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Larati @ Ladati vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
2024 Latest Caselaw 14375 MP

Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 14375 MP
Judgement Date : 16 May, 2024

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Larati @ Ladati vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 May, 2024

             1


     IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                 AT G WA L I O R
                               BEFORE
             HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VINAY SARAF

                    ON THE 16th OF MAY, 2024

             MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 3757 of 2017

BETWEEN:-
LARATI @ LADATI D/O SHRI RAM NATH
SAPERA, AGED 21 YEARS, R/O BAHADURGARH
P.S. RADHOGARH, DISTRICT GUNA (MADHYA
PRADESH)
                                                        .....APPLICANT
(BY SHRI SHOBENDRA KUMAR TIWARI- ADVOCATE)

AND
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
POLICE STATION RAGHOGARH, DISTRICT
GUNA (MADHYA PRADESH)
                                                    .....RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI LOKENDRA SINGH TOMAR- GOVRNMENT ADVOCATE)
      This application coming on for hearing this day, the court passed

the following:

                               ORDER

1. Upon allegation of commission of rape, Police Raghogarh registered the case and filed charge-sheet in connection with Crime No.387/2012 under Sections 363, 366, 376(1), 342 of IPC and Sections 3 (2) (v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities),Act against Kalyan Meena S/o Gappalal registered as Criminal Case No.1145/2012 before the Court

of Special Judge (SC/ST) Act Guna and registered as Special Sessions Case No.06/2013.

2. Allegations were levelled against the accused on the basis of the statement of petitioner recorded during investigation wherein she levelled the allegation that in the intervening night of 11-12 th December, 2012, she was sleeping at her home and Kalyan Meena called her on her mobile and abducted her on the false pretext of marriage and thereafter committed rape against her wish.

3. When the petitioner appeared before the Special Judge, she turned hostile and did not support the prosecution's case to the extent that accuse committed rape with her. Consequently, by order dated 21.02.2013 passed under Section 232 of the Cr.P.C., the court acquitted Kalyan Meena and ordered to forward the complaint against the petitioner for her prosecution.

4. Upon receipt of the complaint under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. from the Special Judge (SC/ST Act, Guna), CJM Guna registered criminal case No.2413/2016 against the present petitioner under Section 182 r/w Section 191, 193 (III) of the IPC. Order of registration of the said case is challenged by the petitioner in the present case on the ground that before referring the complaint to CJM, Guna, learned Special Judge (SC/ST, Guna) has not recorded the finding to the effect that prima facie, it appears that the offence has been committed.

5. Heard learned counsels for the parties for final disposal of the case.

6. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that before initiating

action against the petitioner purportedly under Section 344 of the Cr.P.C., no findings have been recorded by the trial court in respect of alleged false/fabricated evidence knowingly or willfully given by the petitioner. Similarly, opportunity of showing cause has also been denied in the present case and therefore, the order of taking cognizance against the petitioner is liable to be quashed. Learned counsel for petitioner placed reliance over the judgment delivered in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah Vs. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) SCC (Criminal) 1109 whereby learned Apex Court has held that the penal provisions should be strictly construed. He relied on the paragraph 29, which reads as under-

29. Dr. Singhvi has also urged that since we are dealing with a penal provision it should be strictly construed and in support of his proposition he has placed reliance upon a Constitution Bench decision in Tolaram Relumal vs. State of Bombay, 1955(1) SCR 158, wherein it was held that it is well settled rule of construction of penal statutes that if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty and it is not competent for the Court to stretch out the meaning of expression used by the legislature in order to carry out the intention of the legislature. The contention is that since Section 195(1)(b)(ii) affords protection from private prosecution, it should not be given a restrictive interpretation to curtail its scope. We are unable to

accept such broad proposition as has been sought to be urged. In Craies on Statute Law (1971 edn.

Chapter 21), the principle regarding penal provisions has been stated as under :

"But penal statutes must never be construed so as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words in their ordinary acceptations would comprehend. . But where the thing is brought within the words and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed, like any other instrument, according to the fair commonsense meaning of the language used, and the court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute, where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any other instrument."

7. He further relied on the judgment delivered by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Meera Bai and another Vs. State of M.P. 2010 Cr.L.R. (M.P.) 219 wherein, dealing with the case of alleged false evidence, it is held by this Court that prima facie, the finding should be recorded that the case is of deliberate falsehood and the court is satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. He relied on the paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment, which reads as under:-

11. On perusal of the record, I find that except recording the finding that the prosecution

witnesses (appellants) gave false evidence, trial Court did not go into the question whether it was expedient that they should be prosecuted. The equiry as contemplated in Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an enquiry by the trial Court itself for reassuring that the offence which appears to have been committed is in or in relation to the proceeding in that Court.

