Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mohammad Iqbal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 21 May, 2024
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1 W.P. No.12765/2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
ON THE 21st OF MAY, 2024
WRIT PETITION No. 12765 of 2024
BETWEEN:-
1. MOHAMMAD IQBAL S/O MOHAMMAD
ASLAM, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: BUS OPERATOR R/O
RAJENDRA WARD SOHAGPUR, DISTRICT
NARMADAPURAM (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. RAKESH FOUZDAR S/O LATE J.D.
FOUZDAR, AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS,
PARTNER M/S R.J. OPERATOR RESIDENT
OF BALAGANJ NARMADAPURAM
DISTRICT NARMADAMPURAM (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.....PETITIONERS
(BY SHRI ASHISH RAWAT - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
THROUGH SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORT, VALLABH BHAWAN, BHOPAL
DISTRICT BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY
NARMADAPURAM SAMBHAG, DISTRICT
NARMADAPURAM (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. SECRETARY, REGIONAL TRANSPORT
AUTHORITY NARMADAPURAM SAMBHAG
DISTRICT NARMADAPURAM (MADHYA
PRADESH)
4. SUDHIR KUMAR NAYAK S/O SITARAM
NAYAK OCCUPATION: BUS OPERATOR
2 W.P. No.12765/2024
MAIN ROAD BHOURA TEHSIL SHAHPUR
DISTRICT BETUL (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(STATE BY SHRI MOHAN SAUSARKAR-
GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE AND RESPONDENT
NO.4 BY SHRI SUBODH KUMAR PANDEY -
ADVOCATE ON CAVEAT)
............................................................................................................................................
This petition coming on for admission this day, the court passed the
following:
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed
seeking following relief(s):-
7.1 Allow the petition and issue a writ of
certiorari quashing the impugned order dated
12.03.2024 passed by the respondent no.3
(Annexure P/6) and impugned temporary
permit dated 20.03.2024 issued by the
respondent no.3 (Annexure P/7);
7.2 Allow the petition and issue a writ of
mandamus restraining the respondent no.3 to
grant further temporary permit to the
respondent no.4 on the route Shaktigarh to
Bhopal on his vehicle no. MP41P-1347.
7.3 Any other appropriate orders against
respondents be issued in favour of the
petitioner with cost of the petition.
2. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that petitioner is holding a
permanent permit to ply his bus on Shaktigarh to Bhopal route and by the
impugned order, respondent No.3 has issued temporary permit just ahead of
second bus of the petitioner and therefore, the same is liable to be quashed.
It is further submitted that it is very difficult for one driver to drive the
vehicle for 200 Kms on a single trip, therefore there is every possibility of
accident. To buttress his contentions, counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the order passed by Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Tansukhlal Talati Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
reported in I.L.R. [2012] M.P. 1872.
3. Per contra, it is submitted by counsel for respondent No.4 that the
competent Authority has taken note of possible clash of timings and has
accordingly made certain destinations as non-stop like Batkidoh, Sataldehi,
Narmadapuram, Budhani and Obedullaganj, therefore it is submitted that
there is no possibility of clash in timing. It is further submitted that since the
petitioner is not the co-applicant for grant of temporary permit, therefore in
the light of judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh
Garg etc. etc. Vs. Union of India and others etc. etc. reported in AIR
1992 SC 443 as well as in light of judgment passed by this Court in the case
of Gurinder Singh Atwal Vs. State of M.P. & Others decided on
20/12/2018 in M.P. No.5210/2018 (Gwalior Bench), petitioner has no
locus standi to challenge the grant of temporary permit. To buttress his
contentions, counsel for respondent No.4 has also relied upon the judgment
passed by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sheikh Mohd. Anees
Vs. State of M.P. and others decided on 01/07/2019 in W.A. No.806/2019.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
5. This Court in the case of Gurinder Singh Atwal (supra) has held as
under:-
"A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in the
case of Mohd. Ansar (Anwar) Vs. The State
Transport Appellate Tribunal and others by
order dated 13-12-2018 passed in MP No. 722 of
2018 has held as under :-
"In the case at hand, it is
and 4 were not the applicants for
the route for which petitioner
applied; but were operating over
part of said route. And though
objections were raised in respect
of the locus of respondents no. 3
and 4 to challenge the grant of
permit (which is evident from
averments in paragraph 1 of the
written submissions), the
Tribunal did not avert to the
same, there is no finding to that
effect in the impugned order.
