Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bhaskardutt Dwivedi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 22 May, 2024
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1 W.P. No.13236/2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
A T JA B A L P U R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
ON THE 22nd OF MAY, 2024
WRIT PETITION No. 13236 of 2024
BETWEEN:-
BHASKARDUTT DWIVEDI, S/O
HRISHIKESH DWIVEDI, AGED ABOUT 67
YEARS, OCCUPATION RETIRED
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE, R/O
VILLAGE KULBAHERIYA, POLICE
STATION MAUGANJ, TEHSIL MAUGANJ,
DISTRICT MAUGANJ (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI CHANDRAHAS DUBEY- ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
THROUGH SECRETARY,
PANCHAYAT AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT,
VALLABH BHAWAN, BHOPAL
(MADHYA PRADESH)
2. COLLECTOR, DISTRICT MAUGANJ
(MADHYA PRADESH)
3. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
JANPAD PANCHAYAT MAUGANJ,
DISTRICT MAUGANJ (MADHYA
PRADESH)
4. EXECUTIVE OFFICER, JANPAD
PANCHAYAT, MAUGANJ, DISTRICT
2 W.P. No.13236/2024
MAUGANJ (MADHYA PRADESH)
5. GRAM PANCHAYAT,
KULBEHERIYA, THROUGH THE
SECRETARY, GRAM PANCHAYAT
KULEHERIYA, TEHSIL AND
DISTRICT MAUGANJ (MADHYA
PRADESH)
6. SADHNA SINGH, W/O UDAYNAAYAN
SINGH, AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: SARPANCH, R/O
GRAM PANCHAYAT KULBEHERIYA,
TEHSIL AND DISTRICT MAUGANJ
(MADHYA PRADESH)
7. ARJUN SINGH BAGHEL, S/O
SANTOSH SINGH BAGHEL,
OCCUPATION: GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR, R/O VILLAGE
GARHCAP, TEHSIL AND P.S.
MANIKPUR, DISTRICT
CHITRAKOOT (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(SMT. SWATI ASEEM GEORGE- DEPUTY ADVOCATE GENERAL AND SHRI
MOHAN SAUSARKAR- GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR THE
RESPONDENT/STATE)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This petition coming on for admission this day, the court passed the
following:
ORDER
Shri Manoj Kumar Dwivedi- Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa
Division, Rewa is present in person on his own.
2. This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been
filed seeking the following reliefs:-
(i) The Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct
the Respondent no 2 to take expedious steps in
deciding the representation dated 05.09.2023
(Annexure P-5) within a stipulated period and take
necessary steps in relation to the same, in the
interest of justice.
(ii) Any further be pleased to issue any other
writ/order relief(s)/direction(s) which this Hon'ble
Court deem fit and proper may also be given in the
interest of justice.
3. It is the case of petitioner that respondents are constructing a road
on a part of his private land and the said act of the respondents is
contrary to the constitutional right as enshrined under Article 300-A of
Constitution of India as well as human right and the State cannot
encroach upon the land belonging to the private individual without
acquiring the same under Land Acquisition Act.
4. On 20.05.2024, the State Government was directed to seek
instructions in the matter and accordingly order dated 20.05.2024 was
passed which reads as under:-
"Allegation of the petitioner is that without
acquiring the land, respondents no. 6 and 7 are
trying to put soil on the petitioner's land for the
purposes of building a road under the Pradhan
Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna.
Counsel for the State is granted a day's time
to seek instructions in the matter.
List on 21.5.2024."
5. Thereafter, on 21.05.2024 it was fairly conceded by counsel for
the respondents that a road is being constructed on a part of a private
land belonging to the petitioner but it was also submitted by counsel for
the respondents that the road was in existence for last 40-50 years and
now new road is being constructed and filling has also been done.
6. Accordingly, the counsel for respondents was directed to address
on the question as to whether this Court after applying the principle of
adverse possession can dismiss the petition on the ground of delay and
laches because right to property is a constitutional right under Article
300-A of Constitution of India and passed the following orders:-
"It is submitted by Smt. Swati Aseem
George that instructions have been taken and some
private land is also involved in construction of the
road. It is submitted that road was in existence for
the last 40-50 years and now new road is being
constructed and filling has also been done.
