Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 9731 MP
Judgement Date : 15 July, 2022
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH
ON THE 15th OF JULY, 2022
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.4306/2022
Between :
Anand Kumar Goenka S/o Late Shankar
Prasad Goenka, aged about 70 years,R/o
Station Road, Madai Bagicha, PS-Kotwali
Katni, District Katni Madhya Pradesh.
..... Appellant
(BY MS. ARCHANA NAGARIA, ADVOCATE)
AND
The State of Madhya Pradesh, Through
P.S Civil Lines, Satna, District Satna
(Madhya Pradesh)
...... Respondent
(BY SHRI ABHAY SHANKAR PATHAK - PUBLIC PROSECUTOR)
..........................................................................................................
This appeal coming on for orders this day, the court passed the following :
J.U.D.G.M.E.N.T The appellant has preferred this appeal against judgment and order dated 31.10.2014 delivered by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Satna in Criminal Case No. 3789/2007; whereby the appellant and his brother Ashok Kumar Goenka (since dead) have been convicted under Sections 471/120B and 467/120B of IPC and
sentenced to undergo R.I. for 7-7 years with fine of Rs.50-50,000/- for each offences with default stipulation. Since punishment was awarded for greater offences, no separate punishment was imposed for rest of the offences charged against them. 2- It be noted that on the same facts and circumstances, the appeal preferred by co-accused Ashok Kumar Goenka (since dead) through his son Ankit Goenka has been allowed by this Court vide judgment dated 27.06.2022 passed in Criminal Appeal No.23/2015 and his impugned convictions and consequent sentences have been set aside.
3- For a ready reference, relevant part of the aforesaid judgment may be reproduced hereunder :
"Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal before the ld. Additional Sessions Judge, Satna, who vide order dated 01.11.2014 passed in Criminal Appeal No.365/2014 dismissed the same being not maintainable in view of the fact that the sentences were directed to run consecutively and, therefore, as per Section 31 CrPC total sentence imposed becomes a sentence of 14 years and in such a situation, as per Section 374(2) CrPC appeal lies before the High Court; however, the ld. ASJ granted liberty to file an appeal before the High Court. Hence, this appeal.
3- The prosecution story in substance may be narrated thus :
(i) In order to procure order of supply of minerals to the Bokaro Steel Plant, the appellant and his brother Anand Goenka submitted two forged lease agreements and seven forged No Dues Certificates purportedly executed/issued by the Department of Mines and Mineral, Govt. of Madhya Pradesh.
(ii) The offence came to fore when on 1.11.2006, four senior officers of Bokaro Steel Plant (BSP), viz., Shri M.B.
Ravindranath, A.G.M (Purchase), Shri S.K. Singh, Senior Manager (Accounts & Finance), Shri B.S. Popli, Senior Manager (Purchase) and Shri Ajay Kumar, Senior Manager (Raw Material) approached the Collector, Satna for verification of the
documents purportedly submitted by the appellant and his brother/co-accused. The Collector, Satna directed Dr. R.S. Mehta, Regional Head, Directorate, Geology and Mining, Regional Office, Jabalpur, Shri Vinit Kumar Austin, Dy. Director (Mineral Administration) and Shri Shekhar Khare, Assistant Mining Officer, Satna to verify the documents from the originals. The officers of BSP produced photocopies of the following documents :
(a) Agreement executed by the mining department in favour of M/s S. Goenka Lime & Chemicals Ltd. with respect to the Kubri Mine.
(b) Agreement executed by the mining department in favour of Ashok Kumar Goenka R/o Katni with respect to the Bhatura Mine, wherein period of lease was mentioned from 27.07.1987 to 26.07.2007.
(c) No Dues Certificate (NOC) Nos. 508, 217, 439 and 566 (total four certificates) dated 03.01.2006, 10.07.2006, 25.10.2005 and 20.02.2003 relating to Kubri mine purportedly issued in favour of M/s. S. Goenka Lime and Chemicals Katni and No Dues Certificate Nos. 972, 253 and 610 (total three certificates) dated 16.01.2004, 18.07.2006 and 07.08.2003 of Bhatura mine issued in favour of M/s. Ashok Goenka.
