Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt Kiran Bai Thakur vs Vijay Kumar on 21 May, 2024
1
In The High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
At Jabalpur
Before
Hon'ble Shri Justice Duppala Venkata Ramana
On The 21st Of May, 2024
Misc. Appeal No. 6831 Of 2023
Between:-
1. Smt Kiran Bai Thakur W/O Late Shri Raju@
Rajendra Thakur, Aged About 27 Years, Occupation:
Housewife R/O Village Pala Post Singhpur Tahsil And
District Narsinghpur (Madhya Pradesh)
2. Deepak Thakur S/O Lt. Shri Raju @ Rajendra
Thakur, Aged About 9 Years, Occupation: Student,
Minor Through Natural Guardian Mother Smt. Kiran
Bai Thakur W/O Lt. Shri Raju @ Rajendra Thakur,
Age 27 Years R/O Village Pala, Post Singhpur, Tahsil
And District Narsinghpur (Madhya Pradesh)
3. Kamlesh Thakur S/O Lt. Shri Dhansingh Thakur,
Aged About 65 Years, R/O Village Pala, Post Singhpur,
Tahsil And District Narsinghpur (Madhya Pradesh)
4. Smt. Dashoda Thakur W/O Shri Kamlesh Thakur,
Aged About 55 Years, Occupation: Housewife R/O
Village Pala, Post Singhpur, Tahsil And District
Narsinghpur (Madhya Pradesh)
.....APPELLANTS
(By Shri Binod Kumar Tiwari)
And
1. Vijay Kumar S/O Shri Ravindra Kumar, Aged About
35 Years, Occupation: Driver R/O 23 Dagau Kuravali
Mainpur District Mainpuri Up (Uttar Pradesh)
2. United India General Insurance Company Limited,
R/O Bahari Road, Main Road Narsinghpur, District
Narsinghpur (INSURER Truck No. Up-84-T-6937)
(Madhya Pradesh)
.....RESPONDENTS
(None)
2
This appeal coming on for orders this day, the court passed the
following:
ORDER
This application has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 239
days in filing the appeal in question. The present appeal has been filed
challenging the award dated 02.12.2022 passed by learned Additional
Member Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Narsinghpur. It is contended that
the matter got delayed and could not be filed within the period of limitation
as the appellants had no legal knowledge about the limitation, therefore
they could not file the appeal within time. However, the delay in filing the
appeal is not intentional and rather bona fide one.
(2) The brief facts of this case are that the present appeal filed by the
appellants for seeking enhancement of Rs.3,25,000/- against the award of
Rs.16,01,300/- passed by the Member Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,
Narsinghpur dated 02.12.2022, with the delay of 239 days filed in I.A.
No.17612/2023 for condonation of delay.
(3) Counsel for the appellants has stated that the claimants/appellants filed
petition seeking enhancement of compensation of Rs.3,25,000/- on the award
amount of Rs.16,01.300/- passed by the learned Tribunal with delay of 239
days. It is further stated that he could not file the appeal in time as the
appellants were not having the knowledge about the limitation, therefore,
he prayed for condone the delay of 239 days and admit the appeal.
(4) This Court has considered the submissions made. Normally a very
lenient view is being taken in the matters of this nature, particularly, where
the appeals filed by the appellants against the order passed by the learned
Tribunal. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, why the
delay has to be condoned mechanically merely because the appellants had no
legal knowledge about the limitation, they could not file the appeal within
time, is not at all proper explanation.
(5) The law is well settled that longer the delay, the heavier is the burden
on the party to prove that he was prevented by sufficient cause from
approaching the Court earlier. The Courts have to take a liberal view while
considering the applications for condonation of delay, the party, who fails to
give plausible or convincing explanation for condonation of delay, does not
deserve any indulgence by this Court.
(6) A decision reported in Allala Bhagavanth Rao vs Garvandula
Vijayalaxmi and others1, wherein the Court at paras-12 to 15 of the order
held as follows:.
12. The word 'sufficient cause' is not defined either in the
Limitation Act or in the C.P.C.; the reason appears to be that
there is no straightjacket formula to decide whether the cause
shown for condonation of delay is sufficient cause or not.
Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the
Court can exercise discretion and decide the sufficient cause.
Sufficient cause shall be construed liberally without adopting
any pedantic approach. It cannot be stretched to frustrate the
very intention of Legislature in specifying the period for filing
appeal or petition etc.
13. In Lanka Venkateswarlu (Died) by L.Rs.v.State of A.P.,
(2011) 1 UPLJ 242 (SC), the apex Court heavily laid on the
Courts when to allow the petitions, though no sufficient cause
is made out, and ruled as follows:
"We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which
could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after
holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as
"liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial
justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation, especially in cases where the Court concludes that
there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the
approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the
absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is
required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the
1 . 2016 4 ALT 43
parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not
being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the
High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly
strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has
been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of
cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not
enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All
discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be
exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The
discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed
by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections
cannot and should not form the basis of exercising
discretionary powers."
14. In fact, the petitioner did not make out any sufficient
cause except making a bald unsubstantiated allegation in the
affidavit If such lame excuses for condoning the delay are
accepted as sufficient causes, virtually denuding or jettisoning
the substantive law of limitation.
15. In view of the law declared by the apex Court basing
on the concept of real justice, substantial justice the Courts
cannot allow petitions under Section 5 of Limitation Act, when
no sufficient cause is made out. Therefore, basing on lame
excuse or unsubstantiated cause, it is difficult to condone the
delay, liberally construing the word sufficient cause.
