Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dilip Damor vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 19 February, 2024
Author: Prem Narayan Singh
Bench: Prem Narayan Singh
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PREM NARAYAN SINGH
CRIMINAL REVISION No. 5895 of 2019
BETWEEN:-
1. DILIP DAMOR S/O SHRI PIRU DAMOR,
AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: MAJDURI
R/O. VILLAGE SALADOJA, BAJNA,
P.S. BAJNA (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. PIRU DAMORE S/O SHRI LAXMAN DAMORE,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: LABOUR
R/O: GRAM SALADOJA, BAJNA
POLICE THANA BAJNA DIST RATLAM (MADHYA
PRADESH)
3. SMT. MANKIBAI DAMORE
W/O SHRI PIRU DAMORE,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: HOUSE WIFE
R/O: GRAM SALADOJA, BAJNA
POLICE THANA BAJNA DIST RATLAM (MADHYA
PRADESH)
4. SMT. SHANTUBAI DAMORE
W/O SHRI PIRU DAMORE,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE
R/O: GRAM SALADOJA, BAJNA
POLICE THANA BAJNA DIST RATLAM
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(SHRI ASHISH GUPTA - ADVOCATE)
AND
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
STATION HOUSE OFFICER THROUGH
P.S. BAJNA (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(SHRI SURENDRA GUPTA - GOVT. ADVOCATE)
Signature Not Verified
Reserved on : 30.01.2024
Signed by: SUMATHI
Signing time: 21-02-
2024 10:17:50
2
Delivered on : 19.02.2024
Th is criminal revisions having been heard and reserved for orders,
coming on for pronouncement this day, the court passed the following
ORDER
With consent of the parties heard finally.
Invoking the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section
401 of Cr.P.C., the petitioner has preferred this revision against the judgment
dated 26.11.2019 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ratlam, District
Ratlam in S.T. No.188/2019 whereby learned Sessions Judge framed charges
for offence under Section 498-A and 306 of IPC, 1860 against the petitioners.
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution is that on 10.08.2019, a dispute
occurred between petitioner no.1 Dilip and petitioner no.2-Piru Damor, the
father of petitioner no.1, on account of cattle grazing at that time wife of
petitioner no.1- Dilip came there and asked petitioner no.2 why he is always
disputing with her husband and consumed pesticide due to which she became
unconscious and she was taken to hospital at Bajana, wherein she was not given
treatment therefore she was taken to a private hospital at Bajana wherein she
died during treatment. Merg intimation was lodged in crime No.48/2019 and
investigation was carried out.
3. During investigation, statement of the witnesses including the parents
of the deceased were recorded. After investigation charge-sheet under Sections
306, 498-A/34 of IPC, 1860 has been filed. In the sequel thereof, after
considering material available on charge-sheet, the learned trial Court has framed
the charges as aforesaid by the impugned order dated 26.11.2019. Being
aggrieved from that order, the petitioners have filed this revision.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that there is no specific
instance against the petitioners regarding demand of dowry and harassment.
Only general and omnibus allegations has been levelled against them. It is further
submitted that petitioner No.1 is unemployed and he is habitual to get
intoxication of liquor, therefore, his father used to scold him on the date of the
incident also there was a dispute between the husband of the deceased and his
father regarding grazing cattles in between deceased Pooja came there and
asked her father-in-law that why he is always disputing with her husband and
thereafter she consumed pesticide. He further submitted that the dispute occurs
frequently between the father and his son, however, the same cannot be treated
as an act of abetment of the deceased to commit suicide. Petitioners no.2 to 4,
who happens to be father-in-law and mother-in-laws respectively, have nothing
to do with the offence and merely because they happen to be the in-laws of the
deceased they have been dragged into this litigation.
5 . Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that even if the
allegations of prosecution are taken to be true at their face value and accepted in
their entirety, they do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the petitioners. It is further submitted that the present case is a glaring
example of growing tendency in the society to falsely implicate the close
relatives of the husband. In support of his submissions learned counsel for the
petitioners has placed reliance upon orders passed by co-ordinate Bench of this
Court dated 04.08.2023 and 17.01.2024 in the case of Kapil vs. State of M.P.
