[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Kerala High Court
Bedimon S vs State Of Kerala on 10 February, 2026
Author: Anil K.Narendran
Bench: Anil K.Narendran
2026:KER:10902
1
OP(KAT)No.322 of 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MURALEE KRISHNA S.
TUESDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2026 / 21ST MAGHA, 1947
OP(KAT) NO. 322 OF 2017
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 28.03.2017 IN OA(EKM)NO.448 OF 2017
OF KERALA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
PETITIONER/APPELLANT:
BEDIMON S,AGED 39 YEARS,S/O.SASIDHARAN, RESIDING AT
POOVADITHARA HOUSE, CHETTIKADU, PATHIRAPPALLY (PO),
ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, WORKING AS L.D.C. IN THE MEDICAL
COLLEGE HOSPITAL VANDANAM, ALAPPUZHA
BY ADV SHRI.PADMALAYAN.P.P.
RESPONDENTS/RSPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY TO THE
GOVERNMENT, HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE (K) DEPARTMENT
GOVT. SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, KERALA-695001.
2 THE DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL EDUCATION,
MEDICAL COLLEGE P.O. , THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, KERALA-
695001.
3 THE SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER,
DIRECTORATE OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
KERALA-695011
SMT.PRINCY XAVIER, SR.G.P
THIS OP KERALA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL WAS FINALLY HEARD ON
4.2.2026, THE COURT ON 10.2.2026 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
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2
OP(KAT)No.322 of 2017
JUDGMENT
Muralee Krishna, J.
The applicant in O.A.(EKM)No.448 of 2017 before the Kerala
Administrative Tribunal, Additional Bench at Ernakulam, (the
'Tribunal' for short) filed this original petition invoking the
supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 28.03.2017
passed by the Tribunal in that original application.
2. Going by the averments in the original application, the
petitioner is working as L.D.C. in the Medical College Hospital,
Vandanam, Alleppey, under the Medical Education Department. He
was originally appointed as L.D.C on 29.01.2005 and entered
service as on 29.03.2005 in the Health Service, and thereafter, in
connection with the Abolition of the dual control system, the
petitioner opted Medical Education Department. His probation was
declared with effect from 08.04.2007. The petitioner belongs to
the Scheduled Caste. By invoking the power under Rule 13A(1)(a)
of Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules ('KS&SSR' for
short), the petitioner was promoted as U.D.C with effect from
21.02.2011 as per Annexure A1 order dated 29.06.2013. But the
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3rd respondent reverted the petitioner before the expiry of the 3
years as per Annexure-A2 order dated 06.07.2015. The persons
promoted as per Rule 13A(1)(a) of KS&SSR have to pass the
department test within 3 years from the date of such appointment.
This 3-year period is guaranteed to those persons who are
appointed under Rule 13A(1)(a) of KS&SSR to attend and pass the
department test after the promotion. Since the 3rd respondent
passed the promotion order belatedly, only on 29.02.2013 with
retrospective effect from 21.02.2011, the petitioner lost as much
time from 21.02.2011 to 29.06.2013. The petitioner pleaded that
for the purpose of enabling him to attend and pass the department
test after he has been promoted under Rule 13A(1)(a) of KS&SSR,
the specific and statutory period of 3 years shall be calculated from
the date of the order of promotion i.e. from 29.06.2013 and not
from the retrospective date of 21.02.2011. But the 1st respondent
rejected the appeal and issued Annexure-A3 order dated
31.12.2016, confirming reversion on the basis of the ruling in
Annexure-A4 judgment of this Court dated 04.06.2014 in
O.P(KAT) No.3590 of 2013. Moreover, the petitioner passed the
department test within 3 years from 29.06.2013, as evidenced by
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Annexure A5 certificate dated 13.08.2015 issued by the Kerala
Public Service Commission. But yet, the 1st respondent reverted
the petitioner as per Annexure A3 order stating that the 3 years
period is to be calculated from 21.02.2011, the date on which the
vacancy arose, of which the petitioner got knowledge only on
29.06.2013. The petitioner pleaded that the time lost in the past
cannot be taken back, and the petitioner is entitled to 3 years from
29.06.2013. Hence, the petitioner filed the original application
invoking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 19 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs:
"(i) To call for the records leading to Annexure A3 and set
aside the same.
