Madhya Pradesh High Court
M/S Airen Developers vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 9 August, 2024
Author: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
Bench: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT Indore
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
HON'BLE SHRI DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA
ON THE 9th OF AUGUST, 2024
WRIT PETITION No. 15161 of 2024
M/S AIREN DEVELOPERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Vijayesh Atre, learned counsel for the Petitioner .
Shri Bhuwan Gautam, Govt. Advocate for the respondent/State.
ORDER
Per: Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
With Consent of the parties, heard finally at motion stage.
The petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 challenging the impugned letter dated 15.05.2024
(Annexure P/1) whereby the Respondent no.3 has conveyed to the Petitioner
firm that the petitioner cannot be treated as the "Original Allottee" and since its
"Unit" was not in production for a period of 5 years and was not closed for a
minimum period of 2 years, therefore in terms of provisions of Para 19 (B) of
the Madhya Pradesh Allotment of Industrial Land and Building to MSME's and
Management Rules, 2021 (hereinafter referred to as "the Management Rules"),
permission to conduct division of the subject lands in terms of Para 19(B) of the
Management Rules cannot be granted.
2. The Petitioner being aggrieved of the aforesaid letter dated 15.05.2024 has
prayed for followings reliefs from this Court:-
i. issue the Writ of Mandamus declaring that the impugned Letter HAI /
Softens / Aaex FH / 2024 / 1965 dated 15 May, 2024 (Exhibit P-1) issued
by the Respondent No.3, is bad in law;
ii. declare that the petitioner firm is the original allottee and is entitled for
all the rights as original allottee including approval of its proposal in
terms of Para 19 (B) of the Madhya Pradesh Allotment of Industrial Land
and Building to MSME's and Management Rules, 2021 for division of the
subject land under Plot No.4, 5, 6, 7-A, 7-B and the additional land
aggregating to 150572 sq. mtrs. 'situated at Sector-D, Industrial area,
Sanwer Road, Indore; and,
iii.any other or further and appropriate writ order, relief or direction which
this Hon'ble Court may consider appropriate in the facts and
circumstances of the case in the interest of justice.
3. The germane admitted facts of the case in brief, which are necessary to be
taken note of for the disposal of the present petition are as under:-
i. Petitioner is a registered partnership firm registered as a MSME Unit
which is engaged in the business of construction and related development
projects. The present lis pertains to following industrial lands situated at
Sector D, Industrial area, Sanwer Road, Indore (M.P.) (hereinafter
referred as subject lands):-
S.No. Plot No. Size in Sq. mtrs.
1. 4, 5 & 6 59294
2. 7-A 11152
3. 7-B 12082
4. Additional land 68044
Total 150572
ii. Aforesaid subject lands were allotted to M/s. Shri Ishar Alloys Steel
Limited for the period of 99 years vide various lease deeds dated
29.12.1969, 10.11.1978, 02.12.1975 and 04.12.1986. The said company
mortgaged leasehold rights of the aforesaid subject lands and availed
financial assistance from various financial institutions. The Company
defaulted in repayment of the loan obtained from the banks and was
wound up.
iii. Respondent No.1 State granted permission to Isher Alloy to "mortgage
and assign" its leasehold land in favour of any Bank or financial
institution, vide its letter No.22/IDIC/BF/90/3377 dated 20th March,
1990, (Annexure P-4).
iv.Respondent No.1 issued Clarification No.94/IM20/BF/92/7863 dated
23rd October, 1992 (Annexure P-5) wherein while clarifying the clauses
of lease deed, categorically stated that if any public financial institution
wishes to transfer the properties of the lessee, the permission will be
automatic and the lending institution will inform the lessor of their
intention to do so; and on getting such information the lessor will take
such steps and make such amendments in the name of the lessee so that
the transferee gets the same rights as the original lessee.
