[Cites 12, Cited by 0]

Kerala High Court

Rema I.K vs State Of Kerala on 20 February, 2026

WA NO. 401 OF 2025




                                              1
                                                                              2026:KER:15696


                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                          PRESENT

                THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI

                                              &

                       THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P. V. BALAKRISHNAN

                 FRIDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2026 / 1ST PHALGUNA, 1947

                                      WA NO. 401 OF 2025

           AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 31.03.2021 IN WP(C) NO.17677 OF 2017 OF HIGH COURT OF

                                           KERALA


APPELLANT/S:

                REMA I.K, AGED 58 YEARS, W/O MOHANAN KOLLAMUKALIL HOUSE MOOLAMATTOM
                P.O IDUKKI, DISTRICT, PIN - 685589


                BY ADVS.
                SRI.GEORGIE SIMON
                SMT.AISWARYA T.S.
                SMT.TREESA PAUL N.
                SRI.BASIL CHANDY VAVACHAN
                SHRI.MUHASIN K.M.




RESPONDENT/S:

       1        STATE OF KERALA
                REPRESENTED BY GOVERNMENT PLEADER, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, PIN - 682031

       2        TAHASILDAR,
                THODUPUZHA TALUK OFFICE, THODUPUZHA, MINI CIVIL STATION THODUPUZHA
                (P.O), IDUKKI DISTRICT, PIN - 685591
 WA NO. 401 OF 2025




                                             2
                                                                               2026:KER:15696


       3       VILLAGE OFFICER
               ARAKKULAM VILLAGE OFFICE ARAKKULAM, IDUKKI, DISTRICT, PIN - 685591

       4       EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
               K.S.E. B, GENERATION CIRCLE MOOLAVATTOM, IDUKKI, PIN - 685589

       5       SHYLA
               D/O KUNJANKUTTY, MUTHIRAPARAYIL HOUSE MUNIYARA P.O, IDUKKI DISTRICT, PIN
               - 685571

               BY SRI P A HARISH SR GP


       THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING FINALLY HEARD ON 20.02.2026, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
 WA NO. 401 OF 2025




                                       3
                                                                 2026:KER:15696



                                    JUDGMENT

Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J.

The present intra-court appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High

Court Act, 1958, assails the judgment dated 31.03.2021 passed in W.P.(C)

No. 17677 of 2017, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant was

dismissed.

2. Heard on C.M. Application No. 2 of 2025 seeking condonation

of delay. The writ appeal has been filed with a delay of 797 days.

3. In the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

it is stated that the appellant was suffering from medical ailments and,

therefore, she could not communicate with her counsel or take a

decision regarding the filing of the writ appeal. The impugned order was

passed on 31.03.2021. The writ appeal was filed on 02.11.2023 with a

delay of 797 days. The appellant is a widow and has no one to look after

her. Therefore, it is prayed that the delay in filing the writ appeal may WA NO. 401 OF 2025

2026:KER:15696

be condoned.

3.1 The prayer in the writ petition was to quash Ext.P5 Gazette

Notification and Ext.P8 order passed by the second respondent. The

appellant had also sought a direction to the second respondent to pass

an order declaring her as the wife and one of the legal heirs of the

deceased Mohanan. The learned Single Judge, finding no reason to

interfere with Ext.P8 order passed by the Tahsildar, Thodupuzha Taluk

Office, dismissed the writ petition.

4. Per contra, The learned Senior Government Pleader for the

respondent opposed the prayer for condonation of delay, contending

that there is an inordinate delay of 797 days in filing the writ appeal. It

is submitted that, on a perusal of the application seeking condonation of

delay, no cogent or satisfactory grounds have been made out to justify

such delay. Not even a single document regarding the alleged medical

ailment has been produced to substantiate her claim. In these

circumstances, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be WA NO. 401 OF 2025

2026:KER:15696

dismissed and, consequently, the writ appeal is also liable to be

dismissed.

5. The issue relating to condonation of delay is no longer res

integra, and the Supreme Court has settled the legal position through a

catena of decisions, which are reproduced hereunder:

Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. V. K. Thangappan and another 1

5.1 The Supreme Court, in the above case, has held as follows:

"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably."

(2006) 4 SCC 322 WA NO. 401 OF 2025

2026:KER:15696

M.P. Ram Mohan Raja v. State of Tamil Nadu and others2

5.2 The Supreme Court in M.P. Ram Mohan Raja held as follows:

"11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard- and fast rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8-10-1996 an order was passed by the Collector in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit."

Nadia District Primary School Council v. Sristidhar Biswas and others3 5.3 The decision of the Supreme Court in Nadia District Primary

School Council lays down the following:

"11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980 and the petitioners approached the court in 1989 after the decision in Dibakar Pal. Such persons should not be given any benefit by the court when they allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is very significant in

(2007) 9 SCC 78

(2007) 12 SCC 779 WA NO. 401 OF 2025

2026:KER:15696

matters of granting relief and courts cannot come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant of their rights. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning the delay of nine years cannot be countenanced."

Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana and others4

5.4 In Jagdish Lal, the Supreme Court has held thus:

"18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution."

Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India5

5.5 While considering the issue of condonation of delay, the

Supreme Court in Shiv Dass held as under::

"6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition has to be dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the factors to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Consti- tution of India. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes

(1997) 6 SCC 538

(2007) 9 SCC 274 WA NO. 401 OF 2025

2026:KER:15696

prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably."

Mrinmary Maity v. Chhanda Koley6

5.6 The Supreme Court in its latest judgment in the case of

Mrinmary Maity in paragraph 11 has held thus:

"11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental

2024 SCC OnLine 551 WA NO. 401 OF 2025

2026:KER:15696

right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of West Benchal - (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:

"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches."

6. In view of the aforesaid legal pronouncements of the Supreme

Court, we find no justification to grant any indulgence to the appellant

against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, as no plausible

or satisfactory explanation has been put forth in the application seeking

condonation of the delay of 797 days in approaching this Court against

the said judgment. Therefore, the application seeking condonation of

delay is liable to be dismissed.

WA NO. 401 OF 2025

2026:KER:15696

In view of the aforesaid pronouncements of law and considering

that the delay has not been properly explained, C.M. Application No. 2 of

2025 seeking condonation of delay is hereby rejected. Consequently, the