Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sandeep Shrivastava vs Chando Bai on 23 February, 2024
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1 M.Cr.C No.37369/2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
ON THE 23rd OF FEBRUARY, 2024
MISCELLANEOUS CRIMINAL CASE No.37369 of 2019
BETWEEN:-
SANDEEP SHRIVASTAVA S/O MADAN
SHRIVASTAVA, AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: TEACHER IN GOVT. PRIMARY
SCHOOL RAHLON KHURD TAH. LAKHNADAUN
DISTT: SEONI R/O 139 EKTA VIHAR
GUPTESHWAR GANESH MANDIR RATAN NAGAR
JABALPUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPLICANT
(BY SHRI PRAMOD SINGH TOMAR - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. CHANDO BAI W/O BABULAL, AGED ABOUT
55 YEARS, R/O VILLAGE RAHLON KHURD
P.S. DHUMA, TAH. LAKHNADAUN DISTT.
SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. S.K. RATLE MANAGER STPURA KSHETRIYA
GRAMIN BANK, BRANCH LAKHNADAUN,
DISTT. SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(NONE)
............................................................................................................................................
This application coming on for admission this day, the court passed
the following:
ORDER
This application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed for
quashment of criminal Complaint Case No.352/2015 pending before the
Court of A.C.J.M. Lakhnadaun, District Seoni on the ground that
cognizance was taken after the period of limitation had expired and
applicant who is working as Teacher in Government Primary School
Rahlon Khurd, Tahsil Lakhnadaun, District Seoni is having no nexus in
the matter. He has not done anything which may amount to committing
forgery with the complainant.
2. Heard learned counsel for the applicant.
3. Respondent No.1 has filed a criminal complaint for offence under
Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 120B of IPC on the allegations that she is
the owner of 5.150 hectares of land situated in village Rahlon Khurd
bearing khasra Nos.101/1, 190, 192 and 320. It is a joint property of
respondent No.1 along with her sons Vishwanath and Baijnath and their
names are also recorded in the revenue records. For development of
farming, respondent No.1 was in need of money and accordingly she
gave an application for the said purposes and also presented the
documents relevant for the same. On 3-4 occasions she went to the Bank
to verify the status of her application but every time it was informed by
respondent No.2, who was working as Branch Manager, that the loan
will be sanctioned from Union Bank of India Dhuma branch and the
documents filed by her are irrelevant, therefore he should be allowed to
retain the same. The aforesaid incident took place sometimes in the year
2007. In the last year when recovery officer came, then he informed that
there is a loan of Rs.2,90,000/- against the complainant. Respondent
No.1/complainant informed that she had never taken any loan of
Rs.2,90,000/- nor had received any amount and forged recovery
proceedings have been initiated by the Bank. It was further alleged that
about 2 months back she came to know that the applicant in connivance
with the officers of the Bank have withdrawn an amount of
Rs.2,90,000/- and by forging and concocting the documents. It was
alleged that respondent No.1/ complainant had not taken any loan and
applicant as well as respondent No.2 in connivance with each other
withdrew the aforesaid amount and distributed amongst themselves.
When the complainant obtained the documents under Right to
Information Act then she came to know that the documents were
containing forged signature of the complainant. Accordingly, the
complaint was lodged.
4. It is submitted by counsel for the applicant that applicant had
nothing to do with fraudulent transactions. Allegations are false and
Court below has committed material illegality by taking cognizance of
complaint against the applicant. Accordingly, it is prayed that the entire
criminal proceedings be quashed.
5. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the applicant.
6. Before considering the allegations made in the complaint, this
Court would like to consider the scope of interference under Section 482
of Cr.P.C.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of XYZ v. State of Gujarat
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 337 has held as under :
14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and
after perusing the impugned order and other material
placed on record, we are of the view that the High Court
exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction conferred under
Section 482 CrPC, and quashed the proceedings. Even
before the investigation is completed by the
investigating agency, the High Court entertained the writ
petition, and by virtue of interim order granted by the
High Court, further investigation was stalled. Having
regard to the allegations made by the
appellant/informant, whether the 2nd respondent by
clicking inappropriate pictures of the appellant has
blackmailed her or not, and further the 2nd respondent
has continued to interfere by calling Shoukin Malik or
not are the matters for investigation. In view of the
serious allegations made in the complaint, we are of the
view that the High Court should not have made a roving
inquiry while considering the application filed under
Section 482 CrPC. Though the learned counsel have
made elaborate submissions on various contentious
issues, as we are of the view that any observation or
findings by this Court, will affect the investigation and
trial, we refrain from recording any findings on such
issues. From a perusal of the order of the High Court, it
is evident that the High Court has got carried away by
the agreement/settlement arrived at, between the parties,
and recorded a finding that the physical relationship of
the appellant with the 2nd respondent was consensual.