(iii) On verification from the original record kept in the office, it was found that two limestone mines were allotted to the appellant, one each in village Kubri and Bhatura but there were some discrepancies in the name of the lessee in the photocopy of lease-deed produced by the officials of Bokaro Steel Plant and in the original lease-deed kept in the office of mining department. In the photocopy produced by the officials of the BSP, the lease of Kubri mine was sanctioned in the name of M/s. S. Goenka Lime and Chemicals Ltd. while as per the original lease-deed; the name of the lessee was Shri Sukhdev Prasad Goenka, Station Road, Katni, Proprietor- Anand Kumar Goenka. As per original record, the period of lease of Bhatura mine was from 27.07.1987 to 26.07.1997 but in the photocopy produced by the officials of BSP, it was mentioned from 27.07.1987 to 26.07.2007. Thus, the photocopies and original lease-deeds didn't match. It was also found that none of the aforesaid NOCs were issued by the department.
(iv) It was further found that since there was some dispute raised by the forest department; mining could not be carried out even after execution of lease deed on 19.1.1996. Therefore, supply of mineral from both the mines was not possible.
(v) The Inquiry report Ex.P/3 was submitted to the Collector, and thereafter, on 07.11.2006, a written complaint was made by Assistant Mining Officer Shri Shekhar Khare (PW1) to the Police Station Civil Lines. Consequent whereupon, an FIR being Crime No.404/2006 for the offence under Section 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC was registered against the appellant and co-accused Anand Goenka.
4- After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was submitted before CJM, Satna who in turn, framed charges against the appellant and co-accused Anand Goenka under Sections 120B, 465, 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120B of IPC. They denied the charges and took the defence that they have never submitted any documents before the BSP. The ld. trial Court found the charges under Section 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120B proved. The charge u/s 420 was not found proved. The Ld ASJ acquitted the appellant from the charge u/s 420, while imposed sentence for the rest of the offences as stated supra. 5- To bring home the charges, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses including the complainant Shri Shekhar Khare (PW1) who at the relevant point of time was Astt. Mining Officer Satna while no evidence was led in defence.
6- Legality, propriety and correctness of the convictions in question have been assailed on the ground of what has been termed as mis-appreciation of evidence, admission of inadmissible evidence, ignorance of discrepancies of prosecution evidence, reliance on statements of interested witnesses and on ex-parte inquiry report contrary to the cardinal principles of law. 6.1 The ld. Trial Court failed to see that there was no evidence of submission of the alleged forged documents before the BSP by the appellant or that the forgery of valuable security or forgery for the purpose of cheating was committed by him. There is no report of handwriting expert to the effect that the appellant had forged any document. Every witness examined by the prosecution has admitted that the documents have not been forged by the appellant.
6.2 It further failed to see that there was no forgery in the original documents or that nothing has been seized from the appellant.
6.3 It is settled preposition of law that the documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases as mentioned in Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The ld. trial Court has admitted that there is no original documents of Ex.P/7 to Ex.P/21, in spite of this, photocopies of these documents have
been admitted, exhibited and relied upon even after written objection taken by the appellant, which is contrary to the law. The trial Court should not have allowed the prosecution to exhibit these documents in absence of their originals. 6.4 Conviction of the appellant is based on the photocopies of the documents. Original documents were never seized during the investigation nor have they been produced before the Court during the trial. Notarised copy of Ex.P/7 to 12 and self attested copy of Ex.P/13 & 14 have been produced by the witnesses during the trial, but neither there is any report of Notary nor has any Notary been examined to prove that these photocopies were attested as true copies after comparing them from the original ones. Procedure to produce or prove any document by secondary evidence has not been followed. PW-1 has admitted that he had attested the documents as true copies without comparing them with the original ones. The trial Court has committed a serious error of law in treating these documents as original on the basis of signatures of the officers of the BSP. Thus, neither primary nor secondary evidence has produced before the trial Court to prove the alleged forgery. The conviction of the appellant is based on the photocopies of the documents, which is not permissible in law.
