Madhya Pradesh High Court
Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Dhar Through ... vs Prestige Agro Tech Limited Through ... on 28 May, 2024
Author: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
Bench: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND
DHARMADHIKARI
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GAJENDRA SINGH
ON THE 28th OF MAY, 2024
REVIEW PETITION No. 510 of 2024
BETWEEN:-
KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI DHAR THROUGH
SECRETARY KISHORE KUMAR S/O LT. MEHTAB
SINGH NARGANWE, AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: SERVICE KRISHI UPAJ MANDI
SAMITI DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI PRANAV MANDHANYA, ADVOCATE)
AND
PRESTIGE AGRO TECH LIMITED THROUGH
AUGHORISED SIGNATORY MRS VAISHALI W/O
1.
DILIP KHOPKAR 30, JAORA COMPOUND, MYH
ROAD, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
STATE OF M.P. THOUGH SECRETARY
GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT
2.
MANTRALAYA VALLABH BHAWAN, BHOPAL
(MADHYA PRADESH)
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR M.P. RAJYA KRISHI
3
VIPANAN BOARD INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI LAKSHMIBAI
4
NAGARR, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
2
M/S SAPNA ENTERPRISES 68, RAMGANJ,
5
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
M/S RAVI TRADERS 5/5, SAKET NAGAR, INDORE
6
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(NONE)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This review coming on for admission this day, Justice Sushrut
Arvind Dharmadhikari passed the following:
ORDER
Heard on the question of admission.
The instant review petition under Order 47 Rule (1) r/w Section 114
of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed seeking review of order
dated 03.01.2024 passed in W.A. No. 92/2007, whereby the writ appeal has
been allowed.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the Respondent No.1 was a
company carrying on the business of solvent extraction having factory at
Pithampur, Dhar and was a licensee of Mandi Samiti, Dhar. The
Respondent No. 1 purchased agriculture produce like soyabean from
various mandi samitis/ traders within the market area of M.P on which
mandi samiti is having legal right to levy mandi tax on every purchase of
agriculture produce within the area of M.P as per the provisions of Krishi
Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam.
3. The respondent No. 1 purchased agriculture produce in the year
around 2001-02 from Indore and brought that produce in the market area
of Mandi Samity, Dhar and produce 74 market fee receipt which was
verified by the Mandi Samiti, Dhar from Indore Mandi which was found
forged from where the respondent No. 1 purchased the agriculture produce.
Thereafter, Mandi Samiti, Dhar cancelled the mandi license of respondent
No.1 which was challenged before this Court as W.P. No. 399/2003 which
was dismissed vide order dated 19.11.2003. Thereafter, Respondent No. 1
challenged the final order passed in W.P. No. 399/2003 as LPA No.
273/2003 in which the Court passed interim order dated 25.02.2004 to
deposit the amount of Rs. 7,50,000/- before the mandi samiti, Dhar with a
condition that if appeal succeeds then the amount to be refunded to the
depositor. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present review petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that while passing the
impugned order this Court erred in interpreting the provisions of Section
19 of Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam. The fourth proviso of Section 19(2)
of Mandi Adhiniyam which clearly states that if agriculture produce
brought in the market area for commercial transaction of for processing the
tax shall be paid by the buyer or processor if the buyer or processor does
not produce the permit issued under Sub-section 19(6). He further
submitted that the Respondent No. 1 was involved in the business of
processing so he was covered as per the proviso of Section 19(2) of Mandi
Adhiniyam.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the
Respondent No.1 brought in the market area of Dhar with a permit which
was found to be forged as per the verification report of Mandi Samiti,
Indore which proves that respondent No.1's tax liability is covered under
the proviso of Section 19(2).
6. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
7. Section 114 of the CPC which is the substantive provision, deals
with the scope of review and states as follows:-
"Review:- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering
himself aggrieved:-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed
by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred;
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed
by this Code; or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the court
which passed the decree or made the order, and the court
may make such order thereon as it thinks fit."
8. The grounds available for filing a review application against a
judgment have been set out in Order XLVII of the CPC in the following
words:
"1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but
from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not
within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the
time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account
of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or
for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the
decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a
review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or
made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or Order may
apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of
an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such
appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when,
being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case
on which he applies for the review.
1[Explanation-The fact that the decision on a question of law on
which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or
modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any
other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such
judgment.] "
9. A glance at the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that a review
application would be maintainable on (i) discovery of new and important
matters or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, were not within
the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him when the
decree was passed or the order made; (ii) on account of some mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient
reason.
10. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others
reported in 1980 Supp SCC 562, The Apex Court observed that a review
of an earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that the
material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in
miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made
are as under:
"12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear
Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been
hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order
unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order,
undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In
Sow Chandra Kante and Another v. Sheikh Habib reported in
(1975) 1 SCC 674, this Court observed :
'A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant
resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or
patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier
by judicial fallibility. The present stage is not a virgin
ground but review of an earlier order which has the
normal feature of finality.'"
