Madhya Pradesh High Court
Amit Patel vs High Court Of Madhya Pradesh on 3 May, 2024
Author: Vivek Agarwal
Bench: Vivek Agarwal, Avanindra Kumar Singh
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK AGARWAL
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH
WRIT PETITION No. 5193 of 2016
BETWEEN:-
AMIT PATEL S/O SHRI S.R. PATEL, AGED ABOUT
42 YEARS, R/o.1465 VIJAY NAGAR, JABALPUR
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI SATISH VERMA - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
THROUGH REGISTRAR GENERAL, RG
OFFICE MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT,
JABALPUR (MP)
2. STATE BAR COUNCIL, MADHYA PRADESH
THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN/SECRETARY,
STATE BAR COUNCIL BUILDING, MADHYA
PRADESH HIGH COURT, JABALPUR (MP)
3. MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
ADVOCATES BAR ASSOCIATION THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT/SECRETARY, MADHYA
PRADESH HIGH COURT BUILDING,
JABALPUR (MP)
4. MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT BAR
ASSOCIATION, THROUGH ITS ADHOC
COMMITTEE/PRESIDENT/SECRETARY,
SILVER JUBILEE HALL, MADHYA
PRADESH HIGH COURT, JABALPUR (MP)
.....RESPONDENTS
(RESPONDENT NO.1 BY SHRI B.N.MISHRA - ADVOCATE)
(RESPONDENT NO.2 BY SHRI RAMAKANT AWASTHI - ADVOCATE)
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMIT JAIN
Signing time: 03-05-
2024 20:00:20
2
(RESPONDENT NO.3 BY SHRI ANIL KHARE - SENIOR ADVOCATE, SHRI MANOJ
SHARMA - SENIOR ADVOCATE, SHRI SANJAY AGRAWAL - SENIOR ADVOCATE
ASSISTED BY SHRI K.N.FAKHRUDDIN - ADVOCATE, SHRI RAJMANI MISHRA -
ADVOCATE, SHRI ABHISKEK GULATEE - ADVOCATE, SHRI MANOJ KUMAR
RAJAK - ADVOCATE)
(RESPONDENT NO.4 BY SHRI SANJAY VERMA - ADVOCATE)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserved on : 16.2.2024
Pronounced on : 3.5.2024
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This writ petition having been heard and reserved for orders.
Hon'ble Shri Justive Vivek Agarwal pronounced the following:
ORDER
This writ petition is filed by Petitioner, Shri Amit Patel,
Advocate by Profession, challenging the order of allotment of
premises in the High Court Campus to the respondent No.3/Madhya
Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association by the Respondent
No.1/Registrar General, High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur.
2. Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the petitioner is a practising Advocate before the High Court and a
citizen of India. He is life member of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bar Association (Respondent No.4 herein). His grievance is that he
has filed this writ petition in public interest seeking a relief to take
over the physical possession of around 20,000 square feet of space in
the Madhya Pradesh High Court Building allotted to the respondent
No.3/Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association. The
relevant orders of allotment issued by the Registrar General be
cancelled as the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association has no legal entity or recognition under the provisions of
the Advocates Act, 1961 from the State Bar Council of Madhya
Pradesh. Once the application for affiliation/recognition was rejected
by the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh then in the light of the
judgment of the Apex Court in Supreme Court Bar Association
versus B.D.Kaushik (2011) 13 SCC 774, there can only be one Bar
Association annexed with the High Court, which is the respondent
No.4, namely, the Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar Association and,
therefore, the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association
is not entitled to claim any facility for itself.
3. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the
Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association was created
with just a membership of Rs.100/- and 120 members in the year 2007
and which is at present is having membership of at best 300 members.
A valuable space of 20,000 to 22,000 square feet in front of the
Copying Section of the High Court was allotted to the Madhya
Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association without any public
notice or advertisement, which is contrary to the law laid down by the
Apex Court in Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress versus State of
Madhya Pradesh (2011) 5 SCC 29.
4. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that
under similar facts and circumstances of the case, since no transparent
procedure was adopted for allotment of such a prestigious and
valuable property in favour of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
Advocates Bar Association, the Bombay High Court had cancelled
allotment of Government property and land in favour of the trust of
Subhash Ghai-Mukta Arts Limited vide judgment dated 9.2.2012
passed in Writ Petition No.1826/2003 reported in
Manu/MH/0133/2012 and the S.L.P, which was filed against the said
order by Mukta Arts Limited & Another, was dismissed by the Apex
Court vide order dated 4.4.2012 in Petition (S) for Special Leave of
Appeal (Civil) No.(S) 10085-10086 of 2012. Copy of resolution of the
State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh is enclosed as Annexure P/2
whereby request of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association to grant recognition was rejected by the General Body of
the State Bar Council of the Madhya Pradesh.
5. It is pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that
there exists a resolution of the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh bearing
No.88/03/GB:DT.20.12.2003, which provides that "the Council shall
recognize a Bar Association only at such place where a Civil Court or
Link Court is functioning. The Council may consider for recognition
of a Bar Association at such place where Civil Court or Link Court is
not functioning subject to the condition that at such place, the
minimum number of practising lawyers should not be less than 25".
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that vide
Annexure P/2, the petitioner has enclosed Resolution No.53/GB/02
(30 Second GB dated 12.5.2002) where the State Bar Council of
Madhya Pradesh resolved as under:- "The Council reaffirmed its
policy of recognizing only one Bar Association at one place i.e. at
Tehsil Headquarters and the District Headquarters of the State and as a
Special Case, will continue to recognize the High Court Bar
Association at Jabalpur, Indore and Gwalior. The recognized Bar
Associations either at District Headquarters or Tahsil Headquarters are
those Bar Associations either functioning in the Civil Courts/District
& Sessions Courts. Such Bar Associations, which are working in the
name and style of Tax Bar Association, SAT/CAT Bar
Association/Tribunal Bar Association/Labour Bar Association,
Revenue Bar Associations, are not recognized by the Council.
However, at the place concerned, the recognized Bar Association may
form its Wing for the lawyers practising on a particular side such as
District Bar Association of "Taxation Wing" District Bar Association
Labour wing, District Bar Association and SAT/CAT Wing and may
appoint a convenor for such special Wings. However, the lawyers
practising at on a particular side shall necessarily be the members of
the recognized Bar Associations. Those Advocates, who will not be
the members of the Regular Bar Associations, will be liable for
misconduct and would be deprived of the benefits of the Welfare
Schemes of the Council. It is resolved that a circular to this effect be
issued to all Bar Associations".
7. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that at
the High Court level, only one Bar Association is allowed to have
recognition and, therefore, the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates
Bar Association not having any recognition, is not entitled to enjoy the
patronage of the High Court as it is an illegal Association and has no
legal sanctity.
8. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Democratic Lawyer Forum versus
State Bar Council & Others (Writ Petition No.574/2016) has
directed the State Bar Council for implementing the rule of One Bar
One Vote. In addition to the space allotted in front of the Copying
Section, additional space has been allotted in front of the Court Room
No.20, which is also used by the Members of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court Advocates Bar Association to the deprivement of the other
Members of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar Association and,
therefore, it causes not only discrimination but heartburning too.
Prayer is made to cancel the relevant orders of allotment and the
Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association be restrained
from charging huge membership fee from the Advocates and further
members of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar Association be also
permitted to equally use and enjoy the premises and spaces allotted to
the respondent No.3/Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allotment
made in favour of the respondent No.3/Madhya Pradesh High Court
Advocates Bar Association is violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India as no public notice was issued and the space was
given to a parallel unrecognised body. Hon'ble the Chief Justice is the
trustee of the public property and the allotment cannot be made at his
discretion.
10. Reliance is placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on
the judgments of the Apex Court in Usha Mehta versus Government
of Andhra Pradesh & Others (2012) 12 SCC 419, Institute of Law,
Chandigarh & Others versus Neeraj Sharma & Others (2015) 1
SCC 720, Gopal Jha versus Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
(2019) 13 SCC 161. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Delhi
High Court in P.K.Dash Advocates & Others Writ Petition (C)
No.8106/2010 C.M.Application No.2237/2013 & Other Connected
Matters Decided on 31.5.2016. Reliance is placed on the judgments
of the Apex Court in Supreme Court Bar Association versus
B.D.Kaushik (2011) 13 SCC 74 and Akhil Gupta & Another versus
Bar Council of Delhi & Others where the S.L.P (C) No.13162/2016
came to be dismissed by the Apex Court vide order dated 5.9.2016.
11. Reliance is placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on
the aforesaid judgments to point out that the public premises cannot be
allotted dehors the rules of allotment and any allotment made without
following any objective criteria, without considering the effect of over
population and without inviting any competitive bidding but giving it
away at a throwaway price or no price then such allotment is liable to
be set aside by taking corrective steps and the Public Interest
Litigation is maintainable in such matters.
12. Reliance is placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on
the judgment of the Apex Court in Smt.Naseem Bano versus State of
Uttar Pradesh & Others AIR 1993 SC 2592 to contend that if the
specific averments made by the petitioner in his petition have not been
controverted by the respondent then the High Court should proceed on
the basis that averments have been admitted by the respondent.
Petitioner's counsel submits that Hon'ble the Chief Justice could not
have exercised his discretion in a casual manner and, therefore, the
then Chief Justices, have erred in extending the benefit in favour of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association without
following the due process.
