Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 17605 MP
Judgement Date : 20 October, 2023
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ROHIT ARYA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AMAR NATH (KESHARWANI)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1345 OF 2016
BETWEEN:-
SMT. KALAWATI W/O SHRI DAYA RAM LODHA,
PRESENTLY AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
OCCUPATION : HOUSE-WIFE R/O VILLAGE
AVAN P.S. RAGHOGARH DISTRICT GUNA
........APPELLANT
(BY SHRI RISHIKESH BOHRE - ADVOCATE)
AND
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
POLICE STATION RAGHOGARH, DISTRICT
GUNA (MADHYA PRADESH)
........RESPONDENT
(BY DR. SMT. ANJALI GYANANI - PUBLIC PROSECUTOR)
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Reserved on : 16th of October, 2023
Pronounced on : 20th of October, 2023
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This Criminal Appeal having been heard and reserved for
judgment, coming on for pronouncement this day, Hon'ble Shri Justice
Amar Nath (Kesharwani) pronounced the following:
JUDGMENT
Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 20-10-2023 06:40:11 PM
The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (In short "Cr.P.C.") against the judgment dated 24/11/2016 passed by Third Additional Sessions Judge Guna, District Guna (M.P.) in Sessions Trial No.21/2016, whereby the appellant was held guilty for committing an offence punishable under Section 498-A, 302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code (In short "IPC") and sentenced to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment, life imprisonment and three years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.500/- (Rupees Five Hundred), 1000/- (Rupees One Thousand) and Rs.500/- (Rupees Five Hundred); in default of payment of fine further six months, six months and six months R.I. respectively and ordered to suffer imprisonment concurrently.
2. The prosecution story, in brief, is that on 15.09.2015 deceased was brought to District Hospital, Guna in injured condition with burn injuries, in that regard Duty doctor Reetesh Kansal informed to City Kotwali Guna vide memo (Ex.P/5). On the said information, matter was inquired. During inquiry, statements of injured Sadhna and father of injured Diman Lodha (PW-1) were recorded. Dying declaration (Ex.P-
8) of injured Smt. Sadhna Lodha was recorded by J.K. Pandey Naib Tahsildar Guna (PW-7). In her statements, Smt. Sadhna Lodha stated that her mother-in-law Kalawati and sister-in-law Radha Bai poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze with intention to kill her as a result of which her body got burnt. In her statements, she had disclosed that earlier also cruelty was inflicted on her. After inquiry, FIR (Ex.P-14) Crime No.281/2015 offence punishable under Sections 307, 498-A, 34 of IPC was registered against accused Kalawati Lodha and Radha Bai Lodha.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 20-10-2023 06:40:11 PM
3. During the investigation, Sub-Inspector Ramavtar Singh (PW-9) reached on the spot and prepared the spot map (Ex.P-15). Naib Tahsildar J.K. Pandey (PW-7) recorded dying declaration in which the deceased stated that her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and her sister-in-law (Radha) provided matchstick to her mother, who set her ablaze on fire and her husband extinguished the fire by throwing water. Postmortem was conducted by Dr. Y.K. Goyal (PW-12) who opined that deceased sustained burn injuries and the death was result of complications caused due to burn injuries and prepared autopsy report Ex.P-22. Appellant was arrested vide arrest memo Ex.P-16 and after completion of investigation, charge-sheet in the matter was filed against the appellant.
4. The Trial Court framed charges against the appellant under Section 498-A, 304-B in the alternative 302 of IPC and section 201 of IPC to which she has denied and pleaded for trial.
5. Prosecution has examined 13 witnesses and exhibited 24 documents to prove their case and the appellant has examined Dhiraj Singh (DW-1) to prove her defence. After evaluating the evidence that came on record, the Trial Court finds the appellant guilty and convicted and sentenced her as mentioned herein-above in Para No.1. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, the appellant has filed this Criminal Appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is in custody for last eight years. She has no criminal record and the incident occurred in the heat of the moment. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the case would not travel beyond the scope of Section 304 Part II of IPC. The learned counsel for the appellant also
Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 20-10-2023 06:40:11 PM
disputed the genuineness of dying declaration (Ex.P-8) recorded by the Naib Tahsildar (PW-7) and submits that dying declaration is doubtful. Hence, prayed to set-aside the impugned judgment and acquittal for appellant.
7. Per contra, learned Government Advocate for respondent/State submitted that dying declaration was recorded on the date of incident and before recording the dying declaration by Naib Tahsildar, Dr. Sachin Soni (PW-8) who was present in the hospital, certified the fit mental condition of the appellant and after recording of the dying declaration, mental condition of the injured was also certified by the same doctor. It is further submitted that dying declaration was proved by Dr. Sachin Soni (PW-8) and Naib Tahsildar J.K. Pandey (PW-7). She further submits that dying declaration is genuine and the same cannot be disbelieved and that the prosecution has proved their case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant. Hence, the trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant, therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
8. Father of the deceased Shri Diman Singh Lodha (PW-1) and mother of the deceased Smt. Hemlata Lodha (PW-2) have not supported the prosecution case before the Trial Court and they were declared hostile by the prosecution, although they were cross-examined by the prosecution but no such facts were come up which support the prosecution case. Hence, the entire controversy revolves around the dying declaration (Ex.P-8) recorded by J.K. Pandey, Naib Tahsildar (PW-7). The dying declaration is reproduced as below:-
Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 20-10-2023 06:40:11 PM
ej.kklu dFku lfpu gkWLihVy xquk ejht c;ku nsus dh fLFkfr esa gS A gLrk{kj vLi"V 3%30 P.M. fnukad 15@09@2015 Mh-Mh izkjEHk djus dk le;&3%32 P.M.