(emphasis added)
11. In Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others reported
in (1997) 8 SCC 715, stating that an error that is not self- evident and the
one thathas to be detected by the process of reasoning, cannot be described
as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise the
powers of review, the Apex Court held as under:
"7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly
confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.1reported in 1964
SCR (5) 174, this Court opined:
'11. What, however, we are now concerned with is
whether the statement in the order of September 1959
that the case did not involve any substantial question of
law is an 'error apparent on the face of the record'. The
fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an
identical state of facts that a substantial question of law
arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier
order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the
statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an
'error apparent on the face of the record', for there is a
distinction which is real, though it might not always be
capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous
decision and a decision which could be characterized as
vitiated by 'error apparent'. A review is by no means an
appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is
reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.'
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury
reported in (1995) 1 SCC 170, while quoting with approval a
passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak
Sharma reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389, this Court once again held
that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be
strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review
inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of
the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be
detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an
error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to
exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
exercise of this jurisdiction under Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is not
permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and
corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited
purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'".
[emphasis added]
12. The error referred to under the Rule, must be apparent on the face of
the record and not one which has to be searched out. While discussing the
scope and ambit of Article 137 that empowers the Supreme Court to
review its judgments and in the course of discussing the contours of review
jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC in Lily
Thomas(supra), the Apex Court held:-
"54. Article 137 empowers this court to review its judgments subject
to the
provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under
Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in
exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe
that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in
Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:
"1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed,
but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed,
or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be
produced by him at the time when the decree was passed
or order made, or on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record, or for any other
sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree
passed or order made against him, may apply for a review
of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made
the order.'
Under Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies
except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in
criminal cases. Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides
that after an application for review has been disposed of no further
application shall be entertained in the same matter.
XXX XXX XXX
56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for
correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can
be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise
of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The
mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for
review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of
review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of
the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views
by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be
followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers
under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon
satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of
fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other
statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.
XXX XXX XXX
58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order XL of
the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil
Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed
before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the
judgment in the case of Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and
Others v. Union of India and others reported in (1995) 3 SCC
635. It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered
any new and important matter which after the exercise of due
diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought
to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment.
All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on
behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after
considering those pleas, passed the judgment in the case of
Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and Others v. Union of
India and others reported in (1995) 3 SCC 635. We have also
not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record
requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be
such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error
which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of
inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned
counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment.
The only arguments advanced were that the judgment
interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the
fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for
reviewing the judgment. The words "any-other sufficient reason
appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC" must mean "a reason
sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the
rule" as was held in Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram reported in AIR
1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar
Basselios Catholicos. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius
reported in 1955 SCR 520. Error apparent on the face of the
proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or
disregard of the provisions of law. in T.C. Basappa v. T.
Nagappa reported in 1955 SCR 250 this Court held that such
error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong
decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad reported in AIR
1955 SC 233, it was held:
"It is essential that it should be something more than a
mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on
the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference
to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of
the principle as in its application to the facts of a
particular case. When does an error, cease to be mere
error and become an error apparent on the face of the
record? Learned Counsel on either side were unable to
suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between
the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr. Pathak
for the first respondent contended on the strength of
certain observations of Chagla, CJ in - 'Batuk K Vyas v.
Surat Borough Municipality reported in ILR 1953 Bom
191, that no error could be said to be apparent on the face
of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an
examination or argument to establish it. This test might
afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of
cases. But there must be cases in which even this test
might break down, because judicial opinions also differ,
and an error that might be considered by one Judge as
self-evident might not be so considered by another. The
fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the
record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there
being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very
nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on
the facts of each case. Therefore, it can safely be held that
the petitioners have not made out
any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with
Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule
1 CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case.
The petition is misconceived and bereft of any
substance."
(emphasis added)
13. It is also settled law that in exercise of review jurisdiction, the Court
cannot re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion even if
two views are possible in a matter. In Kerala State Electricity Board v.
Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and Others reported in
(2005) 6 SCC 651, the Apex Court observed as follows:
10. ....In a review petition it is not open to this Court to
reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even
if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best sought
to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the
parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We
are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced
in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is
fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation
of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and
reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a
review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent
on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has
not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on
the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue
on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to
converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise."
(emphasis added)
14. Under the garb of filing a review petition, a party cannot be
permitted to repeat old and overruled arguments for reopening the
conclusions arrived at in a judgment. The power of review is not to be
confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior Court to
correct errors committed by a subordinate Court. This point has been
elucidated in Jain Studios Ltd. V. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. reported
in (2006) 5 SCC 501, where it was held thus:
"11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is
concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in
submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief
which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter
and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused,
no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of
the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review
cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a
superior court to correct all errors committed by a
subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter.
