Begum Suraiya Rashid vs Begum Mehr Taj Nawab Sajeda Sultan ...
2022 Latest Caselaw 3896 MP

                                                                                     FA No.296/2000
                                                                                    FA No.437/2000

     H I G H C O U R T O F M A D H YA P R A D E S H , P R I N C I PA L S E AT AT
                                   JABALPUR
                           First Appeal No.296/2000

            N a w a b z a d i q a m a r Ta j R a b i a S u l t a n t h r o u g h L R s
                                              v.
                          N a w a b M e h r Ta j S a j i d a S u l t a n

M r. Va r u n Ta n k h a a n d M r. H a r s h i t B a r i , A d v o c a t e s f o r t h e
appellant No.1.

M r. S i d d h a r t h S h a r m a , A d v o c a t e f o r t h e L R s o f a p p e l l a n t
No.2.

M r. K i s h o r e S h r i v a s t a v a , S e n i o r A d v o c a t e a l o n g w i t h M r.
Ankur Shrivastava, Advocate for proposed appellants.

M r. A s h o k L a l w a n i , A d v o c a t e f o r t h e r e s p o n d e n t s 1 t o 4 .

M r. R a j e s h P a n c h o l i , A d v o c a t e f o r t h e r e s p o n d e n t s 5 a n d 7 .

M r. S a n j a y A g r a w a l , A d v o c a t e f o r t h e r e s p o n d e n t N o . 6 .

M r. S u y a s h T h a k u r, A d v o c a t e f o r t h e r e s p o n d e n t s N o . 9 a n d 1 4 .

M r. M . A . U s m a n i , A d v o c a t e f o r t h e p r o p o s e d r e s p o n d e n t s .

M r. S a n j e e v Tu l i , A d v o c a t e f o r t h e i n t e r v e n e r.

M r. A k h i l e s h       Kumar         Jain,       Advocate           for     the     proposed
respondent.

                           F i rs t Appea l No. 43 7 / 2 0 0 0
                           Begum Suraiya Rashid
                                            v.
   B e g u m M e h r Ta j N a w a b S a j e d a S u l t a n L R s Ay e s h a B e g a m
                       A l i a s M r s . S h a r m i l a Ta g o r e

M r. S u y a s h T h a k u r, A d v o c a t e f o r t h e a p p e l l a n t .

M r. R a j e s h P a n c h o l i , A d v o c a t e f o r L R s o f r e s p o n d e n t N o . 1 .

M r. Va r u n Ta n k h a , a l o n g w i t h H a r s h i t B a r i , A d v o c a t e s f o r
respondent No.4.

M r. S a n j a y A g r a w a l , A d v o c a t e f o r t h e r e s p o n d e n t N o . 5 .

M r. S i d d h r t h S h a r m a , A d v o c a t e f o r L R s o f r e s p o n d e n t N o . 1 0 .

M r. K i s h o r e S h r i v a s t a v a , S e n i o r A d v o c a t e a l o n g w i t h M r.
Ankur Shrivastava, Advocate for proposed respondents.
                                                   FA No.296/2000
                                                  FA No.437/2000
                            2



                          ORDER

(09.03.2022)

Heard on I.A. No.8486/2021, 8932/2021, I.A. No.

8487/2021 and I.A. No.8931/2021,.

I.A. No.8486/2021 and I.A. No.8932/2021 have been

filed under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the CPC

by the applicants 1- A and A Real Estate Pvt. Ltd; and 2-

Mohammed Atique, as well as Priya Goods Pvt. Ltd.,

respectively in First Appeal No.296/2000.

I.A. No.8487/2021 and I.A. No.8931/2021 have been

filed under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the CPC

by the applicants 1- A and A Real Estate Pvt. Ltd; and 2-

Mohammed Atique as well as Priya Goods Pvt. Ltd,

respectively in First Appeal No.437/2000.

The aforesaid applications were heard analogously and

are being decided by this common order.

It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs filed Civil Suit

No.64-A/99 for partition and separate possession of their

shares in the properties of late Nawab Haji Mohammad FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

Hamidullaha Khan Bahadur. The properties include lands

bearing khasra number 47 area 8.57 acres, khasra number 48

area 25.20 acres, khasra number 50 area 9.65 acres and khasra

number 51 area 15.10 acres. The trial Court vide judgment and

decree dated 14.02.2000 dismissed the aforesaid suit.