v. In the year 2005 the ICICI Bank i.e. one of the secured creditors initiated
recovery proceedings against the said company by filing a petition before
the DRT II, Mumbai. The learned DRT vide order dated 08.01.2022
floated tender for auction of the lease hold rights of the subject lands. The
Petitioner firm participated in the said auction and was sole / highest
bidder to the auction. Thereafter, vide order dated 02.12.2022 the
Petitioner was declared as the successful bidder by the learned DRT.
vi.Entire sale consideration amounting to the tune of Rs. 75,74,37,400/- was
paid by the Petitioner and on 18.01.2023 a Sale Certificate was also
issued in favour of the Petitioner by the DRT Mumbai.
vii.Pursuant to the issuance of sale certificate the Petitioner requested the
office of the Respondent no.3 for allotment of the subject land in favour
of the Petitioner and for the execution of the lease deed. For the purpose
of registration, the Respondent no.3 raised a demand of Rs.
18,06,47,972/- towards the transfer fees and other outstanding charges.
The aforesaid demand was fulfilled by the Petitioner and the amount was
paid by way of challans dated 19.05.2023 and 20.05.2023.
viii.That, pursuant to the receipt of the aforesaid payment the Respondent
no.3 on 22.06.2023 executed 4 amended lease deeds in favour of the
Petitioner. Thereafter, the Petitioner on 20.07.2023 forwarded an
application to the Respondent No. 3 to consider division of the subject
lands in terms of Para 19(B) of the Management Rules. On 24.07.2023,
the Respondent no.3 forwarded the said application to the Respondent
no.2 for its approval.
ix.The Respondent No. 3 issued another letter dated 31.07.2023. The
relevant excerpt of the letter w.r.t. issue involved in the present case reads
as under:-
a) In terms of Para 19(B) of the Management Rules, if the land
allotted to the original allottee is auctioned by the Bank or any
Tribunal then it is necessary that the transferee company must be
in production for a minimum period of 5 years and must be closed
for a minimum period of 2 years.
ii. Pursuant, to the issuance of the aforesaid letter, the Petitioner firm vide
letter dated 31.07.2023 and 01.08.2023 submitted representation before
the Respondent No. 3 for considering the Petitioner firm as "original
allottee".
iii.The Respondent No. 3 vide impugned letter dated 15.05.2024 has
informed the Petitioner that the Petitioner does not fulfills the conditions
prescribed under Para/Clause 19 (B) of the Management Rules as the
Petitioner cannot be treated as original allotee. Furthermore, Petitioner
has not remained in production for a period of 5 years and was not closed
for a minimum period of 2 years and therefore, the case of the Petitioner
could not be considered in light of Para/Clause 19 (B) of the Management
Rules.
iv.Being aggrieved by the letter dated 15.05.2024, the present petition is
filed by the Petitioner.
4. The learned counsel of the Petitioner has submitted that the impugned letter
dated 15.05.2024 issued by the Respondent No. 3 is unreasonable and has been
passed by misinterpreting the provisions of Para 19 (B) of the Management
Rules. The land was allotted to M/s. Ishar Alloy and by way of the Sale
Certificate issued by the DRT, Mumbai, the Petitioner steps into the shoes of
the M/s. Ishar Alloy. The Petitioner has further contended that as per
notification dated 23.10.1992 issued by Respondent No. 1 the transferee gets
the same rights as the original lessee. The Petitioner has cleared the outstanding
lease rent and the maintenance charges which was to be paid by the M/s. Ishar
Alloy. The said amount was paid for the period when the M/s. Ishar Alloy was
not into operation. Thus, the Petitioner has stepped into the shoes of the M/s.
Ishar Alloy and therefore, the petitioner is to be treated as an original allottee
and his application for division of subject lands could not have been rejected on
the ground that petitioner cannot be treated as original allotee and on the ground
that Petitioner has not remained in production for a period of 5 years and was
not closed for a minimum period of 2 years when undisputedly, M/s. Ishar
Alloy has been operational for more than 5 years and has been closed for more
than 2 years fulfilling the conditions of Para/Clause 19(B) of Management
Rules.