Accordingly, counsel for respondents is
directed to address this question as to whether this
Court after applying the principle of adverse
possession can dismiss this petition on the ground
of delay and laches because right to property is a
Constitutional right under Article 300-A of
Constitution of India and in the light of judgment
passed by Supreme Court in the case of Kolkata
Municipal Corporation & Anr. Vs. Bimal
Kumar Shah & Ors decided on 16/05/2024 in
Civil Appeal No.6466 of 2024, whether the act of
respondents in illegally dispossessing the
petitioner by constructing a new road can be
upheld?
Counsel for the respondents prays for a day's
time to address on this issue.
As prayed, list on 22/05/2024.
Since it has been admitted by State counsel
that some part of the road is being constructed
over the private land belonging to the petitioner,
therefore further construction on the land
belonging to the petitioner is hereby stayed till
further orders and the private land shall not be
used for road purposes."
7. When the case was taken up, this Court enquired from Smt. Swati
Aseem George, counsel for the State as to whether the interim order
passed by this Court on 21.05.2024 has been complied with or not and
whether the road which is under construction on the private land of the
petitioner has been blocked or not?
8. It was submitted by Smt. Swati Aseem George, Deputy
Government Advocate that yesterday she has communicated to the
responsible officers and she hopes and believes that the officers must
have carried out the interim order granted on 21.05.2024 and must have
blocked the road. However, Smt. Swati Aseem George on her own
submitted that Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer,
PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa is present in the Court.
9. Accordingly, it was enquired from Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi,
Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa as to whether the
interim order dated 21.05.2024 has been complied with or not?
10. It was submitted by Shri Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi,
Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa that it is true that road
is being constructed on a part of private land belonging to the petitioner
but it was submitted that the road is in existence for last 40-50 years and
it is being rebuilt but claimed that the said road is not being used but did
not make a statement that whether interim order has been complied with
or not?.
11. Considered the submissions made by Shri Manoj Kumar
Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa.
12. From the submissions made by Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi,
Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa, it is clear that the
interim order dated 21.05.2024 has not been complied with in spite of
the clear instructions given by the O/o Advocate General. Whether
commuters are using road or not is not the question but the real
controversy is whether the authorities have stopped the use of private
land or not?
13. It is really unfortunate that the civil servants are not realizing the
importance of O/o Advocate General which is a constitutional authority
and they are out and out to carry out their illegal activity as per their
own whims and wishes. On 21.05.2024, this Court had asked a specific
question to the State Counsel as to whether the State can claim adverse
possession against a private individual or not. However, Shri Manoj
Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa
who was aware of the question which has been formulated by this Court
by order dated 21.05.2024 has once again stuck to his original stand that
since the road was in existence for last 40-50 years, therefore, they are
not at fault.
14. It is submitted by Shri Mohan Sausarkar, Government Advocate
who was also sitting in the Court that since the question of ownership is
a disputed question of fact, therefore, what is the value of the land, what
is the location of the land, what is the area of the land, who is the actual
owner of the land cannot be adjudicated by this Court while exercising
power under Article 226 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the
petitioner may be directed to make a representation to the respondents
so that they can decide the same in accordance with law.
15. To buttress his contention, the counsel for respondents has also
relief upon a judgment passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the
case of Rajendra Singh Yadav Vs. The State of M.P. and Others,
decided on 19.03.2024 in W.P. No. 20491 of 2021 (Indore Bench). It is
further submitted by the State Counsel that so far as the statement made
by Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa
Division, Rewa is concerned, he does not know anything about the law
and, therefore, his statement may not be taken note of and the
respondents may be granted some time to file reply.
16. Heard learned counsel for parties.
17. On 21.05.2024, a categorical admission was made by counsel for
respondents that the private land is also involved in construction of a
road.
18. Once, the ownership of the petitioner has not been disputed by the
respondents and once they have not disputed that by encroaching upon
the land belonging to the petitioner they are constructing a road, then it
is suffice to mention here that admission is the best evidence and under
these circumstances, it cannot be said that any disputed question of fact
is involved in the present case.
19. So far as the submissions made by counsel for State that Shri
Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division,
Rewa has no legal knowledge and, therefore, they may be granted
sometime to file return is concerned, the said submission is shocking
even to the conscience of the Court.