13. This Court asked Shri B.N.Mishra, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.1/Registrar General of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur with regard to the
Policy/Rules, if any, framed for allotment of premises in the High
Court.
14. Shri B.N.Mishra on instructions submitted that there is no
specific Policy with regard to the allotment of premises in the High
Court to the interested persons and that is the exclusive prerogative of
Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Shri B.N.Mishra also submitted that he has
instructions to say that the Petitioner Amit Patel has no locus to file
this writ petition as Public Interest Litigation. Shri Amit Patel neither
has a locus nor such writ petition is maintainable in the form of Public
Interest Litigation. The writ petition suffers from delay and latches.
15. Reliance is placed by Shri B.N.Mishra, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.1/Registrar General of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur on Paragraph No.25 of the
judgment of the Apex Court in S.P.Gupta versus Union of India &
Another 1981 (Supp) SCC 87 wherein it is held that "before we part
with this general discussion in regard to the locus standi, there is one
point, we would like to emphasise and it is, that cases may arise where
there is undoubtedly public injury by the act or omission of the State
or a public authority but such act or omission also causes a specific
legal injury to an individual or to a specific class or group of
individuals. In such cases, a member of the public having sufficient
interest can certainly maintain an action challenging the legality of
such act or omission, but if the person or specific class or group of
persons, who are primarily injured as a result of such act or omission,
do not wish to claim any relief and accept such act or omission
willingly and without protest, the member of the public, who
complains of a secondary public injury cannot maintain the action, for
the effect of entertaining the action at the instance of such member of
the public would be to foist a relief on the person or specific class or
group of persons primarily injured, which they do not want". Hence,
Shri B.N.Mishra, Advocate submits that such action being not
maintainable, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
16. Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment of the Apex
Court in S.P.Gupta versus Union of India & Another (supra), it is
pointed out by Shri B.N.Mishra that the Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bar Association, which is the parent Association, has not opposed
formation of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association or the allotment of space to them by Hon'ble the Chief
Justice and, therefore, the petitioner has no locus in the matter.
17. Reliance is placed Shri B.N.Mishra on the judgment of the
Apex Court in Rajeev Suri versus Delhi Development Authority &
Others (2022) 11 SCC 1 wherefrom Paragraph No.550 is referred,
which reads as under:-
"550.We may usefully advert to the exposition in
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India. In
paragraph Nos. 230 to 235 of the reported
decision, the Court noted thus:-
"230. Public interest litigation (PIL) was an
innovation essentially to safeguard and protect the
human rights of those people who were unable to
protect themselves. With the passage of time PIL
jurisdiction has been ballooning so as to
encompass within its ambit subjects such as
probity in public life, granting of largesse in the
form of licences, protecting environment and the
like. But the balloon should not be inflated so
much that it bursts. Public interest litigation
should not be allowed to degenerate to becoming
publicity interest litigation or private
inquisitiveness litigation.
231. While exercising jurisdiction in PIL cases
the court has not forsaken its duty and role as a
court of law dispensing justice in accordance with
law. It is only where there has been a failure on
the part of any authority in acting according to
law or in non-action or acting in violation of the
law that the court has stepped in. No directions
are issued which are in conflict with any legal
provisions. Directions have, in appropriate cases,
been given where the law is silent and inaction
would result in violation of the fundamental rights
or other legal provisions.
232. While protecting the rights of the people
from being violated in any manner utmost care
has to be taken that the court does not transgress
its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional
framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers.
The court has come down heavily whenever the
executive has sought to impinge upon the court's
jurisdiction.
233. At the same time, in exercise of its enormous
power the court should not be called upon to or
undertake governmental duties or functions. The
courts cannot run the Government nor can the
administration indulge in abuse or non-use of
power and get away with it. The essence of
judicial review is a constitutional fundamental.
The role of the higher judiciary under the
Constitution casts on it a great obligation as the
sentinel to defend the values of the Constitution
and the rights of Indians. The courts must,
therefore, act within their judicially permissible
limitations to uphold the rule of law and harness
their power in public interest. It is precisely for
this reason that it has been consistently held by
this Court that in matters of policy the court will
not interfere. When there is a valid law requiring
the Government to act in a particular manner the
court ought not to, without striking down the law,
give any direction which is not in accordance with
law. In other words the court itself is not above
the law.
234. In respect of public projects and policies
which are initiated by the Government the courts
should not become an approval authority.
Normally such decisions are taken by the
Government after due care and consideration. In a
democracy welfare of the people at large, and not
merely of a small section of the society, has to be
the concern of a responsible Government. If a
considered policy decision has been taken, which
is not in conflict with any law or is not malafide,
it will not be in public interest to require the court
to go into and investigate those areas which are
the function of the executive. For any project
which is approved after due deliberation the court
should refrain from being asked to review the
decision just because a petitioner in filing a PIL
alleges that such a decision should not have been
taken because an opposite view against the
undertaking of the project, which view may have
been considered by the Government, is possible.
When two or more options or views are possible
and after considering them the Government takes
a policy 402 decision it is then not the function of
the court to go into the matter afresh and, in a
way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.
235. What the petitioner wants the Court to do in
this case is precisely that. The facts enumerated
hereinabove clearly indicate that the Central
Government had taken a decision to construct the
dam as that was the only solution available to it
for providing water to the water-scarce areas. It
was known at that time that people will be
displaced and will have to be rehabilitated. There
is no material to enable this Court to come to the
conclusion that the decision was malafide. A hard
decision need not necessarily be a bad decision."
(emphasis supplied)."
18. Reliance is placed by Shri B.N.Mishra on the judgment of
the Apex Court in Kushum Lata versus Union of India & Others
(2006) 6 SCC 180 and reading Paragraph Nos.6 to 15, he points out
that under what facts and circumstances, a Public Interest Litigation
will be maintainable and at whose instance, a Public Interest Litigation
can be said to be maintainable. Reading Paragraph No.13, he points
out that Public Interest Litigation is a weapon, which has to be used
with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be
extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest
an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not
lurking.
19. Reliance is placed by Shri B.N.Mishra on the judgment of
the Apex Court in Union of India & Another versus G.Ganayutham
(1997) 7 SCC 463 to contend the limits of judicial review on the
administrative action. Reading Paragraph No.12, Shri B.N.Mishra
points out that while examining the reasonableness, the Court has to
find out that if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken
into account irrelevant factors then the decision of the administrator
must have been within the four corners of the law and not one, which
no sensible person could have reasonably arrived at, having regard to
the above principles, and must have been a bonafide one. The decision
could be one of many choices open to the authority but it was for that
authority to decide upon the choice and not for the Court to substitute
its view.
20. Reliance is placed by Shri B.N.Mishra on the judgment of
the Apex Court in Ranjit Thakur versus Union of India (1987) 4
SCC 611 referring to Paragraph No.15 of Union of India & Another
versus G.Ganayutham (supra), where the Apex Court in Paragraph
No.25 has discussed the issue of question of choice and held as under:-
"25. The question of the choice and quantum of
punishment is within the jurisdiction and
discretion of the court martial. But the sentence
has to suit the offence and the offender. It should
not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be
so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the
conscience and amount in itself to conclusive
evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality,
as part of the concept of judicial review, would
ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise,
within the exclusive province of the court martial,
if the decision of the court even as to sentence is
an outrageous defiance of logic then the sentence
would not be immune from correction.
Irrationality and perversity are recognised
grounds of judicial review."
21. Shri B.N.Mishra submits that the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh has filed an additional return vide I.A.No.1711/2024 duly
supported with an affidavit of the Registrar General of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur wherein it is mentioned in respect to the
query raised by this Court on 24.1.2024 that no such policies, rules or
regulations determining the extent of exercise of authority by Hon'ble
the Chief Justice in the matter of allotment of spaces in the High Court
have been framed. Hon'ble the Chief Justice being the Head of the
Institution possesses inherent powers to allot available vacant
spaces/premises under his jurisdiction and control for necessary use in
order to save and facilitate smooth and efficient working of the Justice
Delivery System. The scope of judicial review is limited and reliance
is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of NCT of Delhi
& Another versus Sanjeev (2005) 5 SCC 181 wherein in Paragraph
No.15, the Apex Court has observed as under:-
"15. One of the points that falls for determination
is the scope for judicial interference in matters of
administrative decisions. Administrative action is
stated to be referable to broad area of
Governmental activities in which the repositories
of power may exercise every class of statutory
function of executive, quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial nature. It is trite law that exercise of
power, whether legislative or administrative, will
be set aside if there is manifest error in the
exercise of such power or the exercise of the
power is manifestly arbitrary (See State of U.P.
and Ors. v. Renusagar Power Co. and Ors). At
one time, the traditional view in England was that
the executive was not answerable where its action
was attributable to the exercise of prerogative
power. Professor De Smith in his classical work
"Judicial Review of Administrative Action" 4th
Edition at Pages 285-287 states the legal position
in his own terse language that the relevant
principles formulated by the Courts may be
broadly summarized as follows. The authority in
which discretion is vested can be compelled to
exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in
any particular manner. In general, discretion must
be exercised only by the authority to which it is
committed. That authority must genuinely
address itself to the matter before it; it must not
act under the dictates of another body or disable
itself from exercising discretion in each
individual case. In the purported exercise of its
discretion, it must not do what it has been
forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not
been authorized to do. It must act in good faith,
must have regard to all relevant considerations
and must not be influenced by irrelevant
considerations, must not seek to promote
purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the
legislation that gives it power to act, and must not
act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several
principles can conveniently be grouped in two
main categories: (i) failure to exercise a
discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of
discretionary power. The two classes are not,
however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion
may be improperly fettered because irrelevant
considerations have been taken into account, and
where an authority hands over its discretion to
another body it acts ultra vires.''