5. Per Contra, Counsel for the Respondents has submitted that the Petitioner
firm cannot be treated as an original allottee. The lease deeds are executed in
favour of the Petitioner only on account of the sale certificate issued by the
DRT, Mumbai. The fresh lease deeds are executed by the Respondent No. 3
treating the Petitioner as a fresh allottee and therefore, the Petitioner does not
come under the purview of the original allottee.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The in light of the arguments advanced by the parties, following
question/issue arises for adjudication before this Court :-
Whether the Petitioner is liable to be treated as original allottee in terms
of Clause 19 (B) of the Management Rules? If yes, then whether the
petitioner is entitled to claim division of subject lands?
8. For proper adjudication of aforesaid issues, it is apposite to deal with Clause
19 (B) of the Management Rules. Clause 19 (B) of the Rules reads as under:-
"Para 19 (b)--Division and transfer of land allotted to closed
unit. In view of proper use of the allotted plot to closed industrial
units which have been in production for at least 05 years and
have been closed for at least 02 years, permission shall be
granted, as per eligibility, or transfer of the plot by separating it
for setting up a new industry.
The conditions for separation of plots to these units in industrial
area and in undeveloped land shall be as follows:-
1. All the court cases related to the plot filed by the parent unit
shall have to be withdrawn.
2. If the undeveloped land is located under the development plan
area, then the use of the land in the prevailing development plan
should be industrial.
3. The area of any of the divided plot should not be less than 500
square meters and there should be an independent way to come
and go in the plots. The layout of the divided plots shall be
approved by the officer authorized by the state government.
4. The new units shall required to pay 100 percent of the
prevailing premium as premium for allotment of land and as per
rules, the annual deed rent shall be calculated on the basis of
prevailing premium.
5. Procedure to make application -- The original allottee shall
be required submit the proposal to the District Trade and
Industry Center which shall be forwarded to the Directorate of
Industries along with the facts by the District Trade and
Industry Center. The case shall be sent by the Directorate of
Industries to the State Government for acceptance. The final
decision for acceptance in the case shall be taken by the State
Government.
6. The development of infrastructure development/industrial park
on division of undeveloped land shall be done within a time limit
of 1 year from the date of in-principle approval by the original
allottee. If the work is not done within the time limit, in case of
proper reasons, time limit may be increased by a maximum of 1
year by the government.
7. In case of development of industrial area on undeveloped land,
the development fee shall not be collected by the government.
Maintenance fee may be |'x' collected from the newly allotted
units by 30 the District Trade and Industry Center. The
maintenance fee shall be determined by the competent authority.
8. The portion of the plot of unit on which the asset is built, before
transfer of that part to the new units, the original unit shall have
to present the registered sale deed, after which the lease deed may
be executed in favor of the new unit.
9. The competent authority shall first issue in-principle
approval on the received proposal, which shall be valid for
one year. The lease deed of the new units shall be executed
only after the parent unit makes full payment of all the
previous dues of the department within a period of I year. The
allotted new unit/units shall have to start production as per
prevailing land allotment rules.
10. The responsibility to pay the dues of the State Government
departments like commercial tax department, energy
department and other related departments against the parent
unit shall lie on parent Unit and in this regard the no-
objection certificate should be submitted to the parent unit
within I year from the date of in principle approval.
11. Such units who have assigned the original lease deed to
any financial institution, shall ensure that they obtain a no-
objection certificate from the concerned financial institution
within one year from the date of receipt of in-principle
approval.
12. If the area of the land allotted to the original unit is less
than 10 acres, as per approval of map, the transfer of all the
divided plots and execution of lease deed shall be done to the
new units within 18 months from the date of in-principle
approval. If the land area allotted to the original unit is more
than 10 acres then as per approval of map, the transfer and
lease deed execution of all the divided plots shall be done to
the new units within 2 years from the date of in-principle
approval. As per above, all the vacant plots which have not
been transferred by the original unit within the said time
period, then such plots shall be treated as unallotted plots and
the possession of the vacant plots shall be obtained by taking
unilateral action by the District Trade and Industry Center. In
this regard, an affidavit shall be taken from the parent unit
before starting of the process or issuance of in-principle
approval. In case of violation of the conditions related to
division and transfer of plots, the possession of the land shall
be taken over by the District Trade and Industry Center. An
affidavit shall be taken before giving in- principle approval to
the parent unit.
