Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Mool Kawar Mehta vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 26 February, 2024
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1 M.Cr.C.No.2964/2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
ON THE 26th OF FEBRUARY, 2024
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 2964 of 2024
BETWEEN:-
1. SMT. MOOL KAWAR MEHTA W/O SHRI
RAKESH MEHTA, AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
R/O H NO 202 FIRST MAIN ROAD TULSI
ENCLAVE SRIRAMPURAM OKALIPURAM
MAIN ROAD BEHIND MANTRI MALL
BENGLAURU (KARNATAKA)
2. SHRI RAKESH MEHTA S/O LATE SHRI
MAHADEV CHAND MEHTA, AGED ABOUT
58 YEARS, R/O H. NO. 202 FIRST MAIN ROAD
TULSI ENCLAVE SRIRAMPURAM
OKALIPURAM MAIN ROAD BEHIND
MANTRI MALL BENGALURU KARNATAKA
(KARNATAKA)
3. SHRI SUMIT MEHTA S/O SHRI RAKESH
MEHTA, AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS, R/O H.
NO. 202 FIRST MAIN ROAD TULSI ENCLAVE
SRIRAMPURAM OKALIPURAM MAIN ROAD
BEHIND MANTRI MALL BENGALURU
KARNATAKA (KARNATAKA)
.....APPLICANTS
(BY SHRI NITIN AGRAWAL - ADVOCATE )
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
THROUGH POLICE STATION MAHILA
THANA DISTRICT BHOPAL (MADHYA
PRADESH)
2. BHAVA PATEL D/O LEELADHAR PATEL,
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, R/O G-9/4 NEW
NARMADA BHAWAN TULSI NAGAR LINK
ROAD BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI K.S.BAGHEL - GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE )
...................................................................................................
2 M.Cr.C.No.2964/2024
This petition coming on for admission this day, the court passed
the following:
ORDER
This application under section 482 of CrPC has been filed
seeking the following reliefs :-
"(i) To quash the impugned Chargesheet
no.01/2022 dated 04/11/2022 registered at Police
Station-Mahila Thana, District Bhopal (M.P.) for the
offence u/s 498-A, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
19\860 and section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961 and other consequential proceedings
arising out of the said Chargesheet/Final Report
bearing RCT no.14430/2022 pending before Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Bhopal (M.P.)(EXHIBIT
A/1) in the interest of justice.
(ii) To pass any other order which this Hon'ble
Court may deem just and proper, in the interest of
justice."
2. The undisputed facts are that the applicant no.1 is the mother-
in-law, applicant no.2 is the father-in-law and applicant no.3 is the
elder brother in-law of respondent no.2. By this application, the
applicants are seeking quashment of FIR, registered for offence
under section 498-A, 506, 34 and section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act.
3. According to the prosecution case, the respondent no.2 lodged
an FIR on the allegations that on 25.11.2020 she got married to
Hitesh Mehta as per Hindu rites and rituals. Immediately after her
marriage, the applicants and husband of respondent no.2 started
harassing her for want of dowry. They used to pass comments on
every day. They were not keeping her properly in the matrimonial
house. They were not providing food to her. Every day taunts were
being passed on account of bringing no dowry. Her husband also
used to quarrel with her on daily basis. Since she was in a private
job, therefore, she was giving 50% of her salary to the in-laws, in
spite of that the applicants and her elder brother in-law were
demanding more money. They were insisting that she should bring
Rs.7,00,000/- from her parents because less dowry has been given.
They were also instigating her husband to demand a car and money.
When she refused to accede to their demand, then she was tortured
mentally by abusing as well as extending a threat to her life. Her
mother-in-law also used to abuse her on daily basis. Even when she
narrated the incident to her father, he also tried to convince them but
they did not accept. The applicants are insisting that either the
respondent no.2 should bring Rs.7,00,000/- and a car, otherwise not
only she will not be allowed to stay back in her matrimonial house
but even they would remarry her husband i.e. Hitesh Mehta.
Although she was bearing all the atrocities with an intention that one
day the things would improve, but she has been turned out of her
matrimonial house.
4. Challenging the FIR lodged by the respondent no.2, it is
submitted by counsel for applicants that it is well established
principle of law that unless and until there are specific allegations
against the near and dear relatives of husband of the complainant,
they should not be compelled to undergo the ordeal of the criminal
trial. In fact the complainant was residing separately from the
applicants. The office address of the complainant was changed from
Bangalore to Mumbai and, therefore, she demanded that her husband
should also shift to Mumbai after leaving his parents at Bangalore.