22. Reliance is placed by Shri B.N.Mishra on the scope of
administrative authority vested in Hon'ble the Chief Justice of High
Court and Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India vis a vis the Supreme
Court as discussed in Shanti Bhushan versus Supreme Court of
India through Its Registrar & Another (2018) 8 SCC 396 wherein
referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in Campaign For
Judicial Accountability & Reforms versus Union of India &
Another (2018) 1 SCC 196, the Apex Court in Paragraph No.25 has
observed thus:-
"25. The second stereotype is that being the
'Chief Justice' and senior most Judge of the
Court, he is empowered to exercise 'leadership'
on the Court. In this role, the 'Chief Justice' is
expected to be the spokesperson and
representative of the judiciary in its dealings
with the Executive, Government and the
Community. For this purpose, the 'Chief Justice'
has a general responsibility to ensure that the
Court promotes change and reform as
appropriate. The judicial reforms, which is a
continuing process in order to ensure that there is
real access to justice, also becomes the moral
responsibility of the 'Chief Justice'. Such
reforms in the administration of justice are not
limited to the judicial aspects (i.e. how the cases
need to be decided, case management and court
management, speedy disposal etc.) but also
include reforms on the administrative side of the
legal system as well. Procedural reforms and
implementation thereof is an integral part of the
judicial reform. The ultimate purpose is to
dispense justice, which is the highest and noblest
virtue. Again, in this role, the 'Chief Justice' gets
the authority and responsibility for the
administration of the Court, which gives him the
ultimate authority for determining the
distribution of judicial work load. In Indian
context, this power was given statutory
recognition by Section 214(3) of the Government
of India Act, 1935 which reads as under:-
"214 (2) Rules made under this section may fix
the minimum number of judges who are to sit for
any purpose, so however that no case shall be
decided by less than three judges:
Provided that, if the Federal Legislature makes
such provision as is mentioned in this chapter for
enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of the court,
the rules shall provide for the constitution of a
special division of the court for the purpose of
deciding all cases which would have been within
the jurisdiction of the court even if its
jurisdiction had not been so enlarged.
(3) Subject to the provisions of any rules of
court, the Chief Justice of India shall determine
what judges are to constitute any division of the
court and what judges are to sit for any purpose."
23. Reliance is placed by Shri B.N.Mishra on the judgment of
the Apex Court in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware versus State of
Maharashtra & Others (2005) 1 SCC 590 to contend that the
petitioner has no right to file a Public Interest Litigation. Placing
reliance on Paragraph No.20 of the said judgment, he points out that
the Apex Court was magnanimous enough not to impose further cost
on the petitioner as it was already imposed by the High Court while
dismissing the writ petition. He also submits that the aforesaid
judgment is on the point that when a Member of the Legal Fraternity
files a writ petition for an oblique motive then that person has no
locus.
24. Thus, placing reliance on the aforesaid judgments of the
Apex Court, it is submitted by Shri B.N.Mishra, learned counsel for
the respondent No.1/High Court of Madhya Pradesh, through Registrar
General, Jabalpur that this Court cannot sit in a judicial review over
the executive decision of Hon'ble the Chief Justice and, therefore, this
writ petition should be dismissed.
25. Shri Anil Khare, learned Senior Counsel for respondent
No.3/Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association submits
that the averments made in Paragraph No.3.6 of the writ petition are
vague. In Paragraph No.3.7, reference to the judgment of the Apex
Court in Supreme Court Bar Association versus B.D.Kaushik
(2011) 13 SCC 74 is also misplaced inasmuch that judgment deals
with 'One Bar One Vote' and does not deal with the recognition of a
Bar Association or allotment of spaces to a Bar. The issue of
recognition is different because recognition authorises a Bar
Association to cater to the welfare measures for its members as may
come out of various schemes of the Bar Council but having an
Association is a different thing and that does not violate any of the
rights of the petitioner.
26. Reliance is placed on Division Bench Decision of this
Hon'ble High Court in Sachin Gupta versus Municipal
Corporation, Gwalior & Others 2016 (3) M.P.L.J 622 wherein
referring to Paragraph Nos.2 & 12, Shri Anil Khare points out that in a
Public Interest Litigation, the petitioner, who claims himself to be a
public spirited individual interalia, seeks a direction to the respondent
No.1 to invite bids for the Ropeway Project with the lease rent payable
at the prevailing rates and also seeks a direction to the Respondent
No.1 not to proceed in furtherance of the agreement, has no locus
inasmuch as in the matter of a contract, which was awarded in favour
of the respondent No.4 after inviting tenders in which he is found to be
highest bidder. Thus, when the contract was awarded in the transparent
manner after following procedure prescribed in law then such
agreement, which was executed on 5.6.2008 could not have been
challenged after an inordinate delay of seven years for which no
explanation has been offered. The principle of delay and latches is
applicable in the case of Public Interest Litigation as well. Reference is
made to the judgment of the Apex Court in Bombay Dyeing &
Manufacturing Company Limited versus Bombay Environmental
Action Group (2006) 3 SCC 434.
27. Reliance is placed on Division Bench Judgment of this
Hon'ble High Court in Rajendra Kumar Gupta versus Shiv Raj
Singh Chouhan, Chief Minister of M.P. & Others 2016 (3) M.P.L.J
61 and reading Paragraph No.12, Shri Anil Khare points out that the
Division Bench of this Hon'ble High Court has held that "it is well
settled law that there must be real and genuine public interest involved
in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight errant borne out
of wishful thinking. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of
person to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their
personal grudge and enmity. The Courts of justice should not be
allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the
extraordinary jurisdiction".
28. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in
Aleemuddin versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (2020) 18
SCC 419 wherein referring to Paragraph No.10, Shri Anil Khare
submits that in the matter of administrative discretion as to where a
Tehsil Building should be constructed, is not a matter for the High
Court to determine in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. These are essentially administrative
matters and a decision has to be taken by the executive. This is hence
an illustration of how a Public Interest Litigation has been utilised to
subserve a personal interest. The High Courts must remain vigilant to
the attempts to misuse PILs to subserve extraneous and motivated
purposes. Such efforts must be dealt with firmly. The high prerogative
writs cannot be utilised for such ends.
29. Shri Anil Khare, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
Respondent No.3/Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association submits that allotment is not malafide and places reliance
on Paragraph Nos.49 & 80 of the judgment of the Apex Court in
Supreme Court Bar Association versus B.D.Kaushik (supra).
30. Relying on the aforesaid judgments, Shri Anil Khare,
learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.3/Madhya Pradesh High
Court Advocates Bar Association submits that the petitioner never
applied for membership of the respondent/Madhya Pradesh High
Court Advocates Bar Association and, therefore, has no locus to
question the existence of the said Association or the spaces allotted to
the said Association.
31. Shri Sanjay Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
Respondent No.3/Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association to supplement the submissions made by Shri Anil Khare,
contends that the Bar Association was registered under the Madhya
Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973. Its Bar Room was
inaugurated on 26.9.2008 by Hon'ble the then Chief Justice. Its
Library was inaugurated on 14.11.2009 by the then Chief Justice of
India in presence of other Supreme Court and High Court Judges. Its
Conference Room was inaugurated on 8.4.2011 by the then
Administrative Judge. Its e-library was inaugurated on 30.4.2016 by
the then Chief Justice. Additional adjoining space was allotted to the
Bar Association by the then Chief Justice vide order dated 19.7.2017.
32. In support of the aforesaid contention, Shri Sanjay Agrawal,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent No.3/Madhya
Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association places reliance on the
order dated 19.7.2017, which says that "Hon'ble the Chief Justice is
pleased to allot the Room in the First Floor of the Old Administrative
Block, presently occupied by the Supreme Court Section to the High
court Advocates Bar Association, Jabalpur. He points out that on
11.12.2017, a new Bar Room was inaugurated by the then Chief
Minister of the State of Madhya Pradesh and the then Chief Justice of
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in presence of the other Hon'ble
Judges and an exhaustive list of facilities, which are available in the
space allotted to the Bar Association, has been detailed out and lakhs
and lakhs of rupees have been spent on creation of those facilitates and
the respondent/Association cannot be uprooted overnight as they are in
existence since 2006.
33. Shri Sanjay Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
Respondent No.3/Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association submits that there is no need for sanction of State Bar
Council and the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association can exist as an Association without recognition from the
State Bar Council. There is no need to subject decisions of Hon'ble the
Chief Justice to the judicial review and, therefore, the decision of
Hon'ble the Chief Justice to allot space cannot be a subject of judicial
review.
34. A list of lectures, which have been organised by the
Respondent No.3/Association from 14.11.2009 to 2.12.2017, has been
detailed out by Shri Sanjay Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel and
thereafter it is pointed out by him that the Bar Association is officially
invited in all the official functions organised by the High Court. They
are part of the High Court Rule Making Committee wherein name of
the President of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association, Jabalpur is mentioned at Serial No.9. Similarly, name of
the President of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association, Jabalpur is mentioned in Committee No.33 i.e. the Apex
Committee for Redressal of Grievances of Litigants & Members of
Bar Association as per Scheme notified vide High Court Order No.
A/3278 / II-15-24/77 (Part-II) dated 12-09-2014.