13. The allotment of the plot shall be made by the District
Trade and Industry Center on the recommendation of the
original allottee and the lease deed of the plot shall be
executed between the District Trade and Industry Center and
the new allottee according to the as per the prevailing land
allotment rules.
14. On the approval of the map for the division of the plot on
the original allotted land, the interest of the land left for
infrastructure development / green belt etc. shall be
calculated separately on the basis of merit considering the
proper use of the land.
15. Units obtaining grants shall be allowed for division and
transfer of plots only on the condition that they remain in
production for the stipulated period after receiving the grant
as per the departmental policy/scheme."
9. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision reveals that the Para 19(B) deals
with the division and transfer of land allotted to the closed units. The said clause
permits for sub division of lease hold lands into plots of the closed industrial
unit which has been into production for 5 years and has been closed for at least
2 years on an application by Original Allotee. Undisputedly, the subject lands
were initially allotted to M/s. Ishar Alloy. Para 19 (B) is applicable to division
and transfer of land allotted to close industrial unit. In the instant case the said
lands were used by M/s. Ishar Alloy which was into operation for several years
and thereafter the operation of the said unit was shut down. Hence, it is not in
dispute that M/s. Ishar Alloy had already fulfilled the criteria for seeking
permission for sub-division of plots as per Para 19(B) i.e. the industrial unit
established by M/s. Ishar Alloy had been into production of 5 years and has
been closed for at least 2 years. Even otherwise, the requirement under Para 19
(B) is with regard to the industrial unit and not of the lessee which is apparent
from the language of the provision which is "In view of proper use of the
allotted plot to closed industrial units which have been in production for at
least 05 years and have been closed for at least 02 years, permission shall be
granted". Hence, in the considered opinion of this court, the requirement of
Para 19(B) of Management Rules is with regards to the industrial unit and not
the allotee/lessee and clearly it is not in dispute that the industrial unit in
question has fulfilled the criteria as prescribed under Para 19(B) of Management
Rules.
10. At this juncture it is pertinent to take note of notification dated
23.10.1992 issued by Respondent No.1 w.r.t. transfer of the lease hold
properties by the financial institutions. The notification reads as under:-
"It is clarified that where the mortgage is intended to be created
in favour of PPIS or MPAVN or MPFC, the permission will be,
automatic Lessor, and the Lessee will not require any
permission from the otherwise If the PFIS or MPAVN or MPFC
are required to sublet: or transfer the 'properties of the Lessee,
they will not -require any permission of the Lessor but will
inform the Lessor "of their intention to do so before and after
the actual sub-letting OF transfer has taken place. On getting
such information;' the "amendments Lessor, as the case may
be, will take such steps and make amendments in the name of
the Lessee etc. as may be required, so that the transferee gets
the same rights as the original lessee. However, in any sub-
letting or transfer, the PFIS, MPAKVN-and MPFC Will take
care to ensure that the dues or over dues of AKVNS on the
Lessee are paid."
11. The aforesaid notification provides that if any public financial institution
wishes to transfer the properties of the lessee, the permission will be automatic
and the lending institution will inform the lessor of their intention to do so.
Upon getting such information the lessor will take such steps and make such
amendments in the name of the lessee so that the transferee gets the same rights
as the original lessee.
12. It is also worth noting that in the present case the learned DRT II,
Mumbai while issuing the Sale Certificate dt. 18.01.2023 has categorically
observed as under:-
"The Purchaser has become absolute owner of Leasehold
Rights of the Residue Period of Lease of immovable
property, on the terms and conditions as specifically
mentioned in Original Lease Deeds, on 18.01.2023 on
payment of entire amount of the property specified below,
without payment of any Transfer Charges."