6.5 The appellant has been named in the FIR on the basis of inquiry report Ex.P/3. This is merely an ex-parte official proceeding. No opportunity of hearing was granted to the appellant during this inquiry. Even after the inquiry, he was never called on to explain the allegation said to be found proved against him. Without granting him opportunity of hearing, the department has directly lodged the FIR, which shows that the intention of the officials of the mining department was malafide. The trial Court should not have given any credence to this report. 6.6 The trial Court did not consider that since there was no mining or transportation of minerals during 2003-06, neither any loss was caused to the State or to the BSP nor was any profit earned by the appellant or his brother.
6.7 The basic ingredients of forgery, cheating and conspiracy are completely missing in the prosecution case. 6.8 The ld. Trial Court has committed a serious error of law in relying upon the testimonies of PW1 to PW-5, PW-7, PW-8, PW-10 and PW-11 as they are interested witnesses and there is no independent corroboration to their statements. In absence of independent corroboration, the evidence of interested witnesses cannot be believed.
6.9 During the trial, without following the due process, the trial Court altered the charges and admitted the documents on 28.04.2014 without assigning any reason, which caused serious prejudice to the appellant and vitiated the trial. The conviction of the appellant is not based on cogent and sound principles of law. It failed to follow cardinal rules of appreciation of evidence. It committed a serious error of law in exercise of its jurisdiction in awarding punishment by sentencing the appellant to undergo sentences consecutively when all the offences arise out of the same transaction. The impugned judgement is illegal, contrary to the law, against the set norms of justice, is in utter violation of cogent and sound principles of law and, therefore, deserves to be set aside and the appellant be acquitted from the charges levelled against him.
7- In the arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant reiterated the same grounds mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. There is no need to repeat them again. 8- In response, the ld. Public Prosecutor while making reference to the incriminating pieces of evidence, has submitted that the convictions are well merited.
9- Now the question for consideration before this Court is whether the evidence on record is sufficient to convict the appellant for the offence alleged against him. 10- The first contention of the appellant is that they have never submitted impugned documents before the BSP and nor was there any occasion for them to submit them before them (BSP). This contention has not been rebutted by the prosecution. PW-8 M.B. Ravinderan has stated that NOCs Ex.P/7 to 10 were produced by S. Goenka lime & Chemicals in the office of the Chief Finance Manager Raw Material, BSP and Account Section of the BSP. PW-10 B.S. Popali DGM, Oxygen Plant has deposed that all the disputed documents were submitted before the finance department of the BSP by S. Goenka lime & Chemicals and Ashok Kumar Alok Kumar Chunawala along with the tender. PW-11 S.K. Singh has stated that all these documents Ex.P/7 to 12 and Ex.P/15 & 16 were produced by S. Goenka lime & Chemicals and Ashok Kumar Alok Kumar Chunawala in the Account Section of the BSP. But none of them has stated that these documents were submitted before them by the appellant or his brother. No entry of inward register, no note-sheet or proceeding of the office, no tender document submitted by the appellant or NIT of such document pre-requisite of submission of tender has been produced to show that it was the appellant or his
brother, who submitted these documents before the BSP or that it was necessary or mandatory for them to submit these documents. Mr Popali PW-10 has admitted in para 6 that there is no provision to submit NOC at the time of getting any order of supply. No officer of the concerned department or section of the BSP before whom the appellant submitted these documents has been examined by the prosecution. Further, neither any witness has stated nor any document has been produced to show that there was any occasion for the appellant to submit those documents before the BSP. It is an admitted fact that neither any supply order was issued in favour of the appellant nor any supply was made by him or his brother on the basis of these documents. It is not the claim of the prosecution that any of the documents forged, fabricated or interpolated by the appellant or his brother. Signature or handwriting of these documents were never got examined by any handwriting expert and the witnesses examined before the Court by the prosecution have nowhere deposed that they had written or signed by the appellant or his brother. Thus, when there is no evidence that the appellant or his brother had submitted those documents or that they forged or fabricated them; then certainly, their conviction recorded by the trial Court is not sustainable.