(ii) Declare that the 3 year period of time for passing the
department test after the promotion under Rule 13A(1)(a)
of KS & SSR is to be reckoned from the date of order of
promotion and if the order of promotion is belated, such
period of delay shall not be prejudicial to the applicant in
the matter of availing actual and specific 3 year period for
attending the department test.
(iii) Declare that the petitioner is entitled to get actual, clear
and specific period of 3 year after the promotion order
under Rule 13A (1)(a) of KS & SSR and any order curtailing
the said specific period is illegal and unsustainable in law.
(iv) To call for Annexure A4 and declare that the applicant
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is entitled to get 3 year period for passing the department
test from 29.06.2013 which is the date of order as far as
time is concerned and also to declare that curtailing the said
3 year period with retrospective effect from 21.02.2011 on
which the promotion order ought to have been passed will
not affect the petitioner for availing 3 year from
29.06.2013.
(v) Declare that the statutory period of 3 years for passing
the test shall not be calculated from a point of time in the
past.
(vi) Declare that the retrospective effect given to the
promotion will only enable the applicant to claim the
monetary benefit to the promotion order passed belatedly
and that the passing of such an order belatedly cannot
adversely affect the applicant in the matter of availing the
statutory period for passing the department test".
3. By Ext.P2 order dated 28.03.2017, the Tribunal
dismissed the original application. Paragraph 3 and the last
paragraph of that order read thus:
"3. On a consideration of the facts, it is noted that the
original order, Annexure A2, is not under challenge in this
Original Application. Annexure A2 order has been issued
promoting the applicant with reference to the date of
occurrence of the vacancy. Whether the benefit of Rule
13A(1)(a) of Part II KS&SSR could be granted from
retrospective effect, i.e. from the date of occurrence of
vacancy is no longer res integra. The Division Bench of the
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Hon'ble High Court as per the judgment in O.P.(KAT) No.
3590 of 2013 dated 04.06.2014 has upheld the decision of
this Tribunal which had upheld the orders issued by the
Government granting the benefits under Rule 13A(1)(a) of
Part II KS&SSR with effect from the date of occurrence of
vacancies. The Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court
unequivocally held that the benefit has to be extended with
reference to the date of occurrence of vacancy and if the
employee concerned does not acquire the qualification
within three years from the above date he was liable to be
reverted in accordance with Rule 13A(2).
In view of the above, the contentions in the Original
Application fails and the Original Application is accordingly
dismissed".
4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Tribunal,
the petitioner is now before this Court with the present original
petition.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the
learned Senior Government Pleader.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit
that the petitioner was granted promotion with retrospective effect
from 21.02.2011 as per Annexure A1 order dated 29.06.2013.
Therefore, the period of three years to pass the departmental
tests for persons who were promoted by granting an exception as
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provided under Rule 13A(1)(a) of Part II of KS&SSR should have
been calculated from the date of Annexure A1 order and not from
the date of promotion. The petitioner has lost 28 months in
acquiring the qualification by passing the departmental test, which
resulted in his reversion. The Tribunal did not consider this fact in
its proper perspective.
7. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government
Pleader would submit that the aforementioned contention of the
petitioner was found against him by the Tribunal in view of the
principles laid down by this court in Annexure A4 judgment dated
04.06.2014 in O.P. (KAT)No.3590 of 2013. Since there is no
illegality in the order of the Tribunal, no interference is needed on
the impugned order by exercising supervisory jurisdiction.
8. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the
power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under
clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall
have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.
9. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (Pvt.) Ltd
[(2001) 8 SCC 97], the Apex Court held thus;
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"The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction
by a High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India
is examined and explained in number of decisions of this
Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a
duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals
within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do
duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The
High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to
correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within
the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or
tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the
orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of
serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of
fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court
does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It
is also well settled that the High Court while acting under
this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court
or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the
subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent
on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or
ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if
there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so
perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to
such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to."
(Underline supplied)
10. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil
[(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope
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and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of
the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both
administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and
orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way
as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference
under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the
wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice
remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public
confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts
subordinate to the High Court.
11. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
[(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of
the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex
Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of
the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate
courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the
powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The
High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they
act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The
exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised
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constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to
correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting
within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can
be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave
dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles
of law or justice.
12. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport
Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in
exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order
of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent
perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to
it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or
the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
13. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1)
KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well
settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in
proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this
Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower
court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only
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supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court.
Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is
called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal
has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably
perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower
court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.
14. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred
to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal
over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The
supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of
the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within
the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under
Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or
judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave
dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles
of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is
called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or
tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably
perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower
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court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law
or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or
the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
15. The petitioner was a Lower Division Clerk in the Medical
Education Department. He belongs to the scheduled caste
community. Therefore, by giving the benefit of Rule 13A(1)(a) of
Part II of KS&SSR, he was granted promotion to the post of Upper
Division Clerk, even though he had not passed the qualifying
departmental test. Admittedly, the period of exemption for passing
the qualifying departmental test by such persons who were
promoted by granting the benefit of Rule 13A(1)(a) of KS&SSR is
three years.
16. The claim of the petitioner is that the period of three
years should have been calculated from the date of the promotion
order and not from the date of promotion. In Jayakumar. G v.
State of Kerala [2014 (3) KHC 763], this Court considered a
similar contention raised by the petitioner therein and held thus:
"15. The precise question which we are called upon to
decide is whether the period of exemption will commence
or is to be counted from the date of occurrence of vacancies
or from the date of actual order appointing the person did
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not arise for consideration before the learned Single Judge.
16. As far as the judgment of the Division Bench in State of
Kerala v. Chathan [2005 KHC 15 : 2005 (1) KLT 75 : 2005
(1) KLJ 68 : ILR 2005 (1) Ker. 35] the petitioner before the
Single Judge was found entitled being member of the
Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes community to
exemption from passing the required tests and therefore to
get promotion. After referring to Rule 13A(2) it is stated
that one has pass the tests within the prescribed number of
years of temporary appointment. The Court was not called
upon to decide the issue as such which we are called upon
to deal with.
17. As far as the judgment in Antony v. State of Kerala
[1989 KHC 94 : 1989 (1) KLT 374] is concerned vacancy in
the concerned posts was existing from 1972 onwards. Order
was passed in the year 1976 appointing the contesting
respondents who belonged to members of Scheduled
Castes apparently giving the benefit of exemption under
Rule 13AA. Thereafter upon calling for the objections they
were given the benefit of notional promotion from 1972
noticing that the order of exemption was available under
Rule 13AA even in 1972. The Court took the view that as
far as persons appointed under Rule 13AA is concerned it is
the date on which he is actually appointed invoking the
exemption granted by Rule 13AA. The Court also took the
view that appointment under Rule 13A cannot be regarded
as temporary appointment as contemplated under Rule 31.
18. The juniors of the petitioners were no doubt promoted
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in December, 1999 (respondents 4 and 5). The 3 rd
respondent also a member of the Scheduled Caste
community and his junior came to be promoted in the year
2000. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner should
have been promoted invoking Rule 13A at least when
juniors of the petitioners were promoted. If this had been
done, runs the argument of the petitioner he would have
been entitled to be promoted immediately in December,
1999 in which case having acquired the test qualification on
30.05.2002, in view of Rule 13A(1) sub-rule (2) he would
have fulfilled the requirement of acquiring the test
qualification within three years from the date of the order.
We notice that he was not given temporary promotion either
in 1999 or in 2000. He was given promotion only in the year
2002 after he actually acquired the qualification.
19. We find some difficulty in the path of the acceptance of
contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner. Rule 28(bb)
which according to the petitioner is to be ignored in our view
stands against the acceptance of the petitioner's
contentions. In fact the principle which is incorporated in
Rule 28(bb) is a barrier against arbitrary action on the part
of the State in the matter of ignoring the just and legal
claims of the employees with reference to the title they have
when the vacancies arise. In other words, whoever is
qualified as on the date when the vacancies occurred is
entitled to be considered for promotion. If the senior is not
qualified on the date of occurrence of vacancies subject to
the proviso in Rule 28 and the junior is qualified then junior
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is entitled to be promoted. There may be delay in passing
orders for promotion. Such delay cannot work against the
interests or destroying the rights which accrue to the
concerned qualified employee. The authority may exercise
power honestly as noted in Varghese v. State of Kerala
[1981 KHC 148 : 1981 KLT 458 : 1981 KLT SN 83 : ILR 1981
(2) Ker. 285 : 1981 KLN 477] and still he can lapse into
error.