20. If the State is of the view that their officers have no legal
knowledge, then it is a high time for the State to consider as to whether
such officers are to be retained in the service or not? How the State can
promote the violation of the constitutional rights of the citizens of the
country only on the ground that their officers have no legal knowledge?
21. Accordingly, the State Counsel was directed to justify the stand as
to how the State can take a defence that their officers are innocent as
they have no legal knowledge.
22. At this stage, it was submitted by counsel for State that in fact her
intention was not to submit that their officers have no legal knowledge
but it is submitted that her intention was to submit that he might not
have understood the question formulated by this Court.
23. The aforesaid explanation given by the State Counsel cannot be
accepted. At the beginning of the arguments, it was submitted by the
State Counsel that they have issued instructions to the respondents and
have communicated about the interim order dated 21.05.2024 and the
State Counsel was sure that the officers must have complied that order
but once, Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD,
Rewa Division, Rewa made a statement in the open Court that the road
is already in existence for last 40-50 years and merely a new road is
being constructed, then it is clear that in spite of the clear
communication by the A.G. Office to the Executive Engineer regarding
question which was formulated by this Court, the Executive Engineer,
PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa is still is of an adamant view that once the
road is situated over the land in dispute for the last 40-50 years, then
State has acquired title and, therefore, they can construct the road.
24. Accordingly, the explanation given by Smt. Swati Aseem George
that the Executive Engineer had might have failed to understand the
question formulated by this Court is nothing but a very weak attempt to
save their officers who according to the State itself are incompetent
having no knowledge of law.
25. Now the next question for consideration is as to whether the State
can claim adverse possession against the private individuals or not?
26. The question is no more res integra. The Supreme Court in the
case of Vidya Devi Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others,
reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held as under:-
"12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated
of her property in 1967, when the right to property
was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31
in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31
guaranteed the right to private property [State of
W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose, (1953) 2 SCC 688 :
AIR 1954 SC 92] , which could not be deprived
without due process of law and upon just and fair
compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-
Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it
continued to be a human right [Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC
(Civ) 491] in a welfare State, and a constitutional
right under Article 300-A of the Constitution.
Article 300-A provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.
The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay
compensation, though not expressly included in
Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [K.T.
Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9
SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414]
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his
private property, without following due process of
law, would be violative of a human right, as also
the constitutional right under Article 300-A of the
Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment
in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius
Shapur Chenai [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn.
Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627]
, wherein this Court held that: (SCC p. 634, para 6)
"6. ... Having regard to the provisions
contained in Article 300-A of the
Constitution, the State in exercise of its
power of "eminent domain" may
interfere with the right of property of a
person by acquiring the same but the
same must be for a public purpose
and reasonable compensation therefor
must be paid."
(emphasis supplied)
12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna
Reddy [N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy,
(2008) 15 SCC 517] , this Court held that: (SCC p.
526, para 21)
"21. If the right of property is a
human right as also a constitutional
right, the same cannot be taken away
except in accordance with law. Article
300-A of the Constitution protects such
right. The provisions of the Act seeking
to divest such right, keeping in view
of the provisions of Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India, must be strictly
construed."
(emphasis supplied)
12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State
of U.P. [Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of
U.P., (2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673]
, this Court recognised the right to property as a
basic human right in the following words: (SCC p.
379, para 30)
"30. It is accepted in every
jurisprudence and by different political
thinkers that some amount of property
right is an indispensable safeguard
against tyranny and economic
oppression of the Government. Jefferson
was of the view that liberty cannot long
subsist without the support of property.
"Property must be secured, else liberty
cannot subsist" was the opinion of John
Adams. Indeed the view that property
itself is the seed-bed which must be
conserved if other constitutional values
are to flourish, is the consensus among
political thinkers and jurists."
(emphasis supplied)
12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat [Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596] , this Court held
as follows: (SCC p. 627, para 48)
"48. ... In other words, Article 300-A
only limits the powers of the State that
no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law. There
has to be no deprivation without any
sanction of law. Deprivation by any
other mode is not acquisition or taking
possession under Article 300-A. In other
words, if there is no law, there is no
deprivation."