When it is the allegation of the appellant, that such
document itself is obtained under threat and coercion, it
is a matter to be investigated. Further, the complaint of
the appellant about interference by the 2nd respondent
by calling Shoukin Malik and further interference is also
a matter for investigation. By looking at the contents of
the complaint and the serious allegations made against
2nd respondent, we are of the view that the High Court
has committed error in quashing the proceedings.
(Underline supplied)
8. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S.
Martin & Ors. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718 has held as under:-
"7. In our view the assessment made by the High Court
at a stage when the investigation was yet to be
completed, is completely incorrect and uncalled for
..........."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Das v. State of
Jharkhand, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319 has held as under :
12. The counsel appearing for the appellant also drew
our attention to the same decision which is relied upon
in the impugned judgment by the High Court i.e. State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. In the said decision, this
Court held that it may not be possible to lay down any
specific guidelines or watertight compartment as to
when the power under Section 482 CrPC could be or is
to be exercised. This Court, however, gave an
exhaustive list of various kinds of cases wherein such
power could be exercised. In para 103 of the said
judgment, this Court, however, hastened to add that as a
note of caution it must be stated that the power of
quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases for the Court would not be justified
in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
first information report or in the complaint and that the
extraordinary or the inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its
whim or caprice.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v.
State of Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350 has held as under :
5. Ordinarily and in the normal course, the High Court
when approached for quashing of a criminal proceeding
will not appreciate the defence of the accused; neither
would it consider the veracity of the document(s) on
which the accused relies. However an exception has
been carved out by this Court in Yin Cheng Hsiung v.
Essem Chemical Industries; State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal and Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley to the
effect that in an appropriate case where the document
relied upon is a public document or where veracity
thereof is not disputed by the complainant, the same can
be considered.
11. The Supreme Court in the case of State of A.P. v. Gourishetty
Mahesh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226 has held as under :
18. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark
upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is
reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of
it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function
of the trial Judge/Court. It is true that the Court should
be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and
should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, otherwise, it would
be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to
unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the
same time, Section 482 is not an instrument handed over
to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and brings
about its closure without full-fledged enquiry.
19. Though the High Court may exercise its power
relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, the power should be exercised sparingly. For
example, where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused or
allegations in the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence or do not disclose commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused or where there
is express legal bar provided in any of the provisions of
the Code or in any other enactment under which a
criminal proceeding is initiated or sufficient material to
show that the criminal proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused due to private and personal
grudge, the High Court may step in.
20. Though the powers possessed by the High Court
under Section 482 are wide, however, such power
requires care/caution in its exercise. The interference
must be on sound principles and the inherent power
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.
We make it clear that if the allegations set out in the
complaint do not constitute the offence of which
cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open
to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of
inherent powers under Section 482.
12. The Supreme Court in the case of M. Srikanth v. State of
Telangana, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 373 has held as under :
17. It could thus be seen, that this Court has held,
that where the allegations made in the FIR or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute a
case against the accused, the High Court would be
justified in quashing the proceedings. Further, it has
been held that where the uncontroverted allegations in
the FIR and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose any offence and make out a case
against the accused, the Court would be justified in
quashing the proceedings.
13. The Supreme Court in the case of CBI v. Arvind Khanna
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 686 has held as under :
17. After perusing the impugned order and on hearing
the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel
on both sides, we are of the view that the impugned
order passed by the High Court is not sustainable. In
a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC, the High
Court has recorded findings on several disputed facts
and allowed the petition. Defence of the accused is to
be tested after appreciating the evidence during trial.
