Kamal vs Mohan (Dead) S/O Jaisingh ...
2023 Latest Caselaw 201 MP

                             1
 IN    THE     HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                    AT JABALPUR
                         BEFORE
      HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
                  ON THE 4 th OF JANUARY, 2023
                 MISC. PETITION No. 4739 of 2022

BETWEEN:-
KAMAL S/O SHRI GAJRAJ SINGH LODHI, AGED ABOUT
40    YEARS, OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURIST R/O
VILLAGE PARSORA TEHSIL RAHATGARH DISTRICT
SAGAR (MADHYA PRADESH)

                                                   .....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI ROHAN HARNE- ADVOCATE)

AND
1.    MOHAN (DEAD) S/O JAISINGH KUSHWAHA
      THROUGH ITS LRS SMT. SUMAN W/O LATE
      MOHAN PATEL, AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS, R/O
      VILLAGE    PARSORA  TEHSIL   RAHATGARH
      DISTRICT SAGAR (MADHYA PRADESH)

2.    KU. ANGITA D/O LATE MOHAN PATEL, AGED
      ABOUT 12 YEARS, R/O VILLAGE PARSORA TEHSIL
      RAHATGARH    DISTRICT     SAGAR   (MADHYA
      PRADESH)

3.    KU. MUSKAN D/O LATE MOHAN PATEL, AGED
      ABOUT 7 YEARS, R/O VILLAGE PARSORA TEHSIL
      RAHATGARH    DISTRICT    SAGAR   (MADHYA
      PRADESH)

4.    KU. KHUSHBU D/O LATE MOHAN PATEL, AGED
      ABOUT 5 YEARS, R/O VILLAGE PARSORA TEHSIL
      RAHATGARH    DISTRICT    SAGAR   (MADHYA
      PRADESH)

5.    RADHIKA D/O LATE MOHAN PATEL, AGED ABOUT
      2   YEARS, R/O VILLAGE PARSORA TEHSIL
      RAHATGARH     DISTRICT SAGAR    (MADHYA
      PRADESH)

6.    SAMPADA ADHIKARI, STATE OF M.P. THROUGH
      COLLECTOR SAGAR DISTRICT-SAGAR (MADHYA
                                      2
      PRADESH)

                                                                .....RESPONDENTS


      This petition coming on for admission this day, th e court passed the
following:
                                      ORDER

This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking the following reliefs:-

"7.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue appropriate directions to the learned Court of

Commissioner Sagar Division Sagar (M.P.) for passing final order in Case No. 01/Punrikshan/2021-22, forthwith, preferably within a period of 15 days, in the interest of justice.

7.2 Any other writ which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also be granted to the petitioners, in the interest of justice."

The petitioner has confined his arguments to the effect that the petitioner has filed Revision No. 1/Revision/2021-22 before the Commissioner, Sagar Division, Sagar which was heard on 13.06.2022 but the order has not been passed so far and accordingly, on 13.07.2022 also an application was filed as well as personal request was made but all the efforts have gone in vain and accordingly, it is prayed that the Commissioner, Sagar Division, Sagar be directed to decide the revision without any further delay.

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.

Although, the petitioner has prayed for a direction to the Commissioner, S agar Division, Sagar but unfortunately he has not impleaded him as respondent. Be that whatever it may.

The crux of the matter is that there should not be any undue time gape between the date on which the case is heard and reserved for orders and the date on which the final order is pronounced. The authorities must try to pass the final order within a reasonable time from the date of final hearing of the case.

According to the petitioner, the revision was heard on 13.06.2022 and approximately 7 months time have passed, but the judgement has not been pronounced.

In light of the judgement passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Rai Vs. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 318 and Balaji Baliram Mupade and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 893, the Division Bench of this Court has passed the following order in the case of Sudesh Kumar Yadav Vs. Union of India and Others, decided on 23.12.2021 in W.P. No. 24337/2021.

"4. The Apex Court time and again has emphasized the importance of expeditious pronouncement of judgment by restricting the time gap between the date on which the case is heard and reserved for orders and the date on which final order is pronounced,

to the bare minimum. However, since instances of time gap between reserving of a case and pronouncing of judgment getting longer, came to the fore, the Supreme Court was compelled in the case of Anil Rai (supra) to lay down thus:

"4. It has been held time and again that justice

should not only be done but should also appear to have been done. Similarly, whereas justice delayed is justice denied, justice withheld is even worst than that. This Court in Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra : 1978 (3) SCC 544, observed that procedure contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitution means "fair and reasonable procedure" which comports with civilised norms like natural justice rooted firm in community consciousness-not primitive processual barbarity nor legislated normative mockery. Right of appeal in a criminal case culminating in conviction was held to be the basis of the civilised jurisprudence.

