Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 14195 MP
Judgement Date : 15 May, 2024
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ACHAL KUMAR PALIWAL
ON THE 15th OF MAY, 2024
SECOND APPEAL No. 119 of 2022
BETWEEN:-
SURENDRA KUMAR S/O CHHIKAUDILAL GUPTA
THR. POWER OF ATTORNEY CUM FATHER
CHIIKAUDIALAL S/O SHRI DEENDAYAL GUPTA,
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, PURANI BASTI
KHAJURAHO TAH RAJNAGAR DISTT.
CHHATARPUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPELLANT
(BY SHRI J.L SONI, ADVOCATE )
AND
1. JIYA KHAN S/O SHRI RAJJAB KHAN, AGED
ABOUT 48 YEARS, MANJURNAGAR TAH.
RAJNAGAR DISTT. CHHATRPUR (MADHYA
PRADESH)
2. KALLOO S/O SHRI SARMANA CHMAMAR,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, OCCUPATION: NIL
VILLAGE LALGAWAN TEHSIL RAJNAGAR
(MADHYA PRADESH)
3. KALICHARAN S/O SHRI SARMANA
CHMAMAR, AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: NIL VILLAGE LALGAWAN
TEHSIL RAJNAGAR (MADHYA PRADESH)
4. SMT. KANI W/O SHRI SARMANA
CHMAMAR, AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: NIL VILLAGE LALGAWAN
TEHSIL RAJNAGAR (MADHYA PRADESH)
5. STATE OF M.P. THROUGH COLLECTOR
DISTRICT CHHATARPUR (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY MISS EKTA GUPTA PANEL LAWYER` )
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: S HUSHMAT
HUSSAIN
Signing time: 01-06-2024
15:45:10
2
This appeal coming on for admission this day, the court passed
the following:
ORDER
This appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 100 of
CPC against the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2021 passed by IIIrd
District Judge, Chhatarpur in Regular Civil Appeal No.1600124/2016
arising out of judgment and decree dated 31.3.2016 passed by IInd
Civil Judge, Class-II, Chhatarpur in Civil Suit No.12A/2015.
2. Brief facts of the case are that plaintiff filed a suit for
declaration of easementary rights as well as injunction and for
declaring Tahsildar order dated 30.06.2012 null and void on the
ground that original owner of survey no.66/3 area 0.506 hectare was
defendants 2 to 4 and from them, plaintiff purchased property in
December, 2012 and since then, plaintiff is in possession of the suit
property. This property was purchased by plaintiff measuring 60 X 50
total areas 3000 sq.ft. and on eastern side of this property, there was
proposed 15 feet wide passage, on western side seller land and on
northern side Khajuraho Gaura Road and on southern side seller's
land. Later on, defendant no.1 also purchased part of land comprising
survey no.66/3 from defendants 2 to 4 and in this sale deed, no
boundaries are mentioned and defendant no.1 is threatening to close
the door of plaintiff's house and is trying to take possession of 15 feet
wide passage situated on eastern side of plaintiff's house. Plaintiff is
using above passage since last 12 years.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that trial Court has
partly decreed plaintiff's suit. Further, order passed by Tahsildar has
been set aside by SDO vide order dated 9.12.2014. As plaintiff is not
owner of the suit property, therefore, he has no right with respect to
disputed property and Court below have erred in granting injunction in
favour of the plaintiff. On above grounds, it is urged that substantial
questions of law as mentioned in appeal memo arises in this appeal
and it be admitted for final hearing.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents has supported the
findings recorded by the Courts below.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record of the case.
6. Learned trial Court vide judgment dated 31.3.2016 passed in
Civil Suit No.12A/2015 partly decreed the plaintiff suit and issued
injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant no.1 and
appellate Court vide judgment dated 29.11.2021 passed in RCA
No.1600124/2016 dismissed the defendants appeal and affirmed the
trial Court's findings.
7. Therefore, question arises as to when this Court can interfere
with the findings of facts arrived at by the first appellate court/trial
court. In this connection, I would like to refer to the law laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chandrabhan (Deceased)
through Lrs. And Others vs. Saraswati and Others reported in AIR
2022 SC 4601, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court in para 33(iii) has held as
under:-
"33 (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well - recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision" based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding".
8. Similarly in the case of Gurnam Singh (Dead) by legal
representatives and Others vs. Lehna Singh (Dead) by legal
representatives, Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"13.1.......However, in Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court, by impugned judgment and order has interfered
with the Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court. While interfering with the judgment and order passed by the first Appellate Court, it appears that while upsetting the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, the High Court has again appreciated the entire evidence on record, which in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC is not permissible. While passing the impugned judgment and order, it appears that High Court has not at all appreciated the fact that the High Court was deciding the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and not first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC. As per the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain second appeal under Section 100 CPC after the 1976 Amendment, is confined only when the second appeal involves a substantial question of law. The existence of 'a substantial question of law' is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (Supra), in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being:
(i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the Applicable law; OR
(ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; OR
(iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of
procedure requiring interference in second appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second appeal".