(emphasis supplied)
12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have
been forcibly dispossessed of her property without
any legal sanction, and without following due
process of law, and depriving her payment of just
compensation, being a fundamental right on the
date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the
appellant or her predecessors had "orally"
consented to the acquisition is completely
baseless. We find complete lack of authority and
legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the
appellant of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the
rule of law, the State could not have deprived a
citizen of their property without the sanction of
law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this
Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram
Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1
SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it was held that the State
must comply with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode. The State being a welfare State governed by
the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status
beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of
Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [State of
Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right to
property is now considered to be not only a
constitutional or statutory right, but also a human
right. Human rights have been considered in the
realm of individual rights such as right to shelter,
livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights
have gained a multi-faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by
the State before the High Court, that since it has
been in continuous possession of the land for over
42 years, it would tantamount to "adverse"
possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot
be permitted to take the plea of adverse
possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person
guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title
over such property for over 12 years. The State
cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land
by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to
grab the property of its own citizens, as has been
done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of
delay and laches of the appellant in moving the
Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches
cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of
action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial
conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a
matter of judicial discretion, which must be
exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts
and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon
the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy
claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There
is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts
to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do
substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is
so compelling, a constitutional court would
exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote
justice, and not defeat it. [P.S.
Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152
: 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]
12.14. In Tukaram Kana
Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC,
(2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] , this
Court while dealing with a similar fact situation,
held as follows: (SCC p. 359, para 11)
"11. There are authorities which state
that delay and laches extinguish the right
to put forth a claim. Most of these
authorities pertain to service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for
a wrong done to them decades ago,
recovery of statutory dues, claim for
educational facilities and other categories
of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true
that there are a few authorities that lay
down that delay and laches debar a
citizen from seeking remedy, even if his
fundamental right has been violated,
under Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution, the case at hand deals with
a different scenario altogether. The
functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the
appellants without any sanction of law.
The appellants had asked repeatedly for
grant of the benefit of compensation. The
State must either comply with the
procedure laid down for acquisition, or
requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode."
27. Thus, it is clear that the State cannot take the defence of adverse
possession against an individual. Surprisingly, the Advocate General
Office is well aware of the law laid down by Supreme Court and in spite
of clear communication by the A.G. Office to the Officers about the law
as well as the question formulated by this Court and the interim order
granted by this Court, Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive
Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa is adamant to say that since the
road is in existence for last 40-50 years, therefore, they are right in
constructing a new road by raising the height of the road. This attitude is
the height of the arbitrariness and mala fide action on the part of Shri
Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division,
Rewa.
28. Thus, it is clear that the attitude of Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi,
Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa is not indicative of
lack of knowledge but it is indicative of the hostile attitude towards the
law citizens of the state as well as the authority of the Court.
29. The Chief Secretary State of Madhya Pradesh is directed to take
immediate action against Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive
Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa for having his hostile attitude in
spite of the clear instructions issued by the O/o Advocate General and in
spite of the interim order granted by this Court.
30. The Supreme Court in the case of Kolkata Municipal
Corporation & Anr. Vs. Bimal Kumar Shah, decided on 16.05.2024
in Civil Appeal No. 6466 of 2024 has held as under:-
"30. Following are the seven principles:
30.1. The Right to notice : (i) A prior notice
informing the bearer of the right that the State
intends to deprive them of the right to property is a
right in itself; a linear extension of the right to know
embedded in Article 19(1)(a). The Constitution does
not contemplate acquisition by ambush. The notice
to acquire must be clear, cogent and meaningful.
Some of the statutes reflect this right.
(ii) Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Section 3(1) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition
of Immovable Property Act, 1952, Section 11 of
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013, and Section 3A of the National Highways
Act, 1956 are examples of such statutory
incorporation of the right to notice before initiation
of the land acquisition proceedings.
(iii) In a large number of decisions, our
constitutional courts have independently recognised
the right to notice before any process of acquisition
is commenced.
30.2. The Right to be heard: (i) Following the
right to a meaningful and effective prior notice of
acquisition, is the right of the property-bearer to
communicate his objections and concerns to the
authority acquiring the property. This right to be
heard against the proposed acquisition must be
meaningful and not a sham.