35. Reliance is placed by Shri Sanjay Agrawal, learned Senior
Counsel on Paragraph Nos.28, 49 & 80 of the judgment of the Apex
Court in Supreme Court Bar Association versus B.D.Kaushik
(supra). Reliance is placed on the judgment of the High Court of
Madras in Writ Petition No.4418/2011 (The Gobichettipalayam
Association Represented By its President K.R.Venkatachalam
versus The Bar Council of Tamil Nadu Represented by its
Secretary, Bar Council Building, High Court Campus, Chennai-
104 Dated 12.6.2012 [2012-4-L.W.674] and the Judgment of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Petition No.9752/2015
(Madras High Court Advocates Association High Court Building
Chennai 600104 Represented by its General Secretary,
Arivazahgan versus The Secretary, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu)
Dated 19.6.2015. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex
Court in Supreme Court Bar Association versus Ministry of Urban
Development & Others 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 236 to contend that the
matters of allotment of spaces to the Bar Association should be left
best to the administrative decision on administrative side rather than
being dealt under Article 32/226 of the Constitution of India. Shri
Sanjay Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel submits that Petitioner Shri
Amit Patel had put in only 11 appearances in 8 years from 2016 to
2024 and, therefore, he cannot be said to be a pubic spirited person
entitled to file a Public Interest Litigation.
36. In Writ Petition No.7551/2016 (High Court Advocates
Bar Association, Jabalpur versus Bar Council of India & Others)
referring to Section 22 of the Madhya Pradesh Society Ragistrikaran
Adhiniyam, 1973, attention is drawn to Page Nos.10, 11 & 12 of the
Rejoinder filed vide I.A.No.1363/2024 to point out that the writ
petition has been filed by a duly authorised person. The Division
Bench Judgment of this Hon'ble High Court in Writ Appeal
No.91/2022 (Swakshtagrahi Sangh versus Union of India &
Others) decided on 15.3.2022 relied upon by the State Bar Council
has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
Section 2(a) of the Adhivakta Kalyan Nidhi Adhiniyam, 1982 deals
with definition of Advocate and the petitioner is entitled to be
Advocates Bar Association without any recognition from the Bar
Council of Madhya Pradesh. Vide Annexure P/12, an amendment
application filed in the year 2023, the order of the Bar Council dated
5.2.2018 was challenged and thereafter the Bar Council has not filed
any reply to the amended petition.
37. Rule 2(g) of the Bar Council of India Certificate and Place of
Practice (Verification) Rules, 2015 clearly provides that the Bar
Association of a given area/town/city means an area/territory and the
Court Work Based Association of Advocates whether registered under
the Society Registration Act or not.
38. Thus, it is evident that the Bar Association has to derive its
sanctity and existence on the basis of the Court Work and that
existence of Association of Advocates will be relevant, therefore, there
being no justification for a parallel body be it registered under the
Society Registration Act or any other Act as there already exits a
Court Work Based Association, namely, the Madhya Pradesh High
Court Bar Association then there is no justification for existence of the
Respondent No.3/Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association.
39. Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the petitioner is a life member of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bar Association. He is a public spirited person. The premises, which is
allotted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice, is a public property and,
therefore, it could not have been allotted without having regard to the
principles to be adopted while allotting a public premises.
40. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in
Institute of Law, Chandigarh & Others versus Neeraj Sharma &
Others (2015) 1 SCC 720 and reading Paragraph Nos.15, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, 21, Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that in the matter of public premises, there has to be an
objective criteria for allotment and without following that criteria, the
petitioner cannot be said to be not having any locus to maintain his
Public Interest Litigation. He also submits that as far as the delay is
concerned, a petition was filed before the High Court with regard to
'One Bar One Vote' and when that case was pending before the High
Court, the petitioner came to know about existence of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association and then he filed the
present writ petition. He further submits that the delay will not come in
way of the petitioner because if there is any encroachment on the
public property by way of unauthorised allotment then it is a
continuing wrong and it can be raised at any point of time. The
Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association cannot raise
the plea of delay inasmuch it has reasonably filed its reply and that too
is not a parawise reply but a general reply. Thus, without controverting
specific pleadings made in this petition, the respondents cannot seek
dismissal on technicalities.
41. Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner
supplies two notes to this Court with regard to the inherent powers of
Hon'ble the Chief Justice and relying on Paragraph No.11 of the
judgment of the Apex Court in H.C.Puttaswamy & Others versus
The Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, Bangalore &
Others 1991 Supp (2) SCC 421, he submits that Hon'ble the Chief
Justice or any other Hon'ble Administrative Judge is not an absolute
Ruler. Nor he is a freewheeler. He must operate in the clean world of
law, not in the neighbourhood of sordid atmosphere. He has a duty to
ensure that in carrying out the administrative functions, he is actuated
by same principles and values as those of the Court he is serving. He
cannot depart from and indeed must remain committed to the
constitutional ethos and traditions of his calling. We need hardly say
that those, who are expected to oversee the conduct of others, must
necessarily maintain a higher standard of ethical and intellectual
rectitude. The public expectations do not seem to be less exacting.
42. Reliance is placed by Shri Satish Verma on the judgment of
the Apex Court in Mahesh Chandra versus Regional Manager, U.P.
Financial Corporation (1993) 2 SCC 279 to contend that every wide
power, the exercise of which has far-reaching repercussion, has
inherent limitation on it. It should be exercised to effectuate the
purpose of the Act. In legislation enacted for general benefit and
common good, the responsibility is far graver. It demands purposeful
approach. The exercise of discretion should be objective. Test of
reasonableness is stricter. The public functionaries should be duty
conscious rather than power charged. Its actions and decisions, which
touch the common man, have to be tested on the touchstone of fairness
and justice.
43. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan versus Ramesh Chand
Paliwal 1998 (3) SCC 72 wherein referring to Paragraph Nos.38 &
40, Shri Satish Verma points out that "the judges have been described
as "hermits". They have to live and behave like "hermits" who have no
desire or aspiration, having shed it through penance. Their mission is
to supply light and not heat. This is necessary so that their latent desire
to run the High Court Administration may not sprout before time, at
least, in some cases".
44. Reliance is placed by Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for
the petitioner on the judgment of the Apex Court in Renu & Others
versus District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari & Another (2014) 14
SCC 50, to contend that "it is axiomatic that no authority is above law
and no man is above law. Article 13(2) of the Constitution provides
that no law can be enacted which runs contrary to the fundamental
rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution".
45. Reliance is placed by Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for
the petitioner on the judgment of the Apex Court in Som Raj &
Others versus State of Haryana & Others AIR 1990 SC 1176 to
contend that if the discretion is exercised without any principle or
without any rule, it is a situation amounting to the antithesis of Rule of
Law. Discretion means sound discretion guided by law or governed by
known principles of rules, not by whim or fancy or caprice of the
authority.
46. Reliance is placed by Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for
the petitioner on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of West
Bengal & Others versus Debasish Mukherjee & Others AIR 2011
SC 3667 wherein it is held that this Court has again dealt with the
provisions of Article 229 of the Constitution and held that the Chief
Justice cannot grant any relief to the employee of the High Court in an
irrational or arbitrary manner unless the Rules provide for such
exceptional relief.
47. Reliance is placed by Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for
the petitioner on the judgment of the Apex Court in Lok Prahari
through its General Secretary versus State of Uttar Pradesh &
Others (2018) 6 SCC 1 wherein it is held that the preamble to the
Constitution of India embodies, interalia, the principles of equality and
fraternity and it is on the basis of these principles of equality and
fraternity that the Constitution recognizes only one single class of
citizens with one singular voice (vote) in the democratic process
subject to provisions made for backward classes, women, children,
SC/ST, minorities etc. A special class of citizens, subject to the
exception noted above, is abhorrent to the constitutional ethos.
48. Reliance is placed by Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for
the petitioner on the judgment of the Apex Court in Vineet Narain &
Others versus Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226 wherein in
Paragraph Nos.54 & 55, seven cardinal rules, which are to be
followed, in public life have been highlighted.
49. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in
Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress versus State of Madhya
Pradesh (2011) 5 SCC 29 wherein it is held that the State and/or its
agencies/instrumentalities cannot give largesse to any person
according to the sweet will and whims of the political entities and/or
officers of the State. Every action/decision of the State and/or its
agencies/instrumentalities to give largesse or confer benefit must be
founded on a sound, transparent, discernible and well defined policy,
which shall be made known to the public by publication in the Official
Gazette and other recognised modes of publicity and such policy must
be implemented/executed by adopting a non-discriminatory and non-
arbitrary method irrespective of the class or category of persons
proposed to be benefited by the policy. The distribution of largesse
like allotment of land, grant of quota, permit licence, etc by the State
and its agencies/instrumentalities should always be done in a fair and
equitable manner and the element of favouritism or nepotism shall not
influence the exercise of discretion, if any, conferred upon the
particular functionary or officer of the State.
50. Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner places
reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sachidanand Pandey
& Another versus State of West Bengal (1987) 2 SCC 295 wherein
it is held that the State owned or public owned property is not to be
dealt with at the absolute discretion of the executive. Certain precepts
and principles have to be observed. Public interest is the paramount
consideration. One of the methods of securing the public interest,
when it is considered necessary to dispose of a property, is to sell the
property by public auction or by inviting tenders. Though that is the
ordinary rule, it is not an invariable rule. There may be situations
where there are compelling reasons necessitating departure from the
rule but then the reasons for the departure must be rational and should
not be suggestive of discrimination. Appearance of public justice is as
important as doing justice. Nothing should be done which gives an
appearance of bias, jobbery or nepotism.
