Madhya Pradesh High Court
Manojkumar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 23 March, 2023
Author: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRAKASH CHANDRA GUPTA
ON THE 23 rd OF MARCH, 2023
WRIT APPEAL No. 308 of 2023
BETWEEN:-
MANOJKUMAR S/O SHRI THAKURPRASAD
SHRIVASTAVA, AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
PRIVAT, R/O 53 BHAGAT SINGH NAGAR, INODRE
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPELLANT
(APPELLANT - MANOJ KUMAR IS PRESENT IN PERSON )
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
CHIEF SECRETARY, MANTRALAY, VALLABH
BHAWAN, GOVT. OF M.P. BHOPAL (MADHYA
PRADESH)
2. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, HIGHER EDUCATION
D E P A R T M E N T MANTRALAYA, VALLABH
BHAWAN GOVT. OF M.P. BHOPAL (MADHYA
PRADESH)
3. VEERAN SINGH BHALAVI, OCCUPATION: AVAR
SACHIV HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
MANTRALAY VALLABH BHAVAN, GOVT. OF M.P.
BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
4. COLLECTOR-INDORE, GOVERNMENT OF M.P.
MOTI TABELA AREA INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
5. JOINT DIRECTOR, TREASURY AND ACCOUNTS,
FINANCE DEPARTMENT, GOVT. OF M.P.
MAHARAJA COMPLEX NEAR KOTHARI MARKET
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
6. REGISTRAR, DEVI AHILYA UNIVERSITY RNT
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Signed by: PREETHA HARI
NAIR
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4:09:15 PM
2
MARG INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
7. CHANCELLOR DEVI AHILYA UNIVERSITY, RAJ
BHAWAN BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
8. VICE CHANCELLOR, DEVI AHILYA UNIVERSITY,
RNT MARG, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
9. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, HOME DEPARTMENT,
GOVT. OF M.P. MANTRALAY, BHOPAL (MADHYA
PRADESH)
10. S.H.O. BHAWARKUA, THANA-MP POLICE INDORE
(MADHYA PRADESH)
11. S.H.O. CHHOTI GWALTOLI THANA, MP POLICE
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
12. POLICE COMMISSIONER, MP POLICE, INDORE,
M.P, (MADHYA PRADESH)
13. HEAD, SCHOOL OF EDUCATION, DEVI AHILYA
VISHWAVIDYALAY, BHANWARKUA SQUARE,
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
14. SECRETARY, UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION
BAHADUR SHAH ZAFAR MARG, NEW DELHI
(DELHI)
15. MEMBER SECRETARY, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
TEACHER EDUCATION, R/O G-7 SECTOR-10
DWARKA, NEAR METRO STATION, NEW DELHI
(DELHI)
.....RESPONDENTS
(NONE FOR THE RESPONDENTS)
This appeal coming on for admission this day, JUSTICE SUSHRUT
ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI passed the following:
ORDER
Due to strike called by the Madhya Pradesh State Bar Council, today the
Advocates are abstaining from Court work.
Heard on the question of admission and interim relief.
1. In this writ appeal under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha
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NAIR
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Nyayalaya(Khandpeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 a challenge has been made
to the order dated 14/02/2023, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.
No.2117/2023 whereby, the writ petition has been dismissed. The
appellant/petitioner had filed the writ petition seeking the following reliefs :-
(i)Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction including writ in the nature of
mandamus against the respondents to meet the justice to order to issues the mark
sheet of First Semester of B.Ed. Course separately.
(ii)Allowing the petition, respondents be directed to pay pecuniary loss of the
petitioner immediately with consequential benefits;
(iii) Respondents be directed to follow the law and let the petitioner be issued the
first semester mark sheet separately without further delay;
(iv) To modify the impugned order Annexure P-2 to the extent of legality so that
petitioner's fundamental rights and natural justice could be saved;
(v)Be further pleased to direct the respondents to pay compensation of Rupees 50
Thousand Crores to the petitioner for not using/issuing the separate Mark sheet of
the First Semester of the B.Ed. Course yet which exploited the career of the
humble petitioner ab initio treacherously and cryptically and;
(vi)Kindly be pleased to order to extend the benefit of Annexure P-1 to the humble
petitioner to check the discrimination and exploitation seeing fundamental Rights
and Natural Justice.
2. Learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition passed the
following order vide order dated 14/02/2023 in W.P. No.2117/2023:
"The petitioner has filed this present petition seeking direction to the respondents
to issue a mark-sheet of first semester separately, modified the impugned order
Annexure P-2 and further direct respondents to pay compensation of Rs.50,000
Crore for not issuing a separate mark-sheet of first Semester of B.Ed course.