Since her husband was working in Bangalore and did not want to
leave his parents for the reason that applicant no.1 is a heart-patient
and has undergone Angioplasty in past and his mother (applicant
no.2) is a thyroid and Asthma patient and he himself is also suffering
from Trigeminal Neuralgia. He also tried to make the complainant
understand about the situation but she did not improve her behavior
and ultimately the complainant has come back to Bhopal on
12.02.2022. The complainant is living in her parental home for the
last 8 months without any rhyme or reason. The allegations leveled
against them are false. The applicants are innocent persons. Even
otherwise, all the major atrocities, if accepted, were committed at
Bangalore and, therefore, FIR at Bhopal is misuse of legal
procedure.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the applicants.
6. Whether the applicants were residing separately from the
complainant and her husband, cannot be adjudicated by this Court
while exercising power under section 482 of CrPC. It is a matter of
evidence, which has to be proved by the applicants by leading cogent
evidence before the trial court.
7. There are specific allegations against the applicants of demand
of dowry and cruelty. It is the case of the respondent no.2 that on
account of demand of dowry, not only she was mentally and
physically harassed but she was turned out of her matrimonial house.
Why a girl, who was in a private job, would leave her matrimonial
house, can only be considered and decided by the trial court.
8. Whether the defence taken by the applicants in the present
case are correct or whether the allegations made by the complainant
are correct, are disputed questions of fact, which cannot be decided
unless and until their evidence is tested on the anvil of cross-
examination. The applicant no.2 is a lady and being a lady it is
expected from a woman that she would protect another woman i.e.
her daughter-in-law and if the applicant no.2 has failed in
discharging her duties, then it is matter which is to be introspected
by the applicant no.2 also.
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Meera Vs. State By The
Inspector of Police Thiruvotriyur Police Station Chennai,
reported in (2022) 3 SCC 93, has held that "when an offence has
been committed by a woman by meeting out cruelty to another
woman, i.e., the daughter-in-law, it becomes a more serious offence.
Such woman deserves no leniency. Mother-in-law must protect
daughter-in-law."
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh and Others reported in (2015) 11 SCC
260 has held as under:-
"10. The law relating to quashing is well
settled. If the allegations are absurd or do not
make out any case or if it can be held that
there is abuse of process of law, the
proceedings can be quashed but if there is a
triable case the court does not go into
reliability or otherwise of the version or the
counter-version. In matrimonial cases, the
courts have to be cautious when omnibus
allegations are made particularly against
relatives who are not generally concerned
with the affairs of the couple. We may refer
to the decisions of this Court dealing with the
issue.
11. Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC
460 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 687, it was observed : (SCC pp. 482-84,
para 27)
"27.1. Though there are no limits
of the powers of the Court under
Section 482 of the Code but the
more the power, the more due
care and caution is to be
exercised in invoking these
powers. The power of quashing
criminal proceedings,
particularly, the charge framed in
terms of Section 228 of the Code
should be exercised very
sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in
the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the
test as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as
made from the record of the case
and the documents submitted
therewith prima facie establish
the offence or not. If the
allegations are so patently absurd
and inherently improbable that no
prudent person can ever reach
such a conclusion and where the
basic ingredients of a criminal
offence are not satisfied then the
Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not
unduly interfere. No meticulous
examination of the evidence is
needed for considering whether
the case would end in conviction
or not at the stage of framing of
charge or quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such
power is absolutely essential to
prevent patent miscarriage of
justice and for correcting some
grave error that might be
committed by the subordinate
courts even in such cases, the
High Court should be loath to
interfere, at the threshold, to
throttle the prosecution in
exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express
legal bar enacted in any of the
provisions of the Code or any
specific law in force to the very
initiation or institution and
continuance of such criminal
proceedings, such a bar is
intended to provide specific
protection to an accused.
27.6. The Court has a duty to
balance the freedom of a person
and the right of the complainant
or prosecution to investigate and
prosecute the offender.
27.7. The process of the court
cannot be permitted to be used
for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior
purpose.
27.8. Where the allegations made
and as they appeared from the
record and documents annexed
therewith to predominantly give
rise and constitute a 'civil wrong'
with no 'element of criminality'
and does not satisfy the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence,
the court may be justified in
quashing the charge. Even in
such cases, the court would not
embark upon the critical analysis
of the evidence.