11- A fact can be proved by producing either primary or secondary evidence. Secondary evidence is defined in Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 65 of the Act, 1872 prescribes the circumstances under which it can be produced. Section 63 & 65 read as under:
63. Secondary evidence.--Secondary evidence means and includes--
(1) Certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained;
(2) Copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies;
(3) Copies made from or compared with the original; (4) Counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them;
(5) Oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it. Illustrations
(a) A photograph of an original is secondary evidence of its contents, though the two have not been compared, if it is proved that the thing photographed was the original.
(b) A copy compared with a copy of a letter made by a copying machine is secondary evidence of the contents of the letter, if it is shown that the copy made by the copying machine was made from the original.
(c) A copy transcribed from a copy, but afterwards compared with the original, is secondary evidence; but the copy not so compared is not secondary evidence of the original, although the copy from which it was transcribed was compared with the original.
(d) Neither an oral account of a copy compared with the original, nor an oral account of a photograph or machine-copy of the original, is secondary evidence of the original.
65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given-
Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases:-
(a) When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power-- of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it;
(b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;
(c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
(d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;
(e) when the original is public document within the meaning of section 74;
(f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in 40 [India] to be given in evidence ;
(g) when the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in court and the fact to be proved it the general result of the whole collection. In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible.
In case (b), the written admission is admissible.
In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, admissible.
In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents. 12- In the present case; initially the prosecution come with photocopies of the documents allegedly forged by the appellants. When objection was raised, the officials of the BSP produced their notarized copies, but Notary was never examined before the Court. None of the witnesses examined, claimed that they had seen the original documents or have compared the photocopies thereof from the original ones. It is not the case of the prosecution that the original was in the possession or power of the appellant against whom the document was sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person did not produce it or that the original was destroyed or lost, or for any other reason not arising from its own default or neglect, the prosecution could not produce it or that the original was of such a nature as not to be easily movable or that the original was a public document within the meaning of section 74 of the Act,1872 or that the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by the Act, 1872 or by any other law in force in India or that the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court. Further, no permission had ever been taken to prove the documents by producing secondary evidence. The photocopies produced in the case in hand are not primary evidence. They also do not fall in any of the category of the secondary evidence. The circumstances entitling the prosecution to prove them by producing secondary evidence have also not been proved. It is admitted by the witnesses and also reflects from the record that original documents said to be submitted by the appellant or his brother nor the original documents kept with the mining department with which the officials of the mining department compared the photocopies produced by the officials of the BSP, were produced on record by the prosecution. Original documents have not been produced before the trial Court, nor had any permission to prove them by producing secondary evidence been taken from the Court, therefore, conviction cannot be based on such documents.
13- There are so many advance techniques available to insert, edit or remove any content, word, figure, or even the signature from any documents during the process of preparing the photocopy. Cloning of any document with the desired modification is also possible with the help of advance electronic devices. Therefore, the Courts are cautious not to admit such document in absence of their original or at least their duly prepared copy. In this case, the photocopy relied upon by the prosecution does not fall either in primary or in secondary evidence. Thus, photocopies thereof are not admissible in any case.
14- In Ramsuresh Singh Vs. Prabhat Singh @ Chhotu and another (2009) 6 SCC 681, United India Insurance Co. Lts. Vs. Anbari and others (2000) 10 SCC 523 and Ramrao Vs. Natthu AIR 2011 MP 195, it has been held that in absence of original document, its xerox or Photo copy is not admissible in evidence and a document cannot be said to be proved by mere marking or exhibiting it.
15- In this regard, reference can also be had to the decisions in K.K.Kamani vs. Harish Kumar (Civil Revision No.445/2002 decided on 20.11.2015, High Court of Allahabad and Shalimar Chemcial Works ltd. Vs Surendra Oil and Dal Mills (Refineries) 2010 8 SCC 423; Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation vs. Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha (2014) 16 SCC 130; Subhash vs. State of Maharashtra (2006) 12 SCC 545 and Ramsuresh vs. Prabhat Singh (2009) 6 SCC 681.