The petitioner took an admission in the B.Ed course in the year 1997-98. The
Devi Ahilya University, Indore issued a mark-sheet to him on 18.06.1998
declaring him failed in the examination. The petitioner himself has filed the
photocopy of the marksheet alongwith list of documents in which the grade in each
subject of semester -I as well as semester -II are mentioned.The petitioner has not
disclosed as to why the separate mark-sheet of first semester is required after lapse
of more than 25 years. In letter dated 18.01.2023, the head of department has
informed the Vice-Chancellor that the petitioner is in habit of making complaints to
Prime Minister and Chief Minister. Since last so many years the petitioner is
claiming compensation to the tune of Rs.50,000 Crores from respondents without
giving any details of the losses suffered by him by not issuing a separate mark-
sheet. The petitioner is an practicing advocate of this Bar therefore, this Court is
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sparing him by not imposing cost for filing this frivolous petition.
In view of above, Writ Petition is hereby dismissed."
3. The grievance of the appellant is that he took admission in B.Ed.
Course in the year 1997-1998. The respondent/University issued a mark-sheet
to him on 18/06/1998 declaring him failed in the examination. The grievance of
the appellant is that the respondent/University has not issued a separate mark-
sheet for Semester-I and Semester-II. However, a joint mark-sheet has been
issued. Therefore, in the circumstances, direction may be issued to the
respondents to issue a separate mark-sheet and also pay compensation to the
tune of Rs.50,000 Crore for not issuing a separate mark-sheet.
4. On perusal of the impugned order as well as the writ petition, it is seen
that the appellant had filed a writ petition after a period of 25 years for which no
explanation has been put forth with regard to huge delay in filing the writ petition
whereas, it is stated in Para - 4 of the writ petition that there is no delay in filing
the writ petition. Moreover, the appellant has also not disclosed as to how he
had suffered losses due to non-issuance of a separate mark-sheet for Semester-
I in the B.Ed. Course. The appellant has also not disclosed as to how he is
entitled for compensation to the tune of Rs.50,000 Crore from the respondent.
It is also seen that the learned Single Judge had spared the appellant from
imposing cost as he is a practicing advocate.
5. Heard the appellant, who is present in person before this Court.
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. C.
Girija and others by order dated 13.02.2019 passed in Civil Appeal No.
1577/2019 has held as under:-
13. This Court again in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. M.K. Sarkar,
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(2010) 2 SCC 59 on belated representation laid down following, which is extracted
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below:-
.15. When a belated representation in regard to a "stale" or "dead" issue/dispute is
considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so,
the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for
reviving the "dead" issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and
latches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with
reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's
direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without
examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will
extend the limitation, or erase the delay and latches.
14.Again, this Court in State of Uttaranchal and Another Vs. Shiv Charan Singh
Bhandari and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 179 had occasion to consider question of delay
in challenging the promotion. The Court further held that representations relating to a
stale 15 claim or dead grievance does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. In
Paragraph Nos. 19 and 23 following was laid down:-
19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or
tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead
grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action
cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the
competent authority does not arrest time.
23. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC 137, this Court, testing the
equality clause on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of service
benefit, has ruled thus: (SCC p.145, para 16)
16 ... filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay
or latches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to
whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or
latches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which
had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a
situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of
those who are alert and vigilant.
15. This Court referring to an earlier judgment in 16 P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs.
State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 noticed that a person aggrieved by an
order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within
six months or at the most a year of such promotion. In Paragraph No. 26 and 28,
following was laid down:-
26. Presently, sitting in a time machine, we may refer to a two-Judge Bench
decision in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152, wherein it
has been laid down that: (SCC p. 154, para 2)
2... A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should
approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion.
It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers
under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot
interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a
sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their
extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it
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expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then
approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters."
28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and latches and granting relief is
contrary to all settled principles and even 17 would not remotely attract the concept of
discretion. We may hasten to WA No. 732/2020 (6) add that the same may not be
applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are
infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have
been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court.
The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpon. Ltd. Vs. K.
Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as under :
6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court
when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In
an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if
there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice
to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of
Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co.
v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon
Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor
Service. Sir Barnes had stated:
Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a
technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either
because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded
upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the
delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either
party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as it relates to the remedy.
