Madhya Pradesh High Court
Pushpendra Singh Sikarwar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 25 March, 2022
Author: Vivek Agarwal
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK AGARWAL
ON THE 25th OF MARCH, 2022
WRIT PETITION No. 20454 of 2014
Between:-
PUSHPENDRA SINGH SIKARWAR S/O SHRI GULAB
SINGH SIKARWAR , AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
WARD NO. 6, PANDAV NAGAR NEAR SARSWATI
SCHOOL SHAHDOL (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI SANJEEV KUMAR SINGH, ADVOCATE )
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THE
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY HOME DEPARTMENT
MANTRALAYA, VALLABH BHAWAN (MADHYA
PRADESH)
2. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE POLICE
HEADQUARTERS NEAR LAL PARADE GROUND,
BHOPAL DISTT. BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (RAIL) POLICE
HEAD QUARTER S DISTT. ANUPPUR (MADHYA
PRADESH)
4. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (RAIL) POLICE
HEADQUARTERS DISTT. SHAHDOL M.P (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT SWATI ASEEM GEORGE, PANEL LAWYER)
T h is petition coming on for hearing this day, the court passed the
following:
ORDER
This petition is filed being aggrieved of order dated 10.10.2014 (Annexure
P-11) passed by the Inspector General of Police, S.A.F. rejecting candidature of
the petitioner on the ground that in criminal Case No.27/03 under Sections 294,
323, 327, 452, 34 of IPC charge-sheet was filed. Vide Judgement dated 21.07.2008
passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shahdol in Case No.1394/2006,
petitioner was acquitted as charges were not found proved but Court had not
Signature
SAN
Verified
Not adjudicated charge under Section 323, therefore, taking note of para 64 of Madhya
Digitally signed by
MOHD TABISH
Pradesh Police Regulation so also of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
KHAN
Date: 2022.03.29
11:15:12 IST
Civil Appeal No.4842/2013 (S.L.P. No.38886/12) Commissioner of Delhi
Police Vs. Mehar Singh, wherein it is held that only a clean acquittal will entitle a
candidate to seek appointment in Police Department because in Police Department
highest level of character, integrity and honesty is expected of a candidate, rejected
the candidature on the ground that charges under Sections 327, 452 of IPC are
pertaining to moral turpitude.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had not
suppressed any of the facts in the verification form. It is further submitted that
learned JMFC had not framed charges against the petitioner under Section 323 of
IPC. Charges were framed only under Sections 452, 294, 327/34 of IPC.
Therefore, there was no occasion for the trial Court to have dealt with Section 323
which was mentioned in the FIR in absence of framing of the charge. This basic
aspect has been lost site of by the Inspector General of Police while making a note
of this fact in para 2 of the impugned order.
It is submitted that the petitioner acquittal is clean. It has come on record
that the evidence which was produced by the prosecution was not sufficient to
prove the charges under Section 452, 294, 327/34 of IPC and, therefore, the
petitioner was acquitted of the levelled charges. Once a person is acquitted of
these charges then learned Inspector General of Police committed a grave illegality
in still treating them to be of a grave nature and denying appointment to the
petitioner.
It is submitted that a Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of Akhilesh
Kumar Patel Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others in W.P.
No.22417/2013 vide order dated 04.08.2014, allowed the writ petition and noted
from paragraphs 16, 19 and 21 of the judgment in case of Commissioner of
Police/Delhi vs. Mehar Singh it observed as under-:
"16. The question before this Court is whether the
candidature of the respondents who had made a clean breast
of their involvement in a criminal case by mentioning this fact
in their application/attestation form while applying for a post
of constable in Delhi Police; who were provisionally selected
subject to verification of their antecedents and who were
subsequently acquitted/discharged in the criminal case, could
be cancelled by the Screening Committee of the Delhi Police
on the ground that they are not found suitable for
appointment to the post of constable.
19. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to
conclude that the Screening Committee would be entitled to
keep persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out
of the police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if
it feels that the acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds
or not honourable. The Screening Committee will be within
its rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds
that the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the
conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of material
witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers of
the Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether
the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to
similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if
appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening
Committee will have to consider the nature and extent of such
person's involvement in the crime and his propensity of
becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation
rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed
by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this
Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons
with impeccable character enter the police force.