13. Admittedly, Petitioner has also cleared the outstanding dues which were
unpaid by M/s. Ishar Alloys. The Respondents demanded a sum of Rs.
2,25,33,813/- towards the lease rent and maintenance charges. The said amount
was unpaid by the M/s. Ishar Alloys since the day when the company remained
closed from its operation.
14. Also, pursuant, to the issuance of the sale certificate by the DRT,
Mumbai the lessor i.e. the Respondents executed 4 amended lease deeds in
favour of the Petitioner. In the considered opinion of this court, said amended
lease deeds cannot be considered as a fresh lease deed as the said lease deeds
which have been executed by the Respondent no. 3 in favour of Petitioner
replaces the original allottee i.e. M/s. Ishar Alloy for the remaining residual
periods, with Petitioner herein. Thus, this court has no hesitation in holding that
Petitioner firm stepped into the shoes of the M/s. Ishar Alloy by way of the
orders passed by the learned DRT, Mumbai and later on by execution of the
amended lease deeds by the Respondents in favour of the Petitioner. Since it is
apparent that petitioner firm has merely stepped into the shoes of the M/s. Ishar
Alloy with respect to subject lands, the petitioner is liable to be treated as
original allotees. Therefore, we are unable to countenance the action of the
Respondent no.3 in issuance of the impugned letter dated 15.05.2024 after
receipt of the entire outstanding lease rent and after execution of the amended
lease deeds.
15. Irrationality, illegality and procedural impropriety are three important
parameters on which an administrative decision can be put to test.Lord
Diplock, L.J. in Council of Civil Service Unions Vs. Minister for the Civil
Service applied the said text as under :-
(i) 'Illegality' which means that the "decision-maker must
understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making
power and must give effect to it". It means that the decision-
maker must keep within the scope of his legal power. Illegality
means that the decision-maker has made an error of law; it
represents infidelity of an official action to a statutory purpose.
Such grounds as excess of jurisdiction, patent error of law, etc.
fall under the head of "illegality".
(ii) 'Irrationality' denotes unreasonableness in the sense of
Wednesbury unreasonableness.
(iii) Procedural Impropriety - The expression includes failure
to observe procedural rules including the rules of natural
justice or fairness wherever these are applicable.
16. This principle was followed by the Apex Court in the case of Tata
Cellular vs. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651
17. From the reasons enumerated above it is manifest that the impugned
action of the Respondent no.3 is irrational, illegal and suffers from procedural
impropriety. Furthermore, the impugned action of the Respondents can be
tested on the doctrine of the legitimate expectation. The concept of legitimate
expectation is of European origin. It is one of the fundamental Principles of
European Community Law. (See: Durbeck v Hauptzollant Frankfurt an
Main Flughafen, (1981) ECR 1095, at 1120; Mulder v. Minister Van
Landbouw en Visserji, (1988) ECR 2321; Spagl v. Hauptzollant Rosenteim
(1990) ECR 453. For some more cases on legitimate expectation from
European Law, Sedley, J.'s opinion in R. v. Maff, ex p. Hamble Fisheries,
(1995) 2 All ER 714). The statement of Lord DIPLOCK in CCSU is regarded
as envisaging legitimate expectation extending to an expectation of a benefit.
This may arise from-
(i) what a person has been permitted by the concerned authority to
enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to
continue to enjoy until "there has been communicated to him some
rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an
opportunity to comment";
(ii) he has received assurance from the concerned authority that
the benefit will not be withdrawn without giving him first an
opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that it should not
be withdrawn.
(iii) It may also extend to a benefit in the future which has not yet
been enjoyed but has been promised.
Lord FRASER also observed as follows: "But even where a
person claiming some benefit or privilege has no legal right to it,
as a matter of private law, he may have a legitimate expectation of
receiving the benefit or privilege, and, if so, the courts will protect
his expectation by judicial review as a matter of public law...
Legitimate or reasonable expectation may arise from an express
promise given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence
of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to
continue."