(7) In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai2, the two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
"What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal
and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the
exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and
other similar statues, the courts can neither become oblivious
of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain
rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of
time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the
costs.
What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the
factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona
fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has
2. (2012) 5 SCC 157
been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause
shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may
condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given
by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly
negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a
legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."
Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for
condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold
that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and,
accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had
condoned the delay of more than seven years."
(8) In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy3, the Hon'ble Apex Court broadly culled out the following
principles:
i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-
pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to
legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their
proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the
fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied
in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue and
uncalled for emphasis.
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of
delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or
litigant is to be taken note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation
of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should
not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the
courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally
unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a
delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine
3. (2013) 12 SCC 649
of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to
its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a
total go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged
in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not
to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud,
misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and
the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial
discretion which is founded on
objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a
collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted
with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner
harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone
delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis
on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt
with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy
which is basically subjective.
c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being
had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort
for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional
motto.
d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious
matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in
a non-challan manner requires to be curbed, of course, within
legal parameters.
(9) In Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao Vs. Reddy Sridevi and
others4, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed:-
"17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa
Coalfields Ltd. [(1962 2 SCR 762] (supra), it is observed and
held as under:--
In construing s.5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of
the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives
rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree
as binding between the parties. In other words, when the
period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder
has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the
decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has
accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be
light- heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay
is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and
admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately
conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and
discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance
substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High
Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269,
"s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of
jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial
power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles
which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause'
receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide
is imputable to the appellant."
18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala
[(1997) 7 SCC 556] (supra), while refusing to condone the
delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of
reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for
seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned
lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts
have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion
for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion
judiciously.
4. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260
19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer,
Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448] (supra), it is
observed as under:--
"The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes
of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace".
An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates
insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential
for public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State
requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same
time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice
suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and
preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for
litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal
remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to
see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail
their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence
states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and
not of the sleepy."
20. In the case of Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] (supra), it is observed and held by
this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each
case. It is further observed that the expression "sufficient
cause" cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction
or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further
observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights
of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party
has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is
inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for
condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is
observed that each application for condonation of delay has to
be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is
further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no
sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that
would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing
utter disregard to legislature."
(10) In the above decision, it is laid down that the expression "sufficient
cause" is elastic term and each day's delay need not be explained in strict
sense. Also, it has been clearly held that the approach to be applied for
condonation of delay would depend upon the cause shown and only when
sufficient cause is shown, the relief sought can be granted. But in the instant
case the appellants having the knowledge about the passing of award but the
present appeal is filed on 01.11.2024 with delay of 239 days prescribing the
outer limit in the form of limitation to approach the Court of law is to see that
the parties to the proceedings are not vexed with the litigation forever or for
an inordinate length of period. This is not the legislative intent. No doubt, the
expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal constructions so as to
advance substantial justice. The delay in preferring the appeal would be
condoned in the interest of justice. However, such delay should only be
condoned where the Court finds that there is absence of negligence or
inaction on the part of the parties seeking the Court to condone the said delay.
(11) In the instant case having the knowledge about the award passed by
Claims Tribunal but the appellants have not taken any steps to file an appeal
forthwith and the negligent attitude or casual approach in approaching the
Court is not expected to be entertained. Public interest and confidence upon
the Courts is to be protected. Judicial verdict has to attain finality, therefore,
this Court does not find any such cause which amounts to sufficient cause for
condonation of delay.
(12). In such circumstances, obviously the discretion could not have been
exercised in favour of the appellants who have not approached this Court
with clean hand, therefore, the application filed by the appellants lacked
bonafide. The condonation of delay of days should only be condoned where
the Court finds that there is absence of negligence or inaction on the part of
the party seeking the Court to condone the said delay. But in the instant case,
the parties are approaching in the Court with a willful default, negligent
attitude and a casual approach in approaching the Court is not expected to be
entertained. The public interest and confidence upon the Courts is to
protected. Judicial verdict has to attain finality. The cause for delay pleaded
in the appeal is not at all acceptable and the appellants fail to give plausible
and convicting explanation for condonation of delay, does not deserves any
indulgence by this Court, the affidavit filed in support of the appeal to
condone the delay does not indicate valid reason, much less proper reason.
Except making an averment in the affidavit that the plea taken in the
application are to be true.
(13). As per expressions of Hon'ble Apex Court, while condoning the delay,
the Court must see whether the deponent explained sufficient cause.
Involving substantial right of the parties alone is not the criteria. Unless
sufficient cause is shown, that in case of inordinate delay, condoning the
delay does not arise. Since the appellants fail to show sufficient cause to
condone the delay as per the affidavit of 239 days, after excluding the period
as per the Honb'le Apex Court the delay is nearly 239 days should not be
condoned.
(14) Having perusal of the above decisions cited (supra) this Court does not
find any sufficient cause pleaded by appellants for condoning the delay in
question, therefore, this Court does not find any ground to condone the delay,
thus I.A.No.17612/2023 is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly,
I.A.No.17612/2023 is dismissed.
(15). In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated above, I find
no merit in this appeal and same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to
costs.
(16). Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall also stand dismissed.
DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA,J
Digitally
K.S.signed by
RAVIKANT KEWAT
Date: 2024.05.22 14:59:15
+05'30'
