technician Grade -III. In
1987, he was again promoted as Technician Grade-II. In September, 1994,
some family dispute arose which lead to registration of a criminal case
under Section 307 of IPC against the petitioner and he was kept in police
custody for more than 48 hours. The petitioner was found guilty and was
sentenced for three years of rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.500/-
by the Sessions Court, Hoshangabad in Criminal Case No.60/1995 vide
order dated 07.06.2000. As a result, the petitioner was dismissed from
service w.e.f. 10.07.2000 under Rule 9 of the M.P. Civil Rules
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. (hereinafter referred to
as 'Rules of 1965').
Against the order dated 07.06.2000 passed by the Sessions Judge,
Hoshangabad, the petitioner had approached this Court by filing Criminal
Appeal No.1509/2000 and the same was also dismissed. Being further
aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Apex Court in Criminal Appeal
No.2126/2011. The Apex Court, vide order dated 16.11.2011, upheld the
conviction recorded by the Courts below and reduced the sentenced
awarded to the sentence already undergone by the petitioner.
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5. Further, the petitioner challenged the order of dismissal before the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur in O.A. No.401/2012 which was
later on withdrawn with liberty to approach this Court. The petitioner
thereafter, preferred a Writ Petition No.1605/2018 before this Court on the
ground that principle of natural justice was not followed. This Court, vide
order dated 21.07.2023, quashed the order of dismissal dated 10.07.2000,
directing the disciplinary authority to afford reasonable opportunity of
hearing to petitioner and thereafter, pass a reasoned and speaking order in
accordance with law, keeping in mind that punishment under Rule 9 need
not be removal or dismissal from service but can be of lesser major
penalty.
6. In pursuance to the order passed by this Court, the disciplinary
authority, vide its order dated 17.04.2023, after granting reasonable
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, maintained the order of dismissal
on the ground that the Apex Court, in the case of Hikmat Ali Khan vs.
Ishwar Prasad Arya, AIR 1997 SCC 864 and also in the case of
Raghvendra Kumar vs. Prabal Kumar 2014 (13) SCC 354, has
specifically held that conviction under Section 307 of IPC would amount
to moral turpitude. Moreover, the petitioner had suppressed the vital
information with regard to his conviction, therefore, suppression of vital
information would render the appointment of the petitioner invalid.
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this present writ petition
challenging the order impugned dated 17.04.2023.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the action of the
disciplinary authority in rejecting the oral request of the petitioner with
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regard to quantum of punishment is per-se illegal, arbitrary, unjust and
unreasonable and thus, the same is liable to the set aside. The respondents
have failed to assign any reason for not considering the question of
quantum of penalty and have totally ignored the observations made by the
Court that some lesser punishment may also be imposed. The petitioner
ought to have been reinstated in service by imposing a lesser punishment
other than termination/dismissal/removal. As a consequence, the petitioner
is also entitled for backwages for the period he remained out of service.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed
the prayer and submitted that the petitioner has rightly been dismissed
from service since he stood convicted under Section 307 of IPC. In
Hikmat Ali Khan (supra) and Raghvendra Kumar (supra), the Apex Court
has already held that conviction under Section 307 of IPC would amount to
moral turpitude. It is for the employer to appoint or not to appoint a person
who had committed an offence which falls within the definition of moral
turpitude. To support his contention, learned counsel for the respondents
has relied upon various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
9. The Apex Court in the case of RBI vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal
(1994) 1 SCC 541 had specifically held that an Honourable acquittal is
when the accused is acquitted after fully considering the evidence of the
prosecution and the prosecution has miserably failed in proving the
charges against accused, and in the instant case, there has been a
compromise, and the Petitioner was granted acquittal not because the
prosecution failed to prove the charges against the Petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt, but only because a compromise was reached between the
accused and the prosecution.
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10. The Apex Court in the case of Avatar Singh vs. Union of India &
Ors. (2016) 8 SCC 471 has held that the employer can consider
antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. It is
submitted that for appointment in police force, a person of an impeccable
character and utmost honesty is required. Two criminal cases were
registered against the petitioner and both the criminal cases resulted in
acquittal only on the ground that in both criminal cases, complainant had
decided to enter into a compromise. Therefore, it is clear that acquittal of
petitioner was not honourable. Honourable acquittal is only when, the
accused is fully absolved from the alleged charges against him. The same
was also reiterated by this court in the case of Deepak Vishnoi Vs The
State of MP & 4 Others WP No. 20686 of 2023.
The Apex Court in the case of Avatar Singh (supra) has also laid
down various parameters which are summarized as under :-
I. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction,
acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or
after entering into service must be true and there should be no
suppression or false mention of required information.
II. Where conviction has been recorded in a case which is not trivial
in nature, the employer may cancel candidature or terminate services
of the employee.
III. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral
turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground
and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt
has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts
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available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to
the continuance of the employee.
11. The Apex Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Singhal Vs. Regional
Manager, Punjab National Bank, 2010 (8) SCC 573, postulated the
definition of Moral Turpitude in the following words:
24. In view of the above, it is evident that moral turpitude means
anything contrary to honesty, modesty or good morals. It means
vileness and depravity. In fact, the conviction of a person in a crime
involving moral turpitude impeaches his credibility as he has been
found to have indulged in shameful, wicked, and base activities.
Further, Moral Turpitude means [Per Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edn.,
2004)] :-
"Conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. In the area
of legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude such as fraud or
breach of trust. Also termed moral depravity."
12. Further, in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Love Kush Meena,
(2021) 8 SCC 774, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that:
23. The mere fact of an acquittal would not suffice but rather it
would depend on whether it is a clean acquittal based on total
absence of evidence or in the criminal jurisprudence requiring the
case to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, that parameter having
not been met, benefit of doubt has been granted to the accused.
13. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Rule 9 of the
Rules of 1965 confers power on the disciplinary authority to consider the
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circumstances of the case and pass such orders there on as it deems fit. On
these grounds, learned counsel for the respondents pray for dismissal of the
writ petition.
14. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
15. On perusal of the impugned order dated 17.04.2023, it can be very
well seen that the respondent authorities have granted reasonable
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and thereafter, passed a reasoned
and speaking order following directions contained in Avatar Singh (supra)
case and also gave reasons for not reinstating the petitioner and have
rejected the prayer for imposition of lesser penalty other than termination/
dismissal/removal.
16. The Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi
and another vs. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685 has held that :-
23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the
Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved in
grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if they
are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or discharge is
on technical grounds or not honourable. The Screening Committee
will be within its rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it
finds that the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct
of the prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses turning
hostile. It is only experienced officers of the Screening Committee
who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged
candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more
strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police force. The
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Screening Committee will have to consider the nature and extent of
such person involvement in the crime and his propensity of
becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation rather
than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi
Police does not merit any interference from this Court as its object
appears to be to ensure that only persons with impeccable character
enter the police force.
17. Taking clue from the aforesaid judgments, this Court can very well
conclude that it is the entire discretion of the appointing authority to
appoint or not to appoint a person who is involved in an offence involving
moral turpitude even if that person is acquitted giving him benefit of doubt
etc., it would not automatically entitled him for the employment. The
disciplinary authority having exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with
law and after giving full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, it cannot
be said that he has committed any mistake in rejecting the candidature of
the petitioner. Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
18. Accordingly, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as
to cost(s).
Certified copy as per rules.
(SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI) (ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE JUDGE
Priya.P
Date: 2024.10.04 18:03:46 +05'30'