(M.Cr.C. No.10385/2021) and Niharika Joshi vs. State of M.P. (M.Cr.C.
No.51971/2021), respectively. Under these circumstances learned counsel
prays for quashing of the FIR bearing Crime No.48/2019 registered against the
petitioners and all consequential proceedings.
6. Learned Govt. Advocate on the other hand, opposed the prayer and
submitted that looking to the gravity of the offence and the nature of the
allegations levelled against the petitioner, no case of interference is made out.
7. Having heard the rival submissions of counsel for the parties, the
record of the case has been perused.
8. Now, the question for consideration arises as to whether the impugned
order passed by the learned trial Court with regard to framing of charges under
Section 498-A, 306 of IPC, is improper, illegal or incorrect?
9 . Here it is also to be taken into consideration that the incident
happened within a period of three years of marriage hence Section 113(A) of
Evidence Act 1872 comes into the play, therefore, before dwelling upon the
contentions of the counsel for the parties, it will be appropriate to refer to the
clause of 113(A) of the Evidence Act, which relates to the offence under
Section 306 of IPC, reads as under:
"113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married
woman.--When the question is whether the commission of
suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or
any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had
committed suicide within a period of seven years from the
date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative
of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may
presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the
case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or
by such relative of her husband.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "cruelty"
shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]"
10. As per the aforesaid provisions, when wife commits suicide within a
period of seven years from the date of marriage, the Court may presume having
regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abated
by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. As such, the impugned
order regarding framing charge cannot be questioned in the case at hand, as the
deceased has committed suicide within three years from the date of her
marriage.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the law
laid down by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Niharika Joshi
vs. State of M.P. (M.Cr.C. No.51971/2021), in that case there was only
evidence regarding suicide as the suicide note was left by the deceased whereas
in this case the parents of the deceased have also supported the prosecution
case which is sufficient for framing of charges. The judgment passed in Kapil
vs. State of M.P. (M.Cr.C. No.10385/2021) by co-ordinate Bench of this
Court is also having different facts. In that case the deceased committed suicide
due to only slapping of her husband, while in the case at hand continuous
cruelty is shown from the statement of the witnesses. Hence the petitioner
cannot be benefited by the aforesaid law laid down by this Court.
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak
[(2019) 13 SCC 62], reversing the order of discharging from charges under
Section 306 of IPC, has enunciated the principles which the High Courts must
keep in mind while exercising their jurisdiction under the provision. In this case,
endorsing another case of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Amit Kapoor vs.
Ramesh Chander [(2012) 9 SCC 460 has quoted as under:-
" 2 7 . .. At best and upon objective analysis of various
judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the
principles to be considered for proper exercise of
jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge
either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section
482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the
case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie
establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently
absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can
ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients
of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may
interfere.
27.3. T h e High Court should not unduly interfere. No
meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for
considering whether the case would end in conviction or
not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of
charge.
27. 4. W here the exercise of such power is absolutely
essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for
correcting some grave error that might be committed by
the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court
should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the
prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to
observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and
materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient
material on the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the
allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an
offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court
leading to injustice.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of
continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly
satisfied, t h e Court should be more inclined to permit
continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at
that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the
records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability
of the documents or records but is an opinion formed
prima facie.
13. In so far as the powers conferred under Section 482 of Cr.P.C is
concerned it is also well settled that Section 482 of Cr.P.C can only be
exercised sparingly in the in rarest of the rare cases where ends of justice
demands. It can be used only to prevent the abuse of process of law and to
secure the ends of justice. In the case of State of W.B. vs. Narayan K.
Patodia [AIR 2000 SC 405] the Hon'ble Apex Court ordained that "Inherent
powers of the High Court as recognized in Section 482 of the Code are
reserved to be used "to give effect to any orders under the Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
14. In the case of Janata Dal vs H.S. Chowdhary And Ors. reported
in (1992) 4 SCC 305 the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
"132 The criminal Courts are clothed with inherent power
to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of
justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined
should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but
should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone the Courts exist. The powers
possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the
Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power
requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be
careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is
based on sound principles."