27.9. Another very significant
caution that the courts have to
observe is that it cannot examine
the facts, evidence and materials
on record to determine whether
there is sufficient material on the
basis of which the case would
end in a conviction; the court is
concerned primarily with the
allegations taken as a whole
whether they will constitute an
offence and, if so, is it an abuse
of the process of court leading to
injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor
is the court called upon to hold a
full-fledged enquiry or to
appreciate evidence collected by
the investigating agencies to find
out whether it is a case of
acquittal or conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give
rise to a civil claim and also
amount to an offence, merely
because a civil claim is
maintainable, does not mean that
a criminal complaint cannot be
maintained.
27.12. In exercise of its
jurisdiction under Section 228
and/or under Section 482, the
Court cannot take into
consideration external materials
given by an accused for reaching
the conclusion that no offence
was disclosed or that there was
possibility of his acquittal. The
Court has to consider the record
and documents annexed
therewith by the prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an
exception to the rule of
continuous prosecution. Where
the offence is even broadly
satisfied, the Court should be
more inclined to permit
continuation of prosecution
rather than its quashing at that
initial stage. The Court is not
expected to marshal the records
with a view to decide
admissibility and reliability of the
documents or records but is an
opinion formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet,
report under Section 173(2) of
the Code, suffers from
fundamental legal defects, the
Court may be well within its
jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of
the above, where the Court finds
that it would amount to abuse of
process of the Code or that the
interest of justice favours,
otherwise it may quash the
charge. The power is to be
exercised ex debito justitiae i.e.
to do real and substantial justice
for administration of which
alone, the courts exist.
[Ref. State of State of
W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha,
(1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC
(Cri) 283, Madhavrao Jiwajirao
Scindia v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1
SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri)
234, Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 :
1993 SCC (Cri) 36, Rupan Deol
Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill,
(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC
(Cri) 1059, G. Sagar Suri v. State
of U.P. , Ajay Mitra v. State of
M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003
SCC (Cri) 703, Pepsi Foods
Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate,
(1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC
(Cri) 1400, State of U.P. v. O.P.
Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 705 :
1996 SCC (Cri) 497, Ganesh
Narayan Hegde v. S.
Bangarappa, (1995) 4 SCC 41 :
1995 SCC (Cri) 634, Zandu
Pharmaceutical Works
Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque,
(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC
(Cri) 283, Medchl Chemicals &
Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E.
Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 615, Shakson
Belthissor v. State of Kerala,
(2009) 14 SCC 466 : (2010) 1
SCC (Cri) 1412, V.V.S. Rama
Sharma v. State of U.P., (2009) 7
SCC 234 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)
356, Chunduru Siva Ram
Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu,
(2009) 11 SCC 203 : (2009) 3
SCC (Cri) 1297, Sheonandan
Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987)
1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri)
82, State of Bihar v. P.P.
Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222
: 1992 SCC (Cri) 192, Lalmuni
Devi v. State of Bihar, (2001) 2
SCC 17 : 2001 SCC (Cri)
275, M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh,
(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC
(Cri) 19, Savita v. State of
Rajasthan, (2005) 12 SCC 338 :
(2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571 and S.M.
Datta v. State of Gujarat, (2001)
7 SCC 659 : 2001 SCC (Cri)
1361 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1201.]
27.16. These are the principles
which individually and
preferably cumulatively (one or
more) be taken into consideration
as precepts to exercise of
extraordinary and wide plenitude
and jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code by the High
Court. Where the factual
foundation for an offence has
been laid down, the courts should
be reluctant and should not
hasten to quash the proceedings
even on the premise that one or
two ingredients have not been
stated or do not appear to be
satisfied if there is substantial
compliance with the
requirements of the offence."
* * *
14. From a reading of the complaint, it cannot
be held that even if the allegations are taken
as proved no case is made out. There are
allegations against Respondent 2 and his
parents for harassing the complainant which
forced her to leave the matrimonial home.
Even now she continues to be separated from
the matrimonial home as she apprehends lack
of security and safety and proper environment
in the matrimonial home. The question
whether the appellant has in fact been
harassed and treated with cruelty is a matter
of trial but at this stage, it cannot be said that
no case is made out. Thus, quashing of
proceedings before the trial is not permissible.
15. The decisions referred to in the judgment
of the High Court are distinguishable.