20. The petitioner stakes a claim for being promoted and
also to be accorded seniority over his juniors. The basis of
the claim is Rule 13A(1). Rule 13A(1) undoubtedly provides
a concession to the members of the Scheduled Castes/
Scheduled Tribes community. By virtue of the concession
even though the members of the Scheduled Castes/
Scheduled Tribes community not qualified with reference to
the special or departmental tests contemplated under Rule
13 he is exempted temporarily from passing such tests and
he is given the benefit of what is called temporary
promotion which we have already explained. In the case of
the petitioner if he is staking claim on the basis of Rule
13A(1) necessarily he must also at the same time point out
the date of the vacancy against which he is basing his claim.
If the petitioner is staking his claim to the vacancy which
actually arose in the year 1998 then he cannot stake the
claim except by invoking Rule 13A(1) which means that he
must also get the benefit of exemption from the date in
1998. This means the period of exemption will start running
from the date on which the notional vacancies arose. If that
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is done as found by the Tribunal the petitioner having
acquired the test qualification only on 30.05.2002 which is
beyond the period of three years from 1998 he must
necessarily face reversion and he cannot certainly therefore
claim the benefit of seniority as against juniors respondents
4 to 5 who were qualified.
21. In such circumstances, we are in agreement with the
view taken by the Tribunal that the date of occurrence of
vacancies governs the appointments to be made and
therefore, the exemption also would operate from the said
dates and therefore though the words used in sub-Rule 2 of
Rule 13A would suggest that it is from the date of
appointment we must understand it as meaning the date of
the appointment as understood when one reads Rule
13A(2) in conjunction with Rule 28(bb), in other words, the
"order of appointment made" read with reference to the
date of occurrence of vacancy. When the matter is to be
decided with reference to the date of occurrence of
vacancies then there is no question of accepting the
petitioner's complaint that had he being given promotion
with reference to the date on which his juniors were
promoted and since he had acquired qualification within
three years from the said date he could have regularised
the promotion. The petitioner in one breath seeks seniority
over his juniors with reference to the date of occurrence of
vacancies and yet in another seeks to retain benefit under
Rule 13A with reference to the date of the order appointing
him. His claim in this regard can be processed and
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considered only with reference to the mandate under Rule
28(bb)". (underline supplied)
17. The promotion to the post of Upper Division Clerk was
granted to the petitioner by virtue of Annexure A1 order dated
29.06.2013, with effect from 21.02.2011. As mentioned above,
the claim of the petitioner is that the period of three years for
passing the qualifying departmental test shall be calculated from
the date of the promotion order and not from the date of
promotion. But this point is no more res integra in view of the
judgment of this Court in Jayakumar. G [2014 (3) KHC 763],
as extracted above.
18. Viewed in the light of the judgments referred to supra,
we find no illegality or impropriety in the impugned order of the
Tribunal which warrants interference by exercising supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
In the result, the original petition stands dismissed.
Sd/-
ANIL K.NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Sd/-
sks MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE
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APPENDIX OF OP(KAT) NO. 322 OF 2017
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF THE O.A(E.K.M)448/17 ALONG WITH
ITS ANNEXURE
Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28/3/17 IN
O.A.(E.K.M) 448/17
Annexure A1 TRUE COPY OF THE PROMOTION ORDER DATED
29/6/2013 PASSED BY 2ND RESPONDENT
Annexure A2 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF REVERSION DATED
06/07/2015 PASSED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT
Annexure A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF REVERSION PASSED
BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT DATED 31/12/2016
Annexure A4 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 04/06/2013
IN OP(KAT) 3590/2013
Annexure A5 TRUE COPY OF THE PSC CERTIFICATED
NO.1065/2015 DATED 13/8/2015