2. Mr. Kishore Shrivastava, learned Senior Counsel

while pressing this application has raised manifold

contentions, however, in essence, it is mainly contended that

to avoid multiplicity of litigation, it is imperative that the

applicants be impleaded. It is contended that the applicants

were not the contesting parties in the suit and during pendency

of the present appeal, the applicants entered into agreements

with the legal representatives of the contesting party for

transferring their respective interest and shares in the suit

property and thereby created interest in the suit property

through which share has been purchased after payment of full

consideration. However, the sale deed is to be executed after

title issue is decided. It is further contended that any order

which may be passed in this matter would seriously affect the FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

rights of the applicants, hence, they are to be impleaded.

3. It is contended that the applicant - Priya Goods

Pvt. Ltd. in I.A. No.8932/2021 entered into agreement on

05.12.2011 with Mohd. Nasir Mirza and Smt. Faiza who are

legal heirs of the appellant - Nawabzadi Qamar Taj Rabiya

Sultan. Hence, they claimed that by the aforesaid agreement,

they acquired the rights of respective shares and interest of

the above appellants in the suit property, namely, "Ahmedabad

Palace". The applicants also contended that the parties to the

suit are trying to alienate the properties in question. Therefore,

the applicants are proper and necessary party to the lis. The

appellants have no objection with regard to interlocutory

applications filed by the applicants and dominus litis has no

applicability in the case at hand. Mr. Kishore Shrivastava,

learned Senior Counsel has referred to the order dated

02.03.2020 and submitted that the application for

impleadment on similar grounds was allowed. It is further

contended that there are agreements in favour of the applicants

and some advance money has already been paid.

FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

4. Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on

several decisions in support of his contentions. Heavy

reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Smt.

Saila Bala Dassi v. Smt. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and

Another, AIR 1958 SC 394 wherein it has been held as

follows:

"9........It is obvious that there are several substantial questions arising for determination in which the appellant as purchaser of the properties is vitally interested and indeed is the only person interested. As a purchaser pendente lite, she will be bound by the proceedings taken by the first respondent in execution of her decree, and justice requires that she should be given an opportunity to protect her rights."

5. Combatting the reply filed on behalf of the

respondents, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on

the decision in the case of Savitri Devi v. District Judge,

Gorakhpur and Others, (1999) 2 SCC 577 especially in FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment which read as

follows:

"8. The facts set out by us in the earlier paragraphs are sufficient to show that, there is a dispute as to whether the first defendant in the suit was party to the order of injunction made by the Court on 18.08.92. The proceedings for punishing him for contempt are admittedly pending. The plea raised by him that the first respondent had played a fraud not only against him but also on the Court would have to be decided before it can be said that the sales effected by the first defendant were in violation of the order of the Court. The plea raised by respondents 3 to 5 that they were bona fide transferees for value in good faith may have to be decided before it can be held that the sales in their favour created no interest in the property. The aforesaid questions have to be decided by the Court either in the suit or in the application filed by respondents 3 to 5 for impleadment in the suit. If the application for impleadment is thrown out without a decision on the aforesaid questions FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

respondents 3 to 5 will certainly come up with a separate suit to enforce their alleged rights which means multiplicity of proceedings. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that respondents 3 to 5 are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit.

9. Order I, Rule 10 C.P.C. enables the Court to add any person as party at any stage of the proceedings if the person whose presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings is also one of the objects of the said provision in the Code."

6. In Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash

University and Others, (2001) 6 SCC 534 in paragraph 6 of

the decision Hon'ble the Supreme Court has expressed thus:

"6............In order to appreciate the points involved, it would be necessary to refer to the provisions of Order 22 of the Code, Rules 3 and 4 whereof prescribe procedure in case of devolution of interest FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

on the death of a party to a suit. Under these Rules, if a party dies and right to sue survives, the Court on an application made in that behalf is required to substitute legal representatives of the deceased party for proceeding with a suit but if such an application is not filed within the time prescribed by law, the suit shall abate so far as the deceased party is concerned. Rule 7 deals with the case of creation of an interest in a husband on marriage and Rule 8 deals with the case of assignment on the insolvency of a plaintiff. Rule 10 provides for cases of assignment, creation and devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit other than those referred to in the foregoing Rules and is based on the principle that the trial of a suit cannot be brought to an end merely because the interest of a party in the subject matter of suit is devolved upon another during its pendency but such a suit may be continued with the leave of the Court by or against the person upon whom such interest has devolved. But, if no such a FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