Conferment of right of appeal to meet the requirement of Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be made a fraught (sic fraud) by protracting the pronouncement of judgment for reasons which are not attributable either to the litigant or to the State or to the legal profession. Delay in disposal of an appeal on account of inadequate number of Judges, insufficiency of infrastructure, strike of lawyers and the circumstances attributable to the State is understandable but once the entire process of participation in justice delivery system is over and only thing to be done is the pronouncement of judgment, no excuse can be found to further delay for adjudication of the rights of the parties, particularly when it affects any of their rights conferred by

the Constitution under Part-III.

5. Learned Counsel for the Appellants has referred to the judgments in Surender Nath Sarkar v. Emperor : AIR 1942 Cal 225 ; Jagarnath Singh v. Francis Kharia AIR 1948 Pat 414 ; Sohagiya v. Ram Briksh Mahto 1961 BLJR 282, to show that only on the ground of delay in rendering the judgment for the period ranging from six months to ten months, the High Courts had held such judgments bad in law and set them aside. In R.C. Sharma v. Union of India 1976 (3) SCC 574, this Court, after noticing that the Code of Civil Procedure did not provide a time limit in delivery of a judgment held:

Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment, unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considers important may have escaped notice. But, what is more important is that litigants must have complete confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment. Justice, as we have often observed, must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done.

6. In Bhagwandas Fateh Chand Daswani v. H. P. A.

International : 2000 (2) SCC 13, this Court observed (at SCC P 14, Para 3) that "a long delay in delivery the judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculation in the minds of parties to a case". The Court in various cases including Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar : 1980 (1) SCC 81 ; Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar 1980 (1) SCC 98 ; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak 1992 (1) SCC 2259; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab 1994 (3)SCC 569 ; Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar 1998 (7) SCC 507 ; Raj Deo Sharma II v. State of Bihar 1999 (7) SCC 604 and Akhtari Bi v. State of M.P. 2001 (4) SCC 355, has in unambiguous terms, held that "the right of speedy trial to be part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India."

7. Adverse effect of the problem of not

pronouncing the reserved judgments within a reasonable time was considered by the Arrears Committee constituted by the Government of India on the recommendation of the Chief Justices' Conference. In its report of 1989-90 Chapter VIII, the Committee recommended that reserved judgments should ordinarily be pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments. If, however, a reserved judgment is not pronounced for a period of three months from the date of the conclusion of the arguments, the

Chief Justice was recommended to be authorised to either post the case for delivering judgment in open court or withdraw the case and post it for disposal before an appropriate Bench.

8. The intention of the Legislature regarding pronouncement of judgments can be inferred from the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub- section (1) of Section 353 of the Code provides that the judgment in every trial in any criminal court of original jurisdiction, shall be pronounced in open court immediately after the conclusion of the trial or on some subsequent time for which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. The words "some subsequent time" mentioned in Section 353 contemplates the passing of the judgment without undue delay, as delay in the pronouncement of judgment is opposed to the principle of law. Such subsequent time can at the most be stretched to a period of six weeks and not beyond that time in any case. The pronouncement of judgments in the civil case should not be permitted to go beyond two months.

9. It is true, that for the High Courts, no period for pronouncement of judgment is contemplated either under the Code of Civil Procedure or the Criminal Procedure Code, but as the pronouncement of the judgment is a part of justice dispensation system, it has to be without delay. In a country like ours where people consider the Judges

only second to God, efforts be made to strengthen that belief of the common man. Delay in disposal of the cases facilitates the people to raise eye-brows, some time genuinely which, if not checked, may shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system. A time has come when the judiciary itself has to assert for preserving its stature, respect and regards for the attainment of the Rule of Law. For the fault of a few, the glorious and glittering name of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be made ugly. It is the policy and purpose of law, to have speedy justice for which efforts are required to be made to come up to the expectation of the society of ensuring speedy, untainted and unpolluted justice.

10. Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High Courts, I feel it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments which, I am sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being the mandate of this Court. Such guidelines, as for present, are as under:

(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in case where the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the

court officer concerned.

(ii) That Chief Justices of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/ Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that months.

(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the Chief Justice concerned shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the Judges of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.

(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months, from the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with a prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.

(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not

pronounced within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as deems fit in the circumstances."

5. The aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Anil Rai (supra) has been reiterated recently in Balaji Baliram Mupade (supra)."

In the light of the above mentioned preposition of law, the prayer made b y counsel for the petitioner for a direction to the Commissioner, Sagar Division, Sagar to decide the revision, as early as possible, appears to be bonafide.

Accordingly, the petition is disposed of with a direction to the Commissioner, Sagar Division, Sagar to decide the Revision No. 01/Revision/2021-22 within a period of 15 days from the date of production of certified copy of this order.

With the aforesaid observations, the petition is finally disposed of.

(G.S. AHLUWALIA) JUDGE ashish ASHISH KUMAR LILHARE 2023.01.06 10:35:36 +05'30'