21. The expression 'honourable acquittal' was
considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram. In that case this
Court was concerned with a situation where disciplinary
proceedings were initiated against a police officer. Criminal
case was pending against him under Section 509 of the IPC
and under Section 4 of the Eve-teasing Act. He was acquitted
in that case because of the non-examination of key witnesses.
There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case.
Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the
judgment of this Court in Management of Reserve Bank of
India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, where in
somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a
bank'™s action of refusing to reinstate an employee in
service on the ground that in the criminal case he was
acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it
was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High
Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment
imposed in departmental proceedings. This Court observed
that the expressions '˜honourable acquittal'™,
'˜acquitted of blame'™ and '˜fully exonerated' are
unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code.
They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to
define what is meant by the expression '˜honourably
acquitted'™. This Court expressed that when the accused
is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution case and
the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges leveled
against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused
was honourably acquitted. In light of above, we are of the
opinion that since the purpose of departmental proceedings is
to keep persons, who are guilty of serious misconduct or
dereliction of duty or who are guilty of grave cases of moral
turpitude, out of the department, if found necessary, because
they pollute the department, surely the above principles will
apply with more vigour at the point of entry of a person in the
police department i.e. at the time of recruitment. If it is found
by the Screening Committee that the person against whom a
serious case involving moral turpitude is registered is
discharged on technical grounds or is acquitted of the same
charge but the acquittal is not honourable, the Screening
Committee would be entitled to cancel his candidature.
Stricter norms need to be applied while appointing persons in
a disciplinary force because public interest is involved in it."
It has also referred to the judgment of Supreme Court in case of
Commissioner of Police Vs. Sandeep Kumar, (2014) 4 SCC 644 , it has been
held -
"When the incident happened the respondent must
have been about 20 years of age. At that age young people
often commit indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often
been condoned. After all, youth will be youth. They are not
expected to behave in as mature a manner as older people.
Hence, our approach should be to condone minor
indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand
them as criminals for the rest of their lives."
So also taking note of the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Ram
Kumar Vs. State of U.P. : Civil Appeal No.7106/2011 arising out of Special
Leave Petition (C) No.12091/2010, it has been observed in para 8 that-
"8. In the facts of the present case, we find that though
Criminal Case No.275 of 2001 under Sections
324/323/504 IPC had been registered against the appellant at
Jaswant Nagar Police Station, District Etawah, admittedly the
appellant had been acquitted by order dated 18.07.2002 by
the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etawah. On a
reading of the order dated 18.07.2002 of the Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate would show that the sole witness
examined before the Court, PW-1 Mr. Akhilesh Kumar, had
deposed before the Court that on 02.12.2000 at 4.00 p.m.
children were quarrelling and at that time the appellant,
Shailendra and Ajay Kumar amongst other neighbours had
reached there and someone from the crowd hurled abuses
and in the scuffle Akhilesh Kumar got injured when he fell
and his head hit a brick platform and that he was not beaten
by the accused persons by any sharp weapon. In the absence
of any other witness against the appellant, the Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate acquitted the appellant of the
charges under Sections 323/34/504 IPC. On these facts, it
was not at all possible for the appointing authority to take a
view that the appellant was not suitable for appointment to
the post of a police constable."
Facts of the present case being identical, calls for the same treatment as
petitioner cannot be made to suffer for the whims and fancies of an individual. This
Court has not hesitation to hold that Inspector General of Police has failed to apply
himself to the fact situation of the case and has arbitrarily passed the impugned
order dated 10.10.2014 (Annexure P-11).
Thus, this writ petition is allowed and impugned order dated 10.10.2014
(Annexure P-11) is set aside. Respondents are directed to permit the petitioner to
join on the selected post of Constable (Driver) in the Office of respondent No.3
and shall also decide his entitlement for consequential seniority etc. within a
reasonable period of 90 days of communication of this order.
In above terms, this petition is allowed and disposed of.
(VIVEK AGARWAL)
JUDGE
Tabish