step is taken, the suit may be continued with the original party and the person upon whom the interest has devolved will be bound by and can have the benefit of the decree, as the case may be, unless it is shown in a properly constituted proceeding that the original party being no longer interested in the proceeding did not vigorously prosecute or colluded with the adversary resulting in decision adverse to the party upon whom interest had devolved. The Legislature while enacting Rules 3,4 and 10 has made clear-

cut distinction. In cases covered by Rules 3 and 4, if right to sue survives and no application for bringing legal representatives of a deceased party is filed within the time prescribed, there is automatic abatement of the suit and procedure has been prescribed for setting aside abatement under Rule 9 on the grounds postulated therein. In cases covered by Rule 10, the Legislature has not prescribed any such procedure in the event of failure to apply for leave of the court to continue the proceeding by or FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

against the person upon whom interest has devolved during the pendency of a suit which shows that the Legislature was conscious of this eventuality and yet has not prescribed that failure would entail dismissal of the suit as it was intended that the proceeding would continue by or against the original party although he ceased to have any interest in the subject of dispute in the event of failure to apply for leave to continue by or against the person upon whom the interest has devolved for bringing him on the record."

7. Learned Senior Counsel has also emphatically

submitted that an alienee pendente lite is bound by the final

decree in a suit hence, an alienee can be brought on record

since under the doctrine of lis pendense a decree passed in the

suit during the pendency of which a transfer is made binds the

transferee, his application for bringing him on record should

ordinarily be allowed. In this context he has placed reliance

on the decision in the case of Amit Kumar Shaw and Another

v. Farida Khatoon and Another, (2005) 11 SCC 403 wherein, FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

it has been held as follows:

"9. The object of Order 1 Rule 10 is to discourage contests on technical pleas, and to save honest and bona fide claimants from being non-suited. The power to strike out or add parties can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the proceedings. Under this Rule, a person may be added as a party to a suit in the following two cases:

(1) When he ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, and is not joined so, or

(2) When, without his presence, the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided.

10. The power of a Court to add a party to a proceeding can not depend solely on the question whether he has interest in the suit property. The question is whether the right of a person may be affected if he is not added as a party. Such right, however, will necessarily include an enforceable legal right."

FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

8. On the other hand, Mr. Ashok Lalwani, learned

counsel appearing for the respondent numbers 1 to 4 filed

reply to I.A. No.8486/2021 and I.A. No.8932/2021 submitted

that the applicants in the aforesaid interlocutory applications,

are not the contesting parties but the aforesaid applications

have been filed on the ground that the applicants have entered

into the agreements with the appellants and their legal

representatives. The applicants have no right and locus to be

impleaded as no legal right is created by an agreement. Mr.

Lalwani further submits that the matter pertains to the suit for

partition and to defeat the same, this frivolous application has

been filed. It is urged that permission for impleadment would

lead to complexity of the matter. It is further contended that

when the decree can be passed in absence of and without

impleadment of the applicants, they are not the necessary

party. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions in

the case of Dilawar Singh v. Amandeep Singh [CR No.5269

of 2015 decided on 18.02.2016 (Punjab and Haryana High

Court)], Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal and Others, (2005) 6 SCC FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

733 and Mandir Shree Sita Ramji v. Land Acquisition

Collector, (2005) 6 SCC 745.

9. Mr. R.K. Pancholi, learned counsel appearing for

the respondent No.5 opposing the application under Order 1

Rule 10 of the CPC (I.A. No.8486/2021) submitted that as the

applicants have no share created in the suit property hence,

they are not entitled for impleadment. The suit was filed by

the parties for partition. As averred by themselves, the

applicants have only entered into an agreement. It is further

contended that impleadment of the applicant would only

culminate into complexities in the matter. Learned counsel

has further urged that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property

Act clearly bars such transfer or alienation of the suit property

during pendency of the proceeding. Mr. Rajesh Pancholi,

learned counsel for the respondents 5 and 7 submitted that the

agreement in question was executed in the year 2011 between

Ms. Faiza Sultan & Mohd. Nasir Mirza and Priya Goods Pvt.