The very fact that the High Court, in this case, went
into the most minute details, on the allegations made
by the appellant CBI, and the defence put forth by the
respondent, led us to a conclusion that the High Court
has exceeded its power, while exercising its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.
18. In our view, the assessment made by the High
Court at this stage, when the matter has been taken
cognizance of by the competent court, is completely
incorrect and uncalled for."
14. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of State of MP Vs.
Kunwar Singh by order dated 30.06.2021 passed in Cr.A. No.709/2021
has held that a detailed and meticulous appreciation of evidence at the
stage of 482 of CrPC is not permissible and should not be done. In the
case of Kunwar Singh (supra), the Supreme Court held as under:-
"8........At this stage, the High Court ought not to
be scrutinizing the material in the manner in which
the trial court would do in the course of the criminal
trial after evidence is adduced. In doing so, the High
Court has exceeded the well-settled limits on the
exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 of
CrPC. A detailed enquiry into the merits of the
allegations was not warranted. The FIR is not
expected to be an encyclopedia..........."
15. Similar view has been taken by Supreme Court in the cases of
Munshiram Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2018) 5 SCC 678,
Teeja Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221,
State of Orissa Vs. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan reported in (2012) 4 SCC
547, S. Khushboo Vs. Kanniammal reported in (2010) 5 SCC 600,
Sangeeta Agrawal Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2019) 2 SCC 336,
Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460,
Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri Satyanarayana Reddy
reported in (2012) 12 SCC 437, M.N. Ojha Vs. Alok Kumar
Srivastav reported in (2009) 9 SCC 682.
16. Thus, it is clear that after considering the uncontroverted
allegations, if this Court comes to a conclusion that no offence is made
out, only then proceedings can be quashed.
17. Complainant had examined Vijay Kakodiya as her witness under
Section 202 of Cr.P.C. He has specifically stated that documents of the
complainant were submitted by the applicant. It is not the case of the
applicant that he had some official duty to accept the documents or
applications submitted by the aspirants. Applicant is a Teacher and he
has nothing to do with the Bank proceedings.
18. Furthermore, it is clear from order dated 24/07/2019 that the
applicant has been declared as absconder. It is really surprising that on
one hand applicant is absconding and on the other hand, he has obtained
certified copy of the order and has challenged the proceedings.
19. The Magistrate was under obligation to issue summons if there
was suspicion with regard to commission of offence by the applicant.
20. The Supreme Court in the case of Shivjee Singh Vs. Nagendra
Tiwary and Others reported in (2010) 7 SCC 578 has held as under:-
"18. The expression "sufficient ground" used in
Sections 203, 204 and 209 means the satisfaction
that a prima facie case is made out against the
person accused of committing an offence and not
sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction.
This interpretation of the provisions contained in
Chapters XV and XVI CrPC finds adequate
support from the judgments of this Court
in Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia v. State of
Bombay [AIR 1958 SC 97 : 1958 Cri LJ 244 :
1958 SCR 618], Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya
Dulaji Ghadigaonkar [AIR 1960 SC 1113 : 1960
Cri LJ 1499 : (1961) 1 SCR 1], Chandra Deo
Singh v. Prokash ChandraBose [AIR 1963 SC
1430 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 397 : (1964) 1 SCR 639]
, Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B. [(1973) 3
SCC 753 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 521], Kewal
Krishan v. Suraj Bhan [1980 Supp SCC 499 :
1981 SCC (Cri) 438], Mohinder
Singh v. Gulwant Singh [(1992) 2 SCC 213 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 361] and Chief Enforcement
Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. [(2008) 2
SCC 492 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 471].
19. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra
Bose [AIR 1963 SC 1430 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 397 :
(1964) 1 SCR 639], it was held that where there
was prima facie evidence, the Magistrate was
bound to issue process and even though the
person charged of an offence in the complaint
might have a defence, the matter has to be left to
be decided by an appropriate forum at an
appropriate stage. It was further held that the
issue of process can be refused only when the
Magistrate finds that the evidence led by the
complainant is self-contradictory or intrinsically
untrustworthy.