uke& lk/kuk yks/kh iRuh& ftrsUnz yks/kh mez& 20 tkfr& yks/kh fuoklh& vkou eSa lR; dFku djrh gWw& iz'u%& D;k ?kVuk ?kfVr gqbZ\ mRrj%& dy 3%30 ds djhc esjh lkl ¼dykorh½ ls >xM+k gqvk FkkA vkSj vkt lqcg Hkh >xMk fd;k vkSj dgk fd rqe dksbZ dke ugha djrh gksA vkSj lkl us vius HkkbZ ls dgk fd i<h fy[kh cgw feyh gS nknk fxnhZ crkrh gS dqN dke ugha djrh gSA dy ls eSus dqN Hkh ugha [kk;k eq>s [kkus dks Hkh ugha igqpk A esjh uun [kkuk cukus yxh Fkh vkSj lkl yMus yxh vkSj dgus yxh fudy tk ;gk ls] esjs Åij feÍh ds rsy dh dqIih Mky nh vkSj uun¼jk/kk½ us ekfpl ns nh vkSj lkl us esjs ess vkx yxk nhA esjk ifr ml le; ogh Fkk mlus ikuh ykdj vkx cq>kbZA tc rd esjs diMksa esa vkx yxus ls esjk iwjk 'kjhj gkFk iSj ty x;sA esjs ifr ,oa lkl vkSj vU; yksx us eq>s vLirky esa ykdj HkrhZ djk fn;kA iz%& vkSj dqN dguk gS\ m%& vkSj dqN ugha dguk gSA gLRkk{kjvLi"V ts-ds-ik.Ms;
uk;c rg0 xquk Mh-Mh lekfIr dk le;& 3%50 P.M.
Lkk/kuk ejht iw.kZ gks'k es jgdj c;ku fn;k gSA gLrk{kj vLi"V 15@09@2015
Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 20-10-2023 06:40:11 PM
9. Looking to the facts mentioned in the dying declaration (Ex.P-8), it is revealed that the quarrel took place due to dispute over some trivial domestic chores and in the heat of moment, the appellant poured kerosene on the deceased and set her ablaze on fire. Hence, it is clear that the fact of pre-meditation and intention of appellant to kill the deceased is absent in the case.
10. Now we consider the genunity of the dying declaration (Ex.P-8). The justification for the sanctity/presumption attached to a dying declaration, is twofold; Ethically and religiously, it is presumed that a person while at the brink of death, breathing last and about to die will not lie. There is no hard and fast rule for determining when a dying declaration should be accepted; the duty of the Court is to decide this question in the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case and be fully convinced of the truthfulness of the same. The evidence and material available on record must be properly weighed in each case to arrive at an appropriate conclusion.
11. In the case of Madan alias Madhu Patekar Versus State of Maharashtra (2019) 13 SCC 464, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that- a dying declaration can form basis of conviction, if in the opinion of the Court, it inspires confidence that the deceased at the time of making such declaration, was in a fit state of mind and there was no tutoring or prompting. Para 10, 11 and 12 are reproduced as below:-
10. The rule of admissibility of dying declaration is no more res integra. In the adjudication of a criminal case, dying declaration plays a crucial role. A dying declaration made by a person as to cause of his/her death or as to any of the circumstances which resulted in his/her death, in cases in which cause of death comes in question, is relevant under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. It has been emphasized number of times that dying declaration is an exception to the rule against admissibility of hearsay evidence. The whole development of the notion that the dying declaration, as an exception to the hearsay rule, is based on the
Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 20-10-2023 06:40:11 PM
formalistic view that the determination of certain classes of evidence as admissible or inadmissible and not on the apparent credibility of particular evidence tendered.
11. We are aware of the fact that the physical or mental weakness consequent upon the approach of death, a desire of self- vindication, or a disposition to impute the responsibility for a wrong to another, as well as the fact that the declarations are made in the absence of the accused, and often in response to leading questions and direct suggestions, and with no opportunity for cross-examination: all these considerations conspire to render such declarations a dangerous kind of evidence. In order to ameliorate such concerns, this court has cautioned in umpteen number of cases to have a cautious approach when considering a conviction solely based on dying declaration. Although there is no absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis for conviction unless it is corroborated, the courts must be cautious and must rely on the same if it inspires confidence in the mind of the Court [See: Ram Bihari Yadav Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (1998) 4 SCC 517 and Suresh Chandra Jana & Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal &Ors., 2017 (8) SCALE 697].