51. Reliance is placed by Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for
the petitioner on the judgments of the Apex Court in Shayara Bano
versus Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1, S.Seshachalam versus Bar
Council of Tamil Nadu (2014) 16 SCC 72, City Industrial
Development Corporation through its Managing Director versus
Platinum Entertainment & Others (2015) 1 SCC 558, Raman
Dayaram Shetty versus International Airport Authority & Others
(1979) 3 SCC 489 and Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy versus State of
Jammu & Kashmir (1980) 4 SCC 1.
52. Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgments, it is submitted
that there cannot be any discrimination between two classes of
Advocates and, therefore, creation of a class within a class is arbitrary
and cannot be given a seal of approval. Hence, prayer is made to allow
the present writ petition by granting the reliefs as prayed for.
53. Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner places
reliance on some photographs to show that the premises is only open
to the Members and not to anybody else.
54. Shri Satish Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the judgment of the Apex Court in Supreme Court Bar
Association versus B.D.Kaushik (supra) says all the Lawyers should
be under one Umbrella. Referring to Paragraph No.18 of the High
Court Office Memorandum dated 19.12.2016 signed by the then
Registrar General of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Shri Manohar
Mamtani, he submits that the principle is One Person, One Chamber,
One Court Complex. The OBC Advocates Welfare Association had
also applied for a space before Hon'ble the Chief Justice and if
fragmentation of Bar is allowed to be carried out then several
fragments will stand up to claim spaces, which may cause a problem
for the High Court in future.
55. Shri B.N.Mishra, learned counsel for respondent
No.1/Registrar General of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Jabalpur submits that the respondent No.3/Madhya Pradesh High
Court Advocates Bar Association is a licencee but as there are no rules
for allotment of the licenced premises, therefore, Hon'ble the Chief
Justice in his discretion can allot places according to his discretion and
wisdom.
56. Shri Vipin Yadav, learned counsel for the Madhya Pradesh
State Bar Council fairly submits that he does not wish to file reply to
the amended writ petition. Annexure P/12 was added by way of
amendment belatedly. Petitioner has neither assailed nor challenged
the reasoning given by the Bar Council in Annexure P/12, therefore,
there is no need to file any reply. He also submits that the judgment of
Gobichettipalayam Association Represented by its President
K.R.Venkatachalam versus The Bar Council of Tamil Nadu
(supra) cited by the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association has no application to the facts and circumstances of the
present case inasmuch as in that case, certain Members were expelled
from the Parent Body and they were not taken back, which forced
them to form another Association while infact that is not the case here.
The Members of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association are either the Members of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court Bar Association or of the District Bar Association, therefore, in
terms of the Bar Council of India Certificate and Place of Practice
(Verification) Rules, 2015, there is no hindrance in casting their vote
from getting the benefit of the Welfare Scheme handed over by the
Bar Association or under the auspices of the Bar Council of Madhya
Pradesh.
57. Shri Sanjay Verma, learned counsel/President of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court Bar Association, Jabalpur (Respondent No.4
herein) submits that fragmentation of Bar is to weaken the Bar
Association and the Successive Chief Justices can play this aspect so
as to weaken the unity of the Bar as has been mentioned in the
documents filed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar Association
alongwith their Reply. Reading specifically from the representation
made by the then President of the High Court Bar Association, Late
Shri Adarsh Muni Trivedi, Shri Sanjay Verma emphasises on
Paragraph No.2, which reads as under:-
2- ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; dk ;g er gS fd ,d gh LFkku
ij ,d ls vf/kd ckj ,lksfl,'kUl gksus ij dkuwu esa dksbZ
jksd ugha gS] ij ;fn ,d LFkku ij ,d ls vf/kd
ckj&,lksfl,'kUl dks ekU;rk nh xbZ rks ^ckj* dh ,drk
fo[kf.Mr gks tk;saxh vkSj vf/kd ckj ,lksfl,'kUl U;k;
ikfydk dks ckj dh ,drk vkSj ,d:irk dks fo[kf.Mr djus
dk volj nsxhA
58. Reading the aforesaid representation, Shri Sanjay Verma,
learned counsel/President of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar
Association, Jabalpur (Respondent No.4 herein) submits that though
there is no bar in creating a parallel Bar Association but for the same
purpose, creation of a parallel Bar Association will be fraught with
several consequences, which cannot be appreciated without having
vision for a better tomorrow.
59. The issue herein is five fold: (1) Whether this writ petition is
maintainable in the name and style of a Public Interest Litigation? (2)
Whether the premises allotted by the Former Chief Justices could have
been allotted as such without calling for applications from the
interested parties? (3) Whether there existed circumstances for
bifurcation of a Bar and formation of a new Association without
having any recognition from the State Bar Council, which is the
mandatory and statutory requirement? (4) Can Madhya Pradesh High
Court Advocates Bar Association enjoy the patronage of the High
Court as a separate distinct legal entity? (5) Whether the space allotted
in front of Court Room No.20 is in the same class as that allotted in
front of the Copying Section above the Silver Jubilee Hall?
60. In connected Writ Petition No.7551/2016, referring to the
circumstances, which resulted in rendering of the judgment by the
High Court of Judicature at Madras in The Gobichettipalayam
Association Represented by its President K.R.Venkatachalam
versus The Bar Council of Tamil Nadu Represented by its
Secretary, Bar Council Building, High Court Campus, Chennai-
104) (supra), this Court has already distinguished two circumstances
and has held that there is no basis in granting recognition to the
Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association. It is also held
that the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh in terms of its resolution
was not at fault in denying such recognition. Moreover, when the
circumstances were different from the case of Tamil Nadu and also
looking to the fact that all the Members of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court Advocates Bar Association are either Members of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court Bar Association or the District Bar Association
and are thus given benefit of the beneficial schemes floated from time
to time either by the State Bar Council or the Bar Council of India.
61. Thus, coming to the issue of locus in the light of the decision
rendered by the Apex Court in S.P.Gupta versus Union of India &
Another (supra), the ratio of law is that a member of the Public, who
complains of a secondary public injury cannot maintain the action but
here the complainant is not a member of the public complaining of a
secondary public injury but is a member of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court Bar Association claiming alternative relief of either cancellation
of allotment or in the alternative allow the use of the allotted premises
in the hands of all the members of the Bar practising at the High Court
inasmuch as the exclusive access to a premises by a particular class of
Association causes prejudice to the interest of a common man and,
therefore, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in S.P.Gupta versus
Union of India & Another (supra) has no application to the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
62. In Rajeev Suri versus Delhi Development Authority &
Others (supra) of which Paragraph No.550 is read by Shri
B.N.Mishra while giving reference to the judgment of the Apex Court
in Narmada Bachao Andolan versus Union of India Narmada
(2000) 10 SCC 664, it is pointed out that how innovation called Public
Interest Litigation has evolved and what are the duties and checks,
which are to be observed while exercising such jurisdiction. It is held
in Paragraph No.548 that the judicial time is not meant for undertaking
a roving enquiry or to adjudicate upon unsubstantiated flaws or
shortcoming in Policy matters of Government of the Day and politicise
the same to appease the dissenting group of citizens - be it in the guise
of civil society or an outfit but here the facts are different. This Court
is not called upon to adjudicate the political interest or the interest of
the dissenting group of citizens but the call is that whether there can be
a class within a class by allotting an exclusive space to an
unrecognised Association of Advocates, which has failed to get
recognition from the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh.
63. Thus, the writ petition raises an issue of discrimination
amongst two classes of Advocates. One being more privileged to
whom special place was allotted and the one, which was already in
existence since formation of the High Court. Even if the writ petition
is named and styled as Public Interest Litigation, it is dealing with
Advocates per se and, therefore, the Court cannot forsake its
responsibility to adjudicate these claims, which deals with public
policy, propriety and rights of the different Advocates practising in the
High Court.
64. In Kushum Lata versus Union of India & Others (supra),
the facts are different. A Public Interest Litigation was filed by an
intending bidder, who was disallowed to participate in the case of
auction of a mining lease. In that case, for the same cause, the
petitioner had filed two separate petitions, one challenging the auction
filed as PIL and another questioning the legality of the auction and
under such facts and circumstances, the Apex Court has held that
being a personal interest, it was not a Public Interest Litigation.
65. In Union of India & Another versus G.Ganayutham
(supra), the issue was that whether the judicial review powers in
administrative law permit the High Courts or the Administrative
Tribunals to apply the principles of proportionality and while
summarising the current position of proportionality in administrative
law in England and India, it is held by the Apex Court in Paragraph
No.31 that "the Court would consider whether the relevant matters had
not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters have been
taken into account or whether the action was not bonafide. The Court
would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse.
However, the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice
made by the administrator amongst various alternatives open to him
nor could it substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is
the Wednesbury Test".
66. Thus, taking clue from the ratio of law laid down by the
Apex Court in Union of India & Another versus G.Ganayutham
(supra), it is true that this Court cannot substitute its decision to that
of the administrator i.e. Hon'ble the Chief Justice or the Registrar
General, as the case may be, but this Court can examine whether
relevant aspects were taken into account or irrelevant matters were
taken into account and whether the action was bonafide or not. This
becomes further more necessary because the learned counsel for the
High Court has clearly exposited on the instructions of the Registrar
General that there was neither any policy for allotment of such space
nor any rules were operating in this regard and, therefore, the
judgment of Union of India & Another versus G.Ganayutham
(supra) will actually help the petitioner rather than the respondent.