Ltd. on 05.11.2011 and application under Order 1 Rule 10 of

the CPC (I.A. No.8932/2021) has been filed on 25.11.2021 i.e. FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

after elapse of an inordinate period of about more than ten

years and more so these interlocutory applications have been

filed when the matter has been fixed for final hearing. Hence,

the same are not tenable. By way of execution of the aforesaid

agreement, no right accrues in favour of the applicants, hence,

they have no locus for impleadment in the case. In fact, the

applications have been filed in collusion with the appellants.

10. Mr. Pancholi has placed reliance on various

judgments in support of his contentions. While placing

reliance on the decision in the case of Harisingh v. Lakhan

Singh and Others, 1988 RN 177 it has been contended that as

per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act an agreement to

sell does not create any right in the property. It is also the

settled law that a sale after institution of the suit in pursuance

of an agreement before the suit is not protected against the

operation of Section 52 of the Act. In other words, Sections 52

and 54 of the Act read together would mean that a sale which

takes place after the institution of the suit in pursuance of a

prior agreement to sell, is hit by section 52 of the Act.

FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

11. It is further contended by learned counsel for the

respondents 5 and 7 that the applicants have not obtained any

prior leave from the Court to enter into the agreement hence,

the cannot claim impleadment. In this context he has placed

reliance on the decision in the case of Sarvinder Singh v.

Dalip Singh and Others, (1996) 5 SCC 539 wherein their

Lordships of the Apex Court in paragraph 6 of the judgment

have held as follows:

"6. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act envisages that:

"During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India ...... of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of

the court and on such terms as it may impose."

It would, therefore, be clear that the defendants in the suit were prohibited by FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

operation of Section 52 to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the appellant except with the order or authority of the Court. Admittedly, the authority or order of the Court had not been obtained for alienation of those properties. Therefore, the alienation obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52. Under these circumstances, the respondents cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties to the suit."

12. It is the contention of the for the respondents 5

and 7 that in violation of stay order passed by this Court,

agreement in question could not have been entered into by the

applicants. In this context, reliance has been placed on the

decision in the case of Surjit Singh and Others v. Harbans

Singh and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 50 wherein it has been held

as follows:

FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

"4. As said before, the assignment is by means of a registered deed. The assignment had taken place after the passing of the preliminary decree in which Pritam Singh has been allotted 1/3rd share. His right to property to that extent stood established. A decree relating to immovable property worth more than hundred rupees, if being assigned, was required to be registered. That has instantly been done. It is per se property, for it relates to the immovable property involved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within the ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make any appreciable difference whether property per se had been alienated or a decree pertaining to that property. In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. Once that is so, Pritam Singh and his assignees, respondents herein, cannot claim to be impleaded as parties on the basis of assignment. Therefore, the assignees-respondents could not have been impleaded by the trial court as parties to the suit, in disobedience of its orders. The principles of lis pendens are altogether on a different footing. We do not propose to examine their involvement presently. All what is emphasised is that the assignees in the present facts and circumstances had no cause to be impleaded as parties to the suit. On that basis, there was no cause for going into the question of interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the settlement deed. The path treaded by the courts below was, in our view, out of their bounds. Unhesitatingly, we upset all the three orders of the courts below and reject FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

the application of the assignees for impleadment under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C."

13. In this context, he has also referred to the decision

in the case of Vidur Impex and Traders Private Ltd. and

Others v. Tosh Apartments Private Ltd. and Others, (2012) 8

SCC 384. Counsel for the respondents 5 and 7 submits that in

the decision in Savitri Devi (supra) is not applicable to the

facts of the case.

14. Mr. Sanjay Agrawal, learned counsel for the

respondent No.6 has vehemently contended that the interim

order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on

22.11.2000 whereby it has been directed that parties are

directed not to sell or alienate the property hereafter in any

manner until further orders, is still in operation. It is further

contended that the sale agreements have been entered into

after the injunction order passed by this Court and hence, the

same is illegal and inviting the contempt of Court. It is further

contended that the suit for partition has already been FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

dismissed and the shares of the parties are still to be

determined and, therefore, the applicants cannot be said to be

bona fide purchaser. It is also contended that all the decisions

relied upon by the counsel appearing for the applicants pertain

to the sale deed and, they cannot be said to be applicable in

case of an unregistered agreement despite the order of this

Court for not alienating the property by this Court. While

referring to Sections 33 and 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899,

learned counsel for the respondent No.6 submitted that the

document i.e. agreements in question are neither properly

stamped nor they are registered, hence, inadmissible. In this

context he has also placed reliance on Section 17 of the

Registration Act, 1908.

