Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 1077 MP
Judgement Date : 25 March, 2021
1 RP. 275.2021
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Review Petition 275.2021
(Naresh Babu Annotia Vs. State of M.P. & others)
Gwalior Dt. 25/3/2021
Shri Saurabh Parashar, learned counsel for the petitioner.
None for respondents.
Heard learned counsel for petitioner.
1. This petition seeks review of the final order dated 9/4/2003
passed in W.P.2202/2002 (Naresh Babu Annotia Vs. State of M.P.
& others) whereby the petition in question had been dismissed as
withdrawn on the submission of the then counsel of
petitioner/review-petitioner that petition has become infructuous.
2. Before taking up the matter on merits, it would be
appropriate to deal with the issue of delay which is as much as
6154 days for which I.A.1760/2021 has been filed. The only
reason assigned in the said IA is that petitioner for being a
disciplined member of the police force and posted in District
Sheopur, could not due to rush of work attend to the proceedings
in W.P.2202/2002 and therefore nursed bona fide impression that
the said writ petition is being pursued and is pending. More so, it
is submitted that no information in regard to the order under
review was given to petitioner by his counsel. It is further 2 RP. 275.2021
submitted that when he was posted to Gwalior then on verifying
the status of the case it came to the knowledge of petitioner for
the first time sometime in 2021 that order under review had been
passed.
3. True it is that in the review petition averment has been
made that no instruction for withdrawal was given by petitioner
to his erstwhile counsel in W.P.2202/2002, but it is also true that
there is no proper explanation in I.A.1760/2021 as to for how
long the petitioner was posted in Sheopur and when was he
posted to Gwalior and also as to why petitioner could not
ascertain the status of W.P.2202/2002 in these last more than 17
years. More so, with availability of modern technology of internet
the petitioner could have very well ascertained the status of his
case.
3.1 As such it is clear as daylight that in the said IA reason
assigned for condonation of delay are vague and insufficient to
enable this court to condone delay of 6156 days.
3.2 The Apex Court though in a petition filed by the State of
M.P. [State of Madhya Pradesh & others Vs. Bherulal (Special
Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 9217, 2020, decided on
15/10/2020] has reiterated the law in regard to condonation of 3 RP. 275.2021
delay by holding that if the explanation for seeking condonation
of delay is not reasonable and sufficient then no amount of
sympathy or compassion can come into play to condone delay.
Relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced below:-
"2. We are constrained to pen down a detailed order as it appears that all our counseling to Government and Government authorities have fallen on deaf ears i.e., the Supreme Court of India cannot be a place for the Governments to walk in when they choose ignoring the period of limitation prescribed. We have raised the issue that if the Government machinery is so inefficient and incapable of filing appeals/petitions in time, the solution may lie in requesting the Legislature to expand the time period for filing limitation for Government authorities because of their gross incompetence. That is not so. Till the Statute subsists, the appeals/petitions have to be filed as per the Statues prescribed.
3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the Government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107). This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563 where the Court observed as under:
"12) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special 4 RP. 275.2021
leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.
13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural redtape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and 5 RP. 275.2021
should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay."
Eight years hence the judgment is still unheeded!
4. A reading of the aforesaid application shows that the reason for such an inordinate delay is stated to be only "due to unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging the documents". In paragraph 4 a reference has been made to "bureaucratic process works, it is inadvertent that delay occurs".
5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay.
6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as "certificate cases". The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier 6 RP. 275.2021
occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.
7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.
8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time.
9. The special leave petition is dismissed as time barred in terms aforesaid.
10. We make it clear that if the aforesaid order is not complied within time, we will be 7 RP. 275.2021
constrained to initiate contempt proceedings against the Chief Secretary.
11. A copy of the order be placed before the Chief Secretary, State of Madhya Pradesh."
3.3 In the instant case, the application for condonation of delay
is not only vague, non-specific but also demonstrates that this
review petition is filed by a sleeping litigant. The court of law
assists the vigilant but not the indolent of the like of petitioner.
4. In view of above in the absence of any cogent reason
mentioned in application for condonation of delay, this court
deems it appropriate to reject I.A.1760/2021.
5. Consequently, review is dismissed as time barred.
(Sheel Nagu) (Anand Pathak)
Judge Judge
25/3/3021 25/3/2021
DHANANJAY
BUCHAKE
(Bu)
2021.03.26
11:12:57
+05'30'
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