Characterizing the doctrine of legitimate expectation as a valuable
and developing doctrine, BINGHAM, L.J., stated in the case of R.
v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex. p. MFK Underwriting
Agents Ltd., (1990) 1 All ER 90 as under: "If a public authority
so conducts itself as to create a legitimate expectation that a
certain course will be followed it would often be unfair if the
authority were permitted to follow a different course to the
detriment of one who entertained the expectation, particularly if he
acted on it... The doctrine of legitimate expectation is rooted in
fairness." SEDLEY, J., ruled that even though policy change may
take place from time to time, the policy maker should seek to
accommodate legitimate expectations.
SEDLEY, J., has observed : "Thus it is an obligation to exercise
powers fairly which permits expectations to be counterpoised to
policy change, not necessarily in order to thwart it but. . . in order
to seek a proper exception to the policy within the British Oxygen
principle."
He went on to observe: "While policy is for the policy maker
alone, the fairness of his or her decision not to accommodate
reasonable expectations which the policy will thwart remains the
court's concern...." While the court accepts ministerial freedom to
formulate and to reformulate policy, 'it is equally the court's duty
to protect the interest of those individuals whose expectation of
different treatment has a legitimacy which in fairness out-tops the
policy choice which tends to frustrate it'.
Finally, SEDLEY, J., has said: "Legitimate expectation is now in
effect a term of art, reserved for expectations which are not only
reasonable but which will be sustained by the court in the face of
changes of policy; secondly, that whether this point has been
reached is determined by the court, whether on ground of
rationality, of legality or of fairness, of all of which the court, not
the decision- maker is the arbiter."
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of National Buildings
Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan reported in AIR 1998 SC 2779
has held as under:
"The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs
of the country are expected to honour their statements of policy or
intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration
without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statement cannot
be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively. Unfairness in the
form of unreasonableness is akin to violation of natural justice. It
was in his context that the doctrine of 'Legitimate Expectation' was
evolved which has today become a source of substantive as well as
procedural rights. But claims based on 'Legitimate Expectation'
have been held to require reliance on representations and resulting
detriment to the claimant in the same way as claims based on
promissory estoppel."
19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent judgment of State of Bihar and
others v/s. Shyama Nandan Mishra reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 554 has
again reiterated the criteria for testing prima facie legitimate expectation. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
34. To understand the legal consequences arising therefrom,
useful reference can be made to R. v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners, ex parte M.F.K. Underwriting Agents
Ltd.9 (1989) where Lord Justice of Appeal, Thomas Bingham,
while invoking fairness as a rationale for protecting legitimate
expectations, expressed the following:--
"If a public authority so conducts itself as to create a legitimate
expectation that a certain course will be followed it would often be
unfair if the authority were permitted to follow a different course to
the detriment of one who entertained the expectation, particularly if
he acted on it. ... The doctrine of legitimate expectation is rooted in
fairness."
35. Another facet of denial of legitimate expectations is underscored by
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in the seminal case
of Coughlan10, where the Court preferred to use abuse of power as one
of the criteria for testing whether a public body could resile from a
prima facie legitimate expectation. In the Court's opinion, if the
government authority induced an expectation which was substantive,
the upsetting of that expectation, through departure from the expected
course of action in the absence of compelling public interest, would be
so unfair, that it would amount to abuse of power. In the present case,
the abuse of power is discernible in the State's disparate decision in
encadring the +2 lecturers with the teachers of nationalized schools,
notwithstanding the contrary representation through the 1985
notification which created the +2 lecturer posts and the 1987
advertisement under which, the respondents entered service. Such
manifest departure from the projected course smacks of arbitrariness
and the government action, to selectively protect the interest of the BES
cadre, does not conform to rules of justice and fair play.
36. Taking a cue from above, where the substantive legitimate
expectation is not ultra vires the power of the authority and the court is
in a position to protect it, the State cannot be allowed to change course
and belie the legitimate expectation of the respondents. As is well known,
Regularity, Predictability, Certainty and Fairness are necessary
concomitants of Government's action and the Bihar government in our
opinion, failed to keep to their commitment by the impugned decision,
which we find was rightly interdicted by the High Court.