A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to
reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can
be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection
and only in exceptional cases.
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant
herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition
was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by
an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in
my opinion, is in the nature of 'second innings' which is
impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted."
(emphasis added)
15. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in
Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320,
the Apex Court observed that review proceedings have to be strictly
confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as
the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been
dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned
judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for
exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned
case as below:
"20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of
review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within
knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by
him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" has been
interpreted in Chajju Ram vs. Neki17, and approved by
this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most
Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors.18 to mean "a reason
sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified
in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in
Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.
& Ors reported in (2013) 8 SCC 337,.
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: -
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not
enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the
original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error,
manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness
or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby
an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies
only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject
cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should
not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within
the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to
be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief
sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been
negatived."
16. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma reported
in (1979) 4 SCC 389, the Apex Court was examining an order passed by
the Judicial Commissioner who was reviewing an earlier judgment that
went in favour of the appellant, while deciding a review application filed
by the respondents therein who took a ground that the predecessor Court
had overlooked two important documents that showed that the respondents
were in possession of the sites through which the appellant had sought
easementary rights to access his home- stead. The said appeal was allowed
by this Court with the following observations:
"3 ...It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh and
Others v. State of Punjab reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389 there
is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High
Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in
every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of
justice or to correct grave and pulpable errors committed by it.
But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of
review. The power of review may be exercised on the
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence was not within the
knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be
produced by him at the time when the order was made; it
may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on
the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on
any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the
ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That
would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of
review is not to be confused with appellate power which may
enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors
committed by the subordinate court."
(emphasis added)
17. In State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Sengupta and
Another reported in (2008) 8 SCC 612, the Apex Court emphasized the
requirement of the review petitioner who approaches a Court on the
ground of discovery of a new matter or evidence, to demonstrate that the
same was not within his knowledge and held thus:
"21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is
sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence,
such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a
character that if the same had been produced, it might have
altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or
important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review
ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has
also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not
within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due
diligence, the same could not be produced before the court
earlier."
(emphasis added)
18. In the captioned judgment, the term 'mistake or error apparent' has
been discussed in the following words:
"22. The term 'mistake or error apparent' by its very
connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from
the record of the case and does not require detailed
examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or
the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection
thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot
be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the
purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3) (f) of the Act.
To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot
be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the
ground that a different view could have been taken by the
court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while
exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned
cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision".
(emphasis added)
19. In S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another
reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595, the Apex Court explained as to when
a review jurisdiction could be treated as statutory or inherent and held
thus :
"18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the
rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way.
The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule
of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as
inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law
bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction
exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and
fairness. If the court finds that the order was passed under a
mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but
for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and
its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it
cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the
error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order.
Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of
rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root
from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice.
It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available
where the mistake is of the Court".
(emphasis added)
20. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others v. Shri Pradyuman
Singhji Arjunsinghji reported in (1971) 3 SCC 844, the Apex Court held
as follows:
"4..... It is well settled that the power to review is not an
inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically
or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was
brought to notice from which it could be gathered that the
Government had power to review its own order. If the
Government had no power to review its own order, it is
obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order.
......"
(emphasis added)
21. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others v. Vinod Kumar
Rawat and Others reported in (2020) SCC Online SC 896, citing
previous decisions and expounding on the scope and ambit of Section 114
read with Order XLVII Rule 1, the Apex Court has observed that Section
114 CPC does not lay any conditions precedent for exercising the power of
review; and nor does the Section prohibit the Court from exercising its
power to review a decision. However, an order can be reviewed by the
Court only on the grounds prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The
said power cannot be exercised as an inherent power and nor can appellate
power be exercised in the guise of exercising the power of review.
22. In our considered opinion, none of the grounds available for
successfully seeking review as recognized by Order 47 Rule 1 CPC are
made out in the present case. The Apex Court in the case of S. Bhagirathi
Amaal Vs. Palani Roman (2009) 10 SCC 464 has held that in order to
seek review, it has to be demonstrated that the order suffers from an error
contemplated under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC which is apparent on the face of
record and not an error which is to be fished out and searched. A decision
or order cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous.
23. In another case, the Apex Court in case of State of West Bengal Vs.
Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8 SCC 612 has held that "a party cannot be
permitted to argue de novo in the garb of review."
24. On perusal of the record and in the light of the judgments passed in
the case of S. Bhagirathi Amaal and State of West Bengal (supra), there
is no error apparent on the face of record warranting interference in the
order impugned.
25. The review petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
(S.A. DHARMADHIKARI) (GAJENDRA SINGH)
JUDGE JUDGE
Vatan
VATAN SHRIVASTAVA
2024.05.29 18:38:09 +05'30'