In view whereof and taking note
of the law laid down in Mohd.
Ibrahim (Supra) Munnawar
Jahan Begum (Smt.) (Supra)
and E. Rama Rao (Supra), there
remains no iota of doubt that the
respondents No. 3 and 4 had no
locus to question the grant of
Stage Carriage Permit in favour
of the petitioner. It was
incumbent upon the Tribunal to
have dismissed the revisions on
said ground alone.
The Tribunal, in the considered
opinion of this Court, grossly
erred in entertaining the
revisions."
It is submitted by the Counsel for the
respondent no.3, that the judgment passed in the
case of Mohd. Ansar (Anwar) (Supra) is per-
incurium, as it has not taken note of judgment
passed by Division Bench of this Court in the
case of Kalim Mohd. Vs. S.T.A.T. (Supra).
Considered the submissions of the parties.
The undisputed fact is that the respondent
no. 3 is not the co-applicant for grant of regular
permit, but is a part route operator.
The Supreme Court in the case of
Mithilesh Garg Vs. U.O.I. reported in AIR
1992 SC 443 has held as under :-
''15. The petitioners have further
contended that the conditions of
roads, social status, of the
applicants, possibility of small
operators being eliminated by big
operators, conditions of hilly
routes, fuel availability and
pollution control are some of the
important factors which the
Regional Transport Authority is
bound to take into consideration
while taking a decision on an
application for grant of permit.
These are the matters which are
supposed to be within the
comprehension of the transport
authorities. The legislative policy
under the Act cannot be
challenged on these grounds. It is
not disputed that the Regional
Transport Authority has the
power under the Act to refuse an
application for grant of permit by
giving reasons. It is for the
authority to take into
consideration all the relevant
factors at the time of quasi-
judicial consideration of the
applications for grant of permits.
The statutory authorities under
the Act are bound to keep a watch
on the erroneous and illegal
exercise of power in granting
permits under the liberalized
policy."
This Court in the case of Kalim Mohd
(Supra), after relying upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg
(Supra) has held as under :-
"It is clear from our decision in
M.P. No. 730/93 and M.P.
No.969/93 while deciding those
cases this Court heavily relied on
the observations of the Supreme
Court in Mithilesh Garg V. U.O.I.
(AIR 1992 SC 443) wherein the
reason for affording hearing to
concerned persons was stated to
be the necessity of some one to
inform the tribunal deciding grant
of permit about the condition of
roads, social status of the
applicant, possibility of small
operators being eliminated by big
operators, conditions of hilly
routes, fuel availability and
pollution control etc., so that the
tribunals are able to decide the
grant or refusal of permit on
objections received. It is for this
reason that we held that the rivals
in the trade, competitors would
be able to assist the tribunals in
this matter by raising objections
and being heard........
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is clear that objections can be
raised with regard to condition of roads, social
status of the applicant, possibility of small
operators being eliminated by big operators,
conditions of hilly routes, fuel availability and
pollution control etc., but it is an admitted
position, that no such objection was raised by the
respondent no.3 before the R.T.A. or before the
S.T.A.T. Even before this Court, no such
objection has been raised. All the objections
which have been raised by the respondent no.3
were in relation to the maintainability of the
application and availability/non-availability of
spare vehicle with the petitioner. The Division
Bench of this Court in the case of Kalim Mohd
(Supra) has not held that all sorts of objections
can be raised by the part route operators, who are
not the co-applicants. Thus, in the considered
opinion of this Court, in absence of any objection
of the nature mentioned in para 15 of the
judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the
case of Mithilesh Garg (Supra) and in the case
of Kalim Mohd. (Supra) it cannot be said that
the judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in the case of Mohd. Ansar (Anwar)
(Supra) is per-incurium."