(ii) Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Section 3(1) of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Section 15 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3C of
the National Highways Act, 1956, are some
statutory embodiments of this right.
(iii) Judicial opinions recognizing the importance
of this right are far too many to reproduce. Suffice
to say that that the enquiry in which a land holder
would raise his objection is not a mere formality.
30.3. The Right to a reasoned decision: i) That
the authorities have heard and considered the
objections is evidenced only through a reasoned
order. It is incumbent upon the authority to take an
informed decision and communicate the same to the
objector.
(ii) Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Section 3(2) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition
of Immovable Property Act, 1952, Section 19 of
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 and Section 3D of the National Highways
Act, 1956, are the statutory incorporations of this
principle.
(iii) Highlighting the importance of the
declaration of the decision to acquire, the Courts
have held that the declaration is mandatory, failing
which, the acquisition proceedings will cease to
have effect.
30.4. The Duty to acquire only for public
purpose: (i) That the acquisition must be for a
public purpose is inherent and an important fetter on
the discretion of the authorities to acquire. This
requirement, which conditions the purpose of
acquisition must stand to reason with the larger
constitutional goals of a welfare state and
distributive justice.
(ii) Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Sections 3(1) and 7(1) of the Requisitioning
and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Sections 2(1), 11(1), 15 (1) (b) and 19(1) of
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 and Section 3A(1) of the National
Highways Act, 1956 depict the statutory
incorporation of the public purpose requirement of
compulsory acquisition.
(iii) The decision of compulsory acquisition of
land is subject to judicial review and the Court will
examine and determine whether the acquisition is
related to public purpose. If the court arrives at a
conclusion that that there is no public purpose
involved in the acquisition, the entire process can be
set-aside. This Court has time and again reiterated
the importance of the underlying objective of
acquisition of land by the State to be for a public
purpose.
30.5. The Right of restitution or fair
compensation: (i) A person's right to hold and enjoy
property is an integral part to the constitutional right
under Article 300A. Deprivation or extinguishment
of that right is permissible only upon restitution, be
it in the form of monetary compensation,
rehabilitation or other similar means. Compensation
has always been considered to be an integral part of
the process of acquisition.
(ii) Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Sections 8 and 9 of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Section 23 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013, and
Sections 3G and 3H of the National Highways Act,
1956 are the statutory incorporations of the right to
restitute a person whose land has been compulsorily
acquired.
(iii) Our courts have not only considered that
compensation is necessary, but have also held that a
fair and reasonable compensation is the sine qua
non for any acquisition process.
30.6. The Right to an efficient and expeditious
process: (i) The acquisition process is traumatic for
more than one reason. The administrative delays in
identifying the land, conducting the enquiry and
evaluating the objections, leading to a final
declaration, consume time and energy. Further,
passing of the award, payment of compensation and
taking over the possession are equally time
consuming. It is necessary for the administration to
be efficient in concluding the process and within a
reasonable time. This obligation must necessarily
form part of Article 300A.
(ii) Sections 5A (1), 6, 11A, and 34 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 6 (1A) and 9 of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952, Sections 4(2), 7(4), 7(5),
11(5), 14, 15(1), 16 (1),
19(2), 25, 38(1), 60(4), 64 and 80 of the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 and Sections 3C(1), 3D(3) and 3E(1) of
the National Highways Act, 1956, prescribe for
statutory frameworks for the completion of
individual steps in the process of acquisition of land
within stipulated timelines.
(iii) On multiple occasions, upon failure to
adhere to the timelines specified in law, the courts
have set aside the acquisition proceedings.
30.7. The Right of conclusion: (i) Upon
conclusion of process of acquisition and payment of
compensation, the State takes possession of the
property in normal circumstances. The culmination
of an acquisition process is not in the payment of
compensation, but also in taking over the actual
physical possession of the land. If possession is not
taken, acquisition is not complete. With the taking
over of actual possession after the normal
procedures of acquisition, the private holding is
divested and the right, title and interest in the
property, along-with possession is vested in the
State. Without final vesting, the State's, or its
beneficiary's right, title and interest in the property
is inconclusive and causes lot of difficulties. The
obligation to conclude and complete the process of
acquisition is also part of Article 300A.
ii) Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Sections 4 and 5 of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Sections 37 and 38 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013, and Sections 3D and 3E of the National
Highways Act, 1956, statutorily recognise this right
of the acquirer.
iii) This step of taking over of possession has been a
matter of great judicial scrutiny and this Court has
endeavoured to construe the relevant provisions in a
way which ensures non-arbitrariness in this action
of the acquirer. For that matter, after taking over
possession, the process of land acquisition
concludes with the vesting of the land with the
concerned authority. The culmination of an
acquisition process by vesting has been a matter of
great importance. On this aspect, the courts have
given a large number of decisions as to the time,
method and manner by which vesting takes place."