135 This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the
Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a
State should normally retrain from giving a premature
decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely
incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not
been collected and produced before the Court and the
issues involved whether factual or legal are of great
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective
without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule
can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High
Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to quashing
the proceedings at any stage."
15. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that since no
prima facie case is made out against the petitioners, the impugned orders are
not sustainable. On this aspect, the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of State of Orissa vs. Debendranath Padhi [2004 Law Suit (SC)
1408] is worth to refer here as under:
"Further, at the stage of framing of charge roving
and fishing inquiry is impermissible. If the
contention of the accused is accepted, there would
be a mini trial at the stage of framing of charge.
That would defeat the object of the Code. It is
well-settled that at the stage of framing of charge
the defence of the accused cannot be put forth."
16. This Court is conscious of the various decisions laid down by
Hon'ble Apex Court on the point. In the case of Union of India vs. Prafulla
Kumar Samal and Another [AIR 1979 SC 366], the Hon'ble Apex Court
has held as under:
"The scope of section 227 of the Code was considered by a
recent decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar v.
Ramesh Singh(1) where Untwalia, J. speaking for the Court
observed as follows:-
"Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in
the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his
guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if
there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that
there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed
an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is
no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The
presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn
at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the
trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is
presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is
only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the
Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence
which the Prosecutor pro poses to adduce to prove the guilt
of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in
cross-examination or rebut ted by the defence evidence; if
any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence
then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the
trial".
1 7 . Learned counsel has vehemently stressed that the ingredients of
Sections 306 and 107 of IPC have not been made out on the basis of material
available on record. On this aspect, the observations made by Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Rajeev Kaurav vs. Baishab and others [2020 (3) SCC
317] is relevant in context of this case. The Hon'ble Apex Court reversing the
order of this Court as to the offence of 306 of IPC observed as under:-
"Moreover, the High Court was aware that one of the
witnesses mentioned that the deceased informed him
about the harassment meted out by Respondent Nos.1 to
3 which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to
commit suicide. The High Court committed an error in
quashing criminal proceedings by assessing the
statements under Section 161 Cr. P.C.
10. We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of
the matter. The High Court ought not to have quashed
the proceedings at this stage, scuttling a full-fledged trial
in which Respondent Nos.1 to 3 would have a fair
opportunity to prove their innocence."
18. In view of the aforesaid principles, I have gone through the evidence
available on record and on careful perusal of the documents filed with the
revision petition, particularly, the charge-sheet, prima facie, well founded the
case for the offence punishable under section 306 of IPC, is made out against
the petitioners for framing the charges. At the stage of framing the charges, the
Court cannot apply its judicial mind for scrutinizing the fact as to whether that
the evidence available on record is sufficient for conviction or not. In a case,
pertaining to the revision under Section 306 of IPC, the view of this Court in the
case of Ravi Kumar Pandey vs. State of M.P. [2018 Law Suit (MP) 2190]
is worth to refer here as under:-.
"The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally
before finding, the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at
the stage of framing of charge by the trial Court. At this stage, even a very
strong suspicion founded upon material before the trial Court, which leads
him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual
ingredients constituting the offence alleged Cri. Rev. No.1971/2013 may
justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission
of that offence is lawful.
9. At this stage it is not required to go into the merits of the prosecution
evidence as required to discuss at the stage of passing of judgment by
the trial Court. There is no need to sift and weigh or appreciate the
prosecution evidence as well as defence available to the applicants and
come to the conclusion that no prima-facie case is made out nor could
b e exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Accordingly, I do not
find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order dated 26.08.2013
warranting interference by way of this revision petition against framing
of charge. Hence, the revision is dismissed summarily."
19. Having said that this is a case where relentless tyranny was said to be
operated by petitioners with the deceased. On this aspect, in the case of
Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt.of NCT of Delhi) (2009) 16 SCC
605, the Hon'ble Court has observed as under:-
"Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a
continued course of conduct, creates such circumstances
that the deceased was left with no other option except to
commit suicide, in which case an "instigation" may have to
be inferred."