16- In J.Yashoda vs. K.Shobha Rani (2007) 5 SCC 730 it has been held :
"3. Learned Single Judge held that the documents which were sought to be received and marked as secondary evidence are photo copies. It was noted that it may be a fact that the original of the documents are not available with the parties but at the same time the requirement of Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Act') is that a document can be received as an evidence under the head of secondary evidence only when the copies made from or compared with the original are certified copies or such other documents as enumerated in the above section. The High Court found the photo copies can not be received as secondary evidence in terms of Section 63 of the Act and they ought not to have been received as secondary evidence. Since the documents in question were admittedly photo copies, there was no possibility of the documents being compared with the originals. Accordingly the Civil Revision was allowed.
...
7. Secondary evidence, as a general rule is admissible only in the absence of primary evidence. If the original itself is found to be inadmissible through failure of the party, who files it to prove it to be valid, the same party is not entitled to introduce secondary evidence of its contents.
8. Essentially, secondary evidence is an evidence which may be given in the absence of that better evidence which law requires to be given first, when a proper explanation of its absence is given. The definition in Section 63 is exhaustive as the Section declares that secondary evidence "means and includes" and then follow the five kinds of secondary evidence.
9. The rule which is the most universal, namely that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit shall be produced, decides this objection that rule only means that, so long as the higher or superior evidence is within your possession or may be reached by you, you shall give no inferior proof in relation to it. Section 65 deals with the proof of the contents of the documents tendered in evidence. In order to enable a party to produce secondary evidence it is necessary for the party to prove existence and execution of the original document. Under Section 64, documents are to be provided by primary evidence. Section 65, however permits secondary evidence to be given of the existence, condition or contents of documents under the circumstances mentioned. The conditions laid down in the said Section must be fulfilled before secondary evidence can be admitted. Secondary evidence of the contents of a document cannot be admitted without non-production of the original being first accounted for in such a manner as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the Section. In Ashok Dulichand v. Madahavlal Dube and Another [1975(4) SCC 664], it was inter alia held as follows:
"7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the order of the High Court in this respect calls for no interference. According to clause (a) of Section 65 of Indian Evidence Act, Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document when the original is shown or appears to be in possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in Section 66 such person does not produce it. Clauses (b) to (g) of Section 65 specify some other contingencies
wherein secondary evidence relating to a document may be given, but we are not concerned with those clauses as it is the common case of the parties that the present case is not covered by those clauses. In order to bring his case within the purview of clause (a) of Section 65, the appellant filed applications on July 4, 1973, before respondent No. 1 was examined as a witness, praying that the said respondent be ordered to produce the original manuscript of which, according to the appellant, he had filed Photostat copy. Prayer was also made by the appellant that in case respondent no. 1 denied that the said manuscript had been written by him, the photostat copy might be got examined from a handwriting expert. The appellant also filed affidavit in support of his applications. It was however, nowhere stated in the affidavit that the original document of which the Photostat copy had been filed by the appellant was in the possession of Respondent No. 1. There was also no other material on the record to indicate the original document was in the possession of respondent no.1. The appellant further failed to explain as to what were the circumstances under which the Photostat copy was prepared and who was in possession of the original document at the time its photograph was taken. Respondent No. 1 in his affidavit denied being in possession appeared to the High Court to be not above suspicion. In view of all the circumstances, the High Court to be not above suspicion. In view of all the circumstances, the High Court came to the conclusion that no foundation had been laid by the appellant for leading secondary evidence in the shape of the Photostat copy. We find no infirmity in the above order of the High Court as might justify interference by this Court."
10. The admitted facts in the present case are that the original was with one P. Srinibas Rao. Only when conditions of Section prescribed in Section 65 are satisfied, documents can be admitted as secondary evidence. In the instant case clause (a) of Section 65 has not been satisfied. Therefore, the High Court's order does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.
11. The appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs."
17- The facts in the present case are identical to the case referred to above (J.Yashoda). Since the conditions to prove documents by producing secondary evidence are not fulfilled in the present case, the conviction of appellant cannot be based on such documents.