20. In Kewal Krishan v. Suraj Bhan [1980 Supp
SCC 499 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 438], this Court
examined the scheme of Sections 200 to 204 and
held: (SCC p. 503, para 10)
"10. ... At the stage of
Sections 203 and 204 of the
Criminal Procedure Code in a case
exclusively triable by the Court of
Session, all that the Magistrate has
to do is to see whether on a cursory
perusal of the complaint and the
evidence recorded during the
preliminary inquiry under Sections
200 and 202 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, there is prima facie
evidence in support of the charge
levelled against the accused. All that
he has to see is whether or not there
is 'sufficient ground for proceeding'
against the accused. At this stage,
the Magistrate is not to weigh the
evidence meticulously as if he were
the trial court. The standard to be
adopted by the Magistrate in
scrutinising the evidence is not the
same as the one which is to be kept
in view at the stage of framing
charges."
21. The aforesaid view was reiterated
in Mohinder Singh v. Gulwant Singh [(1992) 2
SCC 213 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 361] in the following
words: (SCC p. 217, para 11)
"11. ... The scope of enquiry
under Section 202 is extremely
restricted only to finding out the
truth or otherwise of the allegations
made in the complaint in order to
determine whether process should
issue or not under Section 204 of the
Code or whether the complaint
should be dismissed by resorting to
Section 203 of the Code on the
footing that there is no sufficient
ground for proceeding on the basis
of the statements of the complainant
and of his witnesses, if any. But the
enquiry at that stage does not partake
the character of a full-dress trial
which can only take place after
process is issued under Section 204
of the Code calling upon the
proposed accused to answer the
accusation made against him for
adjudging the guilt or otherwise of
the said accused person. Further, the
question whether the evidence is
adequate for supporting the
conviction can be determined only at
the trial and not at the stage of the
enquiry contemplated under Section
202 of the Code. To say in other
words, during the course of the
enquiry under Section 202 of the
Code, the enquiry officer has to
satisfy himself simply on the
evidence adduced by the prosecution
whether prima facie case has been
made out so as to put the proposed
accused on a regular trial and that no
detailed enquiry is called for during
the course of such enquiry."
(emphasis supplied)
22. The use of the word "shall" in the proviso to
Section 202(2) is prima facie indicative of
mandatory character of the provision contained
therein, but a close and critical analysis thereof
along with other provisions contained in Chapter
XV and Sections 226 and 227 and Section 465
would clearly show that non-examination on oath
of any or some of the witnesses cited by the
complainant is, by itself, not sufficient to denude
the Magistrate concerned of the jurisdiction to
pass an order for taking cognizance and issue of
process provided he is satisfied that prima facie
case is made out for doing so. Here it is
significant to note that the word "all" appearing
in the proviso to Section 202(2) is qualified by
the word "his". This implies that the complainant
is not bound to examine all the witnesses named
in the complaint or whose names are disclosed in
response to the order passed by the Magistrate. In
other words, only those witnesses are required to
be examined whom the complainant considers
material to make out a prima facie case for issue
of process."
21. Thus it is clear that sufficient ground means prima facie
satisfaction that prima facie case has been made out against the person
accused of committing an offence, then the Court must issue processes.
22. As per the case of the complainant, documents of the complainant
were submitted by applicant in the bank and loan was not sanctioned
and the documents were also not returned. However later on, it was
found that on the basis of forged documents loan of Rs.2,90,000/- was
sanctioned and said amount was not paid to the complainant and as per
the complainant, said amount was shared by the applicant and
respondent No.2.
23. If the allegations made in the complaint and if the statements of
witnesses are taken on their face value, then this Court is of considered
opinion that Court below did not commit any mistake by issuing process
against the applicant.
24. It is further submitted by counsel for the applicant that the
complaint was barred by time. Offence was committed in the year 2007.
Complaint was filed on 25/11/2010 and cognizance was taken on
13/03/2015. However, it is fairly conceded by counsel for the applicant
that since the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 409 of IPC are
punishable with imprisonment of more than 3 years, therefore no
limitation is provided as per Section 468 of Cr.P.C.
25. No other argument is advanced by counsel for the applicant.
26. Accordingly, application fails and is hereby dismissed.
27. Interim order dated 13/09/2019 is hereby vacated.
(G.S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
S.M.