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this
aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is
apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to
Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India that no
relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation
approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that
though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it 2156/2020 Naresh Singh & Anr.
vs. State of M.P. & Ors . does not follow from this that it was the intention of the
Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in
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petitions filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High Court in
exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the
petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline
to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this
rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit
a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion
and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction
is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out
that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation
of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with
the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State of
T.N. Reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78 has held as under :-
11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid
down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, the facts
stare at the face of it that on 8-10-1996 an order was passed by the Collector in
pursuance of the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the
writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat
tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up to 2003. This on the face of
it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no
justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit.
The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India reported in (2007) 9
SCC 274 has held as under :-
6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition has to be dismissed. Delay
or laches is one of the factors to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they
exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In
an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if
there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances,causes prejudice
to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of
Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum
Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, PC at p. 239 was approved by this Court in
Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service. Sir Barnes had stated:
Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to
a waiver of it, or whereby his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be
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reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of
these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief,which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity
of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two
circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause
a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as
relates to the remedy;
8. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High Court in
exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the
petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline
to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this
rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit
a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion
and public inconvenience and bring in its trainnew injustices, and if writ jurisdiction
is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out
that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation
of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with
the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School Council Vs.
Sristidhar Biswar reported in (2007) 12 SCC 779 has held as under :
11. In the present case, the panel was (10) prepared in 1980 and the petitioners
approached the court in 1989 after the decision in Dibakar Pal. Such persons
should not be given any benefit by the court when they allowed more than nine
years to elapse. Delay is very significant in matters of granting relief and courts
cannot come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant of their rights.
Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning the delay of nine years
cannot be countenanced;
The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Jaswant Singh reported in
(2006) 11 SCC 464 has held as under :
12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England,
para 911, p. 395 as follows:
In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the
chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has
occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing
by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been
completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a
remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving
the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases
lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine
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of laches.
The Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana reported
in (1997) 6 SCC 538 has held as under :
18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay disentitles the party to
the discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court in the case of NDMC Vs. Pan Singh reported in (2007) 9 SCC
278 has held as under:
16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The
respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their
grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17
workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as
parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is
not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were
recruited after the cutoff date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a
long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they
are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be
exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and
laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of
W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan.).
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a
reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India and M.R. Gupta v. Union of
India.).
18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 277, paras 9-10)
9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations
would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in
K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. There is a limit to the time which
can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government
had turned down one representation the making of another representation on
similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray
making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of
the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See also
State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik.).
10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to
month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It
would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable
period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the
relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High
Court did not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it
would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed
the writ petition on that score alone.
19. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where the High
Court should have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the
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respondents herein.
7. If the present case is considered in the light of aforementioned
judgment pronounced by the Apex Court, then it is clear that cause of action
arose in favour of the appellant in the year 1998 itself. The appellant waited for a
period of about 25 years and maintained silence. In Para-4 of the writ petition,
the appellant is required to explain the delay if any. The appellant has clearly
stated that there is no delay in filing the present petition. As the appellant was
sleeping over his rights, it can not be said that there is no delay in filing the writ
petition. It is well established principle of law that old and stale cases need not
be reopened. This Court can not direct the respondents to issue a separate
mark-sheet after a lapse of 25 years so as to open/revive the dead cases and
give fresh cause of action to the appellant.
8. In view of the above, the learned Single Judge has rightly denied the
claim for issuance of a separate mark-sheet in respect of 1st Semester of B.Ed.
Course. The writ Court has not committed any error calling for interference in
the present appeal. However, looking to the fact that the appellant being a
practicing advocate is filing frivolous and non-maintainable litigations and
wasting the precious time of the Court without any merits and substance in the
matter. Even on merits, no such direction can be issued to the respondents to
issue a fresh mark-sheet when the respondents have already issued a proper
mark-sheet in respect of Semester - I as well as Semester-II in the year 1998
itself. Looking to the huge delay and without any explanation thereof, this Court
is not inclined to entertain the writ appeal.
9. Accordingly, the writ appeal fails and is hereby dismissed by imposing
a cost of Rs.5,000/- on the appellant to be deposited in the account of
President and Secretary H.C. Employees Union H.C. (Account
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No.63006406008, Branch Code No. 30528, IFSC No. SBIN0030528,
CIF No. 73003108919) within a period of 30 days from today and obtain a
receipt. The acknowledgment be filed before the Registry failing which, the
Registrar is directed to list this matter before the Court after a period of 30 days
so that appropriate action can be initiated to recover the amount from the
appellant, in accordance with law as arrears of land revenue.
(S. A. DHARMADHIKARI) (PRAKASH CHANDRA GUPTA)
JUDGE JUDGE
pn
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