Madhya Pradesh High Court
Essence Commodities Pvt Ltd. Through ... vs Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax ... on 10 May, 2024
Author: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
Bench: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, Pranay Verma
Review Petition No.1262 of 2023 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT
INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND
DHARMADHIKARI
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRANAY VERMA
ON THE 10th OF MAY, 2024
REVIEW PETITION No. 1262 of 2023
BETWEEN:-
ESSENCE COMMODITIES PVT LTD. THROUGH SHRI SHAILESH
AGRAWAL S/O SHRI SURESH CHANDRA AGRAWAL, AGED ABOUT 52
YEARS, 630, USHA NAGAR EXTENTION, OPP. DASHAHRA MAIDAN,
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI ASHISH GOYAL, ADVOCATE)
AND
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL) 1 ROOM
1. NO. 101, AAYKAR BHAWAN, OPP. WHITE CHURCH, INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APPEAL 3) ROOM NO. 103,
2. AAYKAR BHAWAN, AREA HILLS, HOSHANGABAD ROAD, BHOPAL
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY MS. VEENA MANDLIK, ADVOCATE)
This appeal coming on for admission this day, Justice Sushrut
Arvind Dharmadhikari passed the following:
ORDER
This Review Petition has been filed seeking review / recall of
order dated 10.10.2023 passed in ITA No.73 of 2023, whereby the
appeal has been dismissed in absence of any substantial questions of
law.
02. The petitioner had preferred an appeal under Section 260A of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 assailing the final order dated 10.02.2023 passed
by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Indore in Cross
Objection No.04/IND/2021 (arising out of ITA 278/IND/2020) in
respect of Assessment Year - 2012 - 13 proposing substantial questions
of law.
03. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner
had specifically raised the ground in the cross objection. The learned
ITAT held that the cross objection by the assessee had only been filed to
support the first appellate order. No substantial argument has been
advanced in support of the cross objection by the petitioner. Since by
the earlier orders, the ITAT has dismissed the appeals for the
Assessment Years - 2011 - 12, 2012 - 13 and 2013 - 14, therefore, cross
objections of the assessee are not being adjudicated upon as having
become unacademic and infructuous. Learned counsel further
contended that Clause (a) of sub-section (6) of Section 260A of the
Income Tax Act provides that the High Court may decide an issue,
which is not determined by the ITAT. The word 'determined' means that
the issue is not dealt with, though it was raised before the Tribunal. The
word 'determined, presupposes an issue was raised on argument but
there is a failure of the Tribunal to decide or adjudicate the same.
Learned counsel further contended that a substantial question of law
may arise because of the findings recorded by the Tribunal, but the said
issue / question is not determined. In such cases, an appeal
under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act can be entertained
depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, therefore, the
review petition may be allowed and the Income Tax Appeal may be
reheard.
04. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently
opposed the prayer and submitted that the learned ITAT has
categorically recorded in the order that no substantial arguments have
been advanced in support of the cross objection by the assessee,
therefore, the appeals have been dismissed for the Assessment Year -
2011 - 12, 2012 - 13 and 2013 - 14. Learned counsel for the respondents
further stated that this Court has not committed any error in coming to
the conclusion that no substantial question of law arises for
consideration. Even the ITAT has taken into consideration the cross
objection. Since no arguments were advanced in support, the ITAT had
no other option but to dismiss the appeal. In the appeal, an exhaustive
order has been passed and it has been held that there is no substantial
question of law which arises for consideration. No error apparent error
on record can be seen so as to invoke the provisions of Order XLVII
Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
05. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
06. Section 114 of the CPC which is the substantive provision, deals
with the scope of review and states as follows:-
"Review:- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering
himself aggrieved:-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed
by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred;
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed
by this Code; or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the court
which passed the decree or made the order, and the court
may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.
07. The grounds available for filing a review application against a
judgment have been set out in Order XLVII of the CPC in the following
words:
"1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed,
but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed,
or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be
produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or
order made, or on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record, or for any other
sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree
passed or order made against him, may apply for a review
of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made
the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or Order
may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the
pendency of an appeal by some other party except where
the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and
the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to
the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the
review.
1[Explanation-The fact that the decision on a question of
law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been
reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a
superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for
the review of such judgment.] "
08. A glance at the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that a review
application would be maintainable on (i) discovery of new and important
matters or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, were not within
the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him when the
decree was passed or the order made; (ii) on account of some mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient
reason.
09. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others
reported in 1980 Supp SCC 562, The Apex Court observed that a review
of an earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that the
material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in
miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made
are as under:
"12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to
hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party
has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our
earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on
the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in
miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante and Another
v. Sheikh Habib reported in (1975) 1 SCC 674, this Court
observed :
'A review of a judgment is a serious step and
reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring
omission or patent mistake or like grave error has
crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. The present
stage is not a virgin ground but review of an
earlier order which has the normal feature of
finality.'"