15. Mr. Kishore Shrivastava, learned Senior Counsel

combatting the arguments made on behalf of the other side,

submitted that payment of stamp duty is not applicable at this

stage and the provisions of Registration Act and Stamp Act are

not applicable for agreement to transfer of share. It is further

contended that by virtue of the agreements in question, the FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

applicants have acquired interest in the litigation, hence it

cannot be said that they do not have locus in the case.

16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at

length. Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure enables

the court to add any person as party at any stage of the

proceedings, if the person whose presence before the court is

necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and

completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions.

However, simultaneously the Court has also to see that

complexity in the matter does not arise.

17. In this context, it is apposite to refer to Section 17

of the Registration Act, 1908 which deals with the documents

of which registration is compulsory. Relevant portion of it

reads as follows:

"17. Documents of which registration is compulsory. - (1) The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

executed on or after the date on which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely, :-

(a) instruments of gift of immovable property;

(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property;

      (c)      non-testamentary         instruments
      which     acknowledge     the     receipt   or

payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right title or interest; and xxx xxx xxx"

18. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to Section FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, it reads as follows:

"35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc. -- No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped :

Provided that--

(a) any such instrument 6 [shall] be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable, or, in the case of any instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of five rupees, or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion;

         (b) where any person from whom a
                                                      FA No.296/2000
                                                     FA No.437/2000




stamped       receipt         could   have        been
demanded, has given an unstamped

receipt and such receipt, if stamped, would be admissible in evidence against him, then such receipt shall be admitted in evidence against him on payment of a penalty of one rupee by the person tendering it;

(c) Where a contract or agreement of any kind is effected by correspondence consisting of two or more letters and any one of the letters bears the proper stamp, the contract or agreement shall be deemed to be duly stamped;

(d) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in evidence in proceeding in a Criminal Court, other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (V of 1898);

(e) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in any Court when such instrument has been executed by or on behalf of the Government, or where it bears the FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

certificate of the Collector as provided by section 32 or any other provision of this Act."

19. The suit which was filed by the appellant/plaintiff

for partition has been dismissed by the trial Court. The

agreements in question which have been made basis of filing

applications for impleadment are unregistered documents. The

same does not create any right in favour of the applicants.

20. So far as the contention of the applicants that this

Court allowed the application on the similar grounds vide

order dated 02.03.2020 is concerned, suffice it to say, this

Court by the said order took note of the facts that Saifia

Education Society, Bhopal entered into contract on 07.06.1985

and the suit for specific performance of contract filed by the

Saifia Education Society was decreed by the trial Court vide

judgment and decree dated 19.08.2011. This Court had

observed that the properties purchased by Saifia College is a

part of the suit property and, therefore, allowed the said

application holding that Saifia Society is a necessary and FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

proper party. The same is not the case here.

21. The agreement in question was executed in the

year 2011 between Ms. Faiza Sultan & Mohd. Nasir Mirza

and Priya Goods Pvt. Ltd. on 05.11.2011 and application

under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC (I.A. No.8932/2021) has

been filed on 25.11.2021 i.e. after ten years and more so

these interlocutory applications have been filed when the

matter has been fixed for final hearing. The interim order

passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 22.11.2000

whereby it has been directed to the parties not to sell or

alienate the property hereafter in any manner until further

orders, is still in operation. The sale agreements have been

entered into after the injunction order passed by this Court.

The suit for partition has already been dismissed and the

shares of the parties are still to be determined and, therefore,

the applicants cannot be said to be bona fide purchaser. Most

of the judgments relied upon by the counsel appearing for the

applicants pertain to the sale deeds and, they are not applicable

in case of an unregistered agreement despite the order for not FA No.296/2000 FA No.437/2000

alienating the property by this Court.

22. Hence, in view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the

considered opinion that it would not be appropriate to allow

the applications under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. Accordingly, I.A. No.8486/2021, I.A. No.

8932/2021, I.A. No. 8487/2021 and I.A. No.8931/2021 are

hereby dismissed.

(Smt. Anjuli Palo) JUDGE ks

Digitally signed by KOUSHALENDRA SHARAN SHUKLA Date: 2022.03.22 22:30:21

-07'00'