67. In Ranjit Thakur versus Union of India (supra), the
proposition of law is that the judicial review generally speaking is not
directed against a decision but is directed against "decision making
process". In the present case, no material has been brought to the
notice of this Court despite giving an opportunity to learned counsel
for the High Court that what were the factors that had gone into the
decision making for allotment of space to an unrecognised Advocates
Association.
68. This Court is conscious of the fact that it is argued by Shri
Anil Khare, learned Senior Counsel that the Madhya Pradesh High
Court Advocates Bar Association is registered as a Society under the
Madhya Pradesh Society Ragistrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, but issue
herein is different. The issue is that can there exist within the same
premises of the High Court several different groups of Advocates
professing different value system or principles as different
Associations seeking space in competition to each other and when this
aspect is examined, the ratio of law laid down in Ranjit Thakur
versus Union of India (supra), does not prohibit this Court from
examining decision making process.
69. In Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware versus State of
Maharashtra & Others (supra), the Public Interest Litigation came
to be dismissed because a lawyer was caught red handed blackmailing
the respondent Nos.6 & 7 in respect thereof and accepting
"blackmailing money". There is no such averment in the present case
either against Shri Amit Patel or against Shri Satish Verma and,
therefore, the ratio of the judgment laid down in Dattaraj Nathuji
Thaware versus State of Maharashtra & Others (supra) too is not
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
70. In Shanti Bhushan versus Supreme Court of India
through its Registrar & Another (supra), the ratio of law is that
Hon'ble the Chief Justice as Master of Roster in this context cannot be
read as Collegium of 5 Senior Most Judges of the Supreme Court and
while discharging the administrative functions of the Court, Hon'ble
the Chief Justice in his individual capacity has prerogative to
constitute Benches and allocate cases to those Benches in accordance
with the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 and Handbook on Practice and
Procedure and Office Procedure, 2017.
71. Even the aforesaid case is distinguishable on its own facts
inasmuch as Hon'ble the Chief Justice while acting as Master of
Roster is governed by the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 and Handbook
on Practice and Procedure and Office Procedure, 2017 but in the
present case, while exercising his authority to allot a particular space
in favour of an unrecognised Association, Hon'ble the Chief Justice is
not supported with any of the Rules or the practice and procedure and,
therefore, the judgment in Shanti Bhushan versus Supreme Court of
India through its Registrar & Another (supra) will also be of no
avail to the respondents.
72. In Campaign For Judicial Accountability & Reforms
versus Union of India & Another (supra), the issue was also with
regard to constitution of Benches and allocation of cases, which were
to be made in terms of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. Had the High
Court produced any rule or procedure so formulated for allotment of
spaces in the High Court then the things would have been different but
in absence of any rule or procedure or established practice, the matter
of constitution of Benches and allocation of cases as per the Rules,
which authorises Hon'ble the Chief Justice to be the Master of Roster,
cannot be treated at par with the allotment of space in absence of any
rule or established procedure and, therefore, the judgment of
Campaign For Judicial Accountability & Reforms versus Union of
India & Another (supra) too is not applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
73. The ratio of law laid down in Supreme Court Bar
Association versus B.D.Kaushik (supra) has though been termed to
be not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case as
the main theme of the aforesaid judgment is with regard to One Bar
One Vote but what is relevant is the observation made by the Apex
Court in Paragraph No.28 to deal with the present controversy wherein
it is held that "the Court Annexed Bar Associations constitute a
separate class different from other Lawyers' Associations such as
Lawyers' Forum, All India Advocates' Association etc. as they are
always recognized by the concerned Court. The Court Annexed Bar
Associations function as part of the machinery for administration of
justice. As is said often, the Bench and Bar are like two wheels of a
chariot and one cannot function without the other. The Court Annexed
Bar Associations start with the name of the Court as part of the name
of the Bar Association concerned. The very nature of such a Bar
Association necessarily means and implies that it is an Association
representing members regularly practising in the Court and responsible
for proper conduct of its members in the Court and for ensuring proper
assistance to the Court. In consideration thereof, the Court provides
space for Office of the Association, Library and all necessary facilities
like Chambers at concessional rates for members regularly practising
in the Court, Parking Place, Canteen besides several other amenities.
In the functions organized by the Court Annexed Bar Associations, the
Judges participate and exchange views and ascertain the problems, if
any, to solve them and vice-versa. There is thus regular interaction
between the members of the Bar Association and the Judges. The
regular practitioners are treated as Officers of the Court and are shown
due consideration".
74. It is evident that the Apex Court recognized a distinction
between the Court Annexed Bar Associations and the Lawyers
Association/Advocates Association etc. It has admitted that every
Court has one Bar Association like Supreme Court Bar Association,
Tis Hazari District Court Bar Association, etc and when this analogy is
taken into consideration, which is the spirit of the judgment in
Supreme Court Bar Association versus B.D.Kaushik (supra) then
it cannot be said that reference to this judgment by the petitioner is
irrelevant or superfluous.
75. In Sachin Gupta versus Municipal Corporation, Gwalior
& Others (supra), the facts are different. That case was with regard to
an agreement for construction of rope-way project where the petitioner
was an employee of a newspaper group and was resident of Mumbai
and, therefore, a Division Bench of this High Court has held that he
had no locus to file a petition, which was with regard to a policy
decision for development of tourism and recreational amenities and it
is held that the petition suffered from delay and latches but in the
present case, the cause of action is a continuing one.
76. Recently, as late as 2018, additional space was allotted by
the then Chief Justice even after filing of the present Public Interest
Litigation, therefore, the ratio of law laid down by a Division Bench of
this High Court in Sachin Gupta versus Municipal Corporation,
Gwalior & Others (supra) will not be applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
77. Similarly, the verdict of the Apex Court in Bombay Dyeing
& Manufacturing Company Limited versus Bombay
Environmental Action Group (supra) was with regard to the
challenge to the development/redevelopment of sick and/or closed
industrial undertakings involving change in use of large tracks of land
owned by the said undertakings. In that background, where challenge
was that such change of use for commercial purpose may cause
irretrievable damage to the ecology of the city, the Apex Court held
that the Courts are duty bound to determine how grater public interest
may be subserved by striking a balance and maintaining harmony
between various public interests. Hence, the ratio of the judgment in
Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Company Limited versus
Bombay Environmental Action Group (supra) will have no
application to the facts and circumstances of the present case inasmuch
as no issue of environmental protection is involved and here the issue
is whether an unrecognised Bar Association can enjoy patronage of the
High Court by creating a different class.
78. A Division Bench of this High Court in Rajendra Kumar
Gupta versus Shiv Raj Singh Chouhan, Chief Minister of M.P. &
Others (supra) while dealing with the issue of locus standi, has held
that the Public Interest Litigation must be real and genuine public
interest involved in it and it cannot be invoked by body of persons to
further his or their personal cause or satisfy their personal grudge and
enmity. In the aforesaid case, challenge was to starting of the process
of issuance of e-challan with the help of CCTV Footage by the Road
Transport Officer. In that background, it was held that as none of the
persons, to whom fine was imposed, challenged the same or filed any
writ petition aggrieved by the aforesaid action, therefore, the petitioner
was not having any locus to file writ petition.
79. In the present case, again the facts are different. A lawyer
affected by the so called discrimination has come to this Court and,
therefore, it cannot be said that he has no locus to challenge the
decision of the authorities.
80. The ratio of law in Aleemuddin versus State of Uttar
Pradesh & Others (2020) 18 SCC 419 is that in the matter of
administrative discretion as to where a Tehsil Building is to be
constructed is not a matter for the High Court to determine in exercise
of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Thus, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment is that essentially in
administrative matters, a decision is to be taken by the Executive and,
therefore, Public Interest Litigation should not be entertained.
81. However, in the present case, the facts are slightly different.
When examined in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in
Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress versus State of Madhya
Pradesh (supra) where it is held by the Apex Court that allotment of
lands, grant of quotas, permit or licences etc must be founded on a
sound, transparent, discernible and well defined policy. The policy
should be made known to all public by publication in the official
gazette and other recognised modes of publicity. However, the policy
should be implemented in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary
manner.
82. Thus, when tested on the ratio of this judgment then
Aleemuddin versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (supra) being
a different case where it is held by the Apex Court that it is not for the
public to decide where a particular office shall be established, will not
have any application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
83. As far as the ratio of law laid down by the Delhi High Court
in P.K. Dash Advocates & Others Writ Petition (C) No.8106/2010
C.M.Application No.2237/2013 & Other Connected Matters
Decided on 31.5.2016 (supra) is concerned, the issue was in regard to
allotment of one Chamber to one Advocate, that is termed as one
Chamber, One Advocate, One Complex so to ensure accountability in
allotment of Chambers. That issue is not germane to the present
controversy inasmuch as we are not dealing with the ratio of law laid
down by the Apex Court in Supreme Court Bar Association versus
B.D.Kaushik (supra) in regard to 'One Bar One Vote' and consequent
competing claims for spaces in Bar Association, which was posed
before the Delhi High Court in P.K. Dash Advocates & Others Writ
Petition (C) No.8106/2010 C.M.Application No.2237/2013 & Other
Connected Matters Decided on 31.5.2016 (supra) wherein it is noted
that there were more than a dozen Bar Associations in Delhi and under
the then existing system, an Advocate is free to contest any position in
the Executive Committee or for any post as Office Bearer of any
Association resulting in a situation where an individual, who need not
unnecessarily practice in one Court successfully getting elected for the
Association attached to it leading to unrepresented election results as
such individuals have no sense of belongings and would not hesitate to
undermine the functioning of the Courts, whose Bar Associations elect
them. That being not the issue here. There is no need to further
elaborate on the ratio of law laid down in P.K. Dash Advocates &
Others Writ Petition (C) No.8106/2010 C.M.Application
No.2237/2013 & Other Connected Matters Decided on 31.5.2016
(supra) as it will be superfluous and irrelevant for the present.
