Kriparam vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
2024 Latest Caselaw 34 MP

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Kriparam vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 January, 2024

Author: Sheel Nagu

Bench: Sheel Nagu, Hirdesh

                                    1                                 CRR-3859-2023




      IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                            AT JABALPUR
                                  BEFORE
            HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SHEEL NAGU
                                        &
               HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE HIRDESH
             CRIMINAL REVISION No. 3859 of 2023
       BETWEEN:-

       KRIPARAM S/O GHANSHYAM AADIWASI, AGED
       ABOUT 45 YEARS, OCCUPATION: READER TO
       THE SDM JATARA, TIKAMGARH, R/O VILLAGE
       JHAJNAR MOHALLA, WARD NO 14, NEAR
       PRIMARY SCHOOL, TEHSIL JATARA, DISTRICT
       TIKAMGARH (M.P.)

                                                                    .....PETITIONER

       (BY SHRI VISHAL DANIEL - ADVOCATE)

       AND

       THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
       SPECIAL     POLICE      ESTABLISHMENT
       LOKAYUKTA, DISTRICT SAGAR (M.P.)

                                                                  .....RESPONDENT


(RESPONDENT BY SHRI ABHIJEET AWASTHI - ADVOCATE WITH SHRI
ROHIT RAGHUWANSHI - ADVOCATE)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserved on                   :       16.10.2023
Pronounced on                 :         02.01.2024

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      2                         CRR-3859-2023




      This petition having been heard and reserved for orders, coming on
for pronouncement this day, Hon'ble Shri Justice Sheel Nagu pronounced
the following:
                                    ORDER

The revisional powers of this Court u/S.397 r/w Section 401 of Cr.P.C. are invoked to assail the order dated 07.08.2023 by which charges have been framed against the petitioner/accused for offence punishable u/S.7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short 'P.C.Act').

2. Learned counsel for petitioner is heard on the question of admission so also final disposal.

3. Learned counsel for respondent is also heard.

4. The following two grounds have been raised in support of the aforesaid challenge:

(i) The impugned order of framing of charge is non-speaking.

(ii) Bare perusal of the prosecution story read with the audio tape transcript does not reveal commission of any cognizable offence punishable under the P.C. Act.

5. As regards the first ground of the impugned order being non-speaking, this Court has no manner of doubt that the impugned order does not assign any reason reflecting the mind of the learned trial Judge for his satisfaction that a case of strong suspicion arises against the petitioner/accused of having committed offence punishable u/S.7 of P.C. Act. 5.1 However, since the other ground of allegations not disclosing any cognizable offence punishable under the P.C. Act is also raised, it would be a futile exercise to quash the impugned order merely on the ground of being 3 CRR-3859-2023

non-speaking, without entering into the tenability of the second ground.

6. The prosecution story as spelt out from the impugned charge sheet which is on record, reveals that the petitioner/accused was posted as Assistant Grade III in the office of S.D.O. Jatara, District Tikamgarh at the relevant point of time. The complainant who was suspended Patwari working under the territorial jurisdiction of the S.D.O, Jatara, was aggrieved by his prolonged suspension and thus had preferred various representations but to no avail. This impelled the complainant to approach petitioner/accused to put in a word to the SDO for revoking his suspension. The allegation made by the complainant is that an amount of Rs.20,000/- was demanded as bribe by the petitioner/accused for getting the work done. The complainant declined to accede to the said request and approached the Lokayukta Organization and lodged complaint. The complainant was provided with a tape recorder after completing all formalities and was asked to record the conversation which he intends to have with petitioner/accused in near future. The complainant approached the petitioner/accused on 30th June, 2021 and had conversation withpetitioner/accused which was surreptitiously recorded by the complainant.

6.1 After recording conversation, the Tape Recorder was handed back to the Prosecuting Agency which completed the necessary formalities, conducted and concluded the investigation and filed the charge sheet, whereafter the charges as impugned herein were framed. 6.2 A bare perusal of the audio Tape transcript reveals that though there is no direct allegation against petitioner/accused but certain utterances made by 4 CRR-3859-2023

petitioner/accused create suspicion as regards petitioner having demanded bribe from the complainant.

7. Once this Court gets an impression that there is suspicion as regards involvement of petitioner in the crime alleged, this Court declines to enter into the nitty-gritties of this suspicion being strong enough or not to sustain a charge and thus leaves it to the trial Court to marshal the evidence and thereafter come to an appropriate conclusion.

8. This Court while exercising limited jurisdiction available u/S.397 r/w Section 401 of Cr.P.C. is guided by various decisions of Apex Court including Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander and another, (2012) 9 SCC 460, relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced below for ready reference and convenience:

"27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:

27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, 5 CRR-3859-2023

particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not.

If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.

27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.

27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.

6 CRR-3859-2023

27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a "civil wrong" with no "element of criminality"

and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more 7 CRR-3859-2023

inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.

27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.

27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence."

9. The law as laid down by the Apex Court is to the effect that interference in such matters is an exception whereas non-interference is a rule. The limited window which is available for interference by the statutory provision and as well as myriads of pronouncements of Apex Court, is limited to the extent that where strong suspicion arises of implication of 8 CRR-3859-2023

accused in the crime alleged then this Court in its revisional jurisdiction should stay its hands.

9.1 In the instant case though there is no direct evidence against petitioner which may show that if the material/evidence collected goes uncontroverted then conviction is inevitable but the complaint of the complainant read with the audio transcript creates suspicion of involvement of petitioner. The degree of suspicion may or may not be strong enough but that by itself cannot compel this Court to interfere in its limited revisional jurisdiction. If this Court tends to interfere in these facts and circumstances, it would stifle the trial before it has begun. If that happens then this court would be usurping the jurisdiction vested in the trial Court. This would not be in the interest of justice.

9.2 In view of above discussion, this Court declines interference. 9.3 Any observation or finding recorded herein are only for the purpose of deciding this matter and shall not prejudice the rights and liabilities of the rival parties before the trial Court.

10. Accordingly, criminal revision stands dismissed.

         (SHEEL NAGU)                                                    (HIRDESH)
            JUDGE                                                          JUDGE

DV

DINESH VERMA
2024.01.02 18:50:20
+05'30'