In Neelu Neelu Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10
SCC 184 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286, the
parents of the husband were too old. The
husband Rajesh had died and main allegations
were only against him. This Court found no
cogent material against the other accused.
In Manoj Mahavir Prasad Khaitan v. Ram
Gopal Poddar, (2010) 10 SCC 673 : (2011) 1
SCC (Cri) 94, the appellant before this Court
was the brother of the daughter-in-law of the
accused who lodged the case against the
accused for theft of jewellery during
pendency of earlier Section 498-A IPC case.
This Court found the said case to be absurd.
In Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P., (2012) 10
SCC 741 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 212 : (2013) 1
SCC (Cri) 120, case was against brother and
sister of the husband. Divorce had taken place
between the parties. The said cases neither
purport to nor can be read as laying down any
inflexible rule beyond the principles of
quashing which have been mentioned above
and applied to the facts of the cases therein
which are distinguishable. In the present case
the factual matrix is different from the said
cases. Applying the settled principles, it
cannot be held that there is no triable case
against the accused."
11. Even otherwise in the light of judgments passed by the
Supreme Court in the cases of XYZ v. State of Gujarat reported in
(2019) 10 SCC 337, State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S. Martin & Ors.
reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718, Ajay Kumar Das v. State of
Jharkhand, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319, Mohd. Akram
Siddiqui v. State of Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350, State of
A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226, M.
Srikanth v. State of Telangana, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 373,
CBI v. Arvind Khanna reported in (2019) 10 SCC 686, State of
MP Vs. Kunwar Singh by order dated 30.06.2021 passed in Cr.A.
No.709/2021, Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2018)
5 SCC 678, Teeja Devi v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 15
SCC 221, State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan, reported in
(2012) 4 SCC 547, S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal reported in (2010)
5 SCC 600, Sangeeta Agrawal v. State of U.P., reported in (2019)
2 SCC 336, Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9
SCC 460, Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri
Satyanarayana Reddy reported in (2012) 12 SCC 437 and M.N.
Ojha v. Alok Kumar Srivastav reported in (2009) 9 SCC 682, this
Court can quash the proceedings only if the uncontroverted
allegations do not make out an offence. From the plain reading of
FIR, it cannot be said that no cognizable offence is made out.
12. So far as the territorial jurisdiction is concerned, it is suffice to
mention here that compelling a married woman to live in her parental
home on account of cruelty is a continuous offence of cruelty. The
Supreme Court in the case of Rupali Devi v. State of U.P., reported
in (2019) 5 SCC 384 has held as under:-
"14. "Cruelty" which is the crux of the offence under
Section 498-A IPC is defined in Black's Law
Dictionary to mean "the intentional and malicious
infliction of mental or physical suffering on a living
creature, esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage
(abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)". Cruelty can
be both physical or mental cruelty. The impact on the
mental health of the wife by overt acts on the part of
the husband or his relatives; the mental stress and
trauma of being driven away from the matrimonial
home and her helplessness to go back to the same
home for fear of being ill-treated are aspects that
cannot be ignored while understanding the meaning
of the expression "cruelty" appearing in Section 498-
A of the Penal Code. The emotional distress or
psychological effect on the wife, if not the physical
injury, is bound to continue to traumatise the wife
even after she leaves the matrimonial home and takes
shelter at the parental home. Even if the acts of
physical cruelty committed in the matrimonial house
may have ceased and such acts do not occur at the
parental home, there can be no doubt that the mental
trauma and the psychological distress caused by the
acts of the husband including verbal exchanges, if
any, that had compelled the wife to leave the
matrimonial home and take shelter with her parents
would continue to persist at the parental home.
Mental cruelty borne out of physical cruelty or
abusive and humiliating verbal exchanges would
continue in the parental home even though there may
not be any overt act of physical cruelty at such
place."
13. This Court in the case of Amar Singh vs. Smt. Vimla
decided on 22.06.2021 in Criminal Revision No.2376/2020
(Gwalior Bench) has held that compelling a married woman to live
in her parental home amounts to cruelty.
14. Since the respondent no.2 is residing in Bhopal, therefore,
Police Station Mahila Thana, Bhopal also has territorial jurisdiction
to investigate the matter. There are specific allegations against the
applicants and they cannot be termed as general, omnibus or vague.
15. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion
that in the light of limited scope of interference, no case is made out
warranting interference.
16. The application fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G.S.AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
TG/-
TRUPTI GUNJAL
2024.03.06 15:00:47
+05'30'