9. In this connection, Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) through Lrs vs. Sohan Lal (Dead) by LRs reported in (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 434 may also be referred to. Paras 11 and 12 of the said judgment is relevant and is under:-
"11. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered would have led to an opposite conclusion. This principle has been laid down in a series of judgments of this Court in relation to section 100 CPC after the 1976 amendment. In Dilbagrai Punjabi vs. Sharad Chandra [1988 Supple. SCC 710], while dealing with a Second Appeal of 1978 decided by the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 20.8.81, L.M.Sharma, J.(as he then was) observed that "The Court (the first appellate Court) is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises as of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding. This is the situation in the present case."
In that case, an admission by the defendant-tenant in the reply notice in regard to the plaintiff's title and the description of the plaintiff as `owner' of the property signed by the defendant were not considered by the first appellate Court while holding that the plaintiff had not
proved his title. The High Court interfered with the finding on the ground of non-
consideration of vital evidence and this Court affirmed the said decision. That was upheld. In Jagdish Singh vs. Nathu Singh [1992 (1) SCC 647], with reference to a Second Appeal of 1978 disposed of on 5.4.1991. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) held:
"where the findings by the Court of facts is vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings."
Again in Sundra Naicka Vadiyar vs. Ramaswami Ayyar [1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 534], it was held that where certain vital documents for deciding the question of possession were ignored - such as a compromise, an order of the revenue Court - reliance on oral evidence was unjustified. In yet another case in Mehrunissa vs. Visham Kumari [1998 (2) SCC 295] arising out of Second appeal of 1988 decided on 15.1.1996, it was held by Venkataswami, J. that a finding arrived at by ignoring the second notice issued by the landlady and without noticing that the suit was not based on earlier notices, was vitiated finding. This was in Second Appeal of 1988 decided on 15.1.1996.
12. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In Sri Chand Gupta vs. Gulzar Singh [1992 (1) SCC 143], it was held that the High Court was right in interfering in Second Appeal
where the lower appellate Court relied upon an admission of a third party treating it as binding on the defendant. The admission was inadmissible as against the defendant. This was also a Second Appeal of 1981 disposed of on 24.9.1985".
10. Sole issue involved in the case is whether there is passage on
eastern side of plaintiff house measuring 15 X 50 ft. With respect to
issue involved in the case, sale deed Ex.P/1, Ex.P/7 and D/12 are
important and plaintiff has purchased property vide sale deed Ex.P/1
dated 9.12.2002 and therein boundaries are mentioned and on western
side as well as on southern side, land of seller is shown and on
northern side Khajuraho Gaura Road and on eastern side proposed 15
ft. wide passage has been shown. Sale deed Ex.D/2 is dated 13.3.2006
and it has been executed in favour of defendant no.1 and in above sale
deed as well as map attached thereto on east, west and south, seller's
land is shown and in northern side Khajuraho Gaura Road has been
shown and in Ex.D/12, property purchased by plaintiff has not been
shown on either side of the property purchased by defendant no.1 vide
sale deed Ex.D/12.
11. Similarly, sale deed Ex.P/7 is dated 20.12.2004 and it has
been executed in favour of defendant no.1. In Ex.P/7, only it is
mentioned that land sold is adjacent to Khajuraho Gaura Road and no
boundaries of the sold property are mentioned therein. In view of date
of above sale deeds as well as boundaries mentioned therein, in this
Court's opinion, it cannot be said that no injunction can be issued in
favour of the plaintiffs despite, dismissal of the suit with respect to
declaratory relief. Hence, in this Court's opinion, learned Courts
below have not committed any illegality or perversity in dismissing
the plaintiff suit.
12. If pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties and the
impugned judgment passed by the first appellate court/trial court
are considered, in the light of above legal principles/legal provisions
reiterated in aforesaid judgments, then, in this Court's considered
opinion, the findings of facts recorded by the first appellate
court/trial court are not liable to be interfered with in the instant
case and it cannot be said that first appellate court/trial court has
ignored any material evidence or has acted on no evidence or first
appellate court/trial court has drawn wrong inferences from the
proved facts etc. Further, it cannot be said that evidence taken as a
whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the findings. It can
also be not said that the findings of first appellate court/trial
Court are based on inadmissible evidence.
13. A perusal of the impugned judgment and decree passed
by the first appellate court/trial court reveals that it is well
reasoned and has been passed after due consideration of oral as well
as documentary evidence on record. Learned counsel for the
appellant has failed to show that how the findings of facts recorded
by the first appellate court/trial court are illegal, perverse and
based on no evidence etc. The learned first appellate court/trial
court has legally and rightly dealt with the issues involved in the
matter and has recorded correct findings of fact.
14. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in the
instant second appeal. Findings recorded by the first appellate
court/trial court are fully justified by the evidence on record.
Findings recorded by the first appellate court/trial court are not
based on misreading or mis-appreciation of evidence nor it is shown
to be illegal or perverse in any manner so as to call for interference
in second appeal. No question of law, much less substantial question
of law, arises for adjudication in the instant appeal. Hence, appeal is
dismissed in limine.
15. A copy of this order along with record be sent back
to the first appellate court/trial court for information and its
compliance.
(ACHAL KUMAR PALIWAL) JUDGE Hashmi
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!