(emphasis added)
10. In Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others reported
in (1997) 8 SCC 715, stating that an error that is not self- evident and the
one thathas to be detected by the process of reasoning, cannot be described
as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise the
powers of review, the Apex Court held as under:
"7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly
confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.1reported in
1964 SCR (5) 174, this Court opined:
'11. What, however, we are now concerned with is
whether the statement in the order of September
1959 that the case did not involve any substantial
question of law is an 'error apparent on the face of
the record'. The fact that on the earlier occasion the
Court held on an identical state of facts that a
substantial question of law arose would not per se
be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be
erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was
wrong, it would not follow that it was an 'error
apparent on the face of the record', for there is a
distinction which is real, though it might not always
be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous
decision and a decision which could be
characterized as vitiated by 'error apparent'. A
review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and
corrected, but lies only for patent error.'
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury
reported in (1995) 1 SCC 170, while quoting with approval a
passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak
Sharma reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389, this Court once again
held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and
have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order
47 Rule 1 CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to
review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on
the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and
has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be
said to be an error apparent on the face of the record
justifying the court to exercise its power of review under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of this jurisdiction under
Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous
decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it
must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be
allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'".
[emphasis added]
11. The error referred to under the Rule, must be apparent on the face of
the record and not one which has to be searched out. While discussing the
scope and ambit of Article 137 that empowers the Supreme Court to
review its judgments and in the course of discussing the contours of review
jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC in Lily Thomas(supra),
the Apex Court held:-
"54. Article 137 empowers this court to review its judgments
subject to the
provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made
under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules
made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the
Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of
the grounds specified in Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provides:
"1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any
person considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is
allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is
allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and
important matter or evidence which, after the exercise
of due diligence was not within his knowledge or
could not be produced by him at the time when the
decree was passed or order made, or on account of
some mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to
obtain a review of the decree passed or order made
against him, may apply for a review of judgment to
the Court which passed the decree or made the order.'
Under Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review
lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the
record in criminal cases. Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme Court
Rules provides that after an application for review has been
disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the
same matter.
XXX XXX XXX
56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be
exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view.
Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute
dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated
like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on
the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is
dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The
rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the
larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of
coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and
practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under
Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon
satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in
deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created
under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding
the earlier judgment.
XXX XXX XXX
58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order XL of
the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil
Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed
before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the
judgment in the case of Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and
Others v. Union of India and others reported in (1995) 3 SCC
635. It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered
any new and important matter which after the exercise of due
diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought
to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment.
All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on
behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after
considering those pleas, passed the judgment in the case of Sarla
Mudgal, President, Kalyani and Others v. Union of India and
others reported in (1995) 3 SCC 635. We have also not found
any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring
a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which
is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to
be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence.
No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel
appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The
only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting
Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental
rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing
the judgment. The words "any-other sufficient reason appearing
in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC" must mean "a reason sufficient on
grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule" as was
held in Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram reported in AIR 1922 PC 112
and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos.
v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius reported in 1955 SCR
520. Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error
which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions
of law. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa reported in 1955 SCR
250 this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent
error and not a mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v.
Ahmad reported in AIR 1955 SC 233, it was held:
"It is essential that it should be something more than a
mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on
the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference
to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of
the principle as in its application to the facts of a
particular case. When does an error, cease to be mere
error and become an error apparent on the face of the
record? Learned Counsel on either side were unable to
suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between
the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr. Pathak
for the first respondent contended on the strength of
certain observations of Chagla, CJ in - 'Batuk K Vyas v.
Surat Borough Municipality reported in ILR 1953 Bom
191, that no error could be said to be apparent on the face
of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an
examination or argument to establish it. This test might
afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of
cases. But there must be cases in which even this test
might break down, because judicial opinions also differ,
and an error that might be considered by one Judge as
self-evident might not be so considered by another. The
fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the
record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there
being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very
nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on
the facts of each case. Therefore, it can safely be held that
the petitioners have not made out
any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with
Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule
1 CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case.
The petition is misconceived and bereft of any
substance."
(emphasis added)
12. It is also settled law that in exercise of review jurisdiction, the Court
cannot re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion even if
two views are possible in a matter. In Kerala State Electricity Board v.
Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and Others reported in
(2005) 6 SCC 651, the Apex Court observed as follows:
10. ....In a review petition it is not open to this Court to
reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion,
even if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at
best sought to impress us that the correspondence
exchanged between the parties did not support the
conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a
submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review
petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully
within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation
of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact
and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be
assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is
an error apparent on the face of the record or for some
reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that
there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To
permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of
appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a
review petition into an appeal in disguise."
(emphasis added)
13. Under the garb of filing a review petition, a party cannot be
permitted to repeat old and overruled arguments for reopening the
conclusions arrived at in a judgment. The power of review is not to be
confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior Court to
correct errors committed by a subordinate Court. This point has been
elucidated in Jain Studios Ltd. V. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. reported
in (2006) 5 SCC 501, where it was held thus:
"11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is
concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in
submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief
which had been sought at the time of arguing the main
matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had
been refused, no review petition would lie which would
convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law
that the power of review cannot be confused with
appellate power which enables a superior court to
correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It
is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of
old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen
concluded adjudications. The power of review can be
exercised with extreme care, caution and
circumspection and only in exceptional cases.