18- Before proceeding further, it may be observed that no dispute has been raised to the fact that neither any supply order was issued or mineral was supplied nor any payment was made in favour of the appellant on the basis of the alleged fake documents. The allegation against the appellant is that he manipulated duration of the lease in one of the lease deed and there was some discrepancy in the name of the lessee in another lease deed, but it is an admitted fact that both the leases were sanctioned in favour of the appellant, that after the renewal on 28.07.2001, the period of Bhatura mine was extended till 26.07.2017 and also that nothing was due towards the appellant on account of royalty. No incorrect, false or misleading information was given by the appellant, therefore, there was no need for him to submit false document.
19- It is alleged that in connivance with the officials of the BSP, the officers of the mining department acted malafidely and have foisted a false case upon the appellant. All the material prosecution witnesses have admitted that while conducting inquiry, they did not call the appellants. The entire inquiry was conducted behind their back. They were not present at the time when the documents brought by the officials of the BSP were being compared with the record of the mining department. No show cause notice was issued or no opportunity of hearing was granted before taking penal action. Regional Head of mining department PW-5 Dr R.S. Mehta and Deputy Direction Mining PW-7 Vineet Austin have stated that in compliance of the written order of the Government, they had conducted the inquiry. PW-8 M.B. Rabindran has stated that on the written direction of Director (Administration), they had come for inquiry. PW-11 Sr Manager Accounts & Finance S.K. Singh has admitted that they had come for inquiry on the call of the Collector, Katni, who was otherwise not entitled to conduct any inquiry with regard to the mines not situated under his territorial jurisdiction. But none of these orders have been placed on record. PW-11 has further admitted that even after this inquiry, advance supply order were given to the appellant. Though he has also stated that after this inquiry, another internal inquiry was conducted and the firm of the appellant was blacklisted for submitting false documents, but no such report or order has been produced on record. This witness and other witnesses have admitted that no loss was caused by the appellant to the BSP. PW-10 Mr Popali has admitted in para 6 of his cross examination that there is no need to submit NOC at the time of inviting tenders or at the time of
issuance of supply order. It is not clear when NOCs were not required for the purpose of getting any supply order, as to why the inquiry was conducted against the appellant. All these facts support the allegation of the appellants and create doubts about credibility or trustworthiness of all the interested departmental witnesses.
20- Prabhunath Pandey, (PW3) and Ramniwas Patel (PW4), Driver and Chokidar respectively posted at Colletorate Satna have not stated any incriminating fact against the appellant. 21- The main ingredients of Section 471 of IPC is that the accused has used a forged document and mere submission thereof would not come under the provisions of Section 471 IPC inasmuch as there is no evidence or even the witnessed examined by the prosecution have admitted that no supply order was issued and no payment was made to the appellant on the basis of alleged forged documents.
22- Upon a critical appraisal of the entire evidence on record; under afore discussed circumstances, it is held that the prosecution has failed to prove the necessary elements of the offences against which the appellant has come up in this appeal. 23- Therefore, having regard to the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the material brought on record is insufficient to hold that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts. Accordingly, the accused is entitled for benefit of doubt.
24- Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned convictions and consequent sentences are set-aside. The appellant is acquitted of the offences. His bail bonds/surety bonds, if any, stand discharged. fine amount, if paid, be refunded to him.
4- The said identicality has not been disputed by the ld. Public Prosecutor appearing for the State.
5- Further, it has been held by the Apex Court in Raja Ram vs. State of M.P. (1994) 2 SCC 568, that in criminal trials, the benefit of altered convictions and sentence must also be made available to the non-appealing accused.
6- In the present case also, the facts and circumstances are identical to that of the co-accused Ashok Kumar Goenka and there is no distinguishing feature. In the considered opinion of this Court, it is therefore, appropriate that the benefit of the judgment of acquittal rendered by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.23/2015 (Ashok Kumar Goenka vs. State of Madhya Pradesh) should also be made available to the present appellant. 7- Consequently, this appeal is also allowed. The impugned convictions and consequent sentences are set-aside. The appellant is acquitted of the offences. His bail bonds/surety bonds, if any, stand discharged. fine amount, if paid, be refunded to him.
(VIRENDER SINGH) JUDGE anand Digitally signed by ANAND KRISHNA SEN Date: 2022.07.20 11:44:45 +05'30'
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