31. Thus, the action of the respondents in constructing a road on the
private land of the petitioner is held to be unconstitutional, violative of
constitutional right of the petitioner as enshrined under Article 300-A of
Constitution of India as well as violative of his Human Rights.
32. Therefore, the respondents are directed to immediately remove the
road situated on the private land of the petitioner and submit the report
latest by tomorrow before the Registrar General of this Court.
33. So far as the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the
respondents decided by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
Rajendra Singh Yadav (supra) is concerned, this Court in exercise of
power under Article 226 of Constitution of India is not required to
decide the quantum of compensation. This can be done only by the land
acquisition officer, therefore, this Court is not required to consider the
location of the land, the existing market price of the land, the extent of
the private land encroached upon by the State Authorities.
34. Furthermore, in the case of Rajendra Singh Yadav (supra), the
Coordinate Bench has also held that such a petition cannot be dismissed
on the ground of delay and laches. Thus, a judgment relied upon by the
State Counsel is in fact against the state rather than supporting the cause
of the State.
35. Since, the respondents have illegally encroached upon the land
belonging to the petitioner and are raising construction of a road without
acquiring the same and in spite of the notices issued on 20.05.2024 and
in spite of interim order dated 21.05.2024 have not stopped the use of
land as a road, therefore, the respondents are directed to pay a mesne
profits at the rate of Rs.15,000/- per day to the petitioner till the road is
actually dismantled from the land belonging to the petitioner, or the land
is acquired.
36. Since, the said illegal activity of not complying the interim order
is of Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa
Division, Rewa, therefore, this Court would not like to put an additional
pressure on the public exchequer and, therefore, it is directed that mense
profits shall be recovered from the salary of Shri Manoj Kumar
Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa.
35. The Principal Secretary, PWD, State of Madhya Pradesh is
directed to submit his affidavit to the Registry of this Court clarifying
that how much mesne profit has been paid to the petitioner and whether
it has been deducted from the salary of Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi,
Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa or not and if the
mesne profit is not paid or said amount is not recovered from the salary
of Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa, then the Principal Secretary, PWD,
State of Madhya Pradesh shall also be under obligation to explain that
why no such action has been taken.
36. Let the report be filed latest by 31st of May, 2024.
37. With aforesaid observations, the petition is allowed with cost of
Rs.25,000/- to be deposited by Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi,
Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa within a period of one
month from today, failing which the Registrar General shall not only
initiate the proceeding for recovery of cost but shall also register a case
for Contempt of Court.
38. As already pointed out that Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi,
Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa had made a statement
that road is already in existence and it has not been blocked. However, it
was his contention that it is not being used as road.
39. Whether it was being used as road or not is a disputed question of
fact but once this Court by its interim order dated 21.05.2024 had
directed the respondents that the private land shall not be used for road
purposes, then it was obligatory on the part of Shri Manoj Kumar
Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa to ensure
that the hurdles are placed so that no one can encroach upon the private
land of the petitioner. In spite of the fact that the State Counsel was
under a misconstrued hope and believe that Shri Manoj Kumar
Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa must have
carried out their instructions about the stoppage of use of the private
land as road, surprisingly and shockingly Shri Manoj Kumar
Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa did not
listen even to the O/o Advocate General.
40. Since Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi, Executive Engineer, PWD,
Rewa Division, Rewa has violated the interim order dated 21.05.2024,
therefore, issue show cause notice to Shri Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi,
Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, Rewa as to why he may not
be punished for committing Contempt of Court by violating the order
dated 21.05.2024.
41. Office is directed to register a separate case for the said purposes
and list the said case after the notices are served.
(G.S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
AL
Date: 2024.05.22 19:01:05 +05'30'