Recording a finding by the trial Court regarding commission of the offence is a condition precedent to the prosecution. Some times, in may cases, lack of trustfulness may be noticed in the evidence of witnesses, but it would not call for their prosecution in all the cases. It must be a prima facie case of deliberate falsehood and the Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge.

12. In my opinion, in the instant case, since the trial Court did no keep in mind the aforesaid aspect of the matter, filling of complaint was not called for.

8. On the strength of the above pronouncements of Apex Court and Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, learned counsel for petitioner prayed for quashment of the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner on the basis of the complaint forwarded by the Special Judge (SC/ST Act),

Guna, upon the allegations of giving false evidence against the accused therein.

9. Learned Government Advocate for respondent/State supported the impugned order of taking cognizance and submitted that no case of interference is made out. On the basis of statement recorded during investigation, charge-sheet was filed and Kalyan Meena was prosecuted wherein, the petitioner turned hostile and denied the allegations of commission of rape and consequently, accused was acquitted and it is proved that the petitioner had given false statement before the court. He further submitted that in the given facts and circumstances, no lenient view can be taken.

10. Considered the arguments advanced by the rival parties and perused the documents available on record. It appears that father of the petitioner had lodged missing person report and simply stated that her daughter (present petitioner) was missing since last night. However, after recovery of the petitioner, during inquiry of missing person report, the statement of petitioner was recorded wherein she alleged that Kalyan Meena committed rape with her. She was undergone medical examination also and thereafter crime was registered and after investigation, charge- sheet was filed.

11. Report was not lodged by the petitioner and only her statements were recorded by the police officers, therefore, it cannot be accepted that she has falsely stated during the trial.

12. Under Section 344 of the Cr.P.C., before proceeding against any

witness, it is essential for the court to express its opinion that the witness, who appeared and deposed in the court, had knowingly and willfully gave the false evidence and fabricated the false evidence with the intention that such evidence should be used in such proceedings . No such satisfaction has been recorded by the Special Judge (SC/ST, Act), Guna. Section 344 (1) of the Cr.P.C. reads as under:-

344. Summary procedure for trial for giving false evidence.----(1)If, at the time of delivery of any judgment or final order disposing of any judicial proceeding, a Court of Session or Magistrate of the first class expresses an opinion to the effect that any witness appearing in such proceeding had knowingly or wilfully given false evidence or had fabricated false evidence with the intention that such evidence should be used in such proceeding, it or he may, if satisfied that it is necessary and expedient in the interest of justice that the witness should be tried summarily for giving or fabricating, as the case may be, false evidence, take cognizance of the offence and may, after giving the offender a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be punished for such offence, try such offender summarily and sentence him to imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or to fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.

13. It appears that no statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was

recorded during investigation and statement of the petitioner was recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. only. Statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. are not admissible in evidence and can be used only for the purpose of contradiction and omission in view of the provisions of Section 162 of the Cr.P.C meaning thereby that statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be relied upon as the statement given by the petitioner during investigation. FIR was also not lodged by the petitioner. There was nothing to say that actually the petitioner had stated before the investigating officer that she was subjected to rape and therefore, in the absence of material on record, only on the basis of not supporting the prosecution case by the petitioner, it cannot be accepted that she had given false evidence in the court. Moreover, the Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Guna has not recorded satisfaction that it is a case wherein the witness has knowingly or willfully gave false evidence or fabricated false evidence with the intention that such evidence should be used in such proceedings and without recording satisfaction, the prosecution of witness for giving evidence is not permissible in accordance with Section 344 (1) of the Cr.P.C.

14. Judgment relied by the learned counsel for petitioner delivered in the matter of Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra) is in respect of preparation of forged documents and therefore, the same is not directly applicable to the controversy in hand, however, judgment delivered by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Meerabai (supra) is applicable to the present case. In that case, the court has acquitted the accused persons

though the prosecutrix deposed in the court who stated that she was subjected to rape but in view of the Sessions Court, she had given the false evidence and therefore, the matter was referred to the Magistrate for initiating proceedings against her for the offences punishable under Sections 195, 211 of IPC. In the present matter, no satisfaction has been recorded and even the report was not lodged by the petitioner, therefore, it cannot be accepted that the prosecutrix had given false and fabricated evidence in the court.

15. Consequently, the present petition is allowed. Impugned order passed dated 23.09.2016 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate is hereby set aside. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner are hereby quashed.

(VINAY SARAF) JUDGE vishal

VISHAL UPADHYAY DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH

UPAD GWALIOR, 2.5.4.20=5d5050008f4c040023a64c b030d9c80d25cbf5f3eb4f56fa864a2 0db4fbe3d3e, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh,

HYAY serialNumber=637E939E833627AE8 CC13D85E5F2383A287E83C6CDFA6 347A00E482772314FE9, cn=VISHAL UPADHYAY Date: 2024.05.17 18:45:02 +05'30'

 
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