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant
herein had been made at the time when the arbitration
petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot
be sought by an indirect method by filing a review
petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of
'second innings' which is impermissible and
unwarranted and cannot be granted."
(emphasis added)
14. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in
Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320,
the Apex Court observed that review proceedings have to be strictly
confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as
the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been
dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned
judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for
exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned
case as below:
"20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of
review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within
knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by
him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" has been
interpreted in Chajju Ram vs. Neki17, and approved by
this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most
Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors.18 to mean "a reason
sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified
in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in
Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.
& Ors reported in (2013) 8 SCC 337,.
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: -
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not
enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the
original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error,
manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness
or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby
an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies
only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject
cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should
not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within
the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to
be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief
sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been
negatived."
15. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma reported
in (1979) 4 SCC 389, the Apex Court was examining an order passed by
the Judicial Commissioner who was reviewing an earlier judgment that
went in favour of the appellant, while deciding a review application filed
by the respondents therein who took a ground that the predecessor Court
had overlooked two important documents that showed that the respondents
were in possession of the sites through which the appellant had sought
easementary rights to access his home- stead. The said appeal was allowed
by this Court with the following observations:
"3 ...It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh
and Others v. State of Punjab reported in (1979) 4 SCC
389 there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to
preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review
which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to
prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and
pulpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive
limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of
review may be exercised on the discovery of new and
important matter or evidence which, after the exercise
of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the
person seeking the review or could not be produced by
him at the time when the order was made; it may be
exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the
face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on
any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on
the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits.
That would be the province of a court of appeal. A
power of review is not to be confused with appellate
power which may enable an appellate court to correct
all manner of errors committed by the subordinate
court."
(emphasis added)
16. In State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Sengupta and
Another reported in (2008) 8 SCC 612, the Apex Court emphasized the
requirement of the review petitioner who approaches a Court on the
ground of discovery of a new matter or evidence, to demonstrate that the
same was not within his knowledge and held thus:
"21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a
review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter
or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and
must be of such a character that if the same had been
produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other
words, mere discovery of new or important matter or
evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito
justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to
show that such additional matter or evidence was not within
its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence,
the same could not be produced before the court earlier."
(emphasis added)
17. In the captioned judgment, the term 'mistake or error apparent' has
been discussed in the following words:
"22. The term 'mistake or error apparent' by its very
connotation signifies an error which is evident per se
from the record of the case and does not require
detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of
the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-
evident and detection thereof requires long debate and
process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error
apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order
47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3) (f) of the Act. To put it
differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be
corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the
ground that a different view could have been taken by
the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case,
while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal
concerned cannot sit in appeal over its
judgment/decision".
(emphasis added)
18. In S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another
reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595, the Apex Court explained as to when
a review jurisdiction could be treated as statutory or inherent and held
thus :
"18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers.
Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can
stand in its way. The order of the court should not be
prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for
consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law
as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire
concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher
courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the court
finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it
would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the
erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its
perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it
cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying
the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall
an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and
scope of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law.
But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety
to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The
latter is available where the mistake is of the Court".
(emphasis added)
19. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others v. Shri Pradyuman
Singhji Arjunsinghji reported in (1971) 3 SCC 844, the Apex Court held
as follows:
"4..... It is well settled that the power to review is not an
inherent power. It must be conferred by law either
specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in
the Act was brought to notice from which it could be
gathered that the Government had power to review its own
order. If the Government had no power to review its own
order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have
reviewed its order......."
(emphasis added)
20. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others v. Vinod Kumar
Rawat and Others reported in (2020) SCC Online SC 896, citing
previous decisions and expounding on the scope and ambit of Section 114
read with Order XLVII Rule 1, the Apex Court has observed that Section
114 CPC does not lay any conditions precedent for exercising the power of
review; and nor does the Section prohibit the Court from exercising its
power to review a decision. However, an order can be reviewed by the
Court only on the grounds prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The
said power cannot be exercised as an inherent power and nor can appellate
power be exercised in the guise of exercising the power of review.
21. In our considered opinion, none of the grounds available for
successfully seeking review as recognized by Order 47 Rule 1 CPC are
made out in the present case. The Apex Court in the case of S. Bhagirathi
Amaal Vs. Palani Roman (2009) 10 SCC 464 has held that in order to
seek review, it has to be demonstrated that the order suffers from an error
contemplated under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC which is apparent on the face of
record and not an error which is to be fished out and searched. A decision
or order cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous.
22. In another case, the Apex Court in case of State of West Bengal Vs.
Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8 SCC 612 has held that "a party cannot be
permitted to argue de novo in the garb of review."
23. On perusal of the record and in the light of the judgments passed
in the case of S. Bhagirathi Amaal and State of West Bengal (supra),
there is no error apparent on the face of record warranting interference
in the order impugned.
24. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any reason to review /
recall the order dated 10.10.2023. Hence, Review Petition stands
dismissed.
(S. A. DHARMADHIKARI) (PRANAY VERMA)
JUDGE JUDGE
Ravi