84. In Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress versus State of
Madhya Pradesh (supra) and Institute of Law, Chandigarh &
Others versus Neeraj Sharma & Others (supra), the Apex Court
has deprecated arbitrary, illegal, unjust, unreasonable, non-transparent,
hasty allotment of spaces to the Institution without following any
objective criteria.
85. Thus, it is evident that when there is no objective criteria for
making such allotment and at the cost of repetition, there is no
hesitation to say that despite opportunity, the Registry of this High
Court failed to bring any objective criteria or the policy for allotment
of spaces or for expanding the space already allotted, it will be against
the public policy and may give rise to competing claims, which cannot
be given a seal of approval looking to the fact that every lawyer has a
liberty to be a member of an Association and on the basis of such
allegiance, to claim space in the High Court, if a policy is not framed
that space in the High Court will be available only to a recognised Bar
Association having recognition from the State Bar Council.
86. In H.C.Puttaswamy & Others versus The Hon'ble Chief
Justice of Karnataka High Court, Bangalore & Others (supra), the
ratio of law is that nobody is an absolute Ruler and even Hon'ble the
Chief Justice in violation of the statutory requirements cannot act
arbitrarily.
87. In Mahesh Chandra versus Regional Manager, U.P.
Financial Corporation (supra), the ratio of law is that public
property should be subject to auction/allotment by following a
transparent procedure. It should afford opportunity to all and there
should not be any element of unjustness, unfairness or
unreasonableness.
88. The judgment rendered by the Apex Court in High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan versus Ramesh Chand Paliwal (supra)
has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
89. The Apex Court in Renu & Others versus District &
Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari & Another (supra) has held that no
authority is above law and no man is above law. Article 13(2) of the
Constitution provides that no law can be enacted, which runs contrary
to the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.
The context in which the aforesaid judgment is delivered was that the
High Court is a constitutional and autonomous authority subordinate to
none and hence, nobody can undermine the constitutional authority of
the High Court while making appointment in judicial/institutional
posts where allegations of illegality, irregularity, corruption, nepotism
& favouritism are made, therefore, all steps should be taken to prevent
menace of backdoor entries of employees, who are subsequently
ordered to be regularised. The powers under Article 229(2) of the
Constitution of India cannot be exercised by Hon'ble the Chief Justice
in unfettered & arbitrary manner and should be made adhering to
Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India and/or such rules as made
by the Legislature.
90. Thus, when the Apex Court has held that the powers of
Hon'ble the Chief Justice are not to be exercised in unfettered &
arbitrary manner, in the matter of appointment of employees in the
High Court and the Courts subordinate thereto including Class-IV
employees, then it is evident that the ratio of law in Renu & Others
versus District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari & Another (supra) is
that any act of exercise of jurisdiction should be and can be tested on
the aspect of arbitrariness, rationality and equality. When the aforesaid
ratio of law is applied though the context is different then allotment of
space without adopting a transparent procedure cannot be said to be
just & proper.
91. The Apex Court in Som Raj & Others versus State of
Haryana & Others (supra) has held that if discretion is exercised
without any principle or without any rule, it is a situation amounting to
the antithesis of Rule of Law. Discretion should be exercised in such a
manner that it is guided by law or governed by the known principles of
rules and not by whim or fancy or caprice of the authority.
92. It is an admitted position as stated by learned counsel for the
High Court that neither there was any rule for allotment nor there is
any procedure prescribed or any procedure was laid down before
exercising the discretion of allotment of space and the High Court
being not above the rule of law as held in Renu & Others versus
District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari & Another (supra), such
action in absence of any prescribed procedure cannot be given a seal
of approval.
93. In Lok Prahari through its General Secretary versus
State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (supra), the ratio of law is that
natural resources, public lands and public goods like Government
Bungalows/Official Residences are public properties and "doctrine of
equality" which emerges from the concepts of justice, fairness must
guide the State in distribution/allocation of the same. In Paragraph
No17, the Apex Court has held that the resolve of "the People of
India" to have a republican form of Government is a manifestation of
the constitutional philosophy that does not recognize any arbitrary
sovereign power and domination of citizens by the State. The
republican liberty and the doctrine of equality is the central feature of
the Indian democracy. In Paragraph No.18, it is held that it is
axiomatic that in a democratic republican Government public servants
entrusted with duties of public nature must act in a manner that reflects
that ultimate authority is vested in the citizens and it is to the citizens
that holders of all public offices are eventually accountable. In
Paragraph No.19, referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in
Vineet Narain & Others versus Union of India & Another (1998) 1
SCC 226, the Apex Court referred to seven principles of Public Life
cited in the Report by Lord Nolan, which includes Selflessness,
Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty &
Leadership. They have been paraphrased in Paragraph No.20 in the
following terms:-
"20.The seven principles of public life stated in
the Report by Lord Nolan are as follows:-
THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC LIFE
Selflessness
Holders of public office should take decisions
solely in terms of the public interest. They
should not do so in order to gain financial or
other material benefits for themselves, their
family, or their friends.
Integrity
Holders of public office should not place
themselves under any financial or other
obligation to outside individuals or organisations
that might influence them in the performance of
their official duties.
Objectivity
In carrying out public business, including
making public appointments, awarding contracts,
or recommending individuals for rewards and
benefits, holders of public office should make
choices on merit.
Accountability
Holders of public office are accountable for their
decisions and actions to the public and must
submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is
appropriate to their office.
Openness
Holders of public office should be as open as
possible about all the decisions and actions that
they take. They should give reasons for their
decisions and restrict information only when the
wider public interest clearly demands.
Honesty
Holders of public office have a duty to declare
any private interests relating to their public
duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts
arising in a way that protects the public interest.
Leadership
Holders of public office should promote and
support these principles by leadership and
example."
94. Thus, it is evident that when the action of the authorities is
tested on the seven principles of Public Life then it fails to pass the test
of Selflessness, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty &
Leadership, therefore, on the touchstone of the judgment of the Apex
Court in Lok Prahari through its General Secretary versus State of
Uttar Pradesh & Others (supra) and in the light of the judgment of
the Apex Court in Vineet Narain & Others versus Union of India &
Another (supra), the decision of allotment of space cannot be said to
be a sound decision covering the cannons of transparency and fairness.
95. In Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress versus State of
Madhya Pradesh (supra), the ratio of law is that in the matter of
allotment of public space, there should be transparency and the State
Agencies/Instrumentalities cannot give largesse to any person
according to the sweet will and whims of the political entities and/or
officers of the State.
96. Thus, the ratio of law in Lok Prahari through its General
Secretary versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (supra), Vineet
Narain & Others versus Union of India & Another (supra) and
Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress versus State of Madhya
Pradesh (supra) is that there should be transparency and objectivity
in allotment of public space.
97. In Sachidanand Pandey & Another versus State of West
Bengal (supra), the ratio of law is that where decision is taken openly
after a long process of discussions, negotiations and consideration of
objections, the plea of absence of hearing to the persons affected
cannot be sustained but in the present case, none of the respondents
including the High Court has brought on record any material to show
that the decision to allot space as was taken by the then Chief Justices
fulfilled any of the requirements of the discussions, negotiations,
consideration of objections etc, therefore, the judgment rendered in
Sachidanand Pandey & Another versus State of West Bengal
(supra) will too not help the respondents to protect their allotment in
absence of any such material being brought on record either by the
High Court Authorities or by the adversely affected parties.
98. In Shayara Bano versus Union of India (supra), the ratio
of law is that merely because a practice is widespread and has been
continued and practiced for long by an overwhelming majority of the
denomination concerned, that by itself cannot make it an essential
practice. Thus, the plea of the respondents that they are in possession
of the space since 2006-2007 and have invested lakhs of rupees will
not create any equitable right unless they are able to show that the
cannons of principles of law as enumerated in Lok Prahari through
its General Secretary versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Others
(supra), Vineet Narain & Others versus Union of India & Another
(supra) and Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress versus State of
Madhya Pradesh (supra) were observed and followed before
granting any benefit in favour of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
Advocates Bar Association.
99. It will not be out of place to mention here that if the Madhya
Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association claims that it has spent
several lakhs of rupees but at the same time, it has also enjoyed the
fruits of that investment for about eighteen years and merely because
those fruits have been reaped, it does not mean that any vested right
has come to exist in favour of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
Advocates Bar Association. It is something like a licencee residing in
a house during tenure of its allotment claiming lease on the basis of
some investment made in the licensed property even after revocation
of licence.
100. The Apex Court in S.Seshachalam versus Bar Council of
Tamil Nadu (supra) has held that Article 14 of the Constitution of
India forbids class legislation but it does not forbid reasonable
classification of persons, objects, and transactions by the legislature
for the purpose of achieving specific ends. The classification,
however, must not be "arbitrary, artificial or evasive" but must be
based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and
reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
legislation.
