Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Lalta Devi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 29 March, 2022
Author: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
ON THE 29th OF MARCH, 2022
WRIT PETITION No. 7049 of 2022
Between:-
SMT. LALTA DEVI W/O LATE SHRI LAL SINGH
RATHORE , AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
HOUSE WIFE R/O VILLAGE GADARPUR, POST
DEOGAON, TAHSIL AJAYGARH, DISTRICT PANNA
(M.P.) (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI R.K. VERMA, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER)
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY SCHOOL EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT VALLABH BHAWAN BHOPAL (MP)
(MADHYA PRADESH)
2. DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER, PANNA
DISTRICT-PANNA(M.P.) (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. DISTRICT TREASURY OFFICER, PANNA DISTRICT-
PANNA(M.P.) (MADHYA PRADESH)
4. SANKUL PRINCIPAL, GOVERNMENT EXCELLENCE
HIGHER SECONDARY SCHOOL, AJAYGARH
AJAYGARH, DISTRICT-PANNA(M.P.) (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI PRAVEEN NAMDEO, LEARNED GOVERNMENT
ADVOCATE FOR THE RESPONDENTS/STATE)
T h is petition coming on for admission this day, the court passed the
following:
ORDER
Heard finally with the consent of both the parties.
By filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioner seeks direction to the respondents to grant her Second Time Bound
Promotion/Kramonnati from the date of her initial appointment and arrears thereof
in the light of the principle laid down in the case of Writ Petition No.6773/2006
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(Smt. Prerna vs. State of M.P.).
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Learned counsel for the petitioner was granted ample opportunities to
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explain the delay of about 17 years in approaching this Court claiming the relief.
Learned counsel was also directed to explain as to how the case of Smt.
Prerna’s case (supra) is applicable to the facts of this case. Learned counsel
for the petitioner was unable to point out as to how the judgment of Smt.
Prerna’s case (supra) is applicable in this case.
In spite of repeated opportunity, delay in filing of this writ petition has not
been explained. This Court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition on the
ground of delay and laches of about 17 years.
Heard the learned counsel for parties.
This Court by order dated 4.9.2020 passed in W.P.No.12836/2020 has held
as under:-
"The delay defeats equity and if the petitioner approaches the Court after a long
delay, then the relief prayed by him may be denied on the ground of delay and laches
irrespective of the fact that the similarly situated other candidates have been extended the
benefit of judgment.
The Supreme Court in the case of Chairman/Managing Director, U.P.
Power Corporation Limited and Ors. vs.Ram Gopal by order dated 30/01/2020
passed in Civil Appeal No.852 of 2020 (Arising Out of Special Leave Petition No.
36253 of has held as under:-
''iii) Inordinate delay in filing writ petition
14. Finally, the prolonged delay of many years ought not to have
b e e n overlooked or condoned. Services of the Respondent were
terminated within months of his appointment, in 1978. Statedly, the
Respondent made a representation and served UPPCL with a legal
notice in 1982, however such feeble effort does little to fill the gap
between when the cause of action arose and he chose to seek its
redressal (in 1990).
15. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that the
Respondent has shown little concern to the settled legal tenets. Even a
civil suit challenging termination of services, if filed by the Respondent,
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would have undoubtedly been barred by limitation in 1990. In a similar
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situation where the appellant belatedly challenged the promotion of his
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junior(s), this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v.State of Tamil Nadu ,
held as follows:
"2........if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have
approached the Court even in the year 1957, after the two
representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One
cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that
relaxation in the year 1971............In effect he wants to unscramble a
scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider
whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour
of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent
in 1957, cannot be reproduced now........It is not that there is any
period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under
Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts
cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of
time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the
Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article
226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for
relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then
approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle
settled matters......."
1 6 . Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to
proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India,
nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of
time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always
be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in
exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over
wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence sitters cannot be allowed to
barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant
citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple
occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within
which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu vs. State of Kerala, this
Court observed thus:
"17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "œdelay defeats
equity".....It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High
Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of
delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other
candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment."(emphasis supplied)
17. Similarly, in Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India this Court while
considering the claim of candidates who, despite being higher in merit,
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exercised their right to parity much after those who were though lower in
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merit but were diligently agitating their rights, this Court observed that:
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"27....It becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of
justice or injustice in entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of delay
and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that
existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of
extinction with the passage of time."
18. We may hasten to add that these principles may not , however,
apply to judgments which are delivered in rem. The State and its
instrumentalities are expected In such category of cases to themselves extend
the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees
without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts. This
distinction between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered in
rem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Arvind
Kumar Srivastava laying down that:
22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given
relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by
extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be
applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved
by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should
be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other
similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be
treated differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in
the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not
challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke
up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had
approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such
employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of
similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-
sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to
dismiss their claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the
judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give
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benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not.
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With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself
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extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can
occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like
scheme of regularisation and the like (see K. C. Sharma v. Union of India [ K. C.
Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 226]). On the
other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the
said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is
stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and
language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment
extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either
laches and delays or acquiescence."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. The order passed by the High Court for retention of Shyam Behari Lal in service, does not possess
any ingredient of a Judgment in rem. The above cited exception, therefore, does not come to the
Respondent rescue. It is also pertinent to mention that neither has it been pleaded nor is it apparent
from the material on record that the Respondent was unable to approach the court of law in time on
account of any social or financial disability. Had such been the case, he ought to have availed free legal
aid and should have ventilated his grievances in a timely manner. Instead, he seems to be under the
assumption that the termination order is illegal, that he consequently has a right to be reinstated, and
that he can agitate the same at his own sweet-will. Neither of these three assumptions are true, as
elaborated by us earlier.
The Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka and Others vs. S. M. Kotrayya and
Others, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 267 has held as under:-
''9. Thus considered, we hold that it is not necessary that the respondents should give an explanation
for the delay which occasioned for the period mentioned in subsections (1) or (2) of Section 21, but
they should give explanation for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective
period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should be required to satisfy itself whether
the explanation offered was proper explanation. In this case, the explanation offered was that they
came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the petition
immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at all. What was required of them to explain
under sub-sections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their
grievance before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2). That was not the
explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal is wholly unjustified in condoning the delay.
Faced with such a situation, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that although his prayer for
grant of arrears of salary for the period up-to 31st May, 2018 may be barred by limitation, but if the
said additional period of three years is added to the service of the petitioner, then it will affect the
pension of the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner has recurring cause of action so far as the pension
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is concerned.
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The Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence vs. Babita Puniya and
Others by order dated 17th February, 2020 in Civil Appeal Nos. 9367-9369 of 2011 has made
direction applicable to a particular class of Women Army Officers. When certain Women Officers who
have retired after the pronouncement of judgment but before formulation of scheme moved
Miscellaneous Application No.1497- 1498/2020, then by order dated 03/09/2020, the said
application was dismissed on the ground that it would amount to a review."
The petitioner has approached this Court after 17 long years, for which no
plausible explanation has been putforth by her. Repeated representations will not
bring the case within limitation. Stale and dead cases can not be reopened. The
petitioner has been sleeping over her right and woke up after a long period of 17
years to approach this Court.
I n view of the above, this Court refrains from exercising extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the petition suffers
from unexplained delay and laches on the part of the petitioner.
Accordingly, the petition stands dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches.
(S. A. DHARMADHIKARI)
JUDGE
vinay*
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Digitally signed by VINAY KUMAR
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