6. The objections can be raised with regard to the conditions of roads,
social status of applicants, possibility of small operators being eliminated by
big operators, conditions of hilly routes, fuel availability and pollution
control etc.
7. Petitioner has not challenged the temporary permit on any of these
grounds. His only contention is that petitioner is plying two buses on the
basis of two different permits and the temporary permit granted to
respondent No.4 is likely to suffer financial losses because if the bus of
respondent No.4 is allowed to be operated ahead of second bus of the
petitioner then all the passengers will be taken away by bus of respondent
No.4.
8. Article 19(1)(g) of Constitution of India cannot be interpreted to
create a monopoly of an individual in a trade. Healthy competition will
always for the benefit of individuals. If two buses are plying and if the
condition of one bus is bad then the commuters will always like to wait for
5-10 minutes in order to board a good bus. Therefore, if two buses are
plying, then there is every possibility that commuters would get best the bus
thereby making their journey comfortable.
9. Furthermore, the Motor Vehicles Act has been enacted for the benefit
of commuters and not for the benefit of transporters. Monopoly is a market
structure characterized by a single seller selling a unique product in the
market without any competition and substitute.
10. Counsel for petitioner could not point out from the provisions of
Article 19(1)(g) of Constitution of India to show that a private transporter
can have monopoly of plying his bus only on a particular route.
Furthermore, Article 19(1)(g) of Constitution of India is not an absolute
fundamental right.
11. So far as the submissions made by counsel for petitioner that because
of multiple buses on a single route, the possibility of accident cannot be
ruled out is concerned, this Court is of considered opinion that the
transporter cannot take advantage. If the drivers of the bus are given strict
instructions not to drive the bus rashly and to drive the bus strictly in
accordance with the timings allotted to them, then there will not be any
possibility of accident but if the drivers of the bus at the instance of the
owner get involved in racing or rash driving in order to capture the
commuters, then possibility of more accidents cannot be ruled out. At the
cost of best facilities to the commuters, this Court cannot approve the illegal
activities of the drivers of the buses at the instance of their owners to drive
the vehicle contrary to the provisions under Section 183 of Motor Vehicles
Act.
12. Section 183 of Motor Vehicles Act reads as under:-
"183. Driving at excessive speed, etc.- (1)
Whoever, drives or causes any person who is
employed by him or subjects someone under his
control to drive a motor vehicle in contravention
of the speed limits referred to in section 112 shall
be punishable in the following manner, namely:--
(i) where such motor vehicle is a light
motor vehicle with fine which shall
not be less than one thousand rupees
but may extend to two thousand
rupees;
(ii) where such motor vehicle is a
medium goods vehicle or a medium
passenger vehicle or a heavy goods
vehicle or a heavy passenger vehicle
with fine which shall not be less than
two thousand rupees, but may extend
to four thousand rupees; and
(iii) for the second or any subsequent
offence under this sub-section the
driving licence of such driver shall
be impounded as per the provisions
of the sub-section (4) of section 206.
(2) ***
(3) No person shall be convicted of an
offence punishable under sub-section (1) solely
on the evidence of one witness to the effect that
in the opinion of the witness such person was
driving at a speed which was unlawful, unless
that opinion is shown to be based on an estimate
obtained by the use of some mechanical or
electronic device.
(4) The publication of a time table under
which, or the giving of any direction that, any
journey or part of a journey is to be completed
within a specified time shall, if in the opinion of
the Court it is not practicable in the
circumstances of the case for that journey or part
of a journey to be completed in the specified time
without contravening the speed limits referred to
in section 112 be prima facie evidence that the
person who published the time table or gave the
direction has committed an offence punishable
under sub-section (1)."
13. Therefore, if the transporter alleges that because another transporter
has been granted permit to ply his bus ahead of his bus then he would
violate the provisions of Section 183 of Motor Vehicles Act, then he is
inviting trouble for himself but this Court cannot approve the said
submission made by counsel for the transporters.
14. No other argument has been raised by counsel for the petitioner.
15. For the reasons mentioned above, this Court is of considered opinion
that no case is made out warranting interference.
16. Petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G.S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
S.M.