20. In the case at hand, it is emanated from record, that the petitioners
had, by their act and consecutive course of conduct, constituted such
circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option, except to
commit suicide. On the grounds of these repeated ferocious acts of petitioners,
an "instigation" may have to be inferred by the learned trial Court while framing
the charges under Section 306 of IPC.
21. In FIR there was specific allegation against petitioner no.1 Dilip that
he is habitual to get intoxication of liquor and when the deceased forbidden him
he used to beat her brutally. Along with him both of her mother-in-laws Smt.
Mankibai Damor and Smt. Shanthubai Damor used to taunt her on trivial
issues. It is further alleged that along with them petitioner no.2-Piru Damor also
used to taunt her due to the harassment and torture met out the deceased
committed suicide by consuming pesticides. With regard to the citations
referred to as by learned counsel for the petitioners, the facts of the case are
entirely different from the present case at hand, hence the same are not relevant
22. In view of the aforesaid prepositions and discussions, this Court is of
the view that learned trial Court, while framing of charges, must apply its judicial
mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that there is strong
possibility subsist that the accused has committed the offence. At the juncture
of framing of charges, the Court has to prima facie examine whether there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Nevertheless, the Court is
not expected to evaluate or analyse the findings in order to arrive at the
conclusion that the material furnished by the prosecution are sufficient to
convict the accused or not? In the case at hand, the findings of learned trial
Court regarding prima facie case against the accused persons appear to be
infallible.
23. So far as the revisional power of this Court is concerned, it is well
settled legal position that the jurisdiction of the revisional Court is not as that of
an appellate Court, which is free to reach its own conclusion on evidence
untrammeled by any finding entered by the trial Court. Actually the jurisdiction
of revisional Court has a limited scope. The revisional Court can interfere with
the impugned order of subordinate Court only when it is unjust and unfair. In
case where the order of subordinate Court does not suffer from any infirmity or
illegality merely because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no
jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine
manner.
24. On this aspect, the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Amit Kapoor (Supra), is pertinent to quote here as under:-
"The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 397 can be
exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or
proprietary of an order passed by the trial court or the
inferior court, as the case may be. Though the section does
not specifically use the expression 'prevent abuse of
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice', the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a very limited
one. The legality, proprietary or correctness of an order
passed by a court is the very foundation of exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 397 but ultimately it also requires
justice to be done. The jurisdiction could be exercised
where there is palpable error, non-compliance with the
provisions of law, the decision is completely erroneous or
where the judicial discretion is exercised
arbitrarily..................."
25. Further, in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Fateh Karan Mehdu
[2017 (3) SCC 1998, the apex Court has observed as under:-
" 2 6 . The scope of interference and
exercise of jurisdiction under Section
397 CrPC has been time and again
explained by this Court. Further, the
scope of interference under Section 397
CrPC at a stage, when charge had been
framed, is also well settled. At the stage
o f framing of a charge, the court is
concerned not with the proof of the
allegation rather it has to focus on the
material and form an opinion whether
there is strong suspicion that the
accused has committed an offence,
which if put to trial, could prove his
guilt. T he framing of charge is not a
stage, at which stage final test of guilt is
to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the
stage of framing the charge, the court
should form an opinion that the accused
is certainly guilty of committing an
offence, is to hold something which is
neither permissible nor is in consonance
with the scheme of the Code of Criminal
Procedure."
26. In view of the aforesaid discussion in entirety as well as the material
available on record, the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid
cases, this Court does not find any illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the
impugned order passed by the learned trial Court. Therefore, no interference is
warranted.
2 7 . At this stage, this revision petition filed by the petitioners fails.
Resultantly, the present petition is dismissed and the impugned order of the
learned trial Court is affirmed.
28. Pending application, if any, also closed.
29. It is made clear that this Court has not made any observations on the
merits of the case and this order shall not be come in the way of the learned trial
Court while passing the final judgment.
(PREM NARAYAN SINGH)
JUDGE
sumathi