101. When the aforesaid ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court
in S.Seshachalam versus Bar Council of Tamil Nadu (supra) is
applied to the facts & circumstances of the present case then it is
evident that the space allotted even to the Senior Advocates Council in
front of Court Room No.20 will not form a different class than the
space allotted to the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association in front of the Copying Section. They cannot be treated
differently. The Senior Advocates, being granted a distinction &
honour by the High Court in terms of the rules so framed, are not a
different class and, therefore, the object of granting them an exclusive
space in front of Court Room No.20, can be said to be arbitrary or
illegal.
102. When the aforesaid aspect is tested in the light of the law
laid down in S.Seshachalam versus Bar Council of Tamil Nadu
(supra) then this Court is of the considered opinion that the space
allotted to the Senior Advocates will not be a different class and that
allotment too cannot be protected like the allotment in front of the
Copying Section.
103. In City Industrial Development Corporation through its
Managing Director versus Platinum Entertainment & Others
(supra), the ratio of law is that whenever the Government (which we
can read as authority in the present case) deals with the public
establishment in entering into a contract or issuance of licence, the
Government cannot act arbitrarily on its sweet will but must act in
accordance with law and the action of the Government should not give
the sense of arbitrariness.
104. When the present case is examined on the touchstone of the
judgment rendered by the Apex Court in City Industrial
Development Corporation through its Managing Director versus
Platinum Entertainment & Others (supra) then it is evident that the
authorities of the High Court have failed to satisfy the dual test of not
acting arbitrarily or on its own sweet will and having failed to satisfy
the test of not acting arbitrarily or on its sweet will, the grant of licence
to the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association cannot
be upheld.
105. In Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy versus State of Jammu &
Kashmir (supra) and Raman Dayaram Shetty versus International
Airport Authority & Others (supra), the ratio of law is that the
administrative authority is equally bound by the norms, standards and
procedures laid down by it for others. Disregard of the norms,
standards and procedures would invalidate its action unless based on
some valid principle, which is neither irrational or unreasonable nor
discriminatory.
106. When the High Court on judicial side tests action of the
authorities of the State then irrespective of the fact that the High Court
was acting in exercise of the discretionary power of the then Chief
Justices as submitted by Shri B.N.Mishra, learned counsel appearing
for Respondent No.1/High Court of Madhya Pradesh, through
Registrar General but it was duty bound to keep in mind the norms,
standards and procedures, which it expects the State Instrumentalities
to be followed by itself but unfortunately and admittedly in the name
of the exercise of discretion, none of the aforesaid norms, standards
and procedures of transparency, equality, lack of arbitrariness &
irrationality were given a consideration as there was no discussion, no
background paper nor any discussion was produced by the High Court
to substantiate application of mind on the touchstone of the aforesaid
factors and, therefore, the allotment made in favour of the Respondent
No.3/Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association sans the
norms, standards & procedures so also being violative of the principles
of natural justice & arbitrary, cannot be given a seal of approval.
107. Shri B.N.Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent No.1/Registrar General of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh admits that it was expected of the High Court that before
pointing a finger towards the locus of the petitioner, it should have
introspected with regard to its own conduct in making allotment of a
public space in violation of the law laid down by the Apex Court in
Lok Prahari through its General Secretary versus State of Uttar
Pradesh & Others (supra) and Vineet Narain & Others versus
Union of India (supra) prior to allotment of space to the Madhya
Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association in the year 2006-2007.
108. In reference to the Judgment of Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware
versus State of Maharashtra & Others (supra) on which reliance is
placed by Shri B.N.Mishra, learned counsel appearing for Respondent
No.1/High Court of Madhya Pradesh, through Registrar General to
point out that a Public Interest Litigation for an oblique motive is not
maintainable but neither the High Court nor the Madhya Pradesh High
Court Advocates Bar Association, Jabalpur could substantiate any
oblique motive though lot of personal allegations have been levelled
against Petitioner Shri Amit Patel pointing out that he hardly had any
appearance before the High Court etc but none of them have been
substantiated and merely saying that there are only 11 appearances in
last 8 years from 2016 to 2024 made by Shri Amit Patel, Advocate,
Petitioner in Person, is not sufficient to prove any oblique motive. A
request for equality, a quest for removal of arbitrariness &
unreasonableness even in the hands of a stranger, cannot be
discouraged to protect certain interests, which have been created
because that suits a class of the Society even though it is in violation
of the seven cardinal rules as enumerated in Vineet Narain & Others
versus Union of India (supra).
109. The Apex Court in State of West Bengal & Others versus
Debasish Mukherjee & Others (supra) has held that the power of
Hon'ble the Chief Justice to grant premature increment is justiciable
order passed by the Chief Justice without reference to exceptional
circumstances, cannot be presumed to be under Rule 23 of the High
Court Rules. It is held that "We may note that in a democracy,
governed by rule of law, where arbitrariness in any form is eschewed,
no Government or authority has the right to do whatever it pleases.
Where rule of law prevails, there is nothing like unfettered discretion
or unaccountable action. Even prerogative power is subject to judicial
review, but to a very limited extent. The extent, depth and intensity of
judicial review may depend upon the subject matter of judicial
review".
110. The Apex Court in Gopal Jha versus Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India has held that there is no fundamental right or any
statutory right for allotment of Chambers in any Court Premises and
when this aspect is taken into consideration then the Madhya Pradesh
High Court Advocates Bar Association having failed to make out
violation of any fundamental right or any statutory right arising out of
the revocation of licence or for a prayer to revoke the licence having
been not issued in compliance of the procedure required for fair play
and having been issued in violation of the principles of natural justice
cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal.
111. There is substance in the argument put forth by Shri Satish
Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner that on 2.11.2023, the O.B.C
Advocates Welfare Association had also staked its claim for allotment
of space, hall, electricity, water and other facilities as noted by a
Coordinate Bench of this Hon'ble High Court on 18.12.2023 and such
facilities cannot be granted to an unrecognised body and if any order is
passed in favour of respondent No.3/Madhya Pradesh High Court
Advocates Bar Association then it is likely to open floodgates for other
Associations.
112. When the case at hand is examined on the aforesaid
touchstone then the law laid down by the Apex Court in
Gobichettipalayam Association Represented By its President
K.R.Venkatachalam versus The Bar Council of Tamil Nadu
Represented By its Secretary, Bar Council Building, High Court
Campus (supra) being distinguishable on its own facts, as mentioned
above, has no application to the facts & circumstances of the present
case and the purpose of the Court Annexed Bar Association being to
protect the genuine interest of its members and also to help its
members to gather benefits of the beneficial legislation and that being
already provided to all members of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
Advocates Bar Association, as they already happened to be members
of the either High Court Bar Association or the District Bar
Association, then in terms of the law laid down by the Apex Court
particularly in Paragraph No.28 of the Apex Court in Supreme Court
Bar Association versus B.D.Kaushik (supra), discussing the
distinction between the Court Annexed Bar Rooms and other Lawyers
Association, Respondent/Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association may be an Association registered under the Madhya
Pradesh Society Ragistrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973 but it cannot be given
the status of a Court Annexed Bar Association and, therefore, there
being no provision of Two Court Annexed Bar Associations
competing for space and other recognition, when this Court has
already declared the act of State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh in
not granting recognition to the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates
Bar Association to be just & proper in terms of its resolution, which
reflects its philosophy to maintain the integrity the Court Annexed Bar
Associations, we are of the considered opinion that a Public Interest
Litigation is maintainable and when decision of allotment of space on
licence to the Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association
is examined, that being not made in exercise of cardinal rules of
Selflessness, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty &
Leadership as observed by the Apex Court in as observed by the Apex
Court in Vineet Narain & Others versus Union of India & Another
(supra) and being contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court in Lok
Prahari through its General Secretary versus State of Uttar
Pradesh & Others (eights judgments), this writ petition deserves to
and is hereby allowed. It is held that the licence granted to the
Respondent No.3/Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association being improper & arbitrary deserves to and is hereby
revoked.
113. Thus, the issues, which were made in Paragraph No.59 of
this order, are answered in the following terms:-
Issue No.(1) Whether this writ petition is maintainable in the
name and style of a Public Interest Litigation is answered in
affirmative.
Issue No.(2) Whether the premises allotted by the Former Chief
Justices could have been allotted as such without calling for
applications from the interested parties is answered in negative
holding that the Former Chief Justices were in error in not
following the procedure.
Issue No.(3) Whether there existed circumstances for bifurcation
of a Bar and formation of a new Association without having any
recognition from the State Bar Council, which is the mandatory
and statutory requirement is answered in the terms that no such
circumstances could be highlighted necessitating formation of a
New Association.
Issue No. (4) Can Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar
Association enjoy the patronage of the High Court as a separate
distinct legal entity is answered in negative.
Issue No. (5) Whether the space allotted in front of Court Room
No.20 is in the same class as that allotted in front of the Copying
Section above the Silver Jubilee Hall is answered in the terms
that the space allotted in front of Court Room No.20 to the Senior
Advocates being in the same class will fall within the same
category as the space allotted in front of the Copying Section
above the Silver Jubilee Hall to the Madhya Pradesh High Court
Advocates Bar Association and thus that allotment too cannot be
given a seal of approval.
114. In above terms, this writ petition is disposed off.
(VIVEK AGARWAL) (AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH)
JUDGE JUDGE
amit