12. Moreover, this court has consistently laid down that a dying declaration can form basis of conviction, if in the opinion of the Court, it inspires confidence that the deceased at the time of making such declaration, was in a fit state of mind and there was no tutoring or prompting. If the dying declaration creates any suspicion in the mind of Court as to its correctness and genuineness, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence [See Also: Atbir Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 (9) SCC 1, Paniben Vs. State of Gujarat, 1992 (2) SCC 474 and Panneerselvam Vs. State of Tamilnadu, 2008 (17) SCC 190].
12. In the present case, the dying declaration (Ex.P-8) was duly proved by examining witness J.K. Pandey, Naib Tahsildar (PW-7) who have recorded it and also proved the fitness condition of the victim by the Dr. Sachin Soni (PW-8) during the dying declaration, hence the circumstances surrounding the case also helps to establish the veracity of the statement given by the deceased. Therefore, no space for doubt survives in the light of the dying declaration that the incident actually took place as it was recorded in deceased's statement.
13. Now the point falling for consideration before us is whether the
Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 20-10-2023 06:40:11 PM
conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of IPC is sustainable. As discused in Para No.9 it is found that the fact of pre-meditation and intention of appellant to kill the deceased is absent in the case.
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down in Prabhakar Vithal Gholve v. the State of Maharashtra, AIR 2016 SC 2292 that if the assault on the deceased could be said to be on account of the sudden fight without premeditation, in heat of passion, and upon a sudden quarrel, conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained under S. 302 and altered to one under Section 304 Part-I of IPC. In Sikandar Ali Vs. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 SC 2614, the Court altered the conviction u/s 302 IPC to one u/s 304 part-2 IPC in the following circumstances:
"7. We have no doubt about the complicity of all the accused in the homicide of Sarfraj. A-1 attacked the deceased with the knife and caused injury on his neck which resulted in his death. The other accused assisted him in committing the crime by holding the hands of the deceased. However, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the accused are liable to be punished for an offence under Section 302 IPC. After considering the submissions made by the counsel for the Appellants and scrutinising the material on record, we are of the opinion that the accused are not liable to be convicted under Section 302 IPC. We are convinced that there was neither prior concert nor common intention to commit a murder. During the course of their business activity the accused reached the dhaba where the deceased was present.
An altercation took place during the discussion they were having behind the dhaba. That led to a sudden fight during which A-1 attacked the deceased with a knife. Exception 4 to Section 300 is applicable to the facts of this case. As we are convinced that the accused are responsible for the death of Sarfraj, we are of the opinion that they are liable for conviction under Section 304 part II of the IPC. We are
Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 20-10-2023 06:40:11 PM
informed that A-1 has undergone a sentence of seven years and that A-2 to A-4 have undergone four years of imprisonment. We modify the judgment of the High Court converting the conviction of the accused from Section 302 to Section 304 part II of the IPC sentencing them to the period already undergone. They shall be released forthwith."
15. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in Madhavan and Ors. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2017 SC 3847 that:
"8. Notably, the High Court has not considered the issue of quantum of sentence at all, but mechanically proceeded to affirm the sentence awarded by the Trial Court. From the factual position, which has emerged from the record, it is noticed that there was a preexisting property dispute between the two families. The incident in question happened all of a sudden without any premeditation after PW1 questioned the appellants about their behavior. It was a free fight between the two family members. Both sides suffered injuries during the altercation. The fatal injury caused to Periyasamy was by the use of thadi (wooden log) which was easily available on the spot. The appellants, on their own, immediately reported the matter to the local police alleging that the complainant party was the aggressor. No antecedent or involvement in any other criminal case has been reported against the appellants. Taking oral view of the matter, therefore, we find force in the argument of the appellants that the quantum of sentence is excessive."
16. In the case of Arjun and Another Vs. State of Chattisgarh reported in AIR 2017 SC 1150, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that :-
'20. To invoke this exception (4), the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (1989) 2 SCC 217 : (AIR 1989 SC 1094, Para 6), it has been explained as under:
Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 20-10-2023 06:40:11 PM
"7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.............."
21. Further in the case of Arumugam v. State, Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, (2008) 15 SCC 590 : (AIR 2009 SC 331, Para 15), in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances exception (4) to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under: "9. .......
"18. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight;
(c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 20-10-2023 06:40:11 PM
For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'."
17. In view of the foregoing discussion and looking at the verdicts of the Hon'ble Apex Court as mentioned hereinabove, the judgment of conviction dated 24.11.2016 is hereby confirmed and the culpability of the appellant is maintained. The conviction of appellant under Section 302 of IPC is modified into the offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 8 (Eight) years with the same fine amount as awarded by the learned trial Court. Conviction and sentence imposed for the offence under Section 498-A and 201 of IPC is hereby confirmed.
18. The appellant be released after undergoing the aforesaid sentence and deposit of the fine amount, (if not already deposited) and if not required in any other case.
19. Resultantly, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent mentioned hereinabove.
20. Record of the court below along with a copy of this judgment be sent forthwith for information and compliance.
(ROHIT ARYA) (AMAR NATH (KESHARWANI))
JUDGE JUDGE
ojha
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: YOGENDRA
OJHA
Signing time: 20-10-2023
06:40:11 PM
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