20. The Apex Court has opined that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is a
'latest recruit' to a long list of concepts fashioned by the courts for review of
administrative actions. No doubt, the doctrine has an important place in the
review. Under the said doctrine, a person may have reasonable or legitimate
expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even
though he has no right in law to receive the benefit. In such a situation, if a
decision is taken by an administrative authority adversely affecting his interests,
he may have justifiable grievance in the light of the fact of continuous receipt of
the benefit, legitimate expectation to receive the benefit or privilege which he
has enjoyed all throughout. Such expectation may arise either from the express
promise or from consistent practice which the applicant may reasonably expect
to continue.
21. If the present case is examined on the anvil of principles laid down in
aforesaid cases, it will be crystal clear that pursuant to the (i) Clarification
No.94/IM20/BF/92/7863 dated 23rd October, 1992 issued by Respondent No. 1
clarifying that that if any public financial institution wishes to transfer the
properties of the lessee, the permission will be automatic and the lending
institution will inform the lessor of their intention to do so; and on getting such
information the lessor will take such steps and make such amendments in the
name of the lessee so that the transferee gets the same rights as the original
lessee (ii) orders passed by the learned DRT, Mumbai, (ii) Secondly, issuance
of Sale Certificate observing that "The Purchaser has become absolute owner
of Leasehold Rights of the Residue Period of Lease of immovable property,
on the terms and conditions as specifically mentioned in Original Lease
Deeds, (iii) Thirdly, clearance of outstanding lease rents/dues of M/s. Ishar
Alloy by Petitioner to the tune of Rs.2,25,33,813/- (Annexure P-13), and (iv)
Lastly, execution of amended lease deed instead of fresh lease deed, will clearly
make Petitioner understand and will make expect that the Petitioner is the
original allottee. In the considered opinion of this court, now the Respondents
cannot be permitted, in fairness, to not extend benefits to the petitioner of
original allotee in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present
case. Thus, doctrine of legitimate expectation can be pressed into service in
order to hold that Petitioner is liable to be treated as original allotee.
22. In view of foregoing analysis, the petition deserves to be allowed and is
hereby allowed. Ex Consequenti, the impugned letter dated 15.05.2024 (Annex.
P/1) is hereby set aside on account of it being bad in law. Since this court has
held that the petitioner is "original allotee" in terms Para 19(B) of Madhya
Pradesh Allotment of Industrial Land and Building to MSME's and
Management Rules, 2021, the petitioner has all the rights as "original allotee".
Hence, the Respondents are directed to re-consider the application/proposal of
the Petitioner under Para 19 (B) of Management Rules treating the petitioner as
"original allotee" in light of the observations made by this Court hereinabove
and grant permission to petitioner for sub division of subject lands i.e. Plot No.
4, 5, 6 7-A, 7-B and the additional land aggregating to 150572 sq. mtrs. situated
at Sector D, Indusrial Area, Sanwer, Indore (M.P), subject to other applicable
provisions of law. The Respondents are further directed to decide the said
application/proposal of the Petitioner within a period of 30 days from the date
of receipt of the certified copy of this order.
23. With the aforesaid the petition stands allowed and disposed off. No order
as to cost.
(SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI) (DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA)
JUDGE JUDGE
sh/-
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-IND:23563
SEHAR Digitally signed by SEHAR HASEEN
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH BENCH INDORE, ou=BENCH
HASEE
AT INDORE,
2.5.4.20=900ec6fc757798eaeb3df7a328
60bd3298415a4d1c2d91436213f2568c8
f27da, postalCode=452001, st=Madhya
Pradesh,
serialNumber=E7DBBA955B262C04B84
N
13251CE7FB6F0B7DBA610C57F1559C0
8BF6C6F5DD40D4, cn=SEHAR HASEEN
Date: 2024.08.23 04:52